The Laws Governing Robbery and Theft

The Rules Governing Robbery and Theft. (1 – 34)

1 According to Scriptural Law, it is forbidden to rob or steal1 even the slightest amount2 whether from a Jew or a non-Jew,3 whether from an adult or a minor. Even if a non-Jew aggravates a Jew ([causing him] irritation that does not call for financial recompense), [it is forbidden to steal from him].

Although anything less than a p’rutah’s4 worth is not considered financially significant and need not be returned,5 initially (lechatchilah), Scriptural Law forbids the violation of a commandment even when [the violation involves] less than the minimum measure [for which punishment is meted out].6

If, however, the item is so inconsequential that no one at all would object [to its being taken], for example, taking a sliver from a bundle or a fence to use as a toothpick, it is permitted to do so.7 It is, [however,] pious conduct to refrain from doing this as well.8

2 Even if someone is in mortal danger and he must take property belonging to another person to save his life, he should take it only with the intent of [afterwards] making restitution.9 Although a threat to life supersedes all Torah prohibitions except for the worship of false deities, forbidden sexual relations, and murder,10 it is forbidden to save one’s life with another’s property without intending to undertake responsibility [to return its value. License is granted to do so only] when one intends to make restitution when he has the means,11 for the money can be returned.

Moreover, license [to use another person’s property] with the intent of making restitution applies only when one’s life is endangered. If there is no threat to life, it is forbidden [to take another person’s property] even with the intent to make restitution with an article of greater value. [This is forbidden] even for the sake of healing an illness that is not life-threatening, or to save oneself from a man of force who is oppressing him and causing him physical suffering in a manner that does not threaten his life. For a Scriptural prohibition is involved, and [only] Rabbinic prohibitions [are superseded] for the sake of healing when there is no threat to life, as stated in Yoreh Deah 155.12

It is even [forbidden to steal] with the intent of repaying double,13 [e.g.,] in an instance where one desires to assist another person and knows that he will not accept [a gift].14 Nevertheless, if the “stolen” object is offered for sale and is not one of the owner’s personal articles, and the payment for the object is at hand,15 one is permitted to “steal” it and have someone else accept payment on behalf of the owner.16 Since the owner [regards] payment as more desirable than the object, [the payment] is [considered to be] of benefit to him. [Hence we follow the principle: a transaction that] is to a person’s benefit can be performed on his behalf outside his presence.17 Moreover, [the charge],18 “Do not steal,” is not considered to have been violated. This is not considered theft, since another person19 is aware of the matter and [the person taking the article] is not acting clandestinely at all.

3 Even when a person steals an article with the intent of returning it — he merely desired to irritate his fellow briefly,14 — or even if he has no intent to irritate his fellow at all20 and steals only as a joke — he violates a negative commandment.21 Some authorities maintain that such actions are prohibited only according to Rabbinic decree, lest one become habituated to such behavior.22

4 It is forbidden to withhold even the slightest amount of money23 belonging to one’s fellow, as it is written:24 “Do not withhold [what is due] your friend.”

What is meant by “withholding [a person’s due]”? This refers to a situation in which money belonging to a person came into another person’s possession with the first person’s consent, for example, a loan or an article hired out, and the debtor does not desire to pay (or he procrastinates, [telling him,] “Go and return,” “Go and return.”)25

This prohibition applies only to [withholding money due] a Jew, not a non-Jew, for the prooftext uses the term, “your friend.”26 [Nevertheless, it is forbidden to withhold a non-Jew’s money] when the desecration of G‑d’s name is involved. For example, one borrowed from a non-Jew and the non-Jew died. [The borrower] may deny having taken the loan when payment was demanded if [the son of the deceased] does not know with certainty that [the borrower] is lying.27 It is forbidden to utterly deny [taking the loan] to the non-Jewish [lender] himself, [for] he knows that he is lying and [this] desecrates G‑d’s name.28

Moreover, even when a non-Jew is uncertain [about a business relationship with a Jew, the Jew] has license only to renounce a loan or another obligation he owes the non-Jew. When, by contrast, the non-Jew’s article is intact [in the Jew’s possession], it is forbidden to deny it, for that is actual theft.29

Moreover, even when one purchases an item from a non-Jew, it is forbidden to deceive him when making a reckoning while paying for it, as it is written:30 “You should make a reckoning with his purchaser.” For the non-Jew is [agreeing to] sell him the item only for the sum of money stipulated. If one deceives him regarding the calculation of the money paid, it is equivalent to stealing the article, not to [merely] renouncing an obligation. It is even forbidden to deceive a non-Jew in a matter that does not involve a financial loss in the course of a business transaction, as stated in Hilchos Onaah.31

Nevertheless, if the non-Jew makes the mistake on his own, it is permitted [to take advantage of it],32 provided that doing so will not involve the desecration of G‑d’s name33 because [the non-Jew] will not realize [the error. To avoid that possibility,] it is proper for the Jew to say, “See, I am relying on your tally.”34

If a non-Jew gave an article to a Jew as collateral, there are authorities who permit the Jew to make use of it,35 even though were a Jew’s [article to be given as collateral, one who makes use of it] is considered a thief, (because he is misappropriating an entrusted article. [With regard to a non-Jew, by contrast,] there is no concept of misappropriating [an entrusted article], for the verse states:36 “If he did not extend his hand to the enterprise of his friend.” [The term] “his friend” implies a fellow [Jew] and not a non-Jew. For using an entrusted article is not outright theft; he is merely making use of the entrusted article for his own purposes, and he is willing to make restitution if by using it he reduces its value it in any way. [This is permitted,] for the Torah forbade only stealing a non-Jew’s property outright with no intent to make restitution).

5 A person violates the prohibition:37 “Do not covet” when he covets a house or articles belonging to another person or [covets] any other entity that he could purchase from him, but which the owner does not wish to sell, yet he sends many friends to [pressure] him or makes personal entreaties38 until he sells it to him. He does not violate this prohibition until he acquires the article he coveted, as it is written:39 “Do not covet the gold and silver that is on them and take [them] for yourself.”

From the time he is emotionally enticed and begins thinking of how to acquire the article,40 he violates [the prohibition]:41 “Do not desire.” For desire involves ardent feelings alone.42

Desire leads to coveting; coveting leads to theft; theft leads to murder.43 [From the above] one learns that one who desires something belonging to another violates a single prohibition, and one who purchases the article he desires by entreaties or [repeated] requests, whether made by himself or by others, violates two prohibitions. For this reason [the Torah] states [both]: “Do not covet” and “Do not desire.”

6 It is a positive commandment for a robber44 to return the stolen article itself if it is intact and unchanged,45 as it is written:46 “And he shall return the article he obtained by robbery.” This [charge] also applies to a thief. [If the article is intact,] he does not fulfill his obligation by making financial restitution, even if the owner already despaired of its recovery.47 If, by contrast, it was lost or underwent an irreversible change,48 he fulfills his obligation by making financial restitution according to the value of the article at the time of the robbery.49

If the person from whom the article was stolen is in another locale, [the thief or robber] need not send him the money.50 Instead, he should notify the victim to come to him and be paid.

7 When a well-known thief or robber who derives his livelihood from thievery seeks to repent of his own volition51 and return the value [of a stolen article], our Sages commanded that [the victim] not accept it from him, so that he will not be prevented from repenting.52 Repentance is difficult for him, for if [his money] would be accepted, he would be left with nothing.53 Therefore, our Sages commanded that his [obligation] be waived so as to afford him the opportunity to repent and ask [those from whom he stole] that he be forgiven. If, [however,] the thief says: “Even though you forgave me, I desire to make restitution to fulfill my moral obligation,”54 one who accepts [his payment] should not be rebuked. If, however, the object that was stolen or obtained by robbery is intact, there is no need to absolve the thief [of his obligation] at all.55

If the victim owes [money] to others and he does not have the resources to repay them, he should not absolve the thief at all, so that he will be able to pay his creditors.

8 If [the thief] is embarrassed to make restitution to [the person whose property he stole], he may disguise the money by adding it to the account of a business obligation56 that he owes [that person].57 If he does not do business with that person [and wants to repay him without notifying him], he may give it to another person who does do business with him, so that he will add it to his account.

Alternatively, he should put the money into the purse of the victim that contains other money, for a person will frequently check his purse. [The victim will thus] cound his money and discover that the money was returned. [The thief] is thereby absolved of his obligation. [This leniency is based on the principle that restitution is considered to be complete when] an accounting is made even though [the victim] was not informed [that his money had been returned].58 If, however, [the thief] returns the money into an empty purse, he does not fulfill his obligation until [the owner] finds the money in his purse.59 If [the money placed in the purse] was lost before [the owner] discovered it, [the thief] did not fulfill the mitzvah of returning [the stolen object].

If the victim dies, [the stolen property] should be returned to his heirs.60

Repentance is difficult for a person who robs from people at large and does not know to whom he must return [the stolen items], e.g., toll officials who took more than the fixed amount determined for them by the king, [or] tax collectors61 appointed by the king62 who are lenient to their relatives and levy [heavier duties] on others;63 they are definitely considered as robbers. Similarly, repentance is difficult for tax collectors appointed by the community who commit comparable acts. Hence, they should use [the money set aside as restitution] for communal welfare projects,64 e.g., to dig wells. In this way the victims will also benefit from them. Nevertheless, they are obligated to make restitution [directly] to the victims [from whom they know they took. The fact that the latter also] benefit from the water [or the like] is not sufficient.

Those who lend money at interest65 to people at large [and do not have accounts to whom they lent] should do the same.

9 It is forbidden to purchase from a thief an article that he has stolen.66 This is a severe transgression, because it reinforces the hands of transgressors.67 Concerning this it is said:68 “A person who shares [profits] with a thief hates his [own] soul.” It leads [the thief] to commit other thefts in the future, for if he would not find a purchaser for [the stolen article], he would not steal.69 Even though it is possible for him to go to a locale where he is not known to be a thief,70 it is not so feasible an option. Thus, if all those who know him and recognize him would not purchase from him, he would not steal as much. Therefore, all those who know him are forbidden to purchase from him.71

Similarly, it is forbidden to purchase [a stolen article] from a robber unless one has the welfare of the owner in mind, i.e., to return [the stolen article] to him [with the intent that the owner] will return [the purchaser’s] money. [This applies] in a situation in which the owner could not retrieve the article himself if the other person would not purchase it.

10 Even if it is not known [for certain] that a particular object was obtained through robbery or theft,1 when the seller is a known robber or thief, it is forbidden to purchase anything from him for there is reason to suspect that is was obtained through robbery or theft. The [only] exception is when it is known that [the thief] possesses a similar article of his own. In such an instance, it is permitted either to purchase the article from him or to derive benefit from it at no charge. Even if [the thief] possesses only a few of the objects in question that are his own and a large amount that are stolen goods, we are lenient and assume that [the article in question] is his own.

If, however, a person knows that the article in question was obtained by robbery, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it, either by purchasing it or by [using it] while in the possession of the robber, e.g., to ride on a stolen animal.72

[This applies] even if the owner has already despaired of the article’s return.73 [The rationale is that the owner’s] despair alone is not sufficient for the stolen article to be considered as having left its owner’s possession and for it to become the property of the thief, as is the law with regard to a lost article.74 Since it came into the robber’s possession through the forbidden act of robbery, as long as it is in the domain of the robber, it remains the owner’s property forever.75

[Moreover,] it is forbidden to derive benefit [from a stolen article] even when [it can be assumed that] the owner would not object, e.g., exchanging money that was definitely76 obtained through robbery or theft for an equal amount of other money.77

11 Similarly, it is forbidden to enter a house that is definitely known to be stolen in order to seek refuge from the sun or the rain, or to pass through a field that is definitely stolen.78 (With regard to [using stolen property for a mitzvah], we are stringent so that it not be considered “a mitzvah that comes about by means of a transgression”; [we do not even use articles] that are not definitely known to be stolen, as stated in Orach Chayim 649[:8].)79

[The above applies] even if the owner has already despaired of the recovery [of the house or field] and even if it was sold to a second, third, or fourth party. [The rationale is that] land can never be stolen. It never departs from the domain of its owner [to] enter the domain of the person in whose physical possession it is. For land always remains in the domain of its owner.80

In contrast, when movable property is taken by robbery or theft and the [original] owner despairs of its return and then it is sold or given away, it is acquired by the purchaser or the recipient of the gift.81 [The change in status comes about] as a result [of the owner’s] despair and the transfer [of the article] from [one person’s] domain [to another’s.82 The rationale] is that [the stolen article] did not enter the domain of [the purchaser or the recipient] while prohibited because of theft, because the owner despaired [of its recovery] before it entered that person’s domain. Hence it is comparable to a lost article,83 and he — and anyone else — is permitted to benefit from it according to law. He did, however, violate a transgression by acquiring it, since he knew that it was obtained through robbery and that it was forbidden to benefit from it.84 [For] whenever benefit from an article is forbidden, it is forbidden to purchase it.85 Therefore, if [the purchaser or the recipient] seeks to fulfill his moral obligation54 and absolve himself of the violation of this prohibition, he should return [the stolen object] to its owner.

If a person overpowered the thief or the robber and took the article from him by force, [his taking possession of the article] is not considered a change from one domain to another86 since [the thief] did not willingly give it to him. Hence, [the person who took possession of it] is obligated by law to return it to the owner even if [the owner] already despaired of its recovery.

In these regions, as mandated by [secular]87 law, the custom is to return all articles obtained through theft or robbery even after the owner has despaired of its return and even after it has been transferred to another person’s domain. The only [consideration] is that if [the person in possession] paid for [the stolen article], his money should be returned to him. One should not deviate [from this practice]. If one does not know the identity of the owner, he should announce and make known [his possession of the article] in the manner explained [above] with regard to a lost article.88

12 It is forbidden to derive any benefit — whether provided gratutiously or by purchasing an article — from people89 who are established robbers and about whom it can be assumed that all their property is stolen goods, because that is their profession and they have no other employment at all.90 It is even forbidden to sell to them [an article], for their money can be assumed to have been acquired through theft. It is even forbidden to exchange money with them or accept charity from them.91 We do not rule leniently, assuming that he has a small amount of his own resources, since he has no profession other than robbery.

There are authorities who permit exchanging money with them, since only a minimal amount of benefit is involved and one does not know with certainty that the money was obtained by robbery, although it can be assumed that this is the case. (The same applies with regard to accepting charity [indirectly from such individuals], for [it can be argued that no one is receiving forbidden benefit]. The charity collector does not benefit from taking the money. [Although he fulfills a mitzvah, he is not considered to have benefited, because] mitzvos were not given for the sake of satisfaction.92 And the poor will have received benefit [only] from the charity collector, who already acquired this money for the poor through [the owner’s] despair [of recovery] and through the transfer of the article from one domain to another.)

If, however, one has certain knowledge that these particular coins were obtained through robbery, all authorities agree that one is forbidden to exchange other coins for them (or to accept them as charity). For this reason, it is forbidden to exchange money with money in the chest in which the toll collector places the funds he collected. [The rationale is that] all the money in the chest is considered stolen funds, because it is assumed that he takes more than the amount determined by the king.93 (As such, this duty is not governed by the principle:94 “The law of the ruling kingdom is law,” for it was not collected lawfully and consequently, the entire amount is considered stolen property.)95

Nevertheless, if one is obligated to give half a dinar as a toll and he has only a dinar, he may give it [to the collector] and take a half dinar from him [as change], for this is considered rescuing money from the possession [of the thief].96

13 (Accordingly,97 even though he benefits from this exchange, e.g., he needs the half dinar,98 it is permitted [for him to take it]. Moreover, an exchange from which a Jew derives no benefit99 is permitted, even if he is not rescuing money from the [non-Jew’s] possession. Similarly, any transaction from which a Jew does not benefit at all, e.g., selling to a toll collector or a thief below market price, is permitted100 even though [the purchaser] is certainly paying with stolen funds, since the owner has surely despaired [of their return].101 If, however, the owner has not despaired [of recuping his funds], it is forbidden [to take them] under any circumstance. [Indeed,] according to law, the owner can expropriate his funds from anyone who received them from a thief before he despaired [of their return, a prohibition is not involved].)

14 If a toll collector took a person’s donkey and gave him another donkey in its stead, or if thieves took a person’s garment and gave him another garment, he is permitted to accept it and it is considered his102 (if it is known that the [original] owner despaired [of the article’s return]).103 [The recipient] is not considered to have benefited from stolen property104 since what he was given was merely a replacement for his own property, and he is not certain that this is stolen property, even though it can be assumed to be stolen property.

If, however, the person is conscientious and stringent with himself, he should return it to the original owner103 so as not to benefit from stolen property. (Even though it was given to him in place of his [donkey], his [donkey] was already stolen. Moreover, even if this [donkey] had not been in [the thief’s] possession, it is possible that his own donkey would not be returned to him. Thus he is benefiting by taking [the other donkey], which can be assumed to be stolen, even if it is not definitely known to be so.)

15 The abovementioned105 concept — that a toll collector is considered a robber — applies to a non-Jewish toll collector, or even to a Jew who assumed the position on his own initiative without having been appointed by the king, or even if he was appointed by the king but was not given a defined standard by which to charge, and instead charges as much as he desires.106

[Different rules apply,] however, if a toll collector was appointed by the king to charge a fixed amount,107 and the collector appointed a Jew108 to collect [this duty] for the king. If it is known that this person is trustworthy109 and he does not take more than the fixed amount dictated by the king, he is not presumed to be a thief, for the law of the ruling authorities is binding [according to Jewish Law.110 The rationale is that] the entire land belongs to the king,111 and it is his prerogative to decree that no person benefit from his land without his consent. [His consent will be granted when that person] pays the fixed amount [instituted as a toll].112 The same principle applies with regard to the noblemen in their villages113 (or in regions given them as gifts by the king). Therefore, a person who evades paying such tolls violates the commandment: “Do not rob,” for he is robbing the king [of his due. This applies] whether the king is a Jew or a non-Jew.

(Although it is permitted to renounce a long-standing debt owed to a non-Jew,114 [one who evades these tolls] is not considered as renouncing a debt but rather as committing outright theft, for he is benefiting from [the king’s] land without his consent. This causes [the king] financial loss,115 for he could have sold the right to carry out commercial activities in his country to another person. Moreover, the tolls which a king is entitled to receive from his subjects is considered to already be in his possession. For the inhabitants of that land agreed to [his appointment], and they resolved that he would be their ruler and that they would be his subjects. Everything they own is thus under the lien of the king, and he has the right to charge a toll on it. Thus it is as if [the toll] is actually in his possession, since it is in his land and in the hands of his subjects. Therefore, one who evades [paying such tolls] is stealing the king’s property that has already entered his domain.)

There are, however, those authorities who differ with this [ruling] and grant permission to evade paying tolls even though the [collection] official is a trustworthy Jew,116 since he is collecting [the tolls] for a non-Jewish king. [Moreover, according to this approach, even] if the [collection] official knows that the person is evading [the toll], he does not have license to compel him to pay it, since according to law he can renounce a debt owed to a non-Jew. If, however, [the collection official] is afraid [that] the king [will punish him], he may compel the other person.117

A G‑d-fearing person should be stringent regarding his own conduct and follow the first approach so as not to violate a negative commandment of Scriptural origin.118

If a Jew purchased from the king the [right to collect the] toll, all authorities agree that it is forbidden to evade paying it according to Scriptural Law, for one is stealing from a Jew. If, however, [the right] was purchased by a non-Jew, all authorities agree that it is permitted [to evade payment], even if it is well known that [the non-Jewish collector] does not collect over and above the set duty established by the king. [The rationale for this leniency is that by evading payment,] one is not stealing from the king119 but rather renouncing a debt that he owes this non-Jewish [collector]. ([The leniency is based on the concept that] the king cannot sell the established claim he has to the toll. For that established claim results from his own personage, that he is the king and the entire land is his, that [the inhabitants] are his subjects, and that everything they own is under lien to him. This prerogative cannot be sold, for it is only he [whom his subjects] accepted as king. According to law, all he can sell is the financial claim he has upon [his subjects], and that financial claim is only a debt.)120

16 When a Jew purchases [the right to collect the tolls], even if it is known that he collects over and above the fixed amount determined by the king and [that therefore] he is considered a robber, it is forbidden to evade paying him the fixed amount determined by the king.121 [One may evade paying] only the extra amount.122 For example, if [the toll collector] collects a third more than the fixed amount determined by the king, one should not hide more than one third of the merchandise. For it is forbidden to steal from a robber, and evading payment of the fixed duty determined by the king is outright theft.

If, however, [the toll collector] did not purchase [this right] from the king but instead was appointed as a toll collector for the king,123 and it became known that he charges more than the fixed amount that was determined [and takes it] for himself, it is permitted to evade paying him the entire toll. [This also applies to] a non-Jewish toll collector, for it can be assumed that he takes more [than the required amount, increasing] his own [profit].124

[The rationale for this ruling is that] the entire toll is considered theft. For the only reason one is obligated [to pay] the toll is because it is the law of the kingdom. Now, this toll was collected for the king unlawfully, for [the toll collector] takes more than the amount determined by the king. Thus the entire collection of this toll is unlawful, because it was collected by the agent of the king in a manner that conflicts with the law of the kingdom. For the agent of the king is like the king himself,125 and a king who takes money in a manner that does not conform to the laws of the kingdom — e.g., he appoints a toll collector without determining [a uniform] toll — is considered to be stealing, as explained above.126 Similarly, when one takes more than the predetermined toll, it is similar to collecting an undetermined toll.

In contrast,127 a Jew who purchases the right to collect the toll and collects it for himself is not an agent of the king at all. [Thus] the increment that he takes [which is] robbery does not reduce the king’s portion at all. For the portion due is the king’s by right and the king sold it to this Jew. The portion due the king is not reduced because this Jew collected more than the fixed amount determined by the king. For the king has no part in this collection — he withdrew when he sold this Jew the fixed amount due him by the law of the kingdom. That was a legitimate sale in which no robbery was involved. The Jewish purchaser acquired [the right] to collect the tolls that the inhabitants of the country are to pay according to the law of the kingdom. He thus is considered a creditor who became a thief and [seeks to] collect more than his debt. [In such an instance,] one is not permitted to steal128 the debt that he is [legitimately] owed.129

17 When a king cuts down trees belonging to householders and erects a bridge from [the wood], it is permitted to cross it.130 It is [still] permitted even if [the king] ordered [his servants] to cut down a specific amount [of trees] from every person and his agents went and cut down all the wood [from trees] belonging to one person.131 [The rationale is that they are the agents of the king, and the privileges of] the agents of the king resemble [those of] the king himself. [Like the king, they] do not have to trouble themselves to cut down wood from every person individually. Instead, the people themselves should have taken the trouble [to collect a uniform amount of wood from every individual], or they should reimburse the person whose [trees] were cut down.

If, however, a person’s trees were cut down without the consent of the king and a bridge was constructed from them, it is forbidden to pass over it unless its [ownership] was transferred to the people at large after the owners of the trees despaired of their recovery. [In such an instance there is no prohibition,] because the general populace acquired it due to [the owners’] despair and its transition into a different domain.132 For when it was transferred to them, they acquired it by taking possession of it through walking upon it.

18 Similarly, if a king demolished homes and erected a wall or made a thoroughfare, it is permitted to benefit from it.133 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

The above [applies with regard to a king] whose currency is legal tender in that land. For the inhabitants of that land agreed to his [rule] and accepted the premise that he is their master and that they are his subjects. For if not, he is [no more] than a strong-armed thief and, by the same token, all of his servants are thieves.134

19 Similarly, if a king became enraged with one of his subjects or attendants from among the inhabitants of the country and took his home, it is not considered theft and it is permitted to benefit from it.135 One may purchase it from the king or from a person to whom the king gave it, for this is the right of all kings: to take the property of their attendants when they are enraged with them.

Similarly, if a king decrees that when a person violates a particular decree his property will be confiscated by the king, or [if he passes other] similar [decrees], this is not considered theft and it is permitted to acquire it and benefit from it.

When does the above apply? With regard to a general matter that was decreed by the king and that applies equally to all the inhabitants of his kingdom. If, however, he passes a decree applying solely to one individual, or even to one particular region of his kingdom alone, distinguishing it from the rest of his kingdom, everything he takes from them is [considered] utter theft. It is forbidden to benefit from it unless [the owners] despaired of its recovery and it is transferred to another domain. [The rationale is that] since he does not apply his rulings uniformly, this is not considered as the law of the king, but rather as theft perpetrated by the king.136

If, however, [a king] decrees that the Jews should pay a toll or other levy over and above that paid by the non-Jews, he is still considered to have applied his laws uniformly, because all the Jews are required to pay an equal amount.

Moreover, even when a king applies his decrees uniformly, only matters that benefit the king or enhance the welfare of the entire country are considered as law. This does not apply to [rulings regarding] disputes between one person and another. For were that not to be true, all the Torah’s laws would be nullified,137 Heaven forbid.

20 Just as it is forbidden to benefit from property that was definitely obtained through robbery unless [the owner] has despaired and it has been transferred [from the thief’s] domain to that of another person,138 so too it is forbidden to benefit139 from stolen property.1 [This applies] even if the property is not definitely known to be stolen, but can be assumed to be so, for example, watchmen of produce who sell produce140 in a covert place, e.g., behind a garden.141 Alternatively, [this applies in an instance where] the majority of this type of substance is presumed stolen, e.g., cowherds who sell milk142 and cheese136 from [their employers’ herds], for most cowherds sell stolen goods, [i.e.,] it is not their own property, nor are they acting with the owner’s authorization. It is forbidden to buy it from them or even to benefit without charge.

If, however, a watchman sells produce openly at the entrance to a garden and the basket of produce, the scale, or the measure is in front of him, it is permitted [to purchase from him]. For the matter will be made known and [it can be assumed that] the owner is aware [of the watchman’s actions] and that he is selling with the owner’s authorization. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

In all instances, if the seller tells his purchasers: “Hide [the purchased goods],” it is forbidden to purchase from him.143

21 One may purchase [both] olive-oil and olives, when they are sold by measure, from workers who produce oil from olives in an olive press, because [it can be assumed that] they are selling with the owner’s authorization.141 One may not, however, purchase small quantities of olives or oil, because that can be assumed to be stolen. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. If [the sellers] told [the purchasers]: “Hide it,” [a purchase] is always forbidden.144

22 When a tailor left over a piece of thread145 the length of the needle [on one side] of it and the length of the needle on the other side,146 and thus it would be fit to sew a few stitches with it, or if he left over a patch of cloth from the garment, three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths,147 he must return them to the owner.148 Less than this amount [of thread or fabric] he may keep, since it is not common for people to make an issue over such [small amounts]. ([Even] if a given individual would make an issue [over this amount], his attitude is considered insignificant [in light of the approach of the majority].)149 [An exception is made] if common practice in a particular locale is to make an issue over [such minor amounts]. (Conversely, if [the common practice in a particular locale] is not to make an issue over larger amounts, any amount about which people are not concerned may be kept).150

Similarly, a carpenter may keep thin slivers that he removes from wooden boards when planing them with a small plane,151 because it is not common for people to make an issue over them and take the trouble of bringing them [home] from the carpenter’s [workshop]. He must, however, return to the owner larger slivers that he removes when using a larger plane and, needless to say, the remnants he produces when shortening the planks with a hatchet, unless the local custom is not to make an issue about [such matters]. If [a carpenter] works in the home of the owner, even the sawdust that falls from planing with a chisel152 belongs to the owner.

Similar [guidelines apply] with regard to other crafts in which common local practice is for an owner to make an issue [about the remnants; the craftsman] must return them. [Conversely,] whenever [local custom] is that an issue is not made about them, they belong to the craftsman. (If a given owner makes an issue, his attitude is considered insignificant [in light of the approach of the majority].)

23 Whenever a craftsman sells objects that must be returned [to their owner],153 it is forbidden to purchase them from him.154 Those [remnants] that he is permitted to keep may [be purchased from him]. If, however, he says: “Hide it,” it is forbidden [to purchase it from him],145 because it can be assumed to be stolen.

When [such an object] undergoes a change in the craftsman’s possession, it is permitted to purchase it. For example, a person combs woolen garments155 in a locale where [the owners] make an issue about the tufts that are combed out from the garment, and the comber sells a pillow full of tufts that can be assumed to have come from the garments being combed. [Nevertheless, the sale is permitted because] the name [of the articles in question] has changed. Originally they were called tufts, and now they are [called] a pillow. [This is permitted] even though the change could [easily be undone and the article] revert to its original state, for the tufts could be removed from the pillow and they would once again then be called tufts. [Thus an objection could be raised because generally,] when a change [can be undone and the article would] revert to its original state, the stolen article is not acquired by the thief so that it would belong to him, and he could exempt himself [from the obligation of returning the stolen article] by returning its value. Instead, the stolen article itself must be returned,156 and it is forbidden for another person to purchase such an article from him. Nevertheless, in this instance, leniency is granted since it is not certain that [the pillow] was [made from] stolen [property]; it is merely assumed to be so.

However, it is forbidden to purchase an article that is definitely stolen property that is in thief’s possession, but which underwent a change [that can be undone, causing the article to] revert to its original state. [There is an exception to this rule: an instance] where it is known that the owner became aware of the theft and despaired of the recovery of the article.157 For [together with the owner’s] despair, [even] a change that could be undone, restoring the stolen article to its initial state [is sufficient] for it to be acquired by the thief. [This principle also applies with regard to the acquisition of] property obtained through robbery by the robber.1 He need not return the [stolen] article itself. Instead, he is only required to return its value. Therefore, it is permitted to purchase it or benefit from it while it is still in his possession.

[When an article undergoes] a comprehensive change [and it] will not revert to its original state, it is acquired [by the thief]158 even if [the owner] does not despair of its return. For example, a person stole logs; planed them, making them smooth boards; and attached them to each other with nails, making them into a chest. [This is considered an irreversible change,] because even if the chest were to be dismantled, its components will be flat boards and not logs.159 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

It is, however, forbidden for any person to aid [the thief] in altering the stolen article, for by changing it he is removing it from the domain of the owner and causing it to be acquired [by the thief]. Thus he is considered to be assisting a transgressor.160 Needless to say, it is forbidden to assist a robber or a thief with anything they need in order to [perpetrate] their wickedness.

([The latter prohibition applies] even to [helping] a non-Jew who intends to rob or steal from another non-Jew. Similarly, all the prohibitions against benefiting from an article obtained through robbery or theft161 apply also when one non-Jew [steals] from another. For with regard to the prohibition against robbery or theft, there is no difference between a Jew and a non-Jew. [The rationale is that] the term “your friend,” [which is interpreted as excluding a non-Jew,]162 is used only with regard to [the prohibition against] withholding [money due another person], as it is written:24 “Do not withhold [what is due] your friend and do not rob.” Non-Jews are also enjoined against robbing and taking property by force like Jews are. [Indeed,] this is one of the Seven Mitzvos Commanded to Noach’s Descendants.163 [For its violation, a non-Jew] is liable for the death penalty, even if he robbed or stole from another non-Jew.)

24 One should not purchase articles from women, non-Jewish servants,164 or minors unless it can be assumed that these articles are in their possession with the consent of the husband or owner.165 For example, [in the Talmudic era,] women in the Galilee would sell linen garments,166 where flax was available inexpensively, and it was common for women to buy it, spin it into thread, weave garments from it, sell it, [and keep the proceeds] for themselves. Their husbands would not object. Similarly, in every locale, [the ruling is established] according to its [socio-economic] norms.167

Eggs and chickens may be purchased from any person in any place.160 Whenever [the seller] says: “Hide it,” it is forbidden [to purchase them].141

25 Similarly, entrusted [articles or funds] should not be accepted from women, non-Jewish servants, or minors, lest they were stolen from the husband or owner,168 for it is forbidden to assist transgressors.155

If one transgressed and accepted [an entrusted article or funds] from a woman, he should not return it to her husband, but rather to her.166 [The rationale is that] it could be that someone else entrusted it to her. The same [ruling] applies with regard to a servant. A similar [law] applies to a minor whose understanding is developed, i.e., who has reached an age of minimal maturity — six years and older — and who has a good grasp of commercial dealings.169 The entrusted [article or funds] should be returned to him, for perhaps a gift was given to him.170 [The people who gave him the gift] were not concerned that he might lose it, because his understanding is developed.

26 It is permitted to purchase produce from a sharecropper who works in the orchards of a landowner and who receives a portion of the produce for his efforts.171 [This applies even if he sells the produce] before a division is made. [The rationale is that] it can be assumed that when he comes to divide [the produce] with the owner, [the owner] will deduct the produce that he sold from the portion due [the sharecropper].

There are authorities who forbid [purchasing such produce] lest [the sharecropper] not make such a deduction, rationalizing the leniency to himself because of the great effort [he invests. This restriction applies] when he sells [produce] from the orchard. If, however, he had brought the produce from his home to sell, it can be assumed that he is selling what he already received as his portion. Weight should be given to the words of these authorities. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

27 If the owner [of an orchard] becomes aware172 that a sharecropper is stealing fruit from the orchard, he is not permitted to [unilaterally] reduce [the sharecropper’s] portion when they come to divide [the produce between them].173 Instead, [the matter should be adjudicated] by the [Jewish] court. One should not take the law into his own hands and recoup from the sharecropper what he took. For it is forbidden to rob or steal from a thief [when seeking compensation for] what [the thief] took from him.174 Instead, he should demand from him payment [for the stolen property] in court. If he deducts from his portion without the guidance of the court, he is considered as robbing the [sharecropper of the] portion due him in the remainder of the produce.175 Even though [the thief] already took much more than the portion due him, he did not take it as part of the division of the produce. Instead, he intended to steal from the owner’s share and still receive his [full] share in the remaining produce, for they are partners in all of the produce. [Hence,] if the owner withholds the portion due the sharecropper against the sharecropper’s will, he is considered as robbing him of the equivalent of what he stole from him. Even though according to law [he is entitled] to those [funds], he is not permitted to take the law into his own hands. Instead, he [must have] the court [give him permission to withhold the funds] if he will be vindicated in judgment by proving that [the sharecropper] stole from him. If not, he must forfeit [that money]. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

28 When does the prohibition against taking the law into one’s own hands apply? When one [seeks to] take the worth of the item that the thief took from him, but not if one seeks to retrieve the actual article he took from him. [On the contrary,] it is permitted for him to retrieve an article that was taken from him by robbery or theft, [even] against the will [of the thief].176 This is not considered robbery but rather [merely] recovering one’s own property. If [the thief] prevents him from retrieving it, he is even permitted to administer blows until he gives in, if he has no other way of recovering it.177 He is not obligated to take him to court, for in such a situation, when his article is intact, he is entitled to take the law into his own hands to recover it from the one who stole it, [or to save it] from one who seeks to steal it or from one who seeks to damage it. He may employ any means, even administering blows. Even if he will not suffer any loss by taking the matter to court, he is not required to trouble himself at all.

He should not, however, go to the thief’s home to [recover] his article by theft,176 lest he himself appear as a thief, unless he has no other means of recovering it.

29 When does the above apply? When he can recover [his property] on his own. It is, however, forbidden to have a non-Jew recover [one’s property] under any circumstances.178

[Moreover, the license granted] applies only when the person can verify that the article [he is taking] belongs to him were he to be sued by the other person in court. If, by contrast, he cannot prove his claim, [the entire situation is different].179 It goes without saying that he is not permitted to strike the other person. Indeed, were he to strike him, he would be punished by the court. Even if he does not strike him, his recovery of the article is not valid.180 The only exception is when there were no witnesses that he recovered his article. For then, the recovery is of consequence for him, since then his word would be accepted if he supports it with an oath affirming that he seized property that belonged to him.181 [That claim would be accepted on the basis of the halachic convention referred to as] migo:182 i.e., he could have denied the matter and said, “I did not seize anything,” since there were no witnesses.183

When there are witnesses, by contrast, his seizure [of the article he claims is his] is of no benefit, except to serve as security when the other person admits to him that he owes a debt that does not stem from a loan. For when a debt arises from a loan, it is forbidden to take security oneself in all instances, as explained [above] in Hilchos Halvaah.184

30 When a person’s garments were [inadvertently] exchanged in the house of a mourner or at a [wedding] celebration,185 he should not use [the garment left him].186 ([The rationale is that] even if the other person uses his article, it is considered as stealing from a thief,187 and it is forbidden to take the law into one’s own hands. Instead, one must act under the directive of the court, as explained above).188 When the owner of the [exchanged] article comes [to claim it], it must be returned to him, even if [the finder’s own] article was lost.

Similarly, when a non-Jewish laundress who does laundry for many people delivers a person a garment belonging to someone else, it is forbidden for him to use it. He must return it to its rightful owner even if his own garment is lost.

31 When people play dice and make an agreement that whoever is victorious over his friend in that sport will take such-an-such an amount of money from him, this is considered robbery according to Rabbinic decree. Even though one took the money with the consent of its owner, since he took the other person’s money through sport and gaming without giving him anything in return, it is forbidden by Rabbinic Law.

When a person gambles with a non-Jew, there is no prohibition against stealing involved.189 It does, however, involve a prohibition against occupying oneself in idle matters, for, throughout one’s life, it is not fitting for a person to be involved in anything other than words of wisdom and matters that lead to the world’s stability. There are authorities who maintain that there is no difference between one who gambles with a Jew and one who gambles with a non-Jew, and a prohibition against theft is not involved. (Nevertheless, there is a prohibition involved,190 as stated in Orach Chayim 322.)191 When two people make a wager between themselves, they are governed by the same laws as dice players.192

Nevertheless, if the money was not deposited with a third party,193 [either of the parties to the wager] is permitted to retract unless he promised [to give his winnings] to charity. [In such an instance] it is forbidden to retract, because “a verbal pledge to [give to] the One on High is equivalent to actually giving to an ordinary person.”194

32 A person who relocates the border of a fellow man’s property — i.e., he includes property, even if it is only a fingerbreadth [of land] belonging to the other person, in his property — [violates a transgression]. If he does so by force, he is considered a robber. If he does so with stealth, he is considered a thief. If he relocates the border of [another person’s] property in Eretz Yisrael, he violates two prohibitions: the prohibition against stealing or against robbery, and the prohibition:195 “Do not take your friend’s property… in the land [that G‑d… is giving you].”

33 The borders [of property] that the public has taken possession of may not be undermined.196 Needless to say, [this applies] if they have taken possession [of property] that was ownerless. [Moreover, it applies even when they took possession of land in a private person’s] field or courtyard with the owner’s knowledge, i.e., he saw [them do so], remained silent, and waived his rights. [As a result,] the public acquire this gift, for their walking [on the property] is [an expression of] their taking possession of it. [The owner] is forbidden to retract and take it back from them.197 [His waiver applies] even if he waived his right to it erroneously, e.g., a public path passed through his field, [he wished to exchange that land with other land, so he] plowed it over and gave them a different path. [In such a situation,] he is obligated to return the first path he took from them,198 even if the second path is superior to and more direct than the first. [The rationale is that] he cannot facilitate an exchange with the public without the consent of all [those involved], for there may be some who desire the first [path] because it is closer to them than the second. Nevertheless, it is forbidden for him to ruin199 the second [path], for the public has already acquired it. Even though a private individual would not acquire [property] in such a way,200 the public does, since, it was originally given to them with [the owner’s] consent and license.

34 When a person remembers that he stole from one of two individuals but does not know from whom, if he seeks to fulfill his moral obligation54 he should make [full] restitution to both.201 If, however, he borrowed from one of two individuals and does not know from whom [he took the loan], he may place the sum before the two of them and depart.202

If he borrowed or stole from one of them203 and does not know if he repaid him, if he seeks to fulfill his moral obligation, he should make restitution a second time.204 If, however, he is uncertain as to whether or not he borrowed or stole [from that person], he is exempt, even if he seeks to fulfill his moral obligation.205 If the other person lodges a definite claim against him, [asserting with certainty] that he borrowed from him, he has a moral obligation [to make restitution].206 Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.