The Laws Governing Personal Safety and the Preservation of Property

Our translation of the title of this section is non-literal. Literally, it would read: “The laws concerning the protection of body and life and [the prohibition] against destroying property.” The first subsections (1-13) deal with personal safety, the later ones (14-16) with the preservation of property. The first sentence of subsection 14 explains why the two are included in the same chapter.

See Sefer HaMaamarim 5701, p. 152 et al., which explains the connection between physical health and spiritual health. Indeed, the verse (Devarim 4:15), which is interpreted by the Levush (Yoreh Deah 116:1) as the source for the command to maintain our physical health, reads: “And you shall guard your souls,” thus emphasizing the relationship between body and soul.

Sefer HaMitzvos (positive commandment 184) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 546) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.

Both a man and a woman, because the observance of this mitzvah is not associated with a specific time. Moreover, the positive commandment is also reinforced by a prohibition, as stated in subsection 3.

Devarim 22:8.

In Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 24, p. 140, the Rebbe notes that Chulin 136a requires the exegesis of a Scriptural verse to derive these two exceptions. In contrast, no such teaching is mentioned with regard to the other structures mentioned here. The Rebbe explains that since people frequent a synagogue and a house of study in an ongoing manner, one might think that they are considered similar to dwellings. Hence, the verse is necessary to teach us that this is not so.

Note the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 370:1, which states that if a person lives in a storehouse, a cattle barn, or a building used to store straw, it is considered a dwelling with regard to the laws of constructing an eruv. A distinction can, however, be made between the two instances, because — as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to state here — the roofs of those structures are not used to stand on, and that is what is significant with regard to the obligation to construct a guardrail. If, however, a person dwells in such a structure and it is his common practice to use its roof, he would be obligated to construct a guardrail.

By adding this phrase (based on Sefer Meiras Einayim 427:1), the Alter Rebbe is resolving a question raised by the commentaries concerning the ruling of Rambam, Hilchos Rotzeiach U’Shemiras Nefesh 11:1, which the Alter Rebbe is quoting. These commentaries note that the Sifri to the verse in Devarim explicitly states that it is necessary to construct a guardrail for such structures as well.

The Kessef Mishneh explains Rambam’s ruling by drawing a parallel to the laws of mezuzah, which these structures do not require because they are not dwellings (see Rambam, Hilchos Mezuzah 6:7). Others, however, question the comparison, since the reason for the guardrail is that an open roof presents a danger, and this applies regardless of the nature of the structure. The Alter Rebbe resolves this question by explaining that it is uncommon to use the roofs of these structures for any purpose.

The Alter Rebbe’s wording also allows for the conclusion that if there is a change in the manner in which these structures are built, or if socio-economic norms change and it becomes customary to use the roofs of these structures, it would be necessary to construct a guardrail upon them.

The implication of the Alter Rebbe’s words is that since, at present, roofs are not commonly used, there is no obligation to erect a guardrail on them. Certainly, this applies to homes with slanted roofs. However, even if roofs are flat, if it is quite uncommon to use them, there is no need to erect a guardrail.

See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 366:5, which states that even if a structure is very long, if it is not four cubits wide it is not considered a dwelling. For that same reason, there is no obligation in this instance.

Sifri to Devarim 22:8. A handbreadth is a little more than 8 centimeters (3.15 inches) according to Shiurei Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvos (negative commandment 298) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 547) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.

Devarim 22:8.

As a contemporary extension of this mitzvah, Imrei Yaakov (Biurim) queries whether one is obligated to place bars on windows in multi-storied homes, lest a child climb onto the window sill and endanger his life. A counterargument is that window bars may impede rescue in case of a fire, G‑d forbid, unless they include a mechanism that allows them to be easily released.

Devarim 4:9. We have translated the verse as it is being used here (see also Berachos 32b and the gloss of Maharsha). In its original context, it has a different meaning.

The same law would apply to a dangerous staircase.

Bava Kama 15b.

I.e., a dog that may very well cause harm to others, either through his bark or his bite.

Bava Kama 83a.

Ibid., 79b; 83a. The Sefer Meiras Einayim 409:5 explains that even though such a dog barks, there is no danger of a woman miscarrying out of fright. Since she knows that the dog is chained, she will not be afraid of it attacking her.

I.e., even if a city is not near the border.

The rationale is that since we live among non-Jews who may act in an unruly manner, there is reason to fear the entire day (Shiltei Giborim; Rama, Choshen Mishpat 409:3).

The punishment meted out for the violation of a Rabbinic commandment. See Imrei Yaakov, note 15, which offers several resolutions why this punishment is given, although from the Alter Rebbe’s previous statements it appears that the violation of a Scriptural commandment is involved.

Avodah Zarah 12b. The rationale is that many small organisms could be swallowed while drinking.

Lest the water dribble out of his hand.

The Alter Rebbe was speaking about an era before the invention of electric lighting. If the night would be sufficiently illuminated, this ruling would not apply.

Ibid. This clause is not speaking about material hazards that might be present in the water, but rather about negative spiritual influences imparted by demons.

Chulin 105b. The Pri Chadash writes that nowadays, since we see many people drinking such water without being affected negatively, leniency may be taken. This ruling is reinforced by statements in certain sources that the Baal Shem Tov nullified the influence of demons. Nevertheless, we see that scrupulous people would follow these practices even in the present era, and this is the desired custom.

And thus there is no worry about blindness resulting.

And thus there is no danger of swallowing leeches.

Pesachim 112a.

Bava Metzia 29b. See Imrei Yaakov, note 20, who questions whether it is permitted to drink lukewarm water from an earthenware cup after the water was heated in a metal utensil. See the continuation of this subsection on the following page.

This wording follows Rashi in Chulin 84b; an alternate version of the text, based on Rashi in Bava Metzia, loc. cit., reads “is boiling.”

Rashi, Shabbos 129b, states that this applies only when one ate to satiation. If he just ate a snack, this restriction does not apply.

With regard to standing up right after awakening from sleep, see the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 1:6 in both the Mahadura Kama and the Mahadura Basra. The Mahadura Kama states that one who stands up directly after sleep is “closer to death than to life.”

Shabbos 129b.

Niddah 17a.

Needless to say, it is forbidden to do so on Shabbos, for drawing blood violates Shabbos prohibitions (the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 316:14).

Rosh HaShanah 16b. Lest the wall or the bridge collapse.

See Berachos 3a. See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 90:5.

See Nodeh B’Yehudah, Tinyana, Yoreh Deah, responsum 10, who states that a person is permitted to endanger himself in order to earn his livelihood, as our Sages state (Bava Metzia 112a): “Why does that person ascend a ramp, hang from a tree, and risk his life? Is it not for his livelihood?” Imrei Yaakov (Biurim) discusses this issue (as well as doing things for pleasure that involve danger, e.g., overseas travel), and maintains that there is a difference between activities in which danger is fairly uncommon and therefore people frequently engage in such activities and between activities where danger is common and they are therefore, by and large, shunned by people.

See also the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 156:19, which states: “One may not stand in a dangerous place and say that a miracle will be performed on his behalf, for perhaps a miracle will not be performed for him. And if a miracle is performed on his behalf, his merits will be reduced. One of the Sages would refrain from crossing [a river] in a ferry together with utterly wicked people lest judgment be executed against them and he would be ensnared with them.”

Pesachim 112b-113a. The Alter Rebbe placed this ruling in parentheses, indicating that the matter still required consideration. In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), he notes that Berachos 43b mentioned this prohibition only with regard to a Torah scholar, the rationale being that such conduct will arouse suspicions about his character and could lead to others casting aspersions on him. Yoma 21a states that it is forbidden for any person to set out on a journey before daybreak. Those passages do not, however, mention any prohibition against people at large going out at night. The Alter Rebbe states that his words are taken from Rama (Yoreh Deah 116:5) whose ruling appears to be based on Pesachim, loc. cit., from which it can be derived that one should not go out alone at night for fear of demons. The Alter Rebbe concludes that the matter requires further deliberation.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe cites the Pri Chadash who, based on the Talmud Yerushalmi (Shabbos 2:6), states that this applies only in a dark house, i.e., one into which no light enters at all. Basing his statements on those sources, Darkei Teshuvah 116:66 maintains that if there is any light in the house, this prohibition does not apply. Magen Avraham 239:7 and Darkei Teshuvah also mention that many authorities consider every room in the house a separate entity and thus, even if there are other people sleeping in the house, if one is sleeping in a private room, these restrictions also apply.

Shabbos 151b. Rashi, Niddah 24b, describes Lilis as a demonic creature with the face of a female. She became the mother of the demons (Rabbeinu Bachya, Bereishis 4:22). See also Zohar, Vol. I, p. 34b; Kaf HaChayim, Yoreh Deah 116:49.

Niddah 17a. See also the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 1:37, which interprets sleeping in a cemetery as a sign of emotional instability.

Pesachim 112a. When a person sleeps at night, a spirit of impurity rests upon his body (Zohar, Vol. I, p. 184b; see also Shabbos 109a), for sleep is one-sixtieth of death. When he awakens, the impurity departs from him except from his hands. This is the mystical reason for the morning washing upon arising. Now, while the person is sleeping, that impurity spreads below his body to the ground and encompasses everything in between, including any articles placed under his bed. See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, Mahadura Kama 4:4; Mahadura Basra 4:1.

Niddah 17a.

Niddah, op. cit.; Talmud Yerushalmi, Berachos 7:5.

See Igros Kodesh, Vol. II, Letters no. 233-234, in which the Rebbe focuses on the apparent contradiction between this ruling and the Alter Rebbe’s ruling in Orach Chayim, sec. 455:19, where he states that water drawn for baking matzah can be kept in a metal container for several nights. In resolution, the Rebbe explains that here the restriction is on drinking the water and not on using it for other purposes.

In Letter no. 234, the Rebbe addresses the issue of water being left overnight in a metal cistern — to which a parallel to our water pipes can be drawn — and offers two reasons for leniency: a) the cistern is connected to the ground, and thus the container is not considered an independent entity; b) since people at large disregard this directive (and the effect the matter concerned has on a person is more “spiritual” than directly physical), we can apply the principle (Tehillim 116:6; Shabbos 129b): “G‑d protects the simple.”

Talmud Yerushalmi, Terumos 8:3.

Bereishis 3:19.

Since the dog is causing him a loss, he is allowed to kill it and, as such, the prohibition against causing pain to animals does not apply. See Hilchos Ovrei Derachim VeTzaar Baalei Chayim, subsection 4.

Ben Ish Chai, year 2, Parshas Pinchas, sec. 17, states that if two or more men are walking between two women, or if there is a space of more than four cubits between the two women, the prohibition does not apply. The same would seemingly apply to two or more women walking between two men.

Pesachim 111a.

Chulin 105b.

Pesachim 112b. Shemiras Guf VeNefesh,subsection267:4, states that there is no problem if the flame of the lamp is covered. Furthermore, that text maintains that consequently, this stringency does not apply with regard to electric lighting.

Ibid., 111b.

Chulin, loc. cit. With regard to this law — and thus, to many others in this section — the Rebbe (Toras Menachem 5743, Vol. 1, p. 382ff.) refers to Maharil, who writes that the makeup of our bodies has changed. Accordingly, he maintains, the same dangers that applied in previous eras do not necessarily apply nowadays. Nevertheless, from the fact that the Alter Rebbe quotes this law in his Shulchan Aruch, we can conclude that this is not so. The Rebbe, however, notes that the widespread practice is not to be careful in this regard, and explains this practice based on the principle (Tehillim 116:6; Shabbos 129b): “G‑d protects the simple.”

Sheloh (Shaar HaOsiyos, os kuf) understands this to refer primarily to the froth formed from fermentation of beer and the like. Nevertheless, he recommends also being particular with regard to the bubbles formed when pouring drink into a cup.

Pesachim 111b.

Kaf HaChayim (Yoreh Deah 116:199) states that this statement applies when the bran is strewn over the floor of the home and there is concern that one may step on it. If it is kept in a container, there is no cause for concern.

The Scriptural term tzaraas refers to an affliction that would cause discoloration and degeneration of the skin. Although it is often translated as “leprosy,” that is an error, because as Rambam writes (conclusion of Hilchos Tum’as Tzaraas), the cause of a tzaraas affliction is spiritual, and not physiological.

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See the Shulchan Aruch of R. Yosef Caro, Yoreh Deah 116:2 and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch, sec. 33. For this reason, on Shabbos — when it is customary to eat meat and fish at the same meal — the custom is to drink between those courses to cleanse one’s mouth (Kaf HaChayim 116:30 in the name of the Sheloh HaKodesh).

Berachos 51a.

Zohar, Vol. II, p. 196a.

Although Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 359:2, states that women should be prevented from following a bier in a cemetery, there are varying customs in different communities. The Rebbe once advised that new stringencies not be imposed on the conduct of women at and after funerals.

Zechariah 3:2.

Zohar, loc. cit., 196b.

Yoma 77b.

From this law, Shevet HaLevi, Vol. VI, sec. 112, concludes that any clearly dangerous activity — for example, driving at excessively high speeds and/or recklessly trying to pass other cars on a highway — is included in this prohibition.

Berachos 8b.

Chulin 16b.

Kesubos 8b. As stated there, a person should not open his mouth in a way that invites and empowers Satan, for example, by saying: “For doing such-and-such, so-and-so is deserving of Divine retribution.” See also Zohar, Vol. III, p. 85a, which elaborates on the negative consequences of cursing a fellow Jew, or of even cursing oneself (ibid., Vol. 1, p. 14b).

I.e., the statements a person utters bring about a process of causation that precipitates their coming about in actual fact. In that vein, Moed Katan 18a relates that Pinchas, the brother of the Sage Shmuel, lost a son. Shmuel came to pay him a condolence call, but rather than begin with words of consolation, he started speaking about other matters. In the course of his remarks, he noticed that Pinchas’ nails were overgrown and asked him about that. Pinchas commented: “If such a thing happened to you, wouldn’t your nails be overgrown?” Shortly afterwards, one of Shmuel’s own children died. See also Sanhedrin 102a.

In Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 27, p. 164, note 54, the Rebbe cites HaYom Yom, entry for 29 Tishrei, which states that one of the householders in Mezhibuzh had a running argument with a fellow townsman. Once, while he was in the shul of the Baal Shem Tov, he cried out that he would tear apart his adversary like a fish.

Hearing this, the Baal Shem Tov told all his disciples to join hands and stand near him in a circle with their eyes closed. He then closed the circle by resting his own hands on the shoulders of the two disciples nearest to him. The disciples suddenly began screaming in terror: They had a vision of this person actually tearing apart his adversary like a fish. Thus, not only can one’s words lead to the occurrence of undesirable events, but the very uttering of unfavorable words brings about undesirable consequences in the higher realms.

In that same source, the Rebbe also emphasizes that the same principle applies in a positive sense.Speaking about a person’s good qualities leads to their expression.

Kaf HaChayim, Yoreh Deah 116:103 states that this also applies with regard to frightening a child with a kosher entity.

Bava Kama 60b. In his gloss to that passage, Maharshal states that this restriction applies only at night, when demons and the like go out, and not during the day.

Ibid.; Zohar, Vol. II, 197a.

Shmos 12:22. The verse warned the Jews against leaving their homes on the night of the plague of the slaying of the firstborn.

See Hilchos Nizkei Guf VeNefesh, subsection 4 above. See also Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 34, p. 107, where the Rebbe makes a distinction between a person’s body and his property. A person is the owner of his property. Even though it is granted to him by G‑d, he has full authority over it. The fact that he — as stated in this subsection — is forbidden to destroy it does not minimize his ownership. His body, by contrast, is merely entrusted to him for safekeeping; he has no authority whatsoever over it. He does, however, have a responsibility to care for his body and protect it.

Bava Kama 91b.

Shabbos 129a.

Kiddushin 32a. From that passage, it is evident that if the rip can easily be repaired, one does not violate the prohibition.

See Berachos 50b. See also Zohar, Vol. I, p. 14b, which speaks particularly harshly of one who throws bread.

Shabbos 140b states that if one desires fresher or higher quality food, he may choose it even though doing so will cause the other food to go to waste.

Sefer HaMitzvos (negative commandment 57) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 529) include this as one of the 613 mitzvos of the Torah.

Devarim 20:9. The verse is speaking about the fruit-bearing trees of a city besieged by Jewish armies.

See Shabbos 105b, which states that a person who tears garments and breaks utensils in his wrath is equivalent to one who worships idols.

Middos 1:2 states that the officer in charge of the Temple Mount had the right to burn the clothing of any priest who slept during his watch. Ezras Kohanim, et al., questions this statement, for seemingly, the officer is violating the prohibition against destroying property. From this law the Rebbe (Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 18, pp. 465-466) derives the conclusion that it is permitted to destroy property if by doing so, one will cause a person under his charge to improve his conduct. The basis for this conclusion is the equivalence the Alter Rebbe establishes at the beginning of this subsection between harming one’s body and harming one’s property. Just as one may fast for the sake of repentance — even though doing so will harm his body — and moreover, one may strike one’s children and one’s servants for their own sake (Hilchos Nizkei Guf VeNefesh, subsection 4 above), one may similarly destroy property if doing so will lead to a positive outcome.

See Tzemach Tzedek, Orach Chayim, responsum 20, which states that although there is aprohibition against damaging the structure of a synagogue, license may be granted to tear down a wall in the women’s section of a synagogue in order to create more space because of the discomfort the women suffer.

Bava Kama 92a.

See Chavos Yair, responsum 195, which rules that one may not cut down a tree to enlarge the empty space in one’s courtyard. That responsum also states that if a tree is blocking the light to one’s window and pruning it will be sufficient to increase the light, one should prune it rather than cut it down, even if one will have to prune it repeatedly.

Bava Kama 91b.

It is worthy of note that Shabbos 129a, the source for the Alter Rebbe’s ruling, speaks of burning valuable furniture. However, that source also speaks of making a fire on the day when one lets blood at a time when cold could lead to serious consequences. On that basis, Imrei Yaakov questions whether one is permitted to burn valuable furniture under ordinary circumstances when there is no similar danger.

For the blood of a fowl or non-domesticated animal must be covered by earth or ash after slaughter, as stated in Vayikra 17:13.

Chulin 88b. This refers to a situation in which the meat of the fowl or the animal is worth more than the garment. Otherwise, it is forbidden to burn it (Rama, Yoreh Deah 28:21).

“Whatsoever” is the Alter Rebbe’s addition to the wording of Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 6:9. The apparent implication is that there is no problem even if one derives no benefit whatsoever from cutting down the tree. Note, however, Likkutei Dibburim (in English translation), Vol. I, pp. 179-180, and Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 38, p. 135, which speak negatively about tearing a leaf off the branch of a tree. Certainly, those texts would not condone the wanton destruction of an entire tree. See also Piskei Tosafos, Pesachim 132, which states that even cutting down a shade tree for no purpose is not a sign of blessing.

A kab is a Talmudic measure of volume, equivalent to 1376 cc (approximately 46.5 oz) in contemporary measure according to Shiurei Torah.

Sh’viis 4:10; Bava Kama, loc. cit.

I.e., these are amounts for which it is considered worthwhile to maintain the tree.

In that vein, Bava Kama, loc. cit., quotes Rabbi Chanina as saying that his son died at a young age because he cut down a fruit tree before its time.