Shulchan Aruch: Chapter 507 - The Laws [Governing] Baking on a Festival

Beitzah 34a. The term forni is derived from the same Greek term that is the root of the English word “furnace.”

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the ovens that were commonly used in Eastern Europe in his era.

Beitzah, loc. cit.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the restriction against baking in a new oven on a festival.

See subsection 16, below. See also sec. 447:9, where the Alter Rebbe defines a small oven as one that does not hold twelve esronim of matzah, i.e., an oven whose volume is less than 29,859.84 cc (1,010.88 fl. ounces).

In his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 507:1), Rav Yosef Caro interprets the term forni as referring to an oven of the post-Talmudic era rather than to one used during the Talmudic era.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1) to this section, the Alter Rebbe explains that although his ruling differs with that of Rav Yosef Caro, it is based on the rulings of Darchei Moshe (Orach Chayim 507:1) and Magen Avraham (see the introduction to Magen Avraham 507). True, Magen Avraham later retracted his ruling and ultimately ruled that the ovens of his era may not be heated for the first time on a festival because doing so causes them to be hardened and strengthened. (Some of the lack of clarity regarding this issue is due to the changes in the way ovens are built. In the Talmudic era, ordinary ovens were made of earthenware, while the ovens in the era of Magen Avraham and the Alter Rebbe were made of bricks coated with mortar.) However, the Alter Rebbe also cites Maharshal (Beitzah 2:15, who maintains that his ruling is sourced in those of Rif and Rambam), from whose words it is apparent that such a restriction does not apply and one may heat an oven for the first time on a festival, provided he does not cool it afterwards with cold water. See subsection 16, below.

This definition of the term antichi is based on Shabbos 41a.

See sec. 503:4, where the Alter Rebbe speaks about cooking on a festival and using the food after the festival.

As stated in that source, this wood is included in the decree enacted by the Sages forbidding eating or moving fruit that fell from a tree on Shabbos or a festival, lest one climb [the tree] and pick the fruit. See also sec. 325:8.

Beitzah 4b.

Although the Alter Rebbe presents two situations here ‒ that the wood either fell from the tree directly into the oven on a festival, or a non-Jew added wood to the oven on a festival, without the Jewish owner’s knowledge, ‒ the Talmud only mentions the instance when wood fell directly into the oven. Shitah Mekubetzes on Beitzah 4b comments that the Sages only granted this leniency because the instance described in the Talmud is a very uncommon occurrence. The implication is that the Sages would not grant leniency in a more common situation, i.e., that of a non-Jew placing wood in the oven.

The Alter Rebbe discusses this matter in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), substantiating his ruling in the main text that includes the instance when a non-Jew added wood to the oven. As a basis for his explanation, he cites the ruling of Rav Yosef Caro in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 99:6), which is based on Rashba, Toras HaBayis, (Bayis 4, shaar 3). In that source, Rav Yosef Caro rules that it is permitted to intentionally add permitted substances to a mixture of a permitted substance and a substance that is forbidden only by Rabbinic Law, and thus intentionally nullify the presence of the forbidden substance in the mixture. True, the Ashkenazic custom is to follow the rulings of the Tur and Rama (Yoreh Deah 99:6), which are based on Rabbeinu Asher’s ruling (Beitzah 1:2), and to forbid intentionally nullifying even a substance that is only forbidden by Rabbinic Law in a mixture. Nevertheless, the main text is speaking about using an oven for baking. In the Talmudic era, the dough to be baked would only be placed in the oven after the fuel used for kindling (in this instance, the mixture of forbidden and permitted wood) had been totally burned, so that all that remained were the resulting coals and the heat they generate. Thus, the person would not benefit directly from the forbidden fuel itself. The Alter Rebbe posits that the authorities who generally rule stringently would agree that in such an instance, it is permitted to intentionally nullify the Rabbinically forbidden substance and benefit from the heat generated by burning the mixture.

Support for this thesis can be brought from the Tur’s discussion in Orach Chayim 677. In that source, the Tur addresses the following issue: if oil from a Chanukah menorah, which is forbidden to be used for mundane purposes, became mixed with ordinary oil, causing the ordinary oil to be forbidden, is it permitted to add more oil to the mixture so as to nullify the oil from the Chanukah menorah? The Tur rules that it is forbidden to nullify the oil from the Chanukah menorah because the oil will continue to exist at the time one benefits from it. This implies that would the oil cease to exist at the time the person would derive benefit from it, it would be permitted to nullify its presence. Now, unlike the wood that fell into the oven, adding oil to a lamp is not an unusual situation. Thus, although a non-Jew placing wood in the oven is not considered unusual, since, unlike the oil mentioned by the Tur, the wood would no longer exist when one derives benefit from it, that benefit should be permitted.

One might posit that using the wood brought by the non-Jew is forbidden because it is forbidden to benefit from a prohibited melachah that a non-Jew performed for the sake of a Jew (see sec. 515:1). The Alter Rebbe addresses this issue in this Kuntreis Acharon, and explains that this restriction does not apply in this instance. The rationale is that the non-Jew is not performing a forbidden melachah; he is merely carrying muktzeh (see Rama, Orach Chayim 325:10). Indeed, Rama (Orach Chayim, 276:3) rules that a Jew is permitted to instruct a non-Jew to carry muktzeh. Leniency is certainly called for in this instance, because a) Rama (Orach Chayim 325:10) and Turei Zahav (Orach Chayim 325:1) permit using such wood, even as an initial preference, b) until the Jew nullifies the wood by adding more wood, the non-Jew’s action is of no avail whatsoever, and c) after the Jew adds wood, the wood the non-Jew added is of no importance and it is as if the Jew is not benefitting at all from the non-Jew’s actions.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to an instance when the wood that fell from a tree directly into the oven on the festival comprises the majority of the wood in the oven.

See sec. 442:14, where the Alter Rebbe states: “[The status of] the forbidden [substance] that became batel in the majority [of permitted substances] is transformed [from forbidden to permitted] and it is deemed as permitted in a full sense, even according to Rabbinic Law.”

Before the wood is nullified, it is muktzeh and is forbidden to be moved.

See the Alter Rebbe’s Kuntreis Acharon (note 3) that states that after the forbidden wood is nullified in the mixture of permitted wood, one may move all the wood.

Beitzah 4b. The Alter Rebbe mentions this concept in other sources including sec. 447:61 and sec. 626:5.

Beitzah 3b. The Alter Rebbe mentions this concept in many places including sec. 318:4; sec. 325:10, 14; sec. 445:8; et al.

Beitzah 4b explicitly states that if, on a festival, wood fell from a tree into an oven, it is permitted to nullify the wood that fell into the oven by adding wood that is permitted to be kindled on the festival, provided some such wood was in the oven before the new wood fell in. After nullifying the wood that fell off the tree into the oven, it is permitted to kindle all the wood in the oven. Thus, although the wood that fell into the oven is a davar sheyeish lo matirin, the Sages specifically permitted nullifying it.

As mentioned in footnote 10 above, in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 99:6), Rav Yosef Caro rules that if a substance that is forbidden by Rabbinic Law fell into a mixture containing a permitted substance, but there is not enough of the permitted substance to nullify the presence of the forbidden substance, a person may add enough permitted substances to the mixture to nullify the presence of the forbidden substance. By and large, the Ashkenazic custom is to follow the ruling of Rama in his gloss to that source, and forbid intentionally adding permitted substances to the mixture to nullify the forbidden substance. Nevertheless, the ruling of Rav Yosef Caro combined with the other mitigating factor that the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain, serves as the basis for this ruling. See subsection 6 below, where the Alter Rebbe mentions a similar instance where a Scriptural prohibition is involved, and, therefore, the forbidden wood is not nullified.

(It must be emphasized that even according to Rav Yosef Caro, it is forbidden to intentionally place a substance forbidden by Rabbinic Law in a mixture of permitted substances to nullify it. Rather, if the substance that is forbidden by Rabbinic Law somehow became mixed with a permitted substance, it is permitted to add more permitted substances to the existing mixture.)

Beitzah 2a, 4b.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe notes that his ruling in the main text is an interpretation of these Talmudic passages. Furthermore, the Alter Rebbe explains that his precise choice of words is taken from the ruling of the Tur (Orach Chayim 677) with regard to oil from a Chanukah menorah that became mixed with regular oil (see the Kuntreis Acharon, note 2 to this section, summarized in footnote 10 above). The Tur rules that it is forbidden to add more regular oil to the mixture to nullify oil from the Chanukah menorah (which it is forbidden to use for any purpose other than lighting the menorah)and then use this mixture to light an ordinary lamp. The rationale for this ruling is that the person will benefit from the mixture of oil used as fuel for the lamp, while the oil from the menorah is still present. In the instance mentioned here, by contrast, the Alter Rebbe permits baking in an oven heated with a mixture of forbidden and permitted wood because the forbidden fuel will have already been consumed when the person benefits from it (i.e., when he bakes his bread). This leniency is granted because the person will only place his dough in the oven after all the wood has been totally consumed, and at that time, all that remains are the coals from the wood and the heat they generate.

Nevertheless, there are other Rishonim {among them Maggid Mishneh (Hilchos Shevisas Yom Tov 2:11)} who interpret the Talmud’s wording slightly differently. In that source Maggid Mishneh states that once the wood begins to burn, “since [the wood] will be consumed by fire, it is permitted when nullified [by the presence of] a majority [of permitted substances].” The implication is that even though the wood still exists, since it will ultimately be burnt, its presence can be nullified by adding a majority of permitted substances. This interpretation parallels the statement in Menachos 102b: “Any substance that will ultimately be consumed by fire is considered as if it has [already] been consumed by fire.” The Alter Rebbe explains that this second interpretation is the straightforward way to understand the Talmud’s words.

The Ashkenazic community, however follows the ruling of Rama (Yoreh Deah 99:6), who maintains that it is forbidden to nullify a forbidden substance in a mixture, even if the substance is forbidden merely by Rabbinic Law, as long as that substance still exists. According to that approach, the Talmud’s words can only be explained according to the first interpretation, that the wood that fell into the oven may be nullified since the benefit from that wood will only be realized after it is consumed by fire. In contrast to this, according to the second interpretation, following Rama’s ruling would mean that the wood that fell into the oven could not be nullified because it still exists and has not yet caught fire. {As mentioned above, Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah, loc. cit.) permits nullifying a substance forbidden by Rabbinic Law that became mixed with permitted substances, and it can be assumed that the authorities who follow the second interpretation of the Talmud agree with his ruling.}

It is on this basis that the Alter Rebbe’s rulings in the main text can be understood. Since the benefit from the wood will only be derived after it is consumed by fire, it is permitted to add permitted wood to the oven and nullify the presence of the forbidden wood. Once that addition has been made, the forbidden wood is nullified, and is considered to be absolutely permitted. Hence, once the forbidden wood has been nullified, it is even permitted to move that wood before it has been kindled.

As mentioned in footnote 18 above, in this instance, the person is not considered to be benefitting from the fire or the fuel. The rationale is that the dough is only placed in the oven and baked after the fuel has been consumed, and all that remains are the resulting coals and their residual heat.

Unlike baking, one cooks while the forbidden fuel – in this instance, the wood – still exists. Therefore, one might think that it would be forbidden to cook over a flame that is fueled by the forbidden wood. Indeed, Rav Yosef Caro rules in this manner in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 142:4). In that source, Rav Yosef Caro rules that if a person cooked over a fire fueled by wood that is forbidden because of its connection with a false deity, the food is forbidden. The Alter Rebbe also rules in this manner in sec. 445:9-10. In that source, the Alter Rebbe rules that if an oven was kindled with chametz, and matzah was baked in it or food for Pesach was cooked in it, it is forbidden to benefit from the matzah or the food. The Alter Rebbe resolves this apparent difficulty with the explanation he proceeds to offer in the main text.

The Alter Rebbe addresses his explanation for this ruling in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 4). In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that it is not forbidden to derive benefit from objects that are muktzeh after they have ceased to exist in their original state. In the instance presented in the main text here, the person is not benefitting from the forbidden wood, but rather from the heat of the fire produced by that wood. Therefore, there is no prohibition against cooking food over the fire produced by burning the forbidden wood.

In that Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe then explains that this principle is based on the statement in Bava Kama 101b regarding wood that is sanctified with the holiness of Shemitah, the Sabbatical year, that, “the benefit from wood comes after its consumption.” Ritva (Sukkah 40a) interprets that statement to mean that the benefit one derives from the wood comes after its consumption by fire, i.e., the person only benefits from the wood when he eats the food that was baked or cooked with the heat produced by burning the wood. This is the core of the motivating rationale for the Alter Rebbe’s statements here.

This ruling seems to run contrary to the ruling of the Tur (Orach Chayim 677) regarding oil from a Chanukah menorah that became mixed with regular oil cited above {Kuntreis Acharon (notes 2 and 3, summarized in footnotes 10 and 18, above)}. The Tur rules that it is forbidden to add more regular oil to the mixture to nullify the forbidden oil from the menorah. The rationale is that even if the mixture contains a majority of regular oil, it will still be forbidden to light a lamp with the mixture because at the time the person will benefit from the mixture when the forbidden oil is still present.

The ruling in this subsection seems to contradict the Alter Rebbe’s ruling in subsection 3 above, that on a festival, it is permitted to benefit from wood that fell from a tree directly into an oven containing some wood, provided the wood was first nullified by adding more permitted wood to the oven. Footnote 17 presents the Alter Rebbe’s explanation of this ruling, that the person is permitted to use the wood for baking or cooking because that benefit is derived after the wood has been consumed by fire. However, in the instance described here, the person is benefiting from the light or warmth emanating from the burning wood while the wood still exists. That is seemingly an example of the precise situation that the Tur forbids.

The Alter Rebbe resolves this apparent contradiction by noting a significant difference between the situation presented by the Tur, and the situation presented here. The Tur rules regarding oil from a Chanukah menorah that became mixed with permitted oil. As the Alter Rebbe explains, our Sages forbade ever deriving any benefit from the oil used to light the Chanukah menorah. By contrast, the wood mentioned in this and the previous subsection is forbidden to be used only because it is muktzeh. However, there is no prohibition against benefitting from an object that is muktzeh. Rather, it is only prohibited to make use of an object that is muktzeh while it exists in the form that is muktzeh. In this instance, it is forbidden to benefit from the wood that fell into the oven while it is wood, but once it has burned and no longer exists as wood, it is permitted to benefit from the resulting coals and residual heat. This principle is stated by Magen Avraham 507:3. In that ruling, Magen Avraham cites the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Orach Chayim 276:1), that when a non-Jew lights a lamp or kindles a fire for his own benefit in a Jew’s home, the Jew is permitted to benefit from it even though the lamp’s fuel and the wood for the fire are muktzeh.

However, the Alter Rebbe notes that Magen Avraham 501:12 does not accept Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling, and explicitly rules that it is forbidden to purposefully benefit from muktzeh. The Alter Rebbe offers a resolution to this apparent contradiction based on the ruling of Magen Avraham 509:15. In that ruling, Magen Avraham quotes the ruling of Tosafos (Avodah Zarah 66b), that if a non-Jew bakes with wood that fell from a tree on a festival, after the fact it is permitted to eat the resulting baked goods. True, the wood that fell is muktzeh, and its use is forbidden. Nevertheless, after the fact, the baked goods are permitted because there is no prohibition against benefitting from muktzeh. Similarly, when disagreeing with Rav Yosef Caro, Magen Avraham is specifying that as an initial preference, it is forbidden for a non-Jew to light a lamp in a Jew’s home, even if he lights it solely for his own use. However, all authorities would agree that after the fact, it is permitted for the Jew to benefit from the light of the lamp the non-Jew lit.

Among the other points the Alter Rebbe mentions in this Kuntreis Acharon is the ruling of Magen Avraham 507:4, that if wood fell from a tree on a festival it is permitted to have a non-Jew kindle it on a Shabbos that follows immediately after the festival, provided the presence of the forbidden wood was nullified because of a majority of permitted wood. The logic behind this ruling of Magen Avraham is that the wood that fell from the tree is not forbidden because of a Scriptural command. Rather, it is only forbidden by virtue of a Rabbinic decree. Hence, there is room for leniency. However, the Alter Rebbe questions this ruling of Magen Avraham, and notes his ruling in sec. 276:15, that it is only permitted to have a non-Jew kindle a fire on Shabbos for children or in an instance of extreme cold. In such cases, leniency is granted because “everyone is considered as sick in situations of severe cold. However, on days when the cold is not so severe or [in a household] where there are no young children who suffer extreme distress because of the cold, it is forbidden to tell a non-Jew to kindle a fire.” Moreover, the Alter Rebbe notes that since the festivals fall in the spring, summer, and early fall, it is unlikely that it will be severely cold at that time.

To clarify the issues: If there is no question of severe cold, the wood that fell on the festivalis forbidden not only because a festivalmay not prepare for Shabbos, but also because it is forbidden to instruct a non-Jew to perform a melachah on Shabbos. However, if it is severely cold, there is no need to nullify the forbidden wood in a majority of permitted wood, for the Rabbinic prohibition against having a festival prepare for Shabbos is no more severe than the Rabbinic prohibition against muktzeh. Hence, just as it is permitted to benefit from an object that is muktzeh, it is permitted to benefit from an object that is forbidden because a festivalmay not prepare for Shabbos.

For example, if a fire was kindled with such wood, it would be permitted to benefit from it.

As Bava Kama 102a,states, “It can be assumed that wood was intended to be used for kindling.”

I.e., at the time the person will bake or cook, the wood will have been consumed by the fire.

I.e., baking or cooking.

This is the difference between the instance of a lamp that was lit with forbidden fuel (see Tur, Orach Chayim 677) and the instance presented here, concerning a fire kindled with forbidden wood. It is forbidden to benefit from the lamp while it is burning {see the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Orach Chayim 677:4)} because the person kindles the lamp in order to benefit from its light, and the forbidden fuel still exists while the light is burning. By contrast, the person kindles the wood in the oven in order to bake or cook. However, the heat for baking and cooking is generated by the wood being consumed by fire. Thus, at the time the person benefits from the heat, the wood no longer exists (Magen Avraham 677:12).

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the license to derive benefit from the wood that fell into the oven on a festival after it was nullified because it was mixed with permitted wood.

If the wood that fell into the oven is discernable among the wood that was originally in the oven and/or the wood that was added to the oven, it cannot be said to be nullified, i.e., subsumed within a greater whole, because its own identity remains distinct. See a related ruling in sec. 626:6.

Beitzah 4b.

Beitzah 2b. See also sec. 513:1 and sec. 515:7-8, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this concept and cites the manner in which the prohibition is derived from Scriptural verses.

See subsection 3 above, where this term is defined.

See subsection 3 above, where this concept is mentioned.

Beitzah 33a. As the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain, it is as if the person is making the wood into a utensil when he uses it to stoke the kindling, and it is forbidden to fashion a utensil on a festival.

Thus, the piece of wood would not be muktzeh. See sec. 502:8.

The rationale for this ruling is that since the person picked up a piece of dry wood from among the other wood designated to be used as kindling, it is clear that this piece of wood was not designated to be used as a tool before the festival (see sec. 501:17). Instead, the person caused it to be categorized as a tool by using it for a significant purpose on the festival. Hence, the person is considered to have fashioned a utensil on the festival. See sec. 314:10, sec. 508:2, and sec. 518:5, where the Alter Rebbe rules in a similar manner.

Making a tool is forbidden on a festival because it is included in the forbidden melachah of makeh bepatish (see sec. 302:5, et al.).Even though the wood will be used for stirring a fire and thus, will benefit a person on the festival, preparing it is not considered meleches ochel nefesh, “an activity that is necessary to prepare food,” but rather machshirei ochel nefesh, “an activity that makes it possible to prepare food.” See sec. 495:4, and the Kuntreis Acharon (note 4) to that section.

Making these bundles is considered to be fashioning a utensil, because by doing so, the person makes the straw fit to be used as kindling. See subsection 7, above.

See sec. 253:4 and sec. 308:37, where the Alter Rebbe describes the ovens that were used during the Talmudic period.

Beitzah 32b.

See sec. 308:8.

As the Alter Rebbe states in the main text, the plaster fell inside the oven before the festival. Thus, the person could have raked out the plaster and made the oven fit for use before the festival. Hence, by not doing so before the festival and only doing so on the festival, it is as if the person made the oven into a useful object on the festival.

See sec. 495:4 and notes, where this term is defined.

See also sec. 495:2, where the Alter Rebbe defines meleches ochel nefesh. See also sec. 495:4, where the Alter Rebbe details the difference between machshirei ochel nefesh, these preliminary activities, and meleches ochel nefesh, “labor [necessary to prepare] food.”

Beitzah 32b.

As explained in that source, ash that is hot enough to fry an egg is not deemed muktzeh since it is fit to be used for cooking.

A broom that is dipped in water will clean the surface of the oven’s floor more thoroughly.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), the Alter Rebbe states that it is possible to derive the law in the main text from the wording used by Rav Yosef Caro in his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 507:4), and in his Beis Yosef there.

In sec. 495:2, the Alter Rebbe discusses why kindling a fire is considered meleches ochel nefesh and not machshirei ochel nefesh:

>>Similarly, making a fire [is placed in this category. One might think that] although it is performed for the sake of eating – for one makes fire with wood and cooks on it – [since] it is not performed with the food itself [it is considered merely a preparatory act and not meleches ochel nefesh]. Nevertheless, since through [fire], one makes food fit [to be eaten… this activity] is included [in the category] of meleches ochel nefesh.

See the Kuntreis Acharon (note 4) to that section, where the Alter Rebbe explains this ruling in great detail.

It should be noted that the same concepts apply regarding extinguishing a fire. When extinguishing the fire makes the food fit to eat, it is considered as meleches ochel nefesh. See sec. 514:2, where the Alter Rebbe rules in this manner. See also sec. 510:8 and sec. 511:3-4, where the Alter Rebbe discusses extinguishing a fire to prepare food.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 6), the Alter Rebbe explains that this ruling is based on Turei Zahav 507:6. In that source, Turei Zahav explains that although license was granted to sweep out the oven to enable a loaf to be baked, such license was not granted to prevent the loaf from being partially scorched. Furthermore, Turei Zahav explains that when the restriction against sweeping out the oven was enacted, it was applied regardless of whether the broom was dipped in water or was dry.

In this subsection, the Alter Rebbe rules that it is permissible to sweep out the entire oven, while in subsection 12 above, the Alter Rebbe rules that it is only permissible to sweep out as much of the oven as is absolutely necessary. It is possible to resolve the difference between the rulings by comparing the two instances presented. In the instance described in this subsection, the person is permitted to sweep out the entire oven because he seeks to cool it, and sweeping out the oven and extinguishing the coals is the way to reduce the temperature in this type of oven. By contrast, in the instance presented in subsection 12, the person was sweeping out the oven to clear a space where he could bake his bread. Thus, in that instance, the person is only permitted to sweep out a portion of the oven because all he needs is a place where he can bake his loaf, not all the space in the oven.

In this subsection the Alter Rebbe is referring to an instance where the person swept out the oven with a straw broom, which is the type of broom that was commonly used in the Alter Rebbe’s era. Such a broom is likely to catch fire when it touches hot coals. On an ordinary weekday, the person would dip the broom in water before and/or immediately after sweeping out the coals, to put out this fire. However, as the Alter Rebbe rules here, this is forbidden on a festival because extinguishing a fire is a melachah that, as explained in subsection 12, may only be performed for the sake of the preparation of food. Extinguishing the fire that is burning the broom is not directly involved in preparing food.

See the Kuntreis Acharon to sec. 495 (note 4, summarized in footnote 30 there). In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that the term machshirei ochel nefesh refers to activities that although they make it possible to partake of food, are not performed with the actual food or while preparing the actual food. Although extinguishing the burning broom will enable the person to sweep out the oven again and prepare more food, it is not, “performed with the food itself or while preparing the food itself.” See also sec. 514:2, 4, where the Alter Rebbe delivers related rulings.

See the Kuntreis Acharon to sec. 495 (note 4, summarized in footnote 30 there). In that source, the Alter Rebbe presents two definitions of the term meleches ochel nefesh. The Alter Rebbe’s words, “if he could borrow another broom,” in this subsection imply that if the person desires to bake more bread and does not have another broom, he is permitted to extinguish the burning broom because then, extinguishing it would be considered meleches ochel nefesh. Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim notes thattherefore, with this ruling, the Alter Rebbe appears to be following the second definition of the term meleches ochel nefesh given in the Kuntreis Acharon, to sec. 495 (note 4), i.e., that the term refers to activities without which the food could not be prepared. This is somewhat problematic since the Alter Rebbe rejects that definition in the Kuntreis Acharon. However, it is possible to resolve this difficulty by saying that the situation presented in this subsection is comparable to that of a spit that broke on a festival or that could not have been fixed before the festival (see sec. 495:4; see also sec. 509:3). The rationale why it is permitted to use such a broom is that it is not inevitable that the broom will catch fire and be destroyed.

Beitzah 34a.

The ovens and ranges of the Talmudic era were made from earthenware (see footnote 6, above). As with all earthenware utensils, heating these ovens for the first time strengthened them. Therefore, heating such an oven for the first time was considered to be improving the oven (see sec. 502:9; see also sec. 508:1). Hence, it was forbidden to heat these ovens for the first time on a festival. However, as the Alter Rebbe states in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1) to this section, the ovens of his era were made of bricks covered with mortar. Such ovens were not improved by being heated for the first time. Therefore, there is no difficulty in using these ovens for the first time on a festival. Similarly, the ovens that are commonly used today are not improved in any way when they are heated up for the first time. Therefore, in today’s world, it is permitted to use a new oven for the first time on a festival.

Fixing a utensil on a festival is categorized as machshirei ochel nefesh. Such activities are generally not permitted on a festival.

This leniency is granted to enable the person to bake on the festival, for the festival.

Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim notes that there is an apparent contradiction between the first portion of this subsection, where the Alter Rebbe rules that it is only permitted to use a new oven or range for the first time, provided they are not cooled off by applying cold water to them, and this portion of the subsection where the Alter Rebbe rules that if the person is worried that his loaf will burn if the temperature of the oven or range is not lowered, he is permitted to cool off it off by pouring water on it. See the following footnote, where this issue is resolved.

As mentioned in footnote 54 above, the Alter Rebbe is referring to the ovens of his era, which were made of bricks that were covered with mortar. When cold water is applied to mortar that was subjected to extreme heat – particularly, newly-hardened mortar – the mortar is liable to crack. Therefore, this is not the normal manner in which such an oven would be sealed. Hence, since this practice is a deviation from the ordinary practice, it is permitted in the situation described by the Alter Rebbe. By contrast, when such an oven was not overheated, the ordinary practice is to apply cold water to seal it, as stated in the first clause in this subsection. See Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim.

However, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain, the person must need at least one loaf on the festival.

Beitzah 17a. See also sec. 503:5 and the Kuntreis Acharon (note 1) to that section, where the Alter Rebbe discusses this issue, and rules in the same manner as he rules here. See also sec. 512:4, where the Alter Rebbe rules regarding related matters.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 7) to the present section, the Alter Rebbe discusses the ruling of Magen Avraham 507:13. In that source, Magen Avraham only permits taking this leniency if the person bakes the additional loaves placed in the oven with the specific intent that they will improve the flavor of the loaf he will eat on the festival.

The Alter Rebbe takes issue with Magen Avraham’s ruling, and maintains that, as stated in the main text, as long as the person needs at least one loaf of bread for the festival, he is permitted to bake the additional loaves of bread in the same oven, even if he does not specifically intend to improve the flavor of the bread he will eat on the festival.

Even though the person will not eat all the loaves on the festival, they are all are considered to have been baked for the sake of the festival. The rationale is that the extra loaves that were baked along with the loaf that was necessary for the festival improve the flavor of the loaf that will be eaten on the festival.

See sec. 503:4, 6, where the Alter Rebbe issues similar rulings.

See the sources mentioned in the previous note. In these sources, the Alter Rebbe presents other instances when the leniency mentioned here may apply. The Alter Rebbe discusses boiling up a large pot of water, even though the person needs only a small pitcher of water, and cooking an entire pot of meat even though the person needs only one piece of the meat.

It should be noted that as the Alter Rebbe clearly states in sec. 503:4, and emphasizes in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1 to sec. 503), and specifically mentions in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 7) to this section, even when the person is performing all the melachah at the same time, he may not say explicitly that he is preparing some of the food for the following day.

See also sec. 458:17, where the Alter Rebbe issues a related ruling regarding baking matzos.

See subsection 9 above, and the sources mentioned there, where the Alter Rebbe describes the ovens of the Talmudic era.

See sec. 274:5. See also sec. 291:7.

As long as the person bakes the loaves before partaking of the morning festive meal, it is not obvious that the extra bread that he is baking is for Shabbos, rather than for the festival.

Throughout this subsection, the Alter Rebbe uses the word tit, which can be translated as “mortar”, “clay”, or “mud”. We have translated it as “mortar” or “mud,” depending on the context.

Beitzah 32b. The ovens of the Talmudic era were made with a hole at their top that would be closed with a piece of wood. When the person baking or cooking wished to increase the oven’s heat, he would seal the wood with mortar, to prevent any heat from escaping.

See sec. 259:7 and sec. 314:19, where the Alter Rebbe rules in a similar manner regarding Shabbos.

As the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain at the end of this subsection, in certain instances, the same ruling applies to mud that is used as a sealant.

It should be noted that in sec. 314:21, the Alter Rebbe explains that a person who performs such an activity on Shabbos is liable for smearing a sealant, which is a derivative of the melachah of smoothing a hide.

See sec. 495:4, where this principle is explained.

Beitzah 32b.

See sec. 308:52, where the Alter Rebbe rules in a similar manner with regard to stones. See also the Kuntreis Acharon (note 8) to sec. 495, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this concept.

Beitzah, loc. cit. See also sec. 321:16, where the Alter Rebbe rules that it is permitted to mix ash with water on Shabbos because the mixture cannot be effectively kneaded.

The Alter Rebbe is implying that one should conduct himself stringently.