Shulchan Aruch: Chapter 501 - [When] it is Forbidden and When it is Permitted [to Move] Wood on Festivals

Beitzah 31a.

Ibid. 31b.

Ibid. See also sec. 308:4-5, where the Alter Rebbe defines this category of muktzeh. As stated in that source, when a person has designated an article for a specific purpose because of its value and because the activity associated with that purpose is forbidden on Shabbos and festivals, the article is considered as set aside (muktzeh). Hence, it may not be used on Shabbasos and festivals.

See also sec. 308:48 where the Alter Rebbe explains that bricks that have been designated to be used for construction are muktzeh because they are not considered to be utensils.

The term bein hashmashos is generally translated as “dusk” or “twilight.” See sec. 261:5 and footnotes, and sec. 331:5 and footnotes for a more exact definition of the term. Bein hashmashos is the time when the observance of the Shabbasos and festivals begin and, hence, is the time when the designation of an object as muktzeh takes effect (see sec. 308:27, 78; sec. 310:4; sec. 495:13, et al.).

In that source, the Alter Rebbe rules that if utensils broke before the commencement of a festival, it is permitted to move the fragments to use as kindling on the festival, provided they are fit for that purpose. The rationale is that the person will have had in mind to use the fragments for kindling before the commencement of the festival. By citing this source, it seems that the Alter Rebbe is implying that in the instance described here, by contrast, it is forbidden to use the beams as kindling because the person did not divert his intent from using them for construction before the start of the festival.

Some students of the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch have suggested that a printing error crept into the text, and the citation should be to sec. 308:27. See the following footnote.

See Beitzah 30b, which discusses a similar situation regarding a hut that fell on a festival.

See also sec. 308:27. In that source, the Alter Rebbe presents the instance where an object that was muktzeh machmas chisaron kis during bein hashmashos breaks on Shabbos or on a festival. The Alter Rebbe rules that it is forbidden to move the pieces of such a utensil even though the fragments are no longer muktzeh because of the possibility of financial loss. However, as the Alter Rebbe explains, since during bein hashmashos, when the utensil was intact, the owner had diverted his attention from using the utensil, the fragments are considered muktzeh for the entire day.

See sec. 495:13, where this subject is discussed in detail.

Since the beam is sound and strong, it is not likely that the owner would have thought about using it as kindling on a festival. See sec. 518:20 and sec. 638:12ff. As mentioned in sec. 305:32, certain changes are so significant that they cause an object to be considered nolad even according to the lenient opinions.

See Beitzah 2b.

See Beitzah 30b. See also sec. 518:20, where the Alter Rebbe issues a similar ruling. See also the Kuntreis Acharon (note 5) to that section and the Kuntreis Acharon (note 3)to sec. 499, where the Alter Rebbe discusses this issue.

Beitzah 31b.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), the Alter Rebbe states that his ruling resembles the ruling of Turei Zahav 501:2. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between the two rulings. The Alter Rebbe explains that in his ruling, Turei Zahav is focusing on chopping wood that would be fit for kindling even if it was not chopped into smaller pieces. Therefore, Turei Zahav rules that chopping the wood into smaller pieces is forbidden because the person would be troubling himself unnecessarily on the festival.

In contrast to this, the Alter Rebbe is speaking about chopping up a beam, i.e., wood that is not fit for kindling unless it is chopped into smaller pieces. Therefore, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to emphasizes in the main text, one is only forbidden to chop the beam into very thin pieces that can be used to light a fire, because one would be liable for performing such an activity on Shabbos. Furthermore, the Alter Rebbe explains that the person is not only permitted to chop the beam into very large pieces; even chopping it into small pieces is permitted, as long as he does not chop it into extremely small pieces that are fit to be used to light a fire. Presumably, Turei Zahav would concur in this case.

See also 301:1, where the Alter Rebbe states:

>>One who cuts a vegetable into very thin pieces [performs] a derivative [of the labor] of grinding. For grinding involves taking a single entity and breaking it into many smaller entities, and anyone who performs a similar activity is [thus performing] a derivative of grinding. True, [the two activities] are not entirely alike, for grinding changes the nature of the first entity entirely, and this is not the case when one cuts [very thin pieces]. Nevertheless, it is considered its derivative since there is a resemblance [between the two acts – both] transform a single entity into many [smaller] ones.

Generally, activities that are classified as machshirei ochel nefesh that could have been performed before the festival are forbidden to be performed on a festival even when performed in an unusual manner. See sec. 495:4 and the Kuntreis Acharon (note 1) to sec. 495, where this subject is discussed in detail.

Beitzah 31a.

See sec. 495:4-5, where the Alter Rebbe rules in a similar manner.

Beitzah 31b.

Beitzah 33a.

Ibid. 33b.

As the Alter Rebbe writes in that source, “[The forbidden labor of] collecting produce applies only when produce is collected in the place in which it grows, like a harvested crop whose sheaves are collected in the place where they grow.”

In that source, the Alter Rebbe writes that this activity is forbidden lest the person become very involved in collecting the produce, and this prevent him from adequately rejoicing on the festival.

See sec. 358:1, where the Alter Rebbe defines a karpeif as a large enclosed area where wood is stored.

Beitzah 31a.

See sec. 398:6, where the Alter Rebbe explains (based on Nedarim 56b), that the area within 70 2/3 cubits of a city is considered the iburo shel ir, the extension of the city – literally, “the pregnant bulge of the city”). This area is considered part of the city itself.

Only one of the factors mentioned here must exist for the karpeif to be considered a courtyard.

Beitzah, loc. cit.

See above sec. 495:13. As the Alter Rebbe states in subsection 11 below, the prevailing custom is not to follow this opinion.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe states that, “any vegetation that is attached to the ground that became detached as a matter of course or [which was reaped] by a non-Jew, even if it is not fit for human consumption, is included in this decree.”

See sec. 495:13.

The rationale for the stringency is that, before the festival, the person did not have in mind to use the broken pieces for the purpose he intends to use them at present and they are no longer able to be used for their original purpose.

If, however, the broken pieces can still be used for the purpose for which they were originally intended, their status does not change and they are still considered as utensils. Hence, they may be used for other purposes, including using them as firewood.

Beitzah 32a, 33a. See also sec. 264:15, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this law.

See the Kuntreis Acharon (note 5) to sec. 518. In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that this restriction applies even when, before a festival, a person realized that on the festival a situation was likely to occur that would produce a useful article, and had in mind to use the resulting article. The rationale for not permitting the new article to be used on the festival is that since the article did not exist in its new form when the festival commenced, and only achieved that status on the festival, it is considered nolad. It is therefore forbidden on the festival to derive any benefit from the article in its new form.

See the Kuntreis Acharon (note 4) to sec. 507, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this subject.

Shabbos 29a; i.e., before the festival, the wood existed in the form of a log, and on the festival, the log became fit to hold things. Hence the log was accorded the status of a utensil. Nevertheless, since its status changed on the festival, it is deemed nolad and may not be used on the festival.

It should be noted that, according to some opinions (see Magen Avraham 586:25) this change in status only applies when the log belongs to a Jew. However, if the log belongs to the non-Jew, the new utensil and the discarded wood are not considered nolad because the concept of nolad does not apply to objects belonging to a non-Jew. That distinction is borne out by the Alter Rebbe’s ruling in sec. 586:24-25:

>>…if a non-Jew performed an utterly forbidden labor on his own initiative, e.g., he made a shofar on the festival, a Jew is permitted to sound it….

>>When does [the license to use a shofar made by a non-Jew on Rosh HaShanah] apply? When the non-Jew made the shofar from a horn that he owns, for then the prohibition against using nolad — something that came into existence on the festival — does not apply. For during bein hashmashos, the period between sunset and the appearance of the stars, the horn was in the possession of the non-Jew, and the non-Jew did not divert his attention from making it into a shofar. Since it was in his possession, it was his option to make it into whatever he desired.

>>[Different laws apply,] by contrast, if a non-Jew made a shofar on the festival from a horn that belongs to a Jew. At bein hashmashos, it was not [feasible] to make a shofar from this horn, for it was not in the non-Jew’s domain at that time. This shofar is thus nolad on the festival. A Jew is therefore forbidden to move it…

However, in his ruling in sec. 308:23, the Alter Rebbe states:

>>”Nolad […i.e., an object that first comes into existence on Shabbos or on a festival] – for example, a non-Jew fashions a new utensil on Shabbos on his own initiative – is permitted to be moved and used on Shabbos,… even though one did not have [it] in mind on the preceding day…. On a festival, by contrast, one should rule stringently with regard to nolad.”

In that source, as in the main text here, the Alter Rebbe does not distinguish between whether the original article belonged to the Jew or the non-Jew.

Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim to this section discusses this matter without offering any conclusion.

See also sec. 325:6, where the Alter Rebbe introduces another factor into the discussion: whether or not the non-Jew began the task necessary to complete the article before the festival.

Shabbos, loc. cit.

The Alter Rebbe specifies that this is permitted, even though the person will be benefitting from a broken utensil that is burning because in subsection 11 above, he rules that it is forbidden to kindle a broken utensil.

See also the Kuntreis Acharon (note 3) to that source, where the Alter Rebbe discusses this subject.

Shabbos 129a (see Rashi there). See also the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat, Hilchos Shemiras Guf VeNefesh U’Val Tashchis, subsection 14), which states: “A person must… take precautions with regard to his property, not to destroy it, blemish it, or damage it. Anyone who breaks utensils, tears garments, demolishes a building, dams up a spring, destroys food or drink… or ruins any other entity that could benefit people, violates a negative commandment.” Nevertheless, as the Alter Rebbe continues in subsection 15 of that source: “[There is no prohibition against destroying an article] if one destroys it for one’s own benefit, e.g., if one burns a [wooden] chair and/or a table for warmth if one has no other wood.”

Shabbos 124b. See also Talmud Yerushalmi, Beitzah 4:3.

See also sec. 308:24, where the Alter Rebbe mentions the principles stated in this subsection.

See subsection 1 above, where the Alter Rebbe bases his ruling on the same principles.

Shabbos 29a.

Even if the shells are fit to be eaten by animals, they are still considered nolad. The rationale is that when an item that was previously fit for human consumption changes and is no longer fit for that purpose, the item is considered a new entity. (See Kuntreis Acharon, note 6, to sec. 497.)

It should be noted that since these shells are nolad, one may not remove them from a table in the ordinary manner. See sec. 308:60-62. As mentioned in that source, such shells would not be muktzeh on Shabbos if they are fit for use as animal feed. Hence, it would be permitted to move the shells on Shabbos since we rule leniently regarding moving nolad on Shabbos.

See also sec. 499:8, 10, where the Alter Rebbe issues similar rulings with regard to moving an animal’s hide and forbidden fats.

See sec. 507:7, where the Alter Rebbe issues a similar ruling.

Beitzah 33a.

See subsection 11 above, where the Alter Rebbe rules that a utensil that breaks on a festival may not be used as kindling fuel.

Talmud Yerushalmi, Beitzah 1:1.

See 264:14, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this concept. As stated in that source, it is customary to kindle the wicks of the Shabbos lights before Shabbos and then extinguish them for this reason.

The Alter Rebbe uses the term letzorech gufo, which we have translated as, “for a permitted purpose.”

Therefore, it is only permitted to remove these wicks from the lamp if it would otherwise be impossible to kindle the lamp. It is permitted to remove the wicks and/or remnants lit on Friday night from the candles so that new wicks or candles can be lit in their place for the sake of the festival, as will be mentioned at the conclusion of this subsection.

See also sec. 308:33.

There is significant difference between torches and wicks. The Alter Rebbe uses the term “torch” to refer to a natural piece of wood that is kindled and used as a torch. Since the person does not change the piece of wood in any way, but rather he simply lights it, the torch does not have the status of a utensil. In this sense, it is different than a wick which is cotton that is spun and twisted for the purpose of making it into a useful object, and is therefore classified as a utensil. As such, the remnant of a wick retains the status of a utensil, although it cannot be used on a festival. By contrast, the torch was never classified as a utensil, and its remnant retains that status. As such, the remnant of a torch cannot be used for kindling on a festival, and is classified as muktzeh in a complete sense. As such, it is neither a utensil nor firewood (see below 502:8).

See Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim, which explains that more specifically, on the second day of the festival that is celebrated in the Diaspora, the used wick that remains from the first day of the festival which coincided with Shabbos should be deemed a utensil that is designated for both a permitted and a forbidden use. The rationale is that although the side that was lit is considered a utensil that is designated for a forbidden use, the other side of the wick is considered a utensil that is designated for a permitted use. As a practical matter, such a utensil is governed by the laws that apply to a utensil that is designated for a permitted use (see sec. 308:21).

As the Alter Rebbe explains in that source, not only is it permitted to move such a utensil so that it may be used for a permitted purpose or because one needs its place, it may also be moved for the sake of the utensil itself.

I.e., the second day of the festival begins on any night other than Saturday night.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe explains his ruling in the main text, that it is even permitted to kindle the remnants of the first day’s wicks on the second day of Rosh HaShanah. The Alter Rebbe notes that although the Tur (Orach Chayim 501) rules stringently, and maintains that it is forbidden to kindle these remnants on the second day of Rosh HaShanah, Rav Yosef Caro presents a twofold refutation of this view (see Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 501).

One of the arguments mentioned by Rav Yosef Caro is debated by the Acharonim, with some of these authorities substantiating the Tur’s approach. However, Rav Yosef Caro’s second argument – that the two days of Rosh HaShanah are a single continuum of holiness – is of greater halachic weight and is more universally accepted. As the Alter Rebbe states in the main text, this is the prevailing view. Therefore, it would seemingly follow that there is no concept of the first day of the festival preparing for the second day, for they are like one long day.

There are authorities, including Darchei Moshe (Orach Chayim 501:3) and Pri Chadash (Orach Chayim 501:7), who point out that since it is forbidden to prepare on the first day of Rosh HaShanah for the second day, we see that the two days of Rosh HaShanah are only considered a single continuum of holiness when doing so leads to a stringent ruling, but not when it leads to a lenient one (see sec. 503:3 and sec. 600:3). Nevertheless, Magen Avraham (416:1 and 503:1) explains that the two days of Rosh HaShanah are considered a single continuum of holiness even when doing so leads to a lenient ruling. As the Alter Rebbe explains in the Kuntreis Acharon, this is the view to be followed.

The Alter Rebbe concludes by presenting another reason why the used wicks remaining from the first day of Rosh HaShanah should not be forbidden to be used on the second day of Rosh HaShanah. This reason is based on the principle that when an object becomes fit for use on a festival or on Shabbos itself, we do not forbid it on the next day (which is a festival or Shabbos). The reason is that the preparation of the object for use was permitted since the object could have been used on the first day of Rosh HaShanah. Accordingly, even if it was not used on the first day of Rosh HaShanah, it may be used on the second day of Rosh HaShanah.

To apply that logic to this case, although allowing a wick to burn out on the first day of Rosh HaShanah would make it easier to kindle the wick on the second day of Rosh HaShanah, nevertheless, since the person might desire to rekindle the wick during the last hour of the first day of Rosh HaShanah when it is already getting dark, any preparation resulting from the wick burning out in the earlier part of the first day of Rosh HaShanah is considered to be for the sake of the possible rekindling at the end of that day. Therefore, there is no prohibition against rekindling the wick on the second day.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the situation that applied initially, in the era when the Jewish calendar was determined each month by the sighting of the moon. In that era, it took a somewhat significant amount of time before the communities distant from Eretz Yisrael were notified of when the new moon was sighted. Accordingly, those living in these communities would celebrate the festivals for two days because they were in doubt as to the correct day on which the festival should be celebrated. Even though we now follow a fixed calendar, the Sages ordained that all of the laws regarding the second day of the festivals that were initially established for those Jews living in the Diaspora, should still be followed there to uphold the custom of our ancestors.

In certain contexts – as in the main text here – the practice of maintaining that the status of the day is doubtful is significant. Although Rosh HaShanah was observed as a two-day festival in Eretz Yisrael even during the Talmudic era, one of the days was in essence a weekday (see sec. 496:1-2, 600:1-4 and notes).

This argument also applies to the two days of other festivalsin the Diaspora.

See sec. 600:3, where the Alter Rebbe explains that this is his understanding of the status of the two days of Rosh HaShanah.

See sec. 318:3, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this lenient view. However, in that source, as here, the Alter Rebbe recommends following the stringent approach.

As Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim notes, since a utensil that is designated for a forbidden purpose may be moved for the sake of using its place, seemingly, even according to the more stringent view presented here, if it is impossible to kindle the lamp without removing the used wick, it would be permitted to remove it. Moreover, according to the Alter Rebbe’s conclusion, in this instance, the lenient opinion may be followed, and even the remnants of torches may be removed.

From the ruling in this subsection, it can be inferred that, were there to be a muktzeh item in a candlestick, one may not remove it in order to make room for a candle one wishes to light on a festival. As such, on a festival, one may not remove the leftover wax and small remnants of a candle from a candlestick in order to make room for a new candle (see Minchas Shlomoh, Vol. 2, sec. 39:1).