The Laws Applying to Ritual Slaughter on Festivals

Beitzah 28b.

See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 18:17). In that source, Rav Yosef Caro states that originally, a ritual slaughterer was required to show his knife to a rabbinic expert before slaughtering with it. However, even before his era, this custom had already been nullified.

See the Alter Rebbe’s gloss to Rav Yosef Caro’s Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, (Hilchos Shechitah, sec.18, note 27), and the Kuntreis Acharon (note 9) to that section, where the Alter Rebbe discusses this practice.

See sec. 509:4, where the Alter Rebbe discusses this prohibition.

See the Alter Rebbe’s gloss to Rav Yosef Caro’s Yoreh Deah, (Hilchos Shechitah, sec.18, note 27), where he discusses this practice.

The Alter Rebbe uses the word yafeh, which literally means “nice.” However, we have translated it as “suitable” because that more accurately reflects the Alter Rebbe’s intent.

See subsection 17 below, where the Alter Rebbe makes similar statements with regard to inspecting a firstborn animal to see if it has a blemish that permits its slaughter.

See sec. 323:10, where the Alter Rebbe states a fundamental principle: “Similarly, it is permitted to deliver any and all rulings permitting [the use of a food or a k’li]. One is not considered to be making an object fit for use, for the object is intrinsically fit to be used; it is only that the inquirer does not know [its status] until the halachic authority comes and delivers the ruling to him.” See also footnote 58 below.

See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 18:12). In that source Rav Yosef Caro rules that after slaughtering an animal, the slaughterer must check his knife again.

Beitzah 11a.

See sec. 504:3, where the Alter Rebbe rules in a similar manner.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe asks rhetorically why transferring objects from domain to domain was not forbidden on a festival, even though the transfer could have been done before the festival. The Alter Rebbe answers: “In order to maximize the rejoicing on the festival so that one will go and bring whatever he wants and fulfill his desires.”

See sec. 497:10, where the Alter Rebbe explains that any domesticated animal in a person’s possession is considered as potentially designated for slaughter on a festival.

Beitzah 40a.

This ruling follows the first opinion in Beitzah 40b, which maintains that animals that pasture and sleep outside the town’s festival limits during the summer are comparable to raisins and figs that have been set aside to dry. In sec. 310:2, the Alter Rebbe rules that such raisins and figs are deemed muktzeh because they are unfit to eat until they have thoroughly dried out, since they are repulsive during the drying process. Similarly, animals that pasture and sleep outside the town’s festival limits for part of the year are deemed to be muktzeh during that period because the town’s residents do not have them in mind. As the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain, even if by chance these animals are brought into the town, they may not be slaughtered on a festival that falls during the period when the animals sleep outside the town.

See sec. 495:13-14, where the Alter Rebbe mentions related laws.

The rationale for this ruling is that, as the Alter Rebbe explained previously in this subsection, the animals are deemed muktzeh because their owner did not have in mind to slaughter them on the festival.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe states: “[The rationale is that] everything a non-Jew [possesses] is prepared to be used; he does not set anything aside, but instead, thinks about [using] everything.” See sec. 497:25, where the Alter Rebbe relates this concept to the laws of the festivals.

The Alter Rebbe is describing a situation where the animals’ non-Jewish owner brought them to be slaughtered for the sake of a non-Jew. Then, for whatever reason, he changed his mind, and offered them to a Jew to slaughter on the festival.

See sec. 515:18. When a non-Jew brings an object from outside a town’s festival limits for a Jew on a festival, even on his own initiative, the Jew is forbidden to benefit from it. This prohibition was instituted lest the Jew instruct the non-Jew to bring him an object from outside the festival limits. However, the Sages did not impose any restrictions against a Jew using an object that a non-Jew brought from outside the festival limits for the sake of another non-Jew.

As the Alter Rebbe explains in that source, the reason the article that is muktzeh is prohibited is because it is a davar sheyeish lo matirin, a substance that will become permitted at a later time.See also sec. 325:14.

Even if the object in question was brought specifically for a Jew, it is permitted to benefit from it on the second day of the festival, although it is forbidden to do so on the first day of the festival (see sec. 515:11-13). This leniency is granted on the second day of the festival due to the following sefek sefeika, compounded doubt: Perhaps the article was not brought from outside the festival limits, and even if one would say that it was brought from outside those limits, perhaps the second day of the festival need not be celebrated as a festival at all (see sec. 515:16).

The reason why the sefek sefeika is considered sufficient to rule leniently with regard to the prohibition against bringing an object from outside the town’s festival limits, but not with regard to releasing the prohibition against muktzeh isbecause the Sages considered the prohibition against bringing articles from outside a town’s festival limits less stringent than other Rabbinic prohibitions. Therefore, they granted certain leniencies with regard to it, as explained in sec. 515:4, 13 and in the Kuntreis Acharon to that section (note 3).

Beitzah 6b.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to an instance when the mother cow was either an ordinary domesticated animal, or a cow used for its milk, but that had been designated to be slaughtered. Either way, it was permitted to slaughter the cow on the festival. See subsection 5-6, above.

See sec. 495:13.

See sec. 308:9, where the Alter Rebbe rules that as long as food is fit to be served to dogs, it is not considered muktzeh.

Beitzah 6a.

The law presented here serves as the foundation for a fundamental concept in chassidic thought. See the series of maamarim entitled BeShaah Shehikdimu, 5672, Vol. 1, pp. 68, 262; Sefer HaMaamarim 5704, p. 19; et al., which focus on the fact that this law was mentioned in a discussion between Rav, Rav Kahana and Rav Assi. These Sages asked Rav to differentiate between the law presented in this subsection and the law regarding a chick that hatched on a festival, which Rav ruled was forbidden to be used on the festival. Rav did not give the answer given here – that the calf was permitted because of its mother – but instead remained silent. Nevertheless, he did not retract his ruling, and the halachah was not decided definitively. Therefore, when Rabbah, a later Sage, gave the explanation given here, the halachah was decided accordingly.

Chassidus points to the fact that Rav did not retract his ruling as proof that sometimes, a person can have an understanding of an idea that he unshakably knows is correct even though he cannot logically explain the basis for that knowledge.

See subsection 18, below.

E.g., a cow.

E.g., a sheep or a goat.

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 15:2). See also Rama (Yoreh Deah 13:3) and Magen Avraham 498:9, which state that when the mother cow was treifah, the calf is forbidden since, in the present era, we are not knowledgeable with regard to whether a newborn animal has undergone a full-term period of gestation.

See subsection 16, below.

See sec. 495:13. In that source, as here, the Alter Rebbe states that the custom is to rule leniently regarding moving objects that are muktzeh on festivals. However, in that source, the Alter Rebbe concludes, “May blessing rest upon one who conducts himself stringently [regarding moving muktzeh] on festivals.”

When a mother cow is set aside to raise offspring, it is muktzeh because the person does not have in mind to slaughter it on the festival. Nevertheless, as the Alter Rebbe stated previously in this subsection, the custom in these regions is to permit muktzeh on festivals.

This is an example of an instance where the halachic meaning of a term and its literal meaning are in direct conflict. The word nolad literally means “born,” and the calf was born on the festival. Halachically, however, nolad refers to a situation in which the possibility for using an object for a specific purpose first came about on the festival. As the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain, that is not the case in the present instance.

See subsection 8, above, where the Alter Rebbe explains that had the mother cow been slaughtered on the festival before the calf was born, it would have been permitted to eat the calf as well. The rationale is that before the calf was born, it was part of its mother’s body.

See sec. 513:19, regarding the ruling for a chick that hatched on the festival.

In those sources, the Alter Rebbe rules that when Shabbos follows a festival or a festival follows Shabbos, and an egg was laid or a chick was hatched on the Shabbos or the festival, the egg and the chick are forbidden on the following day, because Shabbos may not prepare for a festival, nor may a festival prepare for Shabbos.

If the animal dies without being slaughtered, the owner will suffer a severe financial loss, because the animal’s meat will no longer be fit for a Jew to eat.

Beitzah 25a.

Pesachim 46b.

The Alter Rebbe specifies that an olive-sized portion of the meat must be eaten, because any smaller amount is not considered significant. The Alter Rebbe mentions this general rule in many sources, including sec. 184:2, sec. 274:6, 8, sec. 442:1, 27, 28, et al.

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, Yoreh Deah 27:1 and the glosses of Sifsei Kohen and Turei Zahav, Yoreh Deah 27:1. These sources state that after an animal is ritually slaughtered, it may still have some involuntary movements even though it is no longer alive. According to Jewish Law, it is permitted to begin butchering the animal while it is still having these involuntary movements, provided one does not partake of that meat until after the involuntary movements cease.

See sec. 497:26, footnote 91 there. As explained in that source, after an animal is slaughtered its lungs must be inspected to ensure that the animal is not a treifah. According to Rabbinic Law, the animal should not be eaten until this inspection has been made. See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, Yoreh Deah 39:17; see also the Alter Rebbe’s Yoreh Deah, Hilchos Shechitah, sec. 1, and the Kuntreis Acharon (note 5) to that source.

Pesachim 46b. See also sec. 503:2, where the Alter Rebbe makes similar statements.

See sec. 495:2.

See sec. 495:3.

As explained in subsection 11 above, it is permitted to slaughter the animal according to Scriptural Law because it is possible that guests might come, and the host would serve them meat from this animal. In subsection 14 below, the Alter Rebbe presents a stricter opinion.

As the Alter Rebbe explains in that source, the hide is considered nolad because it was not fit to be used for any purpose before the festival, while the animal was alive.

Talmud Yerushalmi, Beitzah 3:3.

After the hide is moved, the animal may be butchered, and the meat may be cooked on the festival.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the opinion presented in subsection 12, above.

Beitzah 25a. See also sec. 510:19, where the Alter Rebbe rules in a similar fashion.

See sec. 495:11, where the Alter Rebbe rules stringently for this same reason.

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 58:3). As stated in that source, if any of the fowl’s internal organs (with the exception of the female’s womb) are discovered to have been crushed, the fowl is deemed a treifah.

Beitzah 34a.This license applies even when the 24-hour period after the fowl was trampled ends in the middle of the festival.

Slaughtering an animal is a melachah that is forbidden on Shabbos. It is only permitted on a festival if the animal’s meat will be eaten as part of a festive meal. The Alter Rebbe’s intent here is that even if the fowl is discovered to have been treifah, and, hence, eating it is forbidden, the slaughterer will not retroactively be considered as having transgressed by slaughtering a fowl that could not be used for the sake of the festival. Furthermore, even when initially, there is room for concern that the fowl will be found to have been treifah, its slaughter is not forbidden on the festival.

See Chulin 51a-b, which discusses this issue. See also subsection 8 above, where the Alter Rebbe presents another opinion.

According to Scriptural Law, the owner of a firstborn animal must offer the animal as a sacrifice in the Beis HaMikdash, and give its meat to the kohanim to eat. However, if the firstborn animal has a disqualifying blemish, it is not offered as a sacrifice (see Rambam, Hilchos Issurei Mizbeiach, ch. 2, where these blemishes are listed). Instead, although the animal is not considered as consecrated after it develops a blemish, it must be given to a kohen. The kohen may slaughter it and eat it, sell it, or give it away as a gift. Since the animal is not sanctified, the kohen may even sell or give the animal to a non-Jew.

In the present era, a firstborn animal may not be slaughtereduntil it develops such a blemish. The rationale is that until that time, the firstborn animal has the status of a consecrated animal. As such, one may not have it perform work, shear it, or use it for any other mundane purpose.

The Alter Rebbe proceeds to allude to the fact that it is preferable that a Torah scholar familiar with the pertinent laws examine the animal and determine whether or not the blemish is sufficient to annul the firstborn’s sanctity. If there is no scholar with the necessary expertise present, then three members of the community who are somewhat familiar with the relevant laws are licensed to permit the owner to give the firstborn animal to a kohen when it develops certain obvious blemishes. See Rambam, Hilchos Bechoros, ch. 1-5; see also the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah, sec. 309).

As a practical matter, in the present era it has become customary to sell an animal that is pregnant with its firstborn to a non-Jew until after it gives birth. This way, the animal will be owned by a non-Jew when it gives birth, and as such, the firstborn will not have any special sanctity. The Alter Rebbe composed a bill of sale to be used for such transactions. This bill of sale was included in his Siddur, together with the bill of sale to be used when selling chametz before Pesach, because the same basic principles are involved in both sales.

Beitzah 26a.

See sec. 314:17, where the Alter Rebbe rules: “… [through these actions] one is preparing a k’li. Thus, he is liable for [performing the forbidden labor of] makeh bepatish, [‘completing an article’].”

In his Kuntreis Acharon (towards the end of note 2), the Alter Rebbe differentiates between a ruling regarding a firstborn animal, which may not be issued on a festival, and other halachic rulings permitting food to be eaten, which may be issued (see footnote 7 above).

The difference between the two is that with regard to a firstborn animal, since our Sages ruled that a blemished firstborn animal may not be eaten until a halachic authority inspects it and issues a ruling regarding its status, it is the ruling itself which establishes whether or not the animal is permitted. Hence, issuing such a ruling resembles performing a task that makes an object fit to be used, i.e., performing the melachah of makeh bepatish. However, when issuing a ruling with regard to whether or not food is kosher, the food’s status is established before the ruling is issued; it is just that the status is unknown. Thus, when the halachic authority issues his ruling, he is merely making that status known, he is not establishing a new status.

Until a decision is rendered verbally, the animal remains forbidden to be eaten. Although on the following day, the scholar may rule that the animal is permitted based on the inspection he performed on the festival, there is no prohibition in performing the inspection since he did not issue a ruling.

See sec. 495:13.

Beitzah 26b.

Shabbos 136a. See also subsection 8, above.

See sec. 310:4, where the Alter Rebbe explains that the status of an article vis-à-vis the laws of muktzeh is determined by its status during bein hashmashos.

As the Alter Rebbe explains in that source, as long as the object did not become muktzeh during bein hashmashos, it never becomes irrevocably forbidden to be moved on that particular Shabbos or festival. Even if a factor arises that causes the object to be forbidden to be moved temporarily, as soon as that factor is removed, it becomes permitted to move the object again.

The firstborn animal discussed here was born on the festival itself. As mentioned in subsection 8 above, an animal that is born on a festival is not considered muktzeh, because it was permitted during bein hashmashos because its mother was permitted then. Although a firstborn animal that is born on a festival becomes forbidden when it is born, since it was permitted originally, i.e., it was permitted during bein hashmashos while it was in its mother’s womb, it is restored to that status when the halachic authority transgresses and rules that it is permitted to be slaughtered because of its blemish.

Beitzah 27a-b. As our Sages state in that source, if a person intentionally causes a firstborn animal to develop a blemish, he is penalized and is forbidden to slaughter it. Therefore, before permitting the slaughter of a firstborn, the authority issuing the ruling must first investigate how the animal developed the blemish.

It is forbidden to raise a firstborn animal from a pit on a festival because it is not known whether or not it is blemished, and, were the animal not to be blemished, it would be forbidden to slaughter it on the festival (see subsection 17 below, and notes). Were the animal that fell into the pit not to be a firstborn, it would be permitted to help it climb out of the pit on the festival, because it is permitted to slaughter an ordinary animal on a festival.

This ruling seems to contradict the ruling in sec. 497:5, where the Alter Rebbe rules that it is forbidden to feed an animal that is muktzeh, even if the animal is not considered “yet to be trapped.” The Alter Rebbe addresses this point in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1) to this section, explaining that this subsection’s concluding statement is quoted from Maggid Mishneh (Hilchos Shevisas Yom Tov 2:4). The Alter Rebbe then proceeds to explain the rationale for this ruling: Although the person is forbidden to help the animal out of the pit, he is nonetheless obligated to provide the animal with food, and thus alleviate its suffering. The concern for the animal’s suffering overrides the prohibition against feeding an animal that is muktzeh.

This ruling resembles one in sec. 305:26, where the Alter Rebbe rules:

>>When an animal falls into an irrigation canal [on Shabbos]…, if the water is deep and it is impossible to supply [the animal] with its needs there, one should bring pillows and cushions and place them beneath [the animal]. If this [enables the animal] to climb up, [this may be done to enable it] to climb out….

>>It is, however, forbidden to lift the animal up by hand if [the animal] was not able to ascend via the cushions, even if [the animal] will die there, because the animal is muktzehand our Sages did not permit moving an article that is muktzeheven when an animal’s suffering is involved….

>>(Other authorities permit one to [help the animal] ascend by hand because of consideration for its suffering. One may rely on their words in the case of a significant loss.) (According to all authorities,) it is permitted to instruct a non-Jew to [help the animal] ascend.

On Shabbos, it is also forbidden to derive benefit from the animal. Nevertheless, because of the possibility of the owner suffering a severe financial loss, i.e., if the animal dies in the irrigation canal, the Sages granted leniency and permitted the owner to help the animal climb out of the pit. Hence, it is logical to assume that the leniencies mentioned in sec. 305:26, i.e., using pillows and cushions to enable the animal to climb out, helping it ascend by hand if a significant loss is involved, and instructing a non-Jew to help it ascend, are permitted in the situations mentioned here and in the following subsection, if it appears likely that the animal will die if this assistance is not granted.

There is a Scriptural prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day (Vayikra 22:28; see also Rambam, Hilchos Shechitah 12:1). Accordingly, the person is permitted to slaughter only one of the animals that fell into the pit. Therefore, one might think that once one animal is out of the pit, the second animal is considered muktzeh. With this ruling, the Alter Rebbe is explaining how it is possible to raise both animals out of the pit without violating any prohibitions.

Beitzah 37a.

See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, (Choshen Mishpat, Hilchos Ovrei Derachim VeTzaar Baalei Chayim, subsection 4). In that source the Alter Rebbe rules: “One is… obligated to exert himself physically to save all animals, even those that are ownerless and even those belonging to non-Jews, from suffering.”

This obligation is the Alter Rebbe’s basis for allowing the person to act with guile regarding the prohibition against moving muktzeh, when doing so is necessary to relieve the second animal’s suffering. Hence, this ruling even applies according to those who rule stringently regarding moving muktzeh on festivals.

The rationale is that if neither of the animals is slaughtered, by raising them from the pit, the person would be moving something from which he is forbidden to benefit on the festival. He could not say that he intended to slaughter them, because the guile with which the person acted would be recognizable as an utter, obvious ruse. If the animals’ owner does not wish to slaughter either animal for use on the festival, then he should lower food for the animals into the pit, and relieve their suffering in that manner.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (at the end of note 2), the Alter Rebbe states that although Magen Avraham 498:20 questions the permissibility of bringing all the animals out of a pit, the Alter Rebbe sees no reason to forbid doing so.

The Alter Rebbe explains that with regard to an animal and its offspring, the only reason to forbid helping the animals out of a pit is because the person would be moving something from which he is forbidden to benefit from on the festival. In the present instance, there is no prohibition involved with slaughtering both animals on the same day. Hence, it is permitted to move both animals according to Scriptural Law. In this instance, because of the suffering the animals would endure, the Sages did not impose any restrictions against helping the animals out of the pit.

Beitzah 21a. Needless to say, the non-Jewish partner must consent to the animal’s slaughter.

See sec. 512:1, where the Alter Rebbe rules that performing a melachah for a non-Jew is prohibited.

Ibid. See also sec. 318:5, where the Alter Rebbe makes a similar statement.

It should be noted that for the reason mentioned in this source, a different rule applies to an instance in which a Jew and a non-Jew are partners in a batch of dough. See also sec. 506:12. See also the following footnote.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe explains the various rulings in this subsection, and substantiates the license granted in the main text to slaughter an animal on a festival that is jointly owned by a Jew and a non-Jew, and to then divide the carcass with the non-Jew, provided the non-Jew agrees to this arrangement.

The Alter Rebbe notes that although this ruling follows the rulings of many prominent halachic authorities including Beis Yosef, it is not in accord with that of Turei Zahav 498:10. The rulings mentioned are based on a passage in Beitzah 21a, which makes a distinction between an animal owned by a Jew in partnership with a non-Jew and dough that is jointly owned by such individuals. The Sages conclude that the jointly-owned animal may be slaughtered because it is impossible to divide the animal without first slaughtering it. Hence, even though the melachah of slaughtering performed by the Jew also benefits the non-Jewish partner, it is nonetheless permitted. By contrast, the Sages forbade baking the jointly-owned dough. Instead, the dough must first be divided between the Jewish and non-Jewish owners. The rationale is that dough can be divided without impairing the non-Jew’s portion. Hence, it is forbidden for the Jew to bake the dough without first dividing it.

In his comments on that passage, Rabbeinu Asher (Beitzah 2:13) states the second law presented in this subsection, that even if a Jew owns two animals in partnership with a non-Jew, the Jew is permitted to slaughter both animals because that is the only way to equitably divide the joint property, and he cannot compel the non-Jew to accept the lesser of the two animals.

Magen Avraham 498:21 qualifies Rabbeinu Asher’s ruling, stating the third law presented in the main text, that if both animals are absolutely alike or the non-Jew is willing to give the Jew the better animal, the Jew is only permitted to slaughter that animal. However, Magen Avraham explains that in such an instance the Jew may not slaughter the second animal for the non-Jew.

Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 498) states the final law mentioned in this subsection, that if the Jew does not want to eat an entire animal on the festival, he need not dissolve the partnership in order to avoid performing the melachah of slaughtering for the benefit of a non-Jew. Instead, the Jew may slaughter one of the jointly-owned animals, and divide it with the non-Jew. Beis Yosef maintains that this ruling applies even if the non-Jew is willing to give the Jew the preferred animal, and even if both animals are absolutely the same.

However, as mentioned above, Turei Zahav does not accept the ruling of Beis Yosef. Rather, Turei Zahav bases his ruling on an insight to Beitzah 21a developed by Tosafos regarding dough that is jointly owned by a Jew and a non-Jew. Tosafos notes that although our Sages required the Jew to separate the portion of dough owned by the non-Jew before baking his portion of the dough on a festival, in Beitzah 17a, the Sages permit a woman to bake a full oven of bread on a festival even though she only needs one loaf and the other loaves will not be used until after the festival. One might wonder why the Sages rule leniently in this instance when it is usually forbidden to bake for the days following the festival on the festival itself. However, in this instance, license is granted to bake more than is necessary for the festival because bread tastes better when it is baked in a full oven. In light of this ruling, Tosafos suggests that seemingly in Beitzah 21a, license should have been granted to bake the portion of the dough belonging to the non-Jew, because doing so would improve the flavor of the Jew’s bread. From the fact that the Sages did not rule in this manner, Tosafos concludes that there is an inherent difference between baking dough owned by a Jew and baking dough owned by a non-Jew on a festival. Hence, when a Jew desires to use his portion of the assets of a partnership with a non-Jew, and it is possible to divide the assets, such a division must be made rather than perform a melachah on a festival that will benefit the non-Jew, even though the Jew would benefit from the melachah performed on behalf of the non-Jew.

Turei Zahav argues that these same concepts can be applied in the present instance. When a Jew and a non-Jew jointly own two animals, even though not dividing all the assets of the partnership and slaughtering only one of the jointly owned animals will benefit the Jew, since doing so will also benefit the non-Jew, the Jew may not slaughter that one animal and take his portion, and give the non-Jew his portion.

As stated above, the Alter Rebbe does not accept the logic of Turei Zahav, and rules instead like Beis Yosef. The Alter Rebbe explains that there is a distinct difference between joint ownership of an animal and joint ownership of dough. This distinction is rooted in the fact that the non-Jewish partner can compel the Jew to divide the dough at any time, so that he can have his portion of the dough. Thus, the Jew never really has a share in the non-Jew’s portion of the dough. Therefore, if the Jew were to bake the non-Jew’s portion of dough on the festival, he is essentially baking that portion of dough for the non-Jew. This is true even though the Jew does derive some benefit from having the non-Jew’s dough baked at the same time he bakes his own dough.

By contrast to this, when a Jew and a non-Jew jointly own several animals, the non-Jew cannot compel the Jew to take a given animal in exchange for another animal, even when it appears that it is to the Jew’s benefit to do so. If the Jew desires only half an animal, and the non-Jew consents, the Jew is permitted to slaughter it, since in essence, each animal owned by the partnership is a separate entity and thus covered by the first law in this subsection, which describes how to proceed when a Jew owns an animal in partnership with a non-Jew.

The Alter Rebbe is explaining that even in such an instance, the Jew is not required to dissolve the partnership, take the animal for himself and slaughter it. Instead, he may slaughter a jointly-owned animal to which a portion will be given to his non-Jewish partner.

The Alter Rebbe lived in the era before electricity, and needless to say, before refrigeration. In that era, if all the meat from an animal that was slaughtered on a festival was not consumed on that day, dealing with it presented a significant difficulty. Moreover, even in the present age, the issue, while not as acute, can still be significant.

See Rambam, Hilchos Shechitah 1:5, 7, which states:

>>The place where an animal should be slaughtered is the neck. The entire neck is acceptable for slaughtering.

>>What is implied? With regard to the gullet, from the beginning of the place where when it is cut, it contracts until the place where hair grows and it begins appearing fissured like the stomach, this is the place of slaughter with regard to the gullet….

>>Where is the place of slaughter with regard to the windpipe? From the slant of its cap downward until the beginning of the flank of the lung when the animal extends its neck to pasture, this is the place of slaughter with regard to the windpipe. The area opposite this place on the outside is called the neck.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to a person who is slaughtering a sheep. In such an instance, having the animal’s neck covered with wool could interfere with the slaughter.

See sec. 340:1, where the Alter Rebbe explains that tearing wool off an animal or an animal’s hide by hand is not the ordinary manner of shearing. Therefore, one who does so on Shabbos is not liable. Nevertheless, as Tosafos (Bechoros 25a) states, one is forbidden to pull out the wool intentionally.

The Alter Rebbe’s ruling here is slightly difficult to understand. On one hand, in sec. 340:1 which deals with shearing an animal, he does not mention the prohibition against uprooting an entity from the place it grows, leaving the impression that in this matter, the Alter Rebbe follows the approach of Ramban (Shabbos 107b) who states that the prohibition against uprooting an entity from the place it grows does not apply with regard to removing hair, nails, and the like from the bodies of living beings. On the other hand, in the main text here and in sec. 330:2, with regard to birthing a child, the Alter Rebbe clearly mentions a person’s liability due to that prohibition.

Bechoros 25a.

For this reason, even authorities who permit manually pulling out an animal’s hair, forbid pulling out the feathers of a fowl.

See Tosafos, Bechoros 24b. See also the Alter Rebbe’s Yoreh Deah, Hilchos Shechitah sec. 24, gloss 14, where this practice is mentioned.

See sec. 337:1, where the Alter Rebbe writes: “Any [forbidden labor performed] unintentionally is permitted.” This ruling is based on the fundamental principle that the Torah only prohibited performing melachas machsheves, “purposeful work” (Beitzah 13b). Ritva, in his gloss to Yoma 34b, maintains that this concept is applied beyond the laws of Shabbos, and through the Talmudic convention of binyan av, is extended to all Torah prohibitions. See Likkutei Sichos (Vol. 7, p. 191), where the Rebbe explains why the person is not liable for such actions.

In the Kuntreis Acharon (note 3) to this section, the Alter Rebbe elaborates concerning this principle. The Alter Rebbe explains that Magen Avraham 498:23 maintains that it is permitted to perform an act that may lead to the unintentional performance of a melachah, even if a Scriptural prohibition is involved. The Alter Rebbe then states unequivocally: “This [concept] is clearly apparent and accepted by the Talmud and all the halachic authorities in several places.”

The Alter Rebbe then proceeds to present Rabbeinu Asher’s understanding of Tosafos’ interpretation of Bechoros 25a. The Alter Rebbe explains that these authorities permit a person to clear the place on a sheep’s neck where it will be slaughtered, provided he does not intend to pull out wool while slaughtering the animal. Nevertheless, these authorities forbid this practice before slaughtering a fowl even if the person does not intend to pull out the feathers. The Alter Rebbe explains this opinion as follows:

a) Tosafos and Rabbeinu Asher based this distinction on a theoretical discussion presented in Bechoros 25a. This opinion is in accordance with an opinion presented in the Talmud there, i.e., that it is forbidden to perform an act if it may result in the unintentional performance of a forbidden activity when a Scriptural prohibition is involved. However, the Alter Rebbe maintains that these authorities would agree that with regard to the accepted halachah, performing such an act is permitted, and therefore, there is no reason to make a distinction between a fowl and an animal.

b) There are some authorities who permit one to intentionally remove wool from an animal by hand in preparation for its slaughter, because this is not the normal manner of removing the wool. According to these authorities, a distinction must be made between a fowl and an animal in this regard, because the ordinary way of removing a fowl’s feathers is by hand. Hence, intentionally removing the feathers on a festival is forbidden. As a practical matter, according to the accepted ruling presented in the main text, that it is forbidden to intentionally remove wool from an animal, there is no difference between an animal and a fowl.

As the Alter Rebbe specifies, this ruling does not apply to an instance in which the act will definitely lead to the violation of a prohibition. Rather, such an activity would be considered a p’sik raishah, an activity which would lead to an inevitable result.The Sages frequently (e.g., Shabbos 75a, 103a, 120b, et al.) refer to such situations with the phrase, p’sik raishah vilo yamus, “If its head is severed, will it not die?” i.e., since this is the inevitable result of the person’s prior activity, the act is forbidden. See also sec. 253:10, 11, 28; sec. 259:7, sec. 277:1-5, sec. 278:4, et al., where the Alter Rebbe mentions this concept.

See sec. 523:2, where the Alter Rebbe mentions a related ruling.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe mentions the prohibition on Shabbos against pressing muchin, i.e., any type of soft cloth, into the opening of a flask to serve as a stopper. In that instance, the person would be liable for squeezing liquids out of the muchin, even though he would not be doing so intentionally, because it is a p’sik raishah, an inevitable result, that the liquids would be squeezed out. See also the Kuntreis Acharon (note 1) to sec. 277, where the Alter Rebbe discusses this issue.

The Alter Rebbe specifies that this ruling even applies to an instance in which the person can only slaughter the animal or fowl after removing the wool or feathers by hand or by moving them aside with an implement, because it would seem that in such an instance the act is necessary for the preparation of food. Hence, one might think that in such an instance these acts would be permitted.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe writes:

>>Since the melachah is not being performed with the food that itself is being eaten, but rather with an article that prepares it to be eaten, [that article and the activity necessary to prepare it are placed in a different category. These activities] are referred to as machshirei ochel nefesh, [activities that make it possible to prepare food]. It is forbidden to perform [all such activities] on a festival according to Scriptural Law….

>>To what do the above [restrictions] apply? To preliminary activities that could have been performed before the festival….

See the Kuntreis Acharon (note 4 to this section). In that source the Alter Rebbe presents a lengthy explanation regarding why removing feathers from a fowl before its slaughter is considered machshirei ochel nefesh and not part of the slaughtering process, even if it is impossible to slaughter the fowl without removing its feathers.

Beitzah 2a, 8a.

See sec. 310:17, where the Alter Rebbe mentions carrying a firepan with ashfor this purpose on Shabbos.

Vayikra 17:13 states: “If you will snare a wild beast or a fowl that may be eaten, you shall pour out its blood and cover it with earth.”See Sefer HaMitzvos (positive commandment 147) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 187), where this command is counted as one of the 613 mitzvos of the Torah. See also the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah, Hilchos Shechitah, sec. 14), and the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah, sec. 28) where this mitzvah is discussed in detail.

See sec. 495:13.

The Alter Rebbe is alluding to the concept of nolad gamur, nolad in a complete sense, because previously, the ashes did not exist in the world at all. See sec. 305:33, where the Alter Rebbe also mentions this concept. See also the Kuntreis Acharon (note 5)to sec. 518, where the Alter Rebbe discusses this issue.

When a forbidden substance is mixed with a permitted substance of the same type (min bemino in Talmudicterminology) and the forbidden substance cannot be distinguished within the mixture, the mixture is entirely permitted, as long as there is rov, a simple majority of the permitted substance. See sec. 626:9.

See sec. 310:19, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this ruling.

Our Sages ruled that the presence of a davar sheyeish lo matirin is never nullified in a mixture even if there are thousands of times more permitted substances. The rationale is that since the prohibition will not be in effect in a short time, why permit a forbidden substance? Rather, let the time for the prohibition run its course and then the entire mixture will be permitted (see Rashi, Beitzah 3b). See sec. 318:4, sec. 445:8, sec. 447:18, 23, et al., where this concept is mentioned.

Beitzah 8a.

The Alter Rebbe’s careful wording implies that the ash may be carried for any purpose, including a purpose that is totally unrelated to cooking (see subsection 30, below). The rationale for this ruling is that since the ash is fit to be used on the festival, it is not muktzeh, and since the ash is not muktzeh, it may be carried for any purpose.

The rationale for this ruling is that an object does not become muktzeh for only a portion of a Shabbos or festival, as stated in sec. 310:7. Therefore, since the wood which was burned to produce these ashes was not muktzeh at the onset of the festival, the resulting ashes are not muktzeh either. Furthermore, it is possible to say that with his careful wording, the Alter Rebbe alludes to the fact that although the ashes were produced on the festival, they are not considered nolad. The rationale is that because the wood from which they were produced existed before the festival, and the ashes are fit to be used for cooking once they have been warmed, just as the original wood was, the ashes are not considered a new entity. Therefore, it is permitted to carry the ashes for all purposes.

In such an instance, the coals are not deemed nolad.

See sec. 308:8, where the Alter Rebbe states: “Any entity that is not categorized as a k’li and is neither food for humans nor for animals, e.g., stones, money, wood, reeds, beams, earth, sand…, and all other articles like these [are considered muktzeh in an absolute sense].”

The Alter Rebbe is referring to earth that is not clumped together, and therefore does not need to be broken up. See subsection 29, below.

The Alter Rebbe uses the term batel, which is normally translated as “nullified.” However, in this subsection, we have translated batel as, “considered as part of,” since that reflects the Alter Rebbe’s intent. Were the earth that was piled up to be considered batel, it would no longer be considered an independent entity. Rather, it would be considered as part of the soil in the garden or ruin. In that instance, using it on the festival would be forbidden, because the person would be considered to be digging up his garden or the floor of his ruin, as it were.

The Alter Rebbe lived in the era when most homes had floors of packed earth, rather than floors that were paved, tiled, or covered with wood. Also, this was the era before indoor plumbing. Therefore, it was very common for people to bring in piles of soil, which was used to cover filth, water, etc. This soil would be left where it was strewn, to harden and become part of the floor. See sec. 337:2.

At the beginning of this subsection, the Alter Rebbe rules regarding a large pile of soil in a garden or a ruin, while in this paragraph he rules regarding a bucketful of soil in a home or courtyard. This difference in wording is significant, and reflects the difference between a garden and a ruin, and a courtyard and a home. A person might bring soil into his garden in preparation to till the ground, and he may bring soil into his ruin when preparing to rebuild the ruin. Hence, only a large amount of earth placed in either a garden or a ruin would indicate that the earth is intended to be used for the person’s household needs. By contrast, earth is not usually brought into a home or courtyard. Therefore, it is obvious that even a small amount of soil, e.g., a bucketful, brought into a house is intended for the person’s household needs, provided the soil is placed in a specific corner of the home or courtyard.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), the Alter Rebbe notes the contrast between the ruling in the main text and that of Rav Yosef Caro in his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 498:16), which grants leniency only when one brings “a large amount of earth into his home.” When one brings a small amount into his home it is forbidden. The Alter Rebbe notes that in his Beis Yosef (Orach Chayim 498), Rav Yosef Caro speaks of bringing a bucketful of earth into one’s home. Therefore, he maintains that Rav Yosef Caro’s intent in his Shulchan Aruch is bringing the earth into his domain as a whole – including also a garden and a ruin – and not his house specifically.

In this note, the Alter Rebbe also explains why he did not quote the ruling of Turei Zahav 498:12. In that ruling, Turei Zahav permits using earth that before a festival was not designated for use on the festival to cover the blood of a fowl or an undomesticated animal which was slaughtered on the festival, provided it is a pressing situation. Turei Zahav explains that he only grants this license so as to enable the person to eat and appreciate the joy of the festival in an appropriate manner. However, in the Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe rejects this ruling, explaining that were a person to have already slaughtered the fowl or the animal, it is not necessary to cover the blood before partaking of the meat (see subsection 37, below). Furthermore, if the person had not yet slaughtered the fowl or the animal, he should not be permitted to do so on the festival, if before the festival, he did not prepare dirt with which to cover the blood. This ruling applies even if not slaughtering the animal or fowl will prevent the person from experiencing festive joy (see subsection 31 below, and footnote 121 there). The Alter Rebbe rules in this manner, because he maintains that this is the core of the difference of opinion among the Sages regarding using earth to cover blood (Beitzah 2a, 7b, 9b-10a), and about which the Talmud rules stringently (see subsection 31 below).

The Alter Rebbe explains that in his ruling, Turei Zahav assumes that the positive commandment to rejoice on a festival overrides the prohibition against performing melachah on a festival, in accordance with the general rule that a positive commandment overrides a negative one. However, the Alter Rebbe does not accept this logic, explaining that the observance of a festival involves both a positive and a negative commandment. Therefore, the command to rejoice on the festival does not override the command against performing melachah on the festival.

Moreover, the Alter Rebbe brings proof that the mitzvah of rejoicing on a festival does not nullify the prohibition against performing melachah on a festival from the fact that most halachic authorities do not allow trapping on a festival even though doing so merely involves a Rabbinic prohibition {see sec. 495:9; see also Kuntreis Acharon (note 1) to sec. 497}.

In addition, according to Turei Zahav’s logic, earth that was not designated to be used on the festival would be deemed muktzeh, and the prohibition against muktzeh is not released to allow for rejoicing on a festival. See Rambam, Hilchos Shevisas Yom Tov 3:1.

See sec. 308:77, where the Alter Rebbe rules in a similar manner regarding Shabbos.

Beitzah 8b.

See sec. 308:77, where the Alter Rebbe offers a similar ruling.

Producing a crevice is a derivative of the Scripturally forbidden labor of building. Therefore, it is forbidden to make a crevice on Shabbos or festivals. See sec. 311:14, sec. 337:5, and sec. 506:2, where the Alter Rebbe issues rulings revolving around the premise that a derivative of a Scripturally forbidden labor is itself forbidden.

See sec. 278, where the Alter Rebbe discusses the term melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah at length.

Rashi (Shabbos 93b) explains the rationale of the Sages who maintain that a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah is not forbidden by Scriptural Law. Rashi explains that these Sages maintain that it is only forbidden to perform melachas machsheves, intentional work. In a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah, the purpose of the task does not involve the object with which the forbidden labor is performed, i.e., the person wants to move some of the soil to a different place. While doing so he unintentionally makes a crevice in the pile of soil. Although making a crevice is a forbidden labor, the person did not move the dirt so as to make the crevice. Hence, it can be said that the intent necessary to forbid this activity is lacking.

Although this is in fact the halachah, the Sages nonetheless prohibited performing a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah. As the Alter Rebbe explains in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2) to sec. 275, a melachah she’einah tzorichah le­gufah is considered more serious than other Rabbinic prohibitions, and additional safeguards are instituted to prevent such an act from being performed.

See sec. 278:1, 3.

See subsections 24 and 25, above.

See subsection 29, above.

Beitzah 2a. See also footnote 96 above.

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 28:5). The Alter Rebbe’s ruling here reflects the explanation in Chulin 83b, that the commandment to, “cover an animal’s blood,” implies covering it from above and below.

Beitzah 7b.

Beitzah 2a. This prohibition applies even though by observing it, the person’s rejoicing in honor of the festival will be lessened. See Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), which is summarized in footnote 109 above.

Talmud Yerushalmi, Beitzah 1:4.

See subsection 29 above, where the Alter Rebbe rules regarding the prohibition against making a crevice.

Talmud Yerushalmi, loc. cit. See also the end of subsection 32, below.

See subsection 31 above.

Beitzah 2a.

See subsection 29, above.

Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim compares the ruling here and the ruling in subsection 31, above. In subsection 31, the Alter Rebbe states, “the fulfillment of the Scriptural command of covering [the blood] overrides the prohibition against moving [articles that are] muktzeh” and here, the Alter Rebbe states, “...the Sages did not uphold their [safeguard, when doing so would prevent the person from fulfilling] the [Scriptural] command….”

Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim explains that the wording “overrides” is appropriate because when uprooting the earth, the person makes the crevice before he fulfills the mitzvah.

As mentioned in subsection 29, making a crevice is a melachah she’einah tzorichah legufah. As such, although in this instance it is Scripturally permitted to make a crevice, doing so is nonetheless forbidden by the Sages.

See Rosh HaShanah 31b; Sotah 40a. The Alter Rebbe mentions this principle in several places, including sec. 128:3, 5, sec. 197:6, sec. 305:26, and sec. 446:5. See end of the previous subsection.

Thus, although there is a Scriptural commandment to cover the blood of an animal that has been slaughtered, as the above sources illustrate, the Sages have the authority to instruct a person to refrain from fulfilling that commandment.

The Alter Rebbe’s intent is that, even though the person inserted a shovel into the ground before the start of the festival with the intent of using that soil to cover the blood of a fowl or an undomesticated animal that was slaughtered on the festival, as an initial preference, he should nevertheless refrain from slaughtering on the festival. In the next paragraph, the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain why the person should refrain from slaughtering in this instance.

See subsections 27 and 31 above, from which it is evident that a person must prepare earth or ashes to be used to cover blood.

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 28:5, 7) and Sifsei Kohen, Yoreh Deah 28:36, which emphasize that the earth used to cover blood should be loose.

Beitzah 8b.

See sec. 301:1, where the Alter Rebbe explains: “For grinding involves taking a single entity and breaking it into many smaller entities, and anyone who performs a similar activity is [thus performing] a derivative of grinding.” Thus, breaking up the chunk of earth violates the prohibition against grinding.

Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim discusses why the melachah of grinding is not considered a meleches ochel nefesh, which is permitted on festivals, even though grinding is necessary for the preparation of food.

See Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), which is explained in footnote 109, above.

See sec. 495:1.

In the standard published text of Hilchos Maachalos Asuros 1:13, Rambam defines a ko’i as “a mixed species that comes from mating a kosher domesticated animal with a kosher non-domesticated animal.” That understanding of the term is followed by many other authorities. However, Rav Yosef Caro (see Beis Yosef to Tur, Yoreh Deah 61) explains that Rambam understands the term ko’i as referring to an independent species, and it is unclear whether to classify this species as a domesticated animal or as a wild beast.

Chulin 83b.

An animal’s fat is divided into two categories, shuman and cheilev. It is permitted to eat both the shuman and cheilev of an undomesticated animal. However, it is only permitted to eat the shuman of a domesticated animal. It is forbidden to eat the cheilev of a ko’i because there is an unresolved doubt whether it is considered a domesticated or undomesticated animal. See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah, sec. 64:1 and 80:6). The Alter Rebbe explains that it is prohibited to slaughter a ko’i on a festival, because if a person slaughters a ko’i on a festival and covers its blood, someone observing this might mistakenly assume that a ko’i is an undomesticated animal, and eat the cheilev from a ko’i.

Generally, it is forbidden to slaughter an animal while holding it so that its blood will flow into a container (see the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, Yoreh Deah 11:3). However, license is granted when there is earth in the container, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to state.

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 11:3).

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 28:3).

The mitzvah to cover the blood of a slaughtered animal only applies to the blood of an undomesticated animal and fowl. There is no mitzvah to cover the blood of a domesticated animal.

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 28:14).

See subsection 32, above.

See subsection 30, above.

The Alter Rebbe explains his ruling in the main text in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 6), stating that it is based on the ruling of the Tur (Orach Chayim 498) and many others. The rationale for the stringency is, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain in the main text, it is possible that in an instance such as the one presented here, the person will not cover the blood of the undomesticated animal and the fowl. Thus, the person would have exerted himself unnecessarily on the festival.

In the Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe notes that Turei Zahav 498:21 differs with the Tur’s ruling, and maintains that even in such a situation, the person is required to cover at least some of the blood of the mixture with at least one shovelful of earth. Hence, Turei Zahav maintains that after the fact (i.e., after one violated the directive not to slaughter a ko’i on a festival, and slaughtered it with a fowl and/or an undomesticated animal, or after the person slaughtered a domesticated animal along with a fowl and/or an undomesticated animal, and the blood from all the animals mixed together), it is only necessary to cover some of the blood of the undomesticated animal or fowl. The rationale for Turei Zahav’s ruling is that in this instance, since the blood from all the slaughtered animals is mixed together, by covering a portion of the mixture of blood, the person will have covered at least some of the blood of the undomesticated animal or fowl.

The Alter Rebbe questions this ruling,noting that fundamentally, our Sages did not consider using earth from a pile into which a shovel had been inserted before the festival to cover blood from an animal slaughtered on the festival a desirable option. They permitted doing so only after the fact (Beitzah 7b). Hence, the Alter Rebbe maintains that in an instance such as the one presented in the main text, where one is unsure whether or not he will be performing a mitzvah when covering the blood of slaughtered animals, it is forbidden to do so with such soil. The rationale for the doubt as to whether or not the person would be performing a mitzvah when covering some of the blood from the slaughtered animals is as follows: When the blood of the domesticated animal is mixed with the blood of the undomesticated animal or fowl, it is possible that the blood of the undomesticated animal or fowl is not evenly distributed within the mixture. Therefore, it is possible that in one area, there may be so much more of the blood of the domesticated animal than that of the undomesticated animal or fowl, that the blood of the undomesticated animal or fowl will be nullified. Furthermore, it is altogether possible that the shovelful of earth the person uses will only cover this area of the mixture. Thus, in this instance, it would be considered as if the earth was not used to cover any of the blood of the undomesticated animal or the fowl. Hence, as stated initially, perhaps the person will not be covering the blood of the undomesticated animal and fowl, and thus he would be troubling himself unnecessarily on the festival.

Beitzah 8b.

See Rama, Yoreh Deah 28:1. In that source, Rama rules that the meat of a slaughtered animal may be eaten even when the person intentionally does not cover its blood.

See sec. 506:6, where the Alter Rebbe issues a related ruling with regard to dough that was kneaded on the day before a festival from which challah was not separated. See also sec. 495:5, where the Alter Rebbe rules in similar manner.

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 28:7).

In that source, the Alter Rebbe rules that on Shabbos, when one removes a clump of earth from the ground in a field and places it in a crevice, he is liable for performing the melachah of plowing. However, in sec. 313:24, the Alter Rebbe rules that one who fills in a crevice in a home or in a courtyard is liable for performing the melachah of building. See also sec. 337:1, where the Alter Rebbe explains that it is forbidden to drag heavy objects over the earth on Shabbos, because doing so will create a crevice, which is a derivative of plowing. Nevertheless, in sec. 526:3, the Alter Rebbe issues a similar ruling as here and cites the source in the same manner.