Shulchan Aruch: Chapter 509 - Some Specific Laws Pertaining to the Statutes of the Festivals

Beitzah 28b; see also sec. 340:18, where the Alter Rebbe presents a similar law with regard to Shabbos.

Beitzah, loc. cit. See also sec. 495:4, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this law.

See subsection 4, below.

Beitzah 34a.

Beitzah 28b. See also Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), which is presented in footnote 14 below. In that Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe explains that just as it is permitted to perform activities classified as machshirei ochel nefesh on a festival when one could not perform them before the festival, so too, it is permitted to fix a utensil on a festival that one requires for the sake of preparing food, provided he was unable to fix the utensil before the festival.

The Alter Rebbe explains this ruling in the Kuntreis Acharon (note 1) to this section, stating that this ruling can be deduced from the following incident related in Beitzah 28a-b:

>>Rav Nechemiah ben Rav Yosef stated, “[On a festival,] I was standing before Rava who was running a knife on the edge of a basket. I asked him: ‘Master, are you seeking to sharpen it or to remove its grease?’

>>“He replied to me: ‘To remove its grease.’ However, his intention was clear to me. He was sharpening it, but he was of the opinion that, ‘This is the halachah, but one should not teach it [publicly].’ ”

In the Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe wonders why Rava denied that he was sharpening the knife. After all, Rav Nechemiah was not asking Rava for guidance regarding his own conduct, he was merely asking Rava what he was doing. Rava could have told him: “This is the halachah, but one should not teach it [publicly].”

The Alter Rebbe posits that the reason Rava did not answer Rav Nechemiah in that manner is because after Rav Nechemiah witnessed Rava’s lenient practice, answering him in this manner would be equivalent to teaching the leniency. Similar logic applies to answering one who asks a question about how to conduct himself in actual practice.

See subsections 4-5 below, where the Alter Rebbe rules regarding sharpening a knife on a festival.

See sec. 507:10, where the Alter Rebbe rules in a similar manner, and refers to the law stated here. See also sec. 495:4.

See section 30:2, where the Alter Rebbe rules regarding another instance where a law should not be taught publicly lest doing so lead the unlearned people to err.

See sec. 496:1 and notes, where this concept is explained.

See also sec. 499:6, where the Alter Rebbe issues a stringent ruling based on this rationale.

See subsection 3, subsection 10, subsection 14, and subsection 15 below, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this concept. See also sec. 507:12, 14, where this principle is applied.

Note, however, sec. 514:1, 4, where the Alter Rebbe rules leniently in certain instances.

See subsection 1, above.

Beitzah 28a-b. This law applies both to slaughtering knives and knives used for other purposes.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe explains the rationale behind the ruling in the main text prohibiting sharpening a knife with a knife-sharpener on a festival. The Alter Rebbe notes that there is a difference of opinion regarding this matter among both the Rishonim and the Acharonim. In his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 509:2), Rav Yosef Caro forbids sharpening a knife on a festival even if the person did not have the opportunity to sharpen it before the festival. Rama does not comment on this statement, implying that he accepts Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling. Furthermore, Turei Zahav 509:2 and Magen Avraham 509:7 explain that sharpening a knife with a sharpener is forbidden on a festival because by doing so, the person is fixing a utensil, which is forbidden on a festival.

However, it is difficult to understand the Rama's acceptance of this ruling in light of his ruling in Orach Chayim 509:1, where herules that if a spit is broken on a festival, it may be fixed on the festival. That ruling is in accordance with the approach of Rabbi Yehudah in Beitzah 28a-b. In that source, Rabbi Yehudah permits fixing – albeit not fashioning – a utensil needed for the preparation of food on a festival, provided the person did not have the opportunity to do so on the day before the festival. Beitzah 28a-b compares sharpening a knife to fixing a spit. Therefore, one might wonder why, if Rama permits fixing a spit, he apparently prohibits sharpening a knife. Indeed, it would seem that sharpening a knife would be less problematic than fixing a spit, since a dull or nicked knife is somewhat fit for use, while a broken spit is useless.

After raising these points, the Alter Rebbe proceeds to resolve the difficulty regarding Rama’s acceptance of Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling by explaining that there are several approaches to understanding the passage in Beitzah 28a-b.

Rambam (Hilchos Shevisas Yom Tov 4:8) does not accept the position of Rabbi Yehudah, and understands the passage in Beitzah, loc. cit., as teaching that straightening a spit that became slightly crooked is forbidden. How much more so is it forbidden to fix a spit if it became crooked to a large extent or broken. Based on this understanding, it follows that sharpening a knife with a sharpener is also forbidden. The rationale is that in both instances, one is taking a utensil that could be used with difficulty in its present state, and making it easier to use. Needless to say, Rambam rules that it is forbidden to fix a spit if it became very crooked to the extent that it could not be used in its present state, or if it is totally broken.

However, Ran understands the passage in Beitzah differently, and maintains that Rabbi Yehudah’s position is accepted. Ran explains that when the passage in Beitzah 28a-b forbids fixing a spit on a festival, it is referring to a spit that is no longer fit for use. Hence, Ran maintains that it is only in such situations that it is forbidden to fix a spit. If, however, the spit merely became bent out of shape, it may be fixed on a festival. However, Ran cautions that this law should not be taught publicly. This approach is based upon the premise that on a festival, it is forbidden to fix a utensil that became unusable on the festival. (It should be noted that Turei Zahav 509:2 rules in this manner.) Furthermore, since the passage in Beitzah considers sharpening a knife as analogous to fixing a spit, it can be assumed that Ran would maintain that sharpening a knife with a sharpener is equivalent to fixing a utensil that became unusable, i.e., it is forbidden to sharpen a knife with a sharpener on a festival.

Rashi and Tosafos, however, interpret the passage in Beitzah 28a-b differently, and maintain that the leniency granted by Rabbi Yehudah to fix a spit on a festival was meant to apply to a spit that was entirely broken. Hence, Rashi and Tosafos understand that passage as teaching that fixing a utensil that became unusable on the festival is permitted; it is only that one should not teach this law to others (see subsection 1, above). According to their logic, it would seem that sharpening a knife with a sharpener would also be permitted on a festival.

Rama’s approach is difficult to understand, because it does not clearly follow any of these approaches. On one hand, Rama seems to follow Rashi and Tosafos who rule that it is permitted to fix a broken spit on a festival. Nevertheless, as mentioned, Rama does not comment on Rav Yosef Caro's ruling in his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 509:2), that it is forbidden to sharpen a knife on a festival. This implies that Rama accepts Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling (which follows the approach of Rambam, or possibly of Ran).

The Alter Rebbe resolves this difficulty by explaining that Rama accepts the approach of Rashi and Tosafos with regard to the understanding of Beitzah 28a-b because Tosafos wrote their glosses after Rambam wrote his works. This is in keeping with the principle of accepting the understanding of the later authorities (see Tosafos, Kiddushin 45b; see also Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 525;see also Rama, Choshen Mishpat 25:2; et al). However, the Alter Rebbe posits that Rama does not follow Ran’s approach, that it is forbidden to fix a utensil that became unusable on a festival, because numerous Rishonim differ with his approach (e.g., Rashi, Tosafos, and Rambam in his Commentary to the Mishnah, Megillah 1:5).

However, the question still remains: Why does Rama not rule differently than Rav Yosef Caro with regard to sharpening a knife on a festival? In resolution, the Alter Rebbe posits that Rama does not accept Rav Yosef Caro's position. However, since Rav Yosef Caro ruled in accordance with many authorities, although Rama does not accept their positions, he nevertheless, considers these authorities as holding positions of sufficient weight to warrant consideration. Furthermore, Ramban (Milchamos HaShem, Beitzah, loc. cit.) gives an additional reason for the prohibition against sharpening a knife. As the Alter Rebbe states in the main text, on most occasions, it is possible to borrow a knife from another person for the sake of using it on the festival. Because of both these factors, Rama and, hence, the Alter Rebbe, rule stringently regarding sharpening a knife.

See footnote 6 above, where an incident from Beitzah 28a-b is related.

I.e., the license to sharpen a knife with something other than a knife-sharpener.

E.g., by whetting the knife on another knife, a piece of wood, a stone, or a shard.

Beitzah 28b.

Talmud Yerushalmi, Beitzah 4:5.

As the Alter Rebbe proceeds to state, cutting the thread would be considered machshirei ochel nefesh. It is therefore forbidden to cut the thread on the festival.

The rationale for this ruling is that there is no way the person could know exactly how much thread he would need before actually sewing up the fowl.

Seemingly, it became customary to burn the remaining thread rather than cut it because burning the thread involves a deviation from one’s ordinary practice.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to an instance where the goats or the fowl are stuffed with other foods and then sewn closed before they are roasted, as mentioned in subsection 8, above.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe writes:

>>It is permitted as an initial option to cut other objects that are not attached [to the ground or to a living animal] when they are cut in a manner that does not involve mundane activity, provided: a) one does not intend to cut with a precise measure, b) one does not cut [them] into very small pieces, and also, c) cutting them does not involve preparing a k’li.

Hag’alah is a method of kashering utensils by submerging the utensil in boiling water. This process purges the utensil of any trace of the flavor of non-kosher food absorbed in it. See sec. 451:25 where this process is described.

Libbun is a method of kashering utensils bysubjecting the utensil to fire until it becomes glowing hot. This process burns away any trace of the flavor of non-kosher food absorbed in the utensil. See sec. 451:7, 10, 13 where this process is described.

Kashering a utensil is comparable to fixing a utensil because just as fixing a utensil's physical defects makes it fit for use, so too does kashering it make it fit for use. Therefore, it is forbidden to perform hag'alah or libbun on a festival.

See subsection 1 above; see also sec. 495:4, where this principle is stated.

See subsections 1 and 2 above; see also sec. 495:4, where this concept is explained.

See sec. 494:16.

The Alter Rebbe uses the term havarah, which we have translated as, "kindling a fire." However, Maggid Mishneh (Hilchos Shabbos 12:1) explains that the term havarah can also refer to the process of heating metal. Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim questions whether the Alter Rebbe's intent here was that the person transgressed by kindling the fire or by heating the metal. See sec. 318:7.

In sec. 451:10, the Alter Rebbe writes that whenever a utensil can be kashered by hag’alah, it is sufficient to kasher it by performing the lesser degree of libbun.

In sec. 451:13, the Alter Rebbe writes that milchig utensils can be kashered to be used for meat by hag’alah.

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See Rama, Yoreh Deah 121:4. See also Sifsei Kohen, Yoreh Deah 121:11.

In such an instance, it would not be obvious that the person is kashering the utensil. Instead, a casual observer would say that the person was merely preheating the utensil, as in the previous paragraph.

See subsection 10, above.

See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 76:4) and commentaries. In this source Rav Yosef Caro explains that since the roasting process causes the blood to flow freely from the meat, blood will not be absorbed in the spit. Nevertheless, Rama states that as an initial preference, one should act stringently and kasher the spit before using it again.

As explained in that source, according to Scriptural Law, on Shabbos, it is only forbidden to make a hole that can be used for both inflow and outflow. Hence, making a hole in a barrel on Shabbos is not forbidden according to Scriptural Law, since it can only be used for outflow. Nevertheless, according to Rabbinic Law, it is forbidden to make any hole on Shabbos. This restriction was instituted as a safeguard, lest one err and make a hole that can be used for both inflow and outflow.

Talmud Yerushalmi (Avodah Zarah 5:15) states that when a Jew acquires a utensil from a non-Jew he must immerse it in a mikveh to enable its transition from the possession of a non-Jew and the associated impurity to the state of holiness with which it is endowed when it enters the possession of a Jew. This requirement is alluded to in Bamidbar 31:23, which relates Moshe’s instructions with regard to the spoils taken from Midian (see Avodah Zarah 75b and commentaries).

See sec. 323:8, where the Alter Rebbe discusses this subject in detail.

In sec. 323:6-7, the Alter Rebbe discusses the laws pertaining to washing dishes on Shabbos, stating:

>>Dishes may be washed when necessary for [Shabbos], e.g., if one has another meal left in the day [at which he could use the dishes] to eat with them, he is permitted to wash these dishes even immediately after the preceding meal. After the third [and final Shabbos] meal, by contrast, [one] is forbidden to wash dishes used for eating, because he is troubling himself on Shabbos for the [coming] weekdays. By contrast, one is permitted to wash utensils used for drinking during the entire day because there is no fixed time for drinking. If, however, one is certain that he will no longer need [these utensils], it is forbidden [to wash them].

>>One may wash ten cups so that, if he requires one of them, [it will be possible to] drink [from it].

The Alter Rebbe also mentions the restrictions against washing dishes in sec. 500:20 and 503:3.

See sec. 323:8, where the Alter Rebbe discusses the laws pertaining to immersing dishes in a mikveh on Shabbos. In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that there is a difference of opinion concerning this matter among the Rabbis. Hence, it is desirable to be stringent and not immerse utensils in a mikveh on Shabbos. If on Shabbos, the person needs to use a specific utensil that has not been immersed, the Alter Rebbe advises him to give the utensil to a non-Jew as a present, and then borrow it from him. The rationale is that a Jew is not required to immerse a utensil that he borrows from a non-Jew before using it.

See sec. 323:8, where the Alter Rebbe rules explicitly: “On a festival, by contrast, it is permitted to immerse such a k'li when one was not able to immerse it on the day preceding the festival….”

See sec. 308:8, where the Alter Rebbe rules that stones are designated as muktzeh.

Beitzah 31b.

See sec. 497, where several examples of this ruling are mentioned. See also sec. 638:6, where the Alter Rebbe explains that it is forbidden to partake of fruits that were designated as decorations for a sukkah. Designating fruits as a decoration for a sukkah causes them to be classified as muktzeh because they are forbidden to be used for any other purposes.

See sec. 529.

However, wood that was designated to be used for kindling before a festival may be moved on a festival. See sec. 501:1.

See sec. 308:14, and sec. 446:5, where the Alter Rebbe rules in a similar manner. See also sec. 501:11, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this ruling. See also the Kuntreis Acharon (note 4) to sec. 507, where the Alter Rebbe discusses this ruling at length.

See sec. 308:14, where the Alter Rebbe states: “Any [article that is] muktzeh is only forbidden to be moved…. it is not forbidden to derive benefit from using any article that is muktzeh provided one does not cause it to move.”

See also sec. 507:4 and the Kuntreis Acharon (note 4) to that section, where the Alter Rebbe discusses this ruling and its rationale.

The Alter Rebbe also discusses this ruling in the Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), elaborating concerning the fundamental principle stated in this subsection: that although it is forbidden to move or make use of articles that are muktzeh on a festival, it is not forbidden to benefit from them. The Alter Rebbe begins by citing the gloss of Rashba to Shabbos 29a, where Rashba rules that it is permitted to benefit from articles that are muktzeh. However, Rashba qualifies his ruling by stating that it is forbidden to use an article that is muktzeh as kindling or as support for a bed even if the person does not move the muktzeh article.

The Alter Rebbe takes issue with this stipulation, and thus does not accept the ruling of Rashba in its entirety. Instead, the Alter Rebbe rules according to Ramban andRabbeinuNissim, both of whom permit using an article that is muktzeh for support, provided the person does not move the muktzeh article.

The Alter Rebbe explains that there is a difference between using wood for kindling and using it for support even though in both instances the person is not moving the wood, i.e., the actual substance that is muktzeh. The Alter Rebbe explains that the reason why he rules that it is permitted to use wood that is muktzeh to support a bed is twofold: a) the person is not moving the bed, (i.e., the bed was on top of the wood before the onset of the festival), and b) the substance that is muktzeh is not undergoing any change. When wood that is muktzeh is used for kindling, by contrast, although the wood is not being moved, the wood that holds the flame undergoes a change as it is consumed. Thus, it is forbidden to use wood that is muktzeh as kindling, even if the wood is not moved {see the Kuntreis Acharon (note 4) to sec. 507 for a more complete explanation}.