The Laws Governing Personal Injury and Their Relevant Regulations

Our translation of the title of this section is non-literal. Literally, it would read “The laws concerning damage to body and soul….”

Sefer HaMitzvos (negative commandment 300) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 595) include this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvos.

Devarim 25:2-3. See Kesubos 33a.

See Sanhedrin 85a.

Shmos 2:13, as interpreted in Sanhedrin 58b. The verse describes Moshe’s rebuke to Dasan and Aviram.

This term generally refers to early medieval scholars. The earliest record of this particular practice found is from R. Menachem of Reisburg (circa 5200 [1440]).

Davar shebikedushah in the original. See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 55:2, for a definition of this term. See also subsection 14 of that section, which mentions that a person under a ban of ostracism may not be counted in a minyan, and sec. 199:11, which states that he should not be counted in a zimun for the recitation of Grace after Meals.

A copper coin of minimal value used in the Talmudic era, worth 1/40th of a gram of silver.

Kesubos 32b. Generally, a person is not punished both financially and through corporal punishment for the same transgression. In most instances, when the violation of a prohibition involves a monetary penalty and the obligation of lashes, a person must pay the penalty and he is not held liable for lashes. In this instance, however, since no monetary penalty was incurred, he becomes liable for lashes.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), the Alter Rebbe cites the views of Rashi and Tosafos (Bava Metzia 71a), who maintain that when a person verbally abuses another, the insulted party should not cause even indirect financial damage to the abuser, e.g., by trying to convince others not to patronize his business. (This reflects a reversal of Rashi’s approach, for in Kiddushin 28a Rashi states that he may cause him indirect losses.) Certainly, it is forbidden to strike him. Even when a person physically attacks his fellow man, the victim may not strike him unless there is no other way to avoid or control the attack. In the case of verbal abuse, however, the person always has the option of simply walking away.

Since striking him back would thus not be in self-defense.

See Imrei Yaakov (note 11), who cites authorities who maintain that if the victim strikes an abuser or an attacker, he is judged more leniently than one who attacks another person without cause. See subsection 16, where this point is mentioned.

Implied is that if he could save himself in any other way, e.g., by fleeing, he should do so rather than strike the attacker.

Implied is that it is desirable to reduce both the number and intensity of the blows.

Needless to say, one should also save a Jew who is being struck by a non-Jew. Here, the Alter Rebbe specifically mentions saving a Jew from another Jew because in such an instance, there are restrictions against striking the attacker that do not apply when the attacker is a non-Jew.

See Imrei Yaakov (note 16), who quotes authorities who maintain that if the person defending the victim hates the attacker, he should not strike him, because he would be striking him out of hatred and not with the intent of saving him from transgressing. Ultimately, however, Imrei Yaakov concludes that the person’s intent is of no significance; saving the victim from his attacker is of primary import.

See also Imrei Yaakov (Biurim), which questions why the Alter Rebbe places the emphasis on preventing a prohibition when seemingly the intent is to protect the victim. It is true that the Alter Rebbe is merely quoting his sources, Rabbeinu Asher (Bava Kama 3:13) as cited by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch of R. Yosef Caro (Choshen Mishpat 421:13). Nevertheless, as implied by the following clause, one may not strike anyone to prevent him from transgressing, but rather only those persons under his authority. [There are authorities who permit striking others to prevent them from transgressing. The Alter Rebbe, however, does not grant this authority to every person, only to the officials appointed by the community (see subsection 16).] Why, then, is such wording used? In resolution, a possible explanation is that with regard to other transgressions, the transgressor may justifiably question why the person striking him is interfering in his choice of ethics and values. By contrast, when he is striking another person, the reason for the intervention is obvious.

See subsection 4 for a description of people whom one may strike.

For then there is no preventive value to his actions.

Bava Kama 48a.

See ibid., 28a.

The Alter Rebbe is speaking here about a person who hired a servant for a defined period of time, promising him room and board for the duration of his employment.

I.e., he harbors strong suspicions without possessing definitive proof.

This is not speaking about a thief whom he confronts while breaking in, because in such an instance the homeowner has the right even to kill him, as stated in subsections 11-12.

As stated in Hilchos Gezeilah U’Geneivah, subsection 28 above, if a person sees property that was stolen from him in the possession of another person, he may take the law into his own hands and retrieve the stolen article. He does not have to appeal to the court to have his property recovered through due legal process.

See Bava Kama 90b. As the Rebbe would frequently state (Igros Kodesh, Vol. 10, Letter 3231, et al., borrowing, with a slight change, the wording of Rambam, Hilchos Rotzeiach 1:4): “The body is the property of the Holy One, blessed be He.” As he explains in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 34, pp. 106-107, there is a difference between a person’s body and his property. A person is the owner of his property. Even though it is granted him by G‑d, he has full authority over it. His body, by contrast, is entrusted to him by G‑d for safekeeping; he has no authority whatsoever over it at all. He does, however, have the responsibility to care for his body and protect it. See Hilchos Shemiras Guf VeNefesh, subsection 14 below.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe cites his sources as Bava Kama 91b and the commentaries of Tosafos and Yam shel Shlomoh to that text. The Alter Rebbe, however, takes issue with Yam shel Shlomoh, who writes that one is forbidden to embarrass himself for financial gain. The Alter Rebbe cites Pesachim 113a, which states that it is preferable to perform a degrading task to earn one’s livelihood — even though it involves embarrassment — rather than accept charity, to quote: “Skin a carcass in the market place rather than depend on others for assistance.” Similarly, Yam shel Shlomoh writes that one is forbidden to cause pain to his body in order to earn a livelihood. The Alter Rebbe objects to that point as well, noting that the Torah (Bereishis 31:40) mentions that Yaakov, our Patriarch, endured scorching heat and frigid cold, i.e., he underwent bodily suffering, in order to be gainfully employed.

Note the Rebbe’s Igros Kodesh, Vol. 4, Letter 923, where the Rebbe explains the rationale for the Alter Rebbe’s ruling in the text. Since we are charged (Shmos 35:2): “Six days shall you perform work,” we may expend whatever effort expected by local norms to earn our livelihood. Any effort that exceeds the norm, however, is not permitted, because by doing so, a person is using G‑d’s property, his body, in a way that He did not sanction. The conduct of Yaakov, our Patriarch, was an exception required by the specific situation of his employment as a shepherd.

See Bava Kama 91b, which states that from the fact that a Nazirite is required to bring a sin-offering to atone for having refrained from drinking wine, it can be derived that it is forbidden for a person to deprive himself of any of his basic necessities.

See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, pp. 475-476, sec. 155:1, which states:

It is a mitzvah to conduct oneself in a desirable manner that will protect one’s health so that he will be healthy and strong, [so as to be able] to perform the service of his Creator. One is therefore not permitted to afflict himself, unless doing so is necessary for his [Divine] service; for example, he has a natural tendency to overindulge in his craving for food or drink or other [physical] desires, and he cannot control his natural desire unless he inclines to the other extreme and follows a course of abstinence from that which he craves.

The notes appended to the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch cite the text Reishis Chochmah as the source for this statement. That text — and others of its type — clarify the mystic blemishes caused by sin and how they can be rectified through penance. Later in the course of our nation’s spiritual history, the Baal Shem Tov pioneered a new path of Divine service that enables a person to refine himself — including his physical tendencies — and purify his sins by transforming, rather than subduing, his material environment. See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 2, p. 531; Vol. 21, pp. 130, 132.

שחת, the term the Alter Rebbe uses, borrowed from Yeshayahu 38:17, is often literally translated as “the grave” or “the netherworld.”

See Tanya, Iggeres HaTeshuvah, chs. 2-3, where the Alter Rebbe explains how fasting purifies the soul, but concludes that such actions were appropriate only in previous generations when fasting did not present that much of a difficulty. Nowadays, however, since people have difficulty fasting, they should redeem their fasts through giving charity.

Taanis 11a-b.

As stated in subsection 2 above, one may strike a person to prevent a him from violating a transgression. Surely this applies to one’s children.

Makkos 8b. Our translation of the Hebrew derech eretz, lit. “the way of the world,” reflects the meaning employed in that passage. From the passage cited in the following note it appears that a father may also employ corporal punishment to ingrain positive character traits in his children. See also the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:13, which states that a teacher has the right to employ corporal punishment to motivate his students to study.

I.e., whom one is raising. See also the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 156:9, which states:

If, by contrast, a teacher chastises [orphans] in order to teach them Torah or a vocation, or to lead them along a path of upright conduct, this is permitted. Nevertheless, one should not treat them as [strictly as] he treats other [pupils] but differently [and more gently], guiding them with patience and great compassion.

I.e., by the commandment (Shmos 19:12): “Honor your father and mother.” Thus, even “for his own sake” does not refer to an entirely self-oriented act, but to one that leads to one’s children fulfilling the commandment of honoring one’s parents properly.

Bava Kama 87b.

I.e., a hired worker.

Who is considered as the property of his master.

This reflects the conclusion reached by the Alter Rebbe in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), that one may undergo pain in order to earn his livelihood. Otherwise, a person may not strike a person who gives him permission to do so, as stated in the beginning of this subsection.

Hilchos She’ilah U’Sechirus, subsection 21 below.

This applieseven if the fright he caused resulted in illness or injury (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 420:32). Merely causing fright is in itself not sufficient for an earthly court to demand financial redress.

I.e., a court cannot compel him to pay for any damages or suffering he caused his victim, because he did so indirectly. Accordingly, he is not considered a primary cause of these damages. Not only does this ruling apply in the present era, it was followed even in the early period of the Talmudic era when the court would rule on cases involving fines (dinei k’nasos; see subsection 15).

For he did cause the victim harm through his deeds. Imrei Yaakov (note 43) emphasizes that this applies when one intentionally frightened the victim. A person who does so accidentally is exempt.

As stated in Bava Kama 83b, in the Talmudic era, a person who injured a colleague was required to compensate him for five types of damage:

a) nezek (the damages, i.e., the value of the loss if permanent injury was involved);

b) tzaar (the pain experienced because of the injury);

c) ripui (the medical costs involved in healing the injury);

d) sheves (the loss of wages for the duration of recovery); and

e) boshes (the embarrassment caused).

See subsection 15, which speaks about the adjudication of such cases in the present era.

Bava Kama 92a. That passage states: “Even if he sacrifices all the rams of Nevayos (a region in Eretz Yisrael noted for its choice rams), he does not receive atonement… until he asks the injured party for forgiveness.”

Indeed, the one who withholds forgiveness is now considered the sinner (Rambam, Hilchos Tesh ­uvah 2:9). To illustrate this principle, Rambam notes in his following law (2:10) that because the Giv’onites did not forgive the family of King Shaul, they were ostracized: “The Giv’onites are not among the Children of Israel” (II Shmuel 21:2).

The Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 606:4. That source states that license to withhold forgiveness is granted if the wronged party’s intent is for the benefit of the person asking forgiveness, to humble his brazen heart, or if he fears that by doing so he will cause harm to himself.

Lechem Mishneh (gloss to Rambam’s Hilchos Choveil U’Mazik 5:9) makes the following distinction between robbery and damages: When a person steals an object, he benefits from it. In contrast, when he damages another person’s property, he derives no benefit. It is perhaps for this same reason that the person whose property is damaged does not suffer emotionally as when his property is stolen.

Some commentaries have pointed to Hilchos Ovrei Derachim VeTzaar Baalei Chayim, subsection 6, p. 219 above, which discusses the mitzvah of removing the burden from a fallen animal, and states that if one does not actually see the animal, even though he is aware of its suffering he is not required at all to go and help it. The same conclusion, they maintain, applies here. Although one knows that a person is in danger, unless he sees him, he is not required to go and help him.

Kin’as Eliyahu differs, maintaining that with regard to the mitzvah of removing an animal’s burden, the leniency stems from the prooftext mandating such activity (Shmos 23:5), which begins: “When you see….” With regard to the mitzvah at hand, the prooftext places the emphasis on “your fellow man’s blood [being at risk].” Implied is that if one knows that another Jew is in danger, one must do everything he can to save him. Developing that principle, a recent text — Hatzalah KeHalachah — states that if one hears about a person in distress on the radio or the like, he has an obligation to do what he can to save him.

Shevet HaLevi (Vol. V, responsum 174) raises a question regarding a person who is seriously ill and whose life could be saved by an expensive operation: Is an individual obligated to spend his own savings to save that other person? In resolution, the responsum states that an observer is obligated to step in only when there is an urgent need for which an immediate response is required, such as a person drowning at sea or being attacked. Because that person is there at the time, he is obligated to make the effort to save his fellow man. However, in the case of a person who is ill, there is usually no one person who must make an immediate decision to save him. Instead, although the need is pressing, there generally is time to consider the matter. Hence, the responsibility devolves on the community at large, who should take the necessary steps to raise the funds from all of its members.

Just as there is an obligation to save a person’s life, so too is there an obligation to save a person who is in spiritual danger and who could lose his connection to his Jewish heritage (Maharshdam, as quoted by K’nesses HaGedolah 426:1). See also the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 306:29, Minchas Chinuch, mitzvah 239.

This applies even if doing so would compromise his own honor (Melo HaRo’im, K’vod HaBriyos, sec. 25).

Similarly, even if the person in danger protests and states that he should not be saved, one is obligated to save him (Maharam MiRotenberg, ed. Prague, responsum 39).

Sanhedrin 73a. This source explains that from the phrase (Devarim 21:3): “And you shall return it to him,” one would know that he must exert himself to try to save a person in danger. The prooftext cited below emphasizes that one is also liable to undertake expenses for that purpose.

A doctor who knows how to save a patient’s life is obligated to do so (Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim 4:4, et al.). Similarly, a lawyer whose arguments can save a defendant’s life is obligated to appear on his behalf in court (Rashi, Yoma 88b).

See also Rabbeinu Yonah (Shaarei Teshuvah, shaar 3, sec. 71), who suggests that every community survey its needs and prepare itself in advance in order that people be ready to respond to any type of emergency that might arise.

See also Encyclopedia Talmudis, Vol. X, Erech Hatzalas Nefashos, regarding whether one is obligated to undertake efforts to prevent a person from committing suicide.

If, however, he is saving himself as well, an appropriate division of the financial responsibility should be made. See Rama, Choshen Mishpat 264:4.

For a person is not obligated to use his own financial resources to save another person if that person has resources of his own (gloss of Kessef Mishneh to Hilchos Rotzeiach 1:14). If the person who was saved does not have adequate resources at the time, he is exempt from paying the remainder even if he becomes wealthy afterwards (K’nesses HaGedolah, sec. 426).

Note the contrast to the obligation to save another person’s financial resources (Hilchos Metziah U’Fikadon, subsection 33 above) or to alleviate an animal’s suffering (Hilchos Ovrei Derachim VeTzaar Baalei Chayim, subsection 3 above), where one is obligated to undertake efforts to achieve these goals, but is not required to tap his financial resources for these purposes.

Vayikra 19:16. Sefer HaMitzvos (negative commandment 297) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 237) regard this prohibition as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments. Rambam (Hilchos Rotzeiach 1:16, based on Bava Basra 11a), writes that this prohibition is “very severe, for whoever causes the loss of a Jewish soul is considered as if he destroyed the entire world, and whoever saves a Jewish soul is considered as if he saved the entire world.”

If, however, one’s own life will certainly be endangered, there is no obligation to take risks to save the other person, for one’s responsibility is first to himself (see Bava Metzia 62a, et al. See also the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 329:8; Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 32, pp. 123-124, and the sources cited there).

And one is not required to risk his life. See Shabbos 129a. This is also the Alter Rebbe’s conclusion in Orach Chayim, op. cit. See also Likkutei Sichos, op. cit. It must be emphasized that the very nature of trying to save someone’slifeoften involves a certain amount of risk. It is only when the risk is so great that the rescuer feels his own life seriously endangered that the lenient opinions absolve him of responsibility.

See L’Ohr HaHalachah (R. Shlomoh Yosef Zevin), p. 9ff, which discusses a soldier’s obligation to risk his life in battle. Since the lives of the entire nation — not just of select individuals — are dependent on him, there is reason to postulate that the situation be viewed differently.

Although here, where the Alter Rebbe is speaking about a situation in which the person’s life is at risk, the same concepts apply with regard to saving his financial resources (Imrei Yaakov, note 58).

The term mumar comes from the verb hemar (המר), meaning “exchange.” Thus it is frequently translated as “apostate,” one who renounces the Jewish faith. Similarly, one who converts is described as having heimir daso, “exchanged his faith.” Nevertheless, as indicated here, even a person who does not abandon Judaism entirely can be considered a mumar in given contexts. In that vein, our Sages (Chulin 4b-5a) speak of a mumar with regard to one mitzvah, i.e., a person who repeatedly violates a given prohibition. The rationale is that since the Torah and its mitzvos are one integral unit, rejecting one element is to a certain extent considered renouncing the Jewish faith entirely. Nevertheless, there are many differences between the laws applying to a mumar with regard to the entire Torah and a mumar with regard to one mitzvah. Among them, in the Beis HaMikdash, sacrifices brought by a mumar with regard to the entire Torah were not accepted, while sacrifices brought by a mumar with regard to one mitzvah are accepted. See Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah 3:9, for more details.

Our Sages (Avodah Zarah 26b, et al.) speak about a mumar lehachis (סיעכהל רמומ), “one who transgresses to anger [his Creator],” and a mumar letei’avon (ןובאתל רמומ), “one who transgresses out of desire.” See subsection 10 for a clarification of the distinctions between the two categories. See also Hilchos Shechitah, subsection 2, and notes, in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch for a thorough treatment of the subject.

The commentaries note that there is an apparent contradiction between two rulings in the Shulchan Aruch on this subject. In Hilchos Tzedakah (Yoreh Deah 251:1), the Shulchan Aruch rules that there is no mitzvah to preserve the life of a person who willfully violates one of the Torah’s laws and does not repent. In contrast, when discussing the obligation to save transgressors’ lives (ibid., 158:1), the Shulchan Aruch rules that the lives of people who occasionally transgress for the sake of their desires should be saved. The Turei Zahav 251:1 explains that the key to the distinction is the word “occasionally,” referring to a transgressor who — to use the terminology employed by the Alter Rebbe in the following subsection — “is not unremitting in his wickedness.” A person who transgresses in such a manner is not consciously rebelling against G‑d. Hence, his life should be saved. This charge does not apply to one who transgresses in an ongoing manner.

Even the more stringent authorities agree that only a person who transgresses repetitively is placed in this category, not one who transgresses merely on occasion.

The term ךער, translated as “your fellow man,” literally means “your friend” or “your comrade” and is interpreted as meaning “your fellow Jew” (Bava Metzia 111b) and more particularly, “your comrade in observance” (see Rambam, Hilchos Eivel 14:1; S’mag, positive mitzvah 9).

Vayikra 25:36.

Here also the intent is “your fellow Jew,” and more particularly, “your brother in observance” (Yereim, sec. 156, apparently based on Makkos 23a; Rambam, Hilchos Eivel 14:1).

Devarim 22b.

Avodah Zarah 26b; see Hilchos Metziah U’Fikadon, subsection 39 above.

Bava Kama 81b.

I.e., if his life is in danger.

Subsections 33-34.

This distinction resolves the contradiction in the decisions of the Shulchan Aruch mentioned in note 63. In sec. 251, the Shulchan Aruch is speaking about undertaking expenses, while in sec. 158, the emphasis is on exerting effort.

See subsection 7.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe cites many authorities who maintain that even a mumar who transgresses out of desire is considered “your brother,” and hence, one is obligated to save him. The foundation for this leniency is the law that the prohibition against lending at interest applies to him. See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, Hilchos Ribis, subsection 77. See also Kuntreis Acharon (note 2) to Hilchos Nizkei Mammon above.

See Pischei Teshuvah (Yoreh Deah 251:1), which quotes several authorities who rule that a Jew who consistently steals (and thus transgresses Scriptural Law) who is held captive by non-Jews should be ransomed if there is a chance that he will be killed. If, however, there is no threat to his life, there is no obligation to ransom him.

Avodah Zarah 26b. “Light animals” refers to goats and sheep. Since the shepherds of these animals would pasture them in fields belonging to others, they were considered thieves.

Compare to the Alter Rebbe’s Hilchos Nizkei Mammon, subsection 16 above.

If, however, failing to save a non-Jew’s life will cause enmity, there is an obligation to save him. See also the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 334:28, which speaks of the necessity to save a non-Jew’s property when failing to do so will lead to a general situation of panic.

This law is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See parallel concepts in the Shulchan Aruch of R. Yosef Caro, Yoreh Deah 158:1.

Whether by violating one of the Torah’s prohibitions or by failing to fulfill one of the positive commandments (Tevuos Shor 2:13).

See the Alter Rebbe’s comments in his Kuntreis Acharon to Yoreh Deah, Hilchos Ribis, sec. 2, note 8, which states that the person must have a conscious intent to rebel against his Creator to be considered a heretic for violating a particular transgression. Even if, for example, he had a choice of both kosher and non-kosher food and chose the non-kosher food because he is not sensitive to Torah observance at all, he is not considered a heretic.

I.e., if the taste of the forbidden food surpassed that of the kosher food, it could not be said that the person was choosing the forbidden food “to anger G‑d.” For it could be said that he simply desired the better-tasting food and could not control himself.

See Sifsei Kohen (Yoreh Deah 251:3).

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 4), the Alter Rebbe mentions the opinion of Sifsei Kohen 158:6, which states that one who denigrates a Torah scholar is also placed in this category. The Alter Rebbe differs, citing the opinion of Maharil (responsum 194) that such a person may even be accepted as a ritual slaughterer. Certainly, all necessary steps should be taken to save his life.

Seemingly this also applies to anyone who converts out of the faith, accepting another religion.

I.e., the desire for economic or social advancement; alternatively, for love of the deity. See Rambam, Hilchos Avodas Kochavim 3:6.

Even when he was under duress, he should have sacrificed his life and not worshiped the false deity (Sanhedrin 74a), let alone convert to its faith. Nevertheless, since he was acting under duress, he is not considered liable for his actions (Sifra, Parshas Kedoshim; Sifri to Devarim 17:5).

By the same token, such a person should not be supported, nor should he be redeemed if taken captive (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 251:2).

These harsh rulings apply to individuals who made a conscious decision to deviate from their Torah heritage. When, however, a person was raised with little awareness of his connection to Jewish observance, different guidelines apply. As Rambam writes (Hilchos Mamrim 3:3) with regard to the Karaites:

The children of these errant people and their grandchildren whose parents led them away and who were… raised according to their conception are considered as children captured and raised by [non-Jews. Such a child] may not be eager [to follow] the path of mitzvos, for it is as if he was compelled not to. Even if later he hears that he is Jewish and observed Jews and their faith, he is still considered as one who was compelled [against observance], for he was raised according to their mistaken [path]…. It is appropriate to motivate such people to repent and draw them to the power of the Torah with words of peace.

See Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim, Vol. I, responsum 33, and other authorities cited by R. Avraham YehoshuaPfeuffer in Ishei Yisrael, p. 131, who discuss the halachic status of many in the present age who were raised without the awareness of the obligations of Jewish Law and how they are considered, to use the term employed by Rambam, “children captured and raised by non-Jews.”See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 6, p. 193; Vol. 15, p. 198; Toras Menachem, Vol 1, p. 136ff., et al.

I.e., even nowadays and even in the Diaspora.

With this phrase, we are translating the term moseir used in Hilchos Nizkei Mammon, subsections 6-10 above.

Subsections 7-8.

I.e., when he enters the house, before he steals. If, however, he already stole and has departed, he may not be killed, as stated in subsection 13 and in note 102.

Sanhedrin 72a, based on Shmos 22:1. I.e., even if the thief’s initial thought was not to murder the owner, since, ultimately, he is prepared to do so in the process of his theft, it is considered as if that is his intent. Therefore the owner is allowed to protect himself and kill the thief first.

Or any other person. This applies both during the week and on Shabbos (Rambam, Hilchos Geneivah 9:6).

See Shvus Yaakov, Vol. II, responsum 187, which states that even if it might have been possible for the homeowner to protect himself from the thief by wounding him, he is not held liable for killing him. The rationale is that in a moment of imminent danger to one’s life, it is extremely difficult to determine and use the precise measure of restraint when protecting oneself without killing the thief.

As Sanhedrin, op. cit., comments: “Here the Torah teaches: If someone comes to kill you, take the initiative and kill him first.”

Sanhedrin 72b.

Mechilta D’Rabbi Yishmael, Parshas Mishpatim.

These authorities base themselves on Shmos 22:2, which states: “If the sun shone upon him…,” explaining that although our Sages extended the meaning of that phrase, it should not be removed from its literal connotation.

The Alter Rebbe’s words imply that the robber must have left both the premises and whatever tunnel he used to break in.If the thief was still on the premises or in the tunnel, even if he has already turned his back to flee, he may nevertheless be killed, for it is still possible that the homeowner will try to apprehend him in order to save his property, and the thief will turn around and kill the homeowner if he is discovered. (Seethe gloss of Mirkeves HaMishneh to Rambam, Hilchos Geneivah 9:11).

Obviously, the homeowner’s safety is the primary concern, and even when there is doubt as to whether he is in danger, he may act to save his life. If, however, there is a way that he can alarm the thief without killing him, that is clearly the desirable alternative.

When the thief sees the other people there, he will realize that he is outnumbered and will flee. In contemporary situations, where thieves may have automatic weapons and the like, the details of the law may be somewhat different but the fundamental principle — that if there are onlookers who are capable of saving the homeowner, the thief may not be killed — still applies. If they cannot save him — and how much more so if their own lives are also endangered — they have license to kill the thief.

See subsection 3. Obviously, if the only way to save one’s money is by striking the thief, one has full license to do so.

In previous eras, coins were not minted by precision machinery, and therefore were not perfectly round. Although they were fairly accurate in weight, their edges were quite uneven, raising the temptation to clip off the edges of gold or silver coins and pocket the value of those clippings. In some countries, this was deemed a criminal activity punishable by death. An accomplice of a coin-clipper was liable for similar punishment. Thus if one Jew engaged in coin-clipping, he could endanger his entire community. Accordingly, such a person would be considered a “pursuer” and the community was licensed to protect itself by identifying the criminal to the authorities (Nimukei R. Menachem MiRezburg [s.v. din mutar], appended to responsa of Mahari Veil).

It could be argued that in certain countries, similar principles apply with regard to forging paper currency, and, by extension, selling invalid securities and the like.

I.e., the ruling authorities will punish the entire Jewish community as a result of this individual’s actions.

Although the prohibition against informing on a fellow Jew to non-Jewish authorities is very severe (Hilchos Nizkei Mammon, subsection 6-7 above), it does not apply in this instance, because the welfare and even lives of others (or in the second clause, one’s own self) are involved.

See Imrei Yaakov, note 100, which applies the same principles with regard to a reckless driver.

Gittin 88b. Semichah refers to a special form of ordination, as Rambam (Hilchos Sanhedrin 4:1) writes:

Moshe our teacher ordained Yehoshua by [placing his] hands upon him, as [Bamidbar 27:23] states: “And he placed his hands upon him and commanded him.” Similarly, Moshe ordained the seventy judges, and the Divine Presence rested upon them. Those elders ordained others, and the others still others [in later generations. This tradition continued until the Talmudic era, when the Sages] received ordination one from the other [in a chain] extending back to the court of Yehoshua, and to the court of Moshe.

Some time after the composition of the Mishnah, this chain of tradition ceased, partially because this ordination could be conveyed only in Eretz Yisrael (Rambam, op. cit. 4:4) and the center of Torah study had shifted to Babylonia, and partially because the Romans cruelly sought to stamp it out (see Sanhedrin 14a). The ordination given to Rabbis afterwards, significant as it is, does not grant them the same authority as the Sages who were ordained in previous eras.

Gittin 84b. In his Hilchos Nizkei Mammon 2:8, Rambam defines a k’nas, financial penalty, as a levy where a person is required to pay more or less the actual monetary damage that he caused.

Fundamentally, all matters of Jewish Law should be adjudicated by a court of judges ordained with semichah, as reflected by Shmos 22:8: “To the Elokim shall come both their words.” Elokim refers to G‑d, the Supreme Judge, but is also used to refer to a court comprising of judges with semichah. Nevertheless, the Sages of the Mishnah entrusted the judges in Babylonia with the mission — and thus the authority — to adjudicate “cases that commonly occur, and which involve financial loss, e.g., admissions of liability, loans, and property damage” (Rambam, Hilchos Sanhed ­rin 5:9).

Rama, Choshen Mishpat 1:5, emphasizes that although present-day Jewish courts do not have the authority to impose the financial penalties prescribed by Scriptural Law, they do have the authority to impose financial penalties that they themselves institute.

Since theft involves a monetary loss and it occurs frequently, the judges of the present era are authorized to require the thief to return the stolen article or its value. Requiring payment of the appropriate penalty (the double payment required by Shmos 22:6), however, is beyond their authority (Rambam, op. cit. 5:13). This decision is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 1:3. In his gloss to that source, Rama states that this applies only to types of theft that occur frequently. Infrequent occurrences, e.g., armed robbery, are not adjudicated by the judges of the present era. If, however, the stolen article is extant, they should compel the robber to return it to its owner.

Sanhedrin 2a; Gittin 88b.

See Hilchos Onaah, subsections 28-32 above, regarding the severity of verbal abuse. See also Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), cited in note 10 above.

See Bava Kama 91a.

As mentioned in note 45, according to Scriptural Law, a person who injures his fellow man may be required to pay for five different types of damages. The Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit. 1:2, quotes the ruling of Rambam, who maintains that compensation for the inability to work and for medical expenses is considered a monetary loss, while compensation for damages to the victim’s body, the pain, and the embarrassment he suffers is considered a k’nas. Hence the former may be adjudicated by the judges of the present era, but not the latter. The Alter Rebbe, who empowers the court to coerce the offender “to appease the wronged party,” follows the ruling of the Tur and the Rama, which is based on the understanding of Rabbeinu Asher.

See Rambam, Hilchos Talmud Torah, chs. 6-7, for a description of what such a ban involves.

For a person who injures, wrongs, or embarrasses his fellow man has a moral and spiritual obligation to appease him. Indeed, as stated in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 606:1, such a person cannot secure atonement from G‑d until he appeases the person he wronged.

See, however, Tur, Choshen Mishpat, sec. 1, who writes that when a person injured a colleague and paid the sum Scriptural Law would prescribe (or close to it), but the injured party was not appeased, the court may still lift the ban of ostracism against him.See notes 46 and 47 above.

See Megilah 26a, 27a; Talmud Yerushalmi, Megilah 3:2; and commentaries, which describe the practice of appointing seven communal lay leaders who would manage the affairs of the community at large.

From the Alter Rebbe’s wording it is evident that if the offender possesses financial resources, it is preferable for the court to impose a monetary penalty rather than to subject him to corporal punishment.

According to Scriptural Law, the violation of transgressions between man and G‑d are punishable in such a manner.

For these punishments may only be administered by a court whose judges were ordained with semichah, as stated above (see Sanhedrin 2a, 41a).

Indeed, the Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 2:1, states that if the situation calls for this, a court can impose capital punishment even in the present era. The Alter Rebbe, however, omits this point. See Imrei Yaakov (Biurim), who discusses this issue.

As stated in the following subsection, the authority to take such action that is granted the court is a departure from the norm, and is only granted when the profligacy of the generation as a whole, or that of the particular offender, is such that such special and extreme measures are warranted.

See Talmud Yerushalmi, Megilah 3:2.

Gittin 36b.

Nechemiah 13:25. The Tanach is considered to contain 24 books, as the books of Ezra and Nechemiah are considered as a single volume. See also Moed Katan 16a.

See Bava Kama 96b, which speaks about a person who had established a reputation as a thief and was therefore deserving of harsh penalties.

As stated in Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin, ch. 24, the court has the right to impose corporal punishment on offenders.

See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 496:1-2, which speaks about placing a person under a ban of ostracism for violating the second day of a festival in the Diaspora (a Rabbinic institution), whereas punishing an offender with stripes for rebellious conduct for performing labors forbidden by Rabbinic Law on the first day of a festival. From the wording there, it appears that placing a person under ban is considered a more severe punishment than administering stripes for rebellious conduct.This is also evident from the distinction quoted in the next footnote.

See Moed Katan 17a and the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, op. cit. 496:3, which state that a Torah scholar should be given stripes for rebellious conduct rather than be placed under a ban of ostracism.

See ibid., 493:2, which mentions penalizing a person for violating the custom of not cutting one’s hair during the period of Counting of the Omer.

See subsection 2 above.

It would appear that the Alter Rebbe’s intent is that if two people engage in a violent encounter, they are both liable for the damages resulting from the injuries they inflict upon each other. Thus, the one who causes the most serious injury will be the one making payment even if he did not initiate the altercation.

I.e., the Alter Rebbe is emphasizing that the judges of the present era do not have the authority to punish a person with lashes as dictated by Scriptural Law. Instead, the punishment is only a remembrance of the pain that would be inflicted upon an offender by a court mandated to implement Scriptural Law.

Berachos 19b, et al. Out of respect for people’s honor, a Scriptural prohibition may be superseded as long as one remains passive and does not perform an action to violate it (the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 13:4). Alternatively, the intent is that out of respect for people’s honor, we are allowed to violate Rabbinic prohibitions even when it is necessary to perform an action. Since all Rabbinic prohibitions have their source in the Scriptural commandment (Devarim 17:11): “Do not deviate from the words [of the Sages],” such actions can be considered as superseding a Scriptural commandment (the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit., 311:2).

Shabbos 67b.

See Bava Kama 91a.

The Alter Rebbe’s words are based on those of Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin 2:7. There, Rambam mentions Scriptural sources for each of these requirements.

In his gloss to those halachos, Radbaz asks: “And what should be done if it is impossible to find judges in a particular city who possess these qualities?” He answersthat we should seek out three individuals who, between them all, possess all of these qualities, and appoint them as judges. Obviously, this is not a desirable option, but in no event, however, should a city be left without a Torah court. The Mabit (responsum 280), however, states that at least one of the judges must have all seven qualities listed. See also Rama, Choshen Mishpat 8:1.

Kin’as Eliyahu notes that in Hilchos Sanhedrin 2:13, Rambam writes: “All the judges who sit on a court must be Torah scholars and of befitting [character].” It can be inferred that to sit on a Rabbinic court as a judge, a person must possess at least some of these qualities.

Devarim 1:17. Sefer HaMitzvos (negative commandment 284) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 414) count this as one of the 613 mitzvos of the Torah.

The literal translation of the words תכיר פנים is “recognize the face.”

Sifri to Devarim 1:17.

Rashi (Sanhedrin 7b) interprets this as meaning that the judge gave a bribe to the governing authorities to appoint him. In that vein, see Avnei Nezer, Yoreh Deah, responsum 465, which cites a ban of ostracism forbidding communities to accept Rabbis or halachic authorities who — or whose supporters — paid money for their appointment. From the words of Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin 3:8; Rivash (the conclusion of responsum 271), it would appear that the intent is that the judge was appointed in appreciation of his wealth. It appears that the Alter Rebbe follows this interpretation.

Talmud Yerushalmi, Bikkurim 3:3.

Shmos 20:20. A printing error appears to have crept into the Alter Rebbe’s citation of the verse.

This interpretation, mentioned by the Talmud Yerushalmi, loc. cit., is suggested by the use of the Hebrew term א-לקים which can refer to either G‑d or judges.

With regard to the denigration of false deities, see Sanhedrin 63b.