Shulchan Aruch: Chapter 518 - The Laws Governing the Transfer [of Objects] from One Domain to Another on a Festival

See sec. 495:13, where the Alter Rebbe bestows a special blessing upon those who are stringent and refrain from carrying muktzeh on the festivals.

See sec. 522, where the Alter Rebbe mentions various articles that are prohibited to be carried in a public domain and a karmelis on a festival.

Beitzah 12a.

See sec. 497:31 and sec. 499:5, where the Alter Rebbe issues similar rulings, permitting certain activities that are not at all necessary for the person to adequately rejoice on the festival. As explained in those sources, if these activities are not permitted, the person will likely refrain from performing activities that are permitted, and which are necessary for him to adequately rejoice on a festival.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to an instance where the person would not be using his Siddur or machzor at home later that day. However, if the person needs to use the Siddur or machzor at home on that day, he is permitted to bring it from the synagogue.

See sec. 512:1, 7, where the Alter Rebbe emphasizes that in a town where there is no eruv, a Jew may only transfer objects from one domain to another if the transfer results in directly benefitting a Jew on the festival. However, if the object will benefit only a non-Jew – and similarly, an animal – it is forbidden.

See sec. 495:3, where the Alter Rebbe discusses similar issues.

See sec. 308:18, where the Alter Rebbe mentions a similar law.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe discusses when a person may and may not make transfers from one domain to another for the sake of a non-Jew on the festival.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the restrictions mentioned in subsection 1, above.

See sec. 372:1, where the Alter Rebbe mentions similar laws regarding carrying on Shabbos.

The term lechi refers to a post that is placed within three handbreadths of the entrance to a lane that is surrounded by three walls. According to Rabbinic Law, a lechi is considered as equivalent to a fourth wall. Thus, a lane that is enclosed on three sides and has a lechi at its entrance is considered to be surrounded by four barriers. See sec. 363:1.

Another halachic convention to enclose a lane that has three walls is to place a beam over the entrance to the lane. See sec. 363:1.

The Alter Rebbe uses the term tzuras hapesach, which we have translated as, “the frame of an entrance.” A tzuras hapesach is a halachic considered to be enclosed on all four sides. or an open portion of a wall to be considered as enclosed. See sec. 363:27.

This term refers to the halachic convention through which the residents of all the courtyards that lead to a lane join together as one group to enable them to carry in the lane. See sec. 365:10 and sec. 386.

See sec. 368:4, where the Alter Rebbe explains that a shituf or eruv can be made every week before Shabbos, or once a year for the entire year. As mentioned in the main text here, the common practice has become to make a shituf or eruv once a year, on the day before Pesach. In sec. 368:4, the Alter Rebbe states that it is preferable to make the eruv once a year on the day before Pesach, using matzah:

>>…it has become customary in these regions to make the eruv on the day preceding Pesach from a loaf of matzah, which will not rapidly become moldy. Also, in this way, the eruv can be kept during the days of Pesach as well as throughout the year. This is preferable to making an eruv every Friday, because it is possible that on one occasion [the people] will forget to make the eruv.

See sec. 366:18, where the Alter Rebbe writes the complete text to be recited when establishing an eruv for courtyards. It should be noted that in this text, as well as in the text listed in his Siddur, the Alter Rebbe does not mention having the eruv function on festivals. The Lubavitch custom is to use the wording listed in the Alter Rebbe’s Siddur when establishing an eruv.

See sec. 368:4, where the Alter Rebbe explains the advantage of establishing a new eruv/shituf each week.

Beitzah 28b.

Ibid. See also sec. 308:28, 49.

See sec. 495:13, where this concept is discussed in detail.

The Alter Rebbe uses the term letzorech gufo, which we have translated as, “to use it for a permitted activity.”. See sec. 308:12.

See sec. 308:8, where the Alter Rebbe presents the prohibition against moving objects that are not keilim on Shabbos.

See sec. 502:8 and sec 507:7, where the Alter Rebbe mentions related laws regarding moving articles that are not classified as keilim on festivals.

Although most people would not desire to use the piece of wood again, in this instance, the fact that the person would like to use it again as a spit shows that he regards it as an article that is useful for that purpose(Maharshal, Yam shel Shlomoh, Beitzah 3:24).

In that source, the Alter Rebbe writes:

>>It is permitted to carry [articles that are] muktzeh for the sake of food. For example, [if] stones are lying on fruit, it is permitted to move the stones to eat the fruit on a festival. [The rationale is that] moving muktzeh should not be regarded more severely than performing a melachah in a complete sense, which is permitted [on a festival] for the sake of eating.

Beitzah 9b.

A subsection relating to this issue is not extant in this section of the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Orach Chayim 308:19).

Badei HaShulchan 108:19, suggests that the original manuscript of the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, sec. 308, included a subsection dealing with the subject of ladders, but it was somehow omitted from the printed text.

See sec. 308:35, where the Alter Rebbe presents the laws regarding moving doors on Shabbos that have become detached. These laws are similar to the ones stated here.

In that subsection, the Alter Rebbe states that, according to the letter of the law, it is forbidden to move any limb of a corpse.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that it is permitted to touch an article that is muktzeh, provided the person does not move the article even slightly.

See sec. 308:14-15, where the Alter Rebbe explains that the prohibition against moving an article that is muktzeh applies only when one moves it by hand. If, however, one moves an article that is muktzeh with his feet or other limbs, it is permitted because he is moving it in an abnormal manner.

The rationale for this lenient ruling is as follows. Melachah on Shabbos and festivals is only forbidden only when it is melachas machsheves, “an intentional act.” This concept also applies to the Rabbinic prohibition against moving an article that is muktzeh, i.e., it is only forbidden to do so intentionally. However, if someone accidentally moves an object that is muktzeh, he is not liable.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to doves that do not fly, which the owner designated before the festival to be used as food on the festival. As the Alter Rebbe rules in sec. 497:17, on a festival, it is permitted to take such doves and slaughter them on a festival.

See Beitzah 9a.

See sec. 372:15, where the Alter Rebbe mentions climbing up the projections extending from a house.

See sec. 124:4, where the Alter Rebbe states:

>>(Indeed, even if the [situation for which the enactment was ordained] utterly ceased to exist, an enactment ordained by a vote of Sages remains in effect until it is annulled by another vote [by a Rabbinic body of greater standing], even though the reason for which the enactment was ordained no longer exists.

See also sec. 600:4, where the Alter Rebbe mentions another law based on this rationale.

As explained in sec. 308:75-76, the same laws apply to any repugnant substance.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe writes:

>>it is permitted to take out a chamber pot and a urinal to empty them in a dung heap, it is forbidden to return them to the home, because they are forbidden to be moved even when they are empty since they are so repugnant that they are not even fit to be used to cover a container….

>>If one must return [these items to his home] so that he will be able to relieve himself in them again on this day, it is permitted to return them by placing water that is permitted to be moved inside them….

>>There are authorities who permit returning [these articles] to a home by putting water inside of them under all circumstances, even if one will not need to relieve himself in them [later] that day or remove excrement with them. One should act stringently, following the first view.

>>Nevertheless, in an instance where [the possibility of] a loss is involved, e.g., the chamber pot is somewhat valuable… one may rely on the latter view….

>>All the above applies when one puts down [and releases] the chamber pot [from his hand] when he reaches the dung heap. When, however, the chamber pot remains in [the person’s] hand [the entire time], all authorities agree that it is permitted to return [the chamber pot to his home after emptying it] under all circumstances, even without placing water in it, as is the law regarding all articles that are muktzeh: Once they are already in [the person’s] hand, he is permitted to move [the articles] to any place he desires.... [However,] it is desirable to put water in [the chamber pot] even if it was in one’s hands the entire time.

Beitzah 27b. The intent is that the carcass can be cut up to be used as food for the dogs.

By contrast, on Shabbos, it is permitted to cut up the carcass of an animal that died that day even though it was not dangerously ill on the previous day, as stated in sec. 324:5.

As the Alter Rebbe explains in that source, the term nolad applies to:

>>Any entity that is not fit [to be used on Shabbos or a festival] for the purpose [for which] it was fit [to be used during] bein hashmashos… but rather […can be used] for another purpose…. [The rationale is that the possibility of] using [the broken utensil] for this [new] purpose first came into being (nolad) on [this] Shabbos or festival. On the previous day, this utensil was not designated and fit to be used in this manner.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe rules

>>With regard to the halachah, one should be stringent [and forbid] nolad on festivals, since there are authorities who maintain that even muktzeh is forbidden on [festivals]. On Shabbos, however, even nolad should be permitted, since fundamentally [the halachah] follows this view.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1) to this section, the Alter Rebbe refers to his ruling in sec. 497:28 and to his Kuntreis Acharon (note 6 to that section). In these sources, the Alter Rebbe explains why the carcass of an animal that died on a festival is considered to be nolad and not muktzeh. Consult those sources and footnote 98 to sec. 497. See also subsection 20 below, and the Kuntreis Acharon (note 5, summarized in footnote 70, below), where the Alter Rebbe elaborates regarding the difference between nolad and muktzeh.

The Alter Rebbe’s ruling in the main text here implies that if before the festival, the owner had thought of using the wood for kindling on the festival, he would be permitted to do so. In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2) to this section, the Alter Rebbe’s explains this ruling. The Alter Rebbe begins by referring to his Kuntreis Acharon (note 9) to sec. 495, where he focuses on the difference between objects that were set aside through the person’s intent alone and those that were set aside through an action. As explained in that source, objects that are set aside via an action are only permitted to be used on a festival due to an action which changes their status. By contrast, if an object was set aside only through thought, then a thought alone is sufficient to change its status.

In the Kuntreis Acharon (note 9) to sec. 495, the Alter Rebbe then proceeds to analyze the category into which wood that was brought into a storeroom should be placed, concluding that it is considered to have been set aside by thought and not by an action. The Alter Rebbe substantiates this conclusion in the Kuntreis Acharon here, explaining that Pesachim 8a mentions a person taking wine and oil from his storehouses during a meal. That action indicates that the person never entirely diverted his attention from using the wine and oil, despite the fact that they were set aside in a storehouse. Therefore, the Alter Rebbe concludes that simply placing an object in a storeroom is not sufficient to classify the object as having been set aside. Thus, the wood mentioned in the main text here is considered to have been set aside by thought and not by an action. Accordingly, it is sufficient to prepare the wood for use by simply thinking of using it on the festival before the start of the festival.

Beitzah 30a.

The straw is considered to be prepared for kindling because that is the only purpose that it could serve.

One might think that the straw would be considered muktzeh since it had been stored away, with the intent not to use it at the present time. However, the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain why this is not so.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the leniencies mentioned in subsection 12, above.

See also sec. 497:11. In both these sources the Alter Rebbe explains that the designation of an entity as muktzeh is defined by its situation at bein hashmashos, regardless of whether or not the person involved is aware of that situation.

See sec. 501:1, where the Alter Rebbe makes a similar comment.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the leniencies mentioned in subsection 12, above.

See Bava Basra 19b.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the stringencies mentioned in the subsection 14 and in subsection 12 above.

Beitzah 30a.

See sec. 495:13.

As the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain, he is referring to removing wood from a sukkah used for shade on festivals other than the festival of Sukkos.

Beitzah 30b.

If the sukkah was being used to fulfill the mitzvah of sitting in a sukkah on the festival of Sukkos, every component of the sukkah is considered muktzeh because it is being used for the mitzvah. See (see sec. 308:10; see also sec. 514:24). Moreover, as explained in sec. 638:1-2, there is a unique dimension of severity associated with making use of articles that become part of a sukkah (see the notes to subsection 19, below). However, as the Alter Rebbe specified in the main text, the prohibitions mentioned here even apply when the sukkah in question was not being used to fulfill a mitzvah.

Beitzah 30b. Dismantling a structure is one of the melachos forbidden on a festival.

When mentioning this prohibition in the main text here, the Alter Rebbe uses the word binyan, which we have translated as “structure.” Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim, notes that Beitzah, loc. cit., speaks of dismantling an ohel, i.e., a “tent,” and wonders why the Alter Rebbe changes the word ohel to binyan. Furthermore, Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim wonders why in sec. 638:13, the Alter Rebbe rules that one who removes reeds that are being used to support the walls of a sukkah on the festival of Sukkosis not considered to be dismantling an ohel, i.e., a “tent.” Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim resolves this difficulty by suggesting that perhaps the Alter Rebbe uses the word ohel, “tent” when referring to something built for the short term and the word binyan, “structure” when speaking of something built as a more permanent structure. However, in subsection 18 below, the Alter Rebbe uses the word ohel, “tent,” when referring to a sukkah of a more permanent nature.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe supports his stringent ruling in the main text, explaining that it is based on Turei Zahav 518:6. The Alter Rebbe begins by noting that both Maharshal (Yam shel Shlomoh, Beitzah 4:3) and Magen Avraham (518:11 rule leniently in this matter, and maintain that it is only forbidden to remove reeds that are being used to reinforce the wall of a sukkah before the person finishes building the wall. According to this lenient ruling, once the wall is completed, it is permitted to remove the reeds. However, the Alter Rebbe then explains that Turei Zahav based his ruling on Talmud Yerushalmi, Beitzah 4:2, which states that if the person places the reeds next to walls to thicken them, the reeds are considered to be part of the walls, Hence, one who removes those reeds is considered to be dismantling a structure.

Talmud Yerushalmi, Beitzah 4:2.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 4), the Alter Rebbe explains that he based his ruling on Turei Zahav 518:6, which is based on the Tur (Orach Chayim 518). In that ruling, the Tur writes: “If after he arranged the walls and the s’chach [of a sukkah], he placed bundles next to [the sukkah] but did not join them with it…, he is permitted to take them.” Hence, even if the person’s intent when placing the reeds next to the walls of the sukkah was to strengthen and support the walls, he may nevertheless remove the reeds on a festival provided the reeds were not placed there to make the walls thicker.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the lenient rulings subsection 17 and subsection 16 above.

It appears that the word “wall” is a printing error, and the intent is “s’chach.”

See sec. 629:22, where the Alter Rebbe issues a similar ruling with respect to using bundles of straw or wood as s’chach, when they were originally set out to dry on the roof of a sukkah intended for the sake of observing the mitzvah. The Alter Rebbe explains that these bundles may not be used as s’chach since they were not placed on the roof for the purpose of providing shade. Moreover, our Sages instituted a restrictive decree disqualifying the use of all bundles as s’chach, lest a person err, and think he is fulfilling the mitzvah to sit in the sukkah when sitting under bundles that were placed on top of the s’chach to dry.

See sec. 638:1-2, where the Alter Rebbe writes:

>>[Our Sages state:] Just as G‑d’s holy name abides upon things that are consecrated, and hence, it is forbidden to derive benefit from them, so, too, His holy name abides upon the sukkah, as it is written,”... the Sukkos festival for seven days unto G‑d.”…

>>[In this context,] the term sukkah refers to the s’chach alone. Therefore, there is a Scriptural prohibition against making use of the branches used for the s’chach throughout the seven days of the festival….

>>According to Rabbinic Law, it is also forbidden to make use of the wood used for the walls [of the sukkah] throughout the seven days of the festival….

>>The walls are not the fundamental component of the sukkah. Nevertheless, since they were designated for the mitzvah of the sukkah, the sanctity of the sukkah abides upon them, and hence one may not benefit from them, as with [the s’chach] itself.

Thus, the prohibition against making use of the s’chach or walls of a sukkah that was built to fulfill the mitzvah of sitting in the sukkah is unusually severe. Accordingly, even the authorities who maintain that on a festival it is permitted to make use of articles that are classified as muktzeh do not permit making use of an entity that has become part of the s’chach or walls of a sukkah on the festival of Sukkos.

As stated at the end of subsection 19 above, the Alter Rebbe is not referring to a sukkah used to fulfill the mitzvah of sitting in a sukkah on the festival of Sukkos.

See subsection 16 and subsection 18 above.

Beitzah 30b. See also sec. 501:1.

The beraisa in Beitzah 30b presents different views regarding when it may be permissible to take wood from a sukkah. The beraisa presents Rabbi Shimon’s view, that the prohibition of muktzeh does not usually apply to wood taken from a sukkah that was not built to fulfill the mitzvah of sitting in a sukkah. However, even Rabbi Shimon would agree that it is forbidden to move wood from a sukkah that fell down on a festival, because, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain, the wood is nolad.

The rationale for classifying the wood as nolad is as follows: before the festival, the wood was an intrinsic part of the sukkah. Therefore, it would be forbidden to use that wood for another purpose on the festival because doing so would entail dismantling a structure on the festival. In contrast to this, if the sukkah falls down on the festival, although as Rabbi Shimon maintains, the wood may not be muktzeh, it is nevertheless nolad because it is now considered to be plain pieces of wood rather than part of a structure. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see footnote 70, below.

See sec. 509:16 and the Kuntreis Acharon (note 3) to that section. As explained in those sources, on a festival, it is forbidden to perform an act with the physical substance of an article that is muktzeh. The rationale is that using an article in this manner is equivalent to moving it, and it is forbidden to move articles that are classified as muktzeh on a festival.

The term bein hashmashos is commonly translated as “dusk.” For a more precise definition of that term, see sec. 261:1. That source explains that the term refers to a period of time concerning which there is a doubt whether or not night has fallen.

(According to the Alter Rebbe’s ruling in his Siddur, Seder Hachnasas Shabbos, this refers to the time between sunset and the appearance of three medium-size stars. See also sec. 261:1, 5, sec. 331:5, and the footnotes to those sources, which present a different perspective.)

The Alter Rebbe discusses the prohibition against moving an article set aside by human activity in sec. 279:1, stating:

>>When a lamp was kindled while it was still day [on Friday] and burned until after nightfall – even if it burnt out afterwards – it is forbidden to carry it for the entire Shabbos…. [The reason for the stringency is that] bein hashmashos, when the lamp was burning, it was forbidden to move it, even for the sake of a permitted purpose or for the sake of its place, because it then served as the base for the flame burning in it, which is muktzeh. Hence, the lamp similarly became muktzeh. Since it was intentionally set aside as muktzeh – for he intentionally set it aside when he kindled it and made it a base for an article that is (prohibited [as]) muktzeh – during bein hashmashos, the beginning of the onset of Shabbos, it is deemed as muktzeh for the entire Shabbos, as will be explained in sec. 310[:11].

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), the Alter Rebbe discusses his ruling in the main text, and explains why he classifies wood that fell from a sukkah as nolad. The Alter Rebbe explains that the basis for the rulings in this and some of the previous subsections is the following passage in Beitzah 30b:

>>Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef taught [the following beraisa] before Rabbi Yochanan: One may not take wood from the sukkah [itself]… Rabbi Shimon permits [one to take wood from the sukkah. All] agree that it is prohibited [to remove wood from a] sukkah [that was built for] the festival [of Sukkos] during [that] festival. [Regarding a sukkah on another festival,] if [initially] one stipulated [that he would be permitted to use its wood for other purposes,] everything follows his stipulation.

>>]Does] Rabbi Shimon permit [one to take wood from the sukkah itself]? Isn’t one dismantling a tent?

>>Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: Here, we are dealing with a sukkah [that has already] collapsed. Rabbi Shimon is following his [established line of] reasoning, that there is no prohibition of muktzeh, as was taught: “Oil remaining in a lamp [that was kindled before Shabbos, but which burnt out]… is forbidden. Rabbi Shimon permits it.”

>>[A question is raised:] How can [the two situations] be compared? A person expects that his lamp will burn out, but does a person expect his sukkah to collapse?

>>Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: Here, we are dealing with a sukkah that is not sturdy. Thus, from the previous day, [the eve of the festival, the owner already] had in mind [to use] it.

Rambam (Hilchos Sh’visas Yom Tov 2:14) accepts the well-known approach of Rabbi Yehudah who differs with Rabbi Shimon and maintains that the prohibition of muktzeh applies on festivals. Nevertheless, Rambam does not cite the law that mentions using wood that fell from a sukkah that is not sturdy. In his Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 518), this omission is problematic, for it seems that the wood did not become muktzeh because its owner made a stipulation before the start of the festival, and therefore never diverted his attention from it. Thus, it would seem that even Rabbi Yehudah would permit using that wood. Why then did Rambam not mention this law?

Rav Yosef Caro resolves this issue by positing that the entire passage quoted above applies only according to Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning. As Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak explains, Rabbi Shimon maintains that if, on the day before the festival the sukkah is not sturdy, it is not necessary to make any verbal stipulation regarding using the wood. Instead, if the sukkah falls on the festival, the owner is permitted to use its wood because it is assumed that he intended to use the wood should the sukkah fall. However, if on the day preceding the festival, the sukkah is sturdy, then the owner must make some sort of a stipulation, whether it is spoken or whether the owner actively thinks, that if the sukkah falls down despite being well built, he may use its wood on the festival. However, according to Rabbi Yehudah, the sukkah is considered muktzeh regardless of whether or not such a stipulation is made, and hence, the stipulation is not effective in permitting the wood to be used on the festival.

Magen Avraham 518:13 questions the understanding of Rambam and Rav Yosef Caro of Rabbi Yehudah’s position. for he understands the passage from Beitzah, loc. cit., as implying that even Rabbi Yehudah would agree that a stipulation made before the beginning of the festival should be effective. After all, the concept of muktzeh is based on the assumption that the person diverted his attention from the object in question. However, if the person made a stipulation before the beginning of the festival that should the sukkah fall down on the festival, he would be able to use the wood, then he clearly has not diverted his attention from using the wood. The Alter Rebbe resolves this issue with his ruling in the main text, that a stipulation is not effective because the issue involved is not one of muktzeh, but one of nolad.

The Alter Rebbe substantiates his argument, by citing a ruling from Shabbos 29a, [quoted by Rav Yosef Caro in his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 501:7) and the Alter Rebbe 501:16,] that if one eats nuts and almonds on a festival, the shells may not be used for kindling on that festival because of nolad. As the Alter Rebbe explains, this is because the present state of the shells – that they appear as an independent entity – is an entirely new development that came about on the festival. Hence, the shells are deemed nolad. Even though it can be assumed that the person eating the nuts might have thought of using their shells for kindling before the festival, that is not sufficient to permit their use.

The Alter Rebbe then offers the following explanation regarding why a stipulation is not effective regarding nolad based on the interpretation of Tosafos, Shabbos 44a. Tosafos explains that Rabbi Yehudah would rule that it is forbidden to move a lamp that burnt out on Shabbos. Even though, as stated in the passage from Beitzah, loc. cit., a person expects that his lamp will burn out during the course of the Shabbos. Nevertheless, the rationale behind Tosafos’ interpretation is that the Shabbos prohibitions take effect at the beginning of bein hashmashos, and at that time the lamp was burning as a result of the person’s activity. Hence, it is set aside and forbidden for the entire Shabbos. The Alter Rebbe maintains that the same principles apply on a festival. For this reason, Magen Avraham 501:2 rules that even when a sukkah was shaky before the festival began, since its s’chach is intact before the festival, it is nonetheless considered part of the sukkah. Therefore, even if the owner intended to use the s’chach on the festival were it to fall, his intent is not significant and he is forbidden to use it.

Nevertheless, Magen Avraham’s rulings concerning this matter are somewhat paradoxical. In sec. 499:9, Magen Avraham rules that if an animal that is sick before the festival dies on the festival, the owner is permitted to cut up the carcass and feed it to dogs, provided he had in mind to do so were the animal to die on the festival. This implies that Magen Avraham does not consider the animal’s carcass to be nolad. (See subsection 11, above where the Alter Rebbe rules in a similar manner.) Moreover, it is not only Magen Avraham who rules in this manner, Rav Yosef Caro also renders this same decision.

The enigmatic nature of the subject is complicated the ruling in Shabbos 29a cited above, that the shells of nuts and almonds that were separated from the nuts on a festival are considered to be nolad, and are therefore forbidden to be used for kindling. Seemingly, before the festival a person would think of using the shells from the nuts he will eat on the festival as kindling. Thus, they should not be considered as nolad on the festival, in the same way the animal’s carcass mentioned in Magen Avraham 499:9 is not considered nolad.

The Alter Rebbe resolves this difficulty by distinguishing between the two instances. With regard to the nut shells, the Alter Rebbe explains that before they are separated from the nuts, the shells are considered to be totally secondary to the nuts, to the extent that they are halachically considered to be part of the nuts. Hence, since nuts are not used for kindling, it cannot be said that the shells were designated for kindling on the day before the festival, because at that time they were an unimportant part of the nuts, rather than an independent entity. Accordingly, it is only on the festival that the shells first became an independent entity that was fit to be used for kindling. Therefore, they are placed in the category of nolad (see Magen Avraham 499:9). By contrast, the animal that was sick on the day before the festival is an independent entity, and is not considered to be secondary to any other entity. Therefore, since the person had in mind to cut it up and feed it to the dogs if it died on the festival, the carcass is not considered to be nolad.

Seemingly, the same logic would apply regarding a sukkah; it too is an independent entity that is in no way secondary to anything else. Hence, if it was shaky before the festival and the person had in mind to use its wood for kindling if it fell, one would think it should be permitted to do so. For this reason, Magen Avraham explains that the reason behind the prohibition against using wood from the sukkah is because the wood is muktzeh.

Rambam has a different understanding. He rules that an animal that dies on the festival is forbidden because of muktzeh. Therefore, a stipulation is effective to enable it to be fed to the dogs. By contrast, the shells of the seeds are considered nolad and a stipulation is not effective for such an object.

On this basis, it is possible to understand Rambam’s ruling regarding wood from a sukkah that fell down on a festival. With regard to nolad, Rambam does not differentiate between an object that starts out being secondary to another one (like the nut shells) and an object that was always considered an independent entity (like the wood from the sukkah). He considers them both forbidden because of nolad. Therefore, a stipulation is not effective in permitting these entities to be used on the festival.

We can now understand the Alter Rebbe’s ruling in the main text as well. The concept that a stipulation is not effective in permitting the use of nolad is reflected in the ruling in sec. 505:3. In that source, the Alter Rebbe rules that if an animal that has been designated for milking was milked on a festival, the milk is considered to be nolad, even though before the festival the owner intended to express milk from the animal and then partake of the milk. Even if the animal was milked by a non-Jew, the milk is still forbidden as nolad.

In the Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe mentions another instance where an object that is nolad is forbidden to be used on a festival. In sec. 501:11, the Alter Rebbe rules that if a utensil broke on a festival, the pieces of the broken utensil may not be used for another purpose because they are classified as nolad. The Alter Rebbe illustrates this ruling with the example of a wood utensil that breaks on a festival. Since at the onset of the festival the object was considered a utensil, and now it is merely wood, the utensil is considered to have undergone a fundamental change. Therefore, the pieces of wood are categorized as nolad.

This same concept applies to a sukkah that fell down on a festival. Before the festival the wood was considered an intrinsic part of the sukkah. However, once the sukkah fell down, the wood is considered to have undergone a fundamental change, and was transformed from an intrinsic part of a sukkah to mere pieces of wood. Therefore, the wood is categorized as nolad.

In all of these instances, a stipulation is not effective because the object in question is considered to have undergone a fundamental change and become a new entity. Needless to say, a person could not have made a stipulation before the start of the festival about an entity that did not exist. By contrast, a sick animal that died on the festival is not considered to have undergone a fundamental change. Therefore, a stipulation regarding it is effective.

See sec. 495:13, where the Alter Rebbe explains that the common practice among Ashkenazim is to follow the authorities who rule that nolad is forbidden on a festival.

Beitzah 31b.

See subsection 22, below, where the Alter Rebbe rules that if the non-Jew opened the storehouse for the sake of a Jew, the produce stored inside would be forbidden.

See sec. 313: 17, where this prohibition is mentioned.

A question could be raised regarding the ruling in the main text based on the concept that one is only liable for destroying a structure when one does so with the intent to rebuild that structure (i.e., soser al menas livnos). It could be argued that in this instance, since one derives benefit from dismantling part of the structure – i.e., the produce becomes accessible – it is equivalent to destroying with the intent to rebuild. However, from the Alter Rebbe’s ruling in sec. 278:2, it does not appear that he accepts this logic.

See sec. 310:4, where the Alter Rebbe presents situations where this principle applies.

See sec. 394:3.

See sec. 515:1, 14, 22, where the Alter Rebbe explains that. the reason produce brought from outside a town’s festival limits is prohibited in certain instances is because we are concerned that the Jew may instruct a non-Jew to bring him produce from outside the festival limits in the future. That concern is not relevant in this instance.