The Laws Governing Wayfarers and [Consideration For] the Pain Suffered by Animals

Even a non-Jew; see subsection 8.

I.e., any animal. Although the prooftext mentions “a donkey,” that is only because they were the beasts of burden most commonly used in that age (Bava Kama 54b).

There is a difference of opinion among the commentaries if this mitzvah also applies to a person who fell because of the weight of his burden. See the responsa of Rashba, Vol. I, responsum 252; Radbaz, Vol. III, responsum 728, et al.

We do not say that since the owner overloaded his animal, he alone should bear the responsibility of removing its burden. The rationale is that perhaps he did so unintentionally. Alternatively, the mitzvah of unloading is primarily intended to alleviate the animal’s suffering and that purpose applies even if the owner purposefully overloaded the animal.

Bava Metzia 32a.

Sefer HaMitzvos (positive commandment 202) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 80) include this charge as one of the 613 mitzvos. A blessing is not recited over the performance of this mitzvah because the owner may refuse the offer of assistance (the responsa of Rashba, Vol. I, responsum 18 et al.).

Shmos 23:5.

For he will be left alone in the midst of a journey with no one to assist him in reloading the animal.

This implies that if the original burden was greater than the animal could carry, one is not required to help the owner load that entire burden, only as much as the animal can bear.

Devarim 22:4.

Sefer HaMitzvos (positive commandment 203) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 541) both include this charge as a separate commandment in their reckoning of the 613 mitzvos. See subsection 3 for details regarding when this mitzvah applies.

The Alter Rebbe is borrowing the wording of Rambam, Hilchos Rotzeiach 13:2. The commentaries to that source suggest either amending that text to read: “He has negated the observance of two positive commandments,” or understanding Rambam’s words to mean that by failing to perform either of these acts — unloading and reloading — one negates the performance of a positive commandment and violates a negative commandment.

Sefer HaMitzvos (negative commandment 270) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 540) both include this prohibition as a separate commandment in their reckoning of the 613 mitzvos.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), the Alter Rebbe states that the words in parentheses are based on the statements of the Sefer Meiras Einayim 272:3. The Alter Rebbe indicates that the person’s obligation extends beyond such an instance. Even if the burden is so heavy that the animal is not able to continue carrying it for a long period without resting, one would be obligated to unload it and reload it (see a parallel situation in Bava Metzia 30b). It appears that the parentheses were added to the text, because the Alter Rebbe questioned whether these additions were necessary.

See subsection 7 and notes with regard to the contrast between this ruling and the ruling there.

In Biblical Hebrew, the compound form of the verb (e.g., azov ta’azov), in which the imperative verb (ta’azov) is reinforced by the insertion of the infinitive (azov), simply intensifies it. Hence it is translated as, “You must certainly help him.” Our Sages perceived that the initial infinitive command azov is emphatic enough to require the performance of the action repeatedly, as if to say, “You shall do this action repeatedly — indeed, even a hundred times,” and the imperative command ta’azov is added to teach the concept stated in subsection 7 (Bava Metzia 32a; Tosefta, Bava Metzia 2:10; Tosefos Yom Tov, Bava Metzia 2:9; Sefer Meiras Einayim 272:7).

Bava Metzia 33a; a parsah is a Persian measure of distance, equivalent to four mil, approximately 4 kilometers.

Imrei Yaakov (note 10) suggests that the obligation to accompany the animal applies only when it appears likely that the animal will fall again. If it is appears that the animal will be able to proceed on its own, the person who offered assistance need not accompany it. He states, however, that he did not find any prior Rabbinic sources that support this conclusion.

I.e., in this situation, the animal’s suffering is not an issue.

Sefer Meiras Einayim 272:7 states that since a person is obligated to perform this mitzvah without charge, he is forbidden to accept payment for it. There is room to say that even if the owner of the animal offers payment on his own volition, giving him the money as a gift, it is forbidden to accept it. There are, however, more lenient views that do not accept this restriction (see Imrei Yaakov, note 11).

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe cites Tosafos, Bava Metzia 32b, s.v. mi lo askinin, who state that this approach follows the opinion of Rava, who explains that we should deduce the motivating rationale for the Torah’s commandments. The fact that the Torah requires one to unload an animal without charge but allows him to charge for reloading it indicates that we take the animal’s suffering into account. Tosafos, s.v. michlal, notes that this perspective differs from the perspective of another Sage, Rabbi Yossi HaGalili, who makes a different distinction between these two obligations.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe cites Bava Metzia 88b, which states that, according to Scriptural Law, a person is not even obligated to feed his own animal. Even if the animal is dying of thirst, he is not required to give it water, although the water costs less than a p’rutah. From Shabbos 155b, it appears that one is obligated to feed his own animals, but that can be understood as merely a Rabbinic obligation. According to this view, the obligation to feed one’s animals before he himself eats (Berachos 40a, based on Devarim 11:15) is merely an asmachta (a Rabbinical obligation associated with a verse, but not derived from it).

The Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain that certain authorities require a person to unload a fallen animal in order to alleviate its suffering although thereby he will incur financial loss. According to this opinion, a distinction is made between pain that an animal feels naturally (i.e., hunger), which a person is not obligated to suffer a loss to alleviate, and pain to which an animal is subjected because of human activity (i.e., an animal who falls under his burden), which he is obligated to alleviate.

It is, however, obvious that this distinction is not accepted by all authorities, as evidenced by the ruling that permits an animal to be milked by a non-Jew on Shabbos. Although the pain caused by the build-up of milk comes naturally, provisions are made to alleviate it as well.

Hilchos Metziah U’Fikadon, subsection 34 above. There it was explained that even if a rescuer’s loss of profit is minor and the lost article is extremely valuable, the rescuer’s personal interests take priority. This is derived from the verse (Devarim 15:4): “May there be no poor among you.” Our Sages (Bava Metzia 33a) understand that verse as serving as a charge to avoid impoverishing situations. Although here the animal’s suffering could also be considered a significant factor, the person’s own financial situation is considered to be of greater priority.

Bava Metzia 88b. As the Alter Rebbe states in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), this applies even if the loss is less than a p’rutah.

He is, however, obligated to feed his own animal. Although, as mentioned in the Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), there is a question as to whether this obligation is Scriptural or Rabbinic, all agree, that such an obligation exists.

See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 305:7, which states that consideration for an animal’s suffering is a Scriptural obligation.

See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 156:3, which explains that we should endeavor to have our character traits model G‑d’s attributes.

Shabbos 155b. Since dogs do not receive much food, G‑d caused their food to take a long time to digest, and as long as they are still digesting their food, they will not be hungry. See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 324:7, which quotes this concept as a rationale for permitting one to feed an ownerless dog on Shabbos.

Shabbos, op. cit.

Here as well, there is a question as to whether the obligation is Scriptural or Rabbinic, but all agree that this obligation exists.

Bava Metzia 32b.

One is, however, obligated to unload the fallen animal even if the non-Jew does not pay, as stated in subsection 8.

Similarly, a person may cause suffering to an animal to prevent financial loss (see Hilchos Shemiras Guf VeNefesh, the conclusion of subsection 8 below; Imrei Yaakov, note 19).

I.e., just as in ritual slaughter, where an animal’s suffering is permitted for the sake of human benefit, so too, in all instances, man is allowed to subject an animal to suffering for his benefit.

A further point, however, must also be made. Although ritual slaughter is permitted, care must be taken not to subject the animal to excessive pain. Similarly, in other instances, although one is permitted to cause an animal suffering, excessive and unnecessary suffering must be avoided.

E.g., as food for a sick person or to produce medication from parts of their bodies. Similarly, medical experiments may be carried out upon animals, since the purpose is for human welfare (Responsa Shvus Yaakov, Vol. III, responsum 71).

For example, a person may slaughter an animal to feed it to his dogs (the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 1:40). Contemporary authorities differ as to whether inflicting pain upon animals is limited to “human needs” or is permitted even in order to make a profit. See Nishmas Avraham (Yoreh Deah 28:2).

Although obviously this would involve some pain. (Goose feathers were used for pillows, blankets, and the like.)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 4), the Alter Rebbe cites his sources: Darkei Moshe (Choshen Mishpat 272:1) and Nimukei Yosef (Bava Metzia 17b). He states that the wording used by the Nimukei Yosef implies that the license a person has to cause suffering to animals due to consideration for his dignity is only when the suffering he causes is passive (as in the present instance, when he remains passive and does not unload the animal), but this does not give him license to actively cause an animal suffering. The Nimukei Yosef’s position appears to be based on Berachos 19b, which states that respect for human dignity overrides even a Scriptural commandment, provided that the violation is of a passive nature. Respect for human dignity does not allow one to actively violate a Scriptural commandment.

The Alter Rebbe explains that the two instances are not entirely alike. The passage in Berachos concerns a Scriptural prohibition, while concern for the suffering of an animal is comparable to a financial matter, which is judged more leniently. Accordingly, the Alter Rebbe maintains that, as with the fulfillment of all other personal needs, concern for one’s dignity overrides the suffering of an animal even when this entails actively causing it suffering.

I.e., either a scholar or an elder; he need not possess both virtues. Indeed, the leniency applies to anyone who is shown respect and honor because of a particular quality, e.g., wealth or family lineage (Hilchos Metziah U’Fikadon, subsection 36 above).

I.e., observers may look askance at a distinguished person involving himself in such a menial activity. When would unloading an animal not be considered as befitting his honor? When he would not do so even if his own animal were involved (ibid., subsection 35).

Ibid.

There it is explained that a person should go beyond the mandates of the law and seek to return a lost object in all situations. In such an instance, however, it is possible that while returning the lost object, he degrades the honor of the Torah. Rather than do so, if a scholar desires to go beyond the mandates of the law, he should make financial restitution for the article with his own funds. Similarly, in this situation, he should use his own financial resources to have others unload the animal, but should not undertake the task himself.

Bava Metzia 33a. In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), the Alter Rebbe explains that because of the distance, not only is the person exempt from fulfilling the mitzvah of unloading the animal, he is also not obligated to show concern for the animal’s suffering. Even if he is offered payment, he need not go to unload the animal.

Shmos 23:4.

Approximately 130 meters in contemporary measure, according to Shiurei Torah.

In which instance he is not offering financial assistance to a fellow man but merely relieving the animal’s suffering.

I.e., other types of suffering, in which instance he is not fulfilling the mitzvah of unloading an animal.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), the Alter Rebbe notes that certain Rabbinic prohibitions are waived for the sake of relieving the suffering of an animal (see the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, Orach Chayim 305:19, 498:10) even though the person does not necessarily see the suffering animal. Seemingly, this would indicate that the obligation to relieve an animal’s suffering applies even when one does not see the animal.

In resolution, the Alter Rebbe postulates that alleviating an animal’s suffering does not override a Rabbinic safeguard. Instead, since the Sages saw the emphasis the Torah places on alleviating an animal’s suffering, they did not enforce their decrees in instances where such suffering is involved. Therefore, if a person wants to assist the animal that is suffering, he is permitted to do so.

In the instances the Alter Rebbe cites, the person is not assisting the animal because of his concern for its suffering. (And, indeed, because he does not see the animal, he has no obligation to alleviate his suffering.) He seeks to assist the animal for his own financial benefit. Nevertheless, our Sages took into consideration the suffering of the animal and in such instances refrained from enforcing their decrees.

Bava Metzia 31a.

Ibid., 32a. In which instance the person who encounters him is obligated to unload the animal alone.

As stated in subsection 3 above.

Although in subsection 2 the Alter Rebbe states that if the animal falls repeatedly, one is obligated to unload it and reload it again and again, there is a distinction between that instance, where the animal falls unwillingly, and here, where it is in the habit of frequently lying down.

Bava Metzia 33a.

Implied is that if the non-Jew could unload his animal alone, there is no obligation to help him.

In contrast to the laws that apply with regard to a Jew, as stated in the previous subsection.

As explained by the Beis Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 272), even though there is a question whether the mitzvah of unloading the animal applies since the burden belongs to a non-Jew, there is a binding obligation to relieve the animal’s suffering.

For example, the road was overly muddy, or was washed out.

As mentioned in note 2, the concept of relieving suffering also applies with regard to a human being. Accordingly, it can be said that there is an obligation to help a person whose car malfunctioned or who was involved in an accident, as long as one does not place himself in personal danger by doing so. See Imrei Yaakov, note 35.

Since the non-Jew is not present, there is no possibility of enmity arising.

Bava Metzia 32b.

From Rashbam’s commentary to Pesachim 113b, our Sages’ question can be understood as follows: The Torah does not concern itself with the wicked. Why, then, would it communicate a mitzvah in a manner that mentions hatred, a behavior that runs contrary to the Torah’s standards?

Vayikra 19:17.

Pesachim 113b.

I.e., not together with another witness. He thus cannot testify against him in court, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain.

If he did not administer a warning, it could be that the other person transgressed unknowingly. Hence, the onlooker should not hate the transgressor.

For the testimony of one witness is of no consequence in such instances. Hence he is forbidden to bring the matter to court, for his testimony will do nothing more than tarnish the reputation of his fellow man, as stated in Hilchos Edus, subsection 1 above.

Were there to be two witnesses, there would be no reason for the witnesses to hate the transgressor, for they could bring him to court and see that he be punished for his transgressions. And once a transgressor receives the punishment due him, he is fully regarded as one’s brother (see Makkos 23a).

Pesachim 113b.

And thus should be hated.

Rambam, Hilchos Rotzeiach 13:14, explains the rationale for this obligation, stating that we are afraid:

Lest he tarry [on the road] because of his money and be brought to danger. For the Torah showed concern for the lives of the Jewish people, both the wicked and the righteous, for they are [all] attached to G‑d and believe in the fundamentals of [our] faith. And it is written (Yechezkel 33:11): “Say to them, ‘As I live,’ says G‑d, the L‑rd, ‘do I desire the death of a wicked man? [I desire] that the wicked return from his path and live.’”

I.e., and not as an act of rebellion against G‑d. See Hilchos Metziah U’Fikadon, subsection 39 above.

A similar order of precedence applies with regard to performing favors for two individuals, one whom he hates for invalid reasons and one whom he loves (Ahavas Chesed 4:3).

Vayikra 19:18.

As described in the previous subsection.

While there is no mitzvah to hate a person who caused one personal pain, until the wrongdoer asks for forgiveness, the injured party is not forbidden against doing so. The rationale is that one is permitted to hate another person who sins, and causing pain and aggravation to another person is also a sin (Imrei Yaakov, Biurim).

Imrei Yaakov maintains that the Alter Rebbe enclosed this ruling in parentheses because he was not certain of its validity and considered the possibility of revising it. Although that is one of the reasons the Alter Rebbe used parentheses in his text, he would also employ them to highlight new ideas that were not explicitly mentioned by previous authorities (Shaar HaKollel 1:2). See also Toras Chabad (Mondshine), Vol. II, p. 23.

Vayikra 19:15.

Devarim 16:20.

Sanhedrin 32b. See the conclusion of subsection 13, which states that the verse from Vayikra refers to arranging a compromise.

Even in a place where there is room for judgment, it is desirable to first seek “righteousness,” i.e., a compromise. As the Shulchan Aruch of R. Yosef Caro (Choshen Mishpat 12:2) states, when litigants come to court, an effort should first be made to have them agree to a compromise. The instance above refers to a situation where a judgment is not possible — for it is unlikely that a court will be convened to resolve such an impasse. Therefore our Sages prescribed these formulae for compromise.

As evident from the following subsection, at that time, such journeys were dangerous and a person left to make the journey alone would be placed in a perilous situation.

Imrei Yaakov (note 51) maintains that the obligation to wait applies only when the members of the company had agreed to travel together at the outset. If, by contrast, they had met on the way and proceeded to journey together, one is not required to wait for the other.

Implied is that they should wait with him for a brief time until he decides upon a course of action.

So that if there is a hazardous situation, the other wagon will encounter it first and the second wagon will thus be able to avoid that danger.