Shulchan Aruch: Chapter 495 - The Labors Forbidden on Festivals

The Alter Rebbe is only referring to the sacred days of the festivals mandated by Scriptural Law. Therefore, he does not mention the second day of the festivals celebrated in the Diaspora. See sec. 496, regarding the laws pertaining to the second sacred day of the festivals celebrated in the Diaspora.

The Alter Rebbe does not mention Yom Kippur in this section because Yom Kippur is governed by different laws (see sec. 611, where these laws are discussed).

The eighth day of Sukkos – i.e., Shemini Atzeres – is sometimes considered an independent festival (Rosh HaShanah 4b; Yoma 3a). Nevertheless, the Torah refers to Shemini Atzeres as the conclusion of Sukkos (Vayikra 23:39; Bamidbar 29:35).

In this section, the term “festival” is used to refer exclusively to the sacred days of the festivals, rather than to the entire festive week including Chol HaMoed, the intermediate days, where there are far fewer restrictions on the performance of labor.

The Torah uses the term meleches avodah, which we have translated as “toilsome labor” in the prooftext cited by the Alter Rebbe (Vayikra 23:7-8, 25, 35-36; et al). Maggid Mishneh (Hilchos Shevisas Yom Tov 1:1) interprets this term as referring to, “servile work,” i.e., tasks that a person would hire a servant to do rather than perform himself.

Although many of the 39 labors forbidden on Shabbos are also forbidden on the festivals, an exception is made regarding meleches ochel nefesh, “labor that is necessary to prepare food” (see subsection 2, below). Such tasks are permitted on the sacred days of a festival (see subsection 2, below). In this and the subsequent subsections, the Alter Rebbe explains what constitutes meleches avodah and meleches ochel nefesh.

One who willfully violates a Scriptural prohibition is punished by lashes, provided his action was observed by witnesses, the transgressor was previously warned of the severity of his action, and he acknowledged the above. Lashes were only administered during the era when the rabbinic judges had received semichah as part of the chain which dated back to Moshe, our teacher. That semichah was perpetuated for several centuries after the destruction of the Second Beis HaMikdash, at which time it ceased. Since that time, the punishment of lashes has not been administered. See Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin, ch. 14, 16:2-3.

Thus, one who observes the festivals fulfills both a positive and negative commandment. Both Rambam and Sefer HaChinuch count the commandments not to perform work and to rest on these six days as twelve separate mitzvos in their reckoning of the Torah’s 613 mitzvos. See Rambam, Sefer HaMitzvos (negative commandments 323-328; positive commandments 159-160, 162-163, 166-167); Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvos 297-298, 300-301, 308-309, 310-311, 318-319, 321, and 323).

Vayikra 23:24, 39. See also Shabbos 24b.

By specifying that the activity in question “is not necessary for eating or drinking,” the Alter Rebbe is teaching that, according to Scriptural Law, one is permitted to perform any task that is directly necessary for the preparation of food, even though the task does not involve the physical substance of the food being prepared. See subsection 4, below.

The Alter Rebbe uses this example because the preparation of food sometimes involves extinguishing a fire (see, for example, sec. 507:12, 514:2). However, extinguishing a candle never serves that purpose.

There are different Hebrew terms for harvesting various different types of produce. The Alter Rebbe uses the term betzirah, which denotes harvesting grapes.

In this subsection, the Alter Rebbe is discussing what is permitted on the sacred days of a festival according to Scriptural Law. However, as he explains in subsection 9 below, the Sages forbade performing some of these activities on a festival’s sacred days, except in specific instances.

The Alter Rebbe is specifying that the term meleches ochel nefesh only applies to activities directly involving the food being prepared. This is in contrast to activities which do not involve the actual food, but are nonetheless considered to be necessary for the preparation of food. An example of such an activity would be fashioning a spit on which to roast meat. Such an activity is not categorized as meleches ochel nefesh,but rather as machshirei ochel nefesh. See subsection 4 below, where the Alter Rebbe explains this concept.

See subsection 3, below.

The Sages of the Talmud use two terms to imply granting license, hutrah and hudchah. Hutrah means “released,” and is used when the prohibition is lifted entirely. In contrast to this, hudchah means “deferred,” and is used in an instance when fundamentally, the prohibition remains, but license is granted to bypass it in a specific instance.

In this subsection, the Alter Rebbe uses the term hitirah, which shares the same root as hutrah, implying that meleches ochel nefes is entirely permitted on a festival. As he states in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2) to sec. 510, “meleches ochel nefesh is permitted entirely on a festival…. It is not said that [the observance of] the festival was [merely] deferred.” See the following footnote.

See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 11, p. 34ff., where the Rebbe analyzes why the Alter Rebbe uses the word hitirah in this subsection, and in the course of doing so, arrives at a unique explanation of why meleches avodah is prohibited on festivals, while meleches ochel nefesh is permitted.

The Rebbe begins by citing Vayikra 23:7, “You shall not perform any meleches avodah.” Ramban explains this verse as follows:

[The term] meleches avodah, “toilsome labor,” refers to any melachah that is not meleches ochel nefesh, “labor [necessary to prepare] food….” Meleches ochel nefesh is melachah that leads to pleasure and satisfaction, not toilsome labor.

It appears that Ramban maintains that the Torah’s prohibition against performing melachah on festivals only refers to meleches avodah, “toilsome labor.” Thus, according to Ramban, any melachah that is necessary to prepare food is not considered meleches avodah, and is therefore entirely permitted according to Scriptural Law.

Alternatively, however, it is possible to focus on the prooftext the Alter Rebbe cites here, “No melachah shall be performed on them, except for what will be eaten by any person.” The Alter Rebbe seems to be implying that in essence, “no melachah” is permitted on festivals. Nevertheless, license is granted to do any melachah that readies food to “be eaten by any person.” Thus, according to this understanding, all melachah, – not only meleches avodah – is fundamentally forbidden on festivals; it is only that permission is granted to allow food to be prepared.

It is possible to say that these two perspectives are reflected in a difference of interpretation regarding the following ruling of the School of Hillel (Beitzah 12a): “[Since transferring an object from one domain to another on a festival] is permitted when it is necessary [for the preparation of food], it is also permitted even when it is not necessary [for that purpose].”

Rashi understands the School of Hillel’s ruling as meaning that transferring an object from one domain to another was never forbidden on the festivals. Similarly, any other melachos that are necessary for the preparation of food were never forbidden on the festivals. Hence, Rashi maintains that according to the School of Hillel, Scriptural Law entirely permits meleches ochel nefesh, for they are not considered meleches avodah, “toilsome labor.” (It is only that our Sages placed some limitations on these melachos, and required that if they do not involve the preparation of food, they must lead to a person deriving some satisfaction.) Thus, Rashi’s understanding of the School of Hillel’s ruling parallels the understanding of Ramban mentioned previously.

Tosafos, however, understands the ruling of the School of Hillel differently. Tosafos maintains that the intent behind this ruling is that since transferring an object from one domain to another is permitted when it is necessary for the preparation of food, it is also permitted in instances when it is not necessary for the preparation of food. Nevertheless, Tosafos maintains that the license to transfer objects between domains is not a blanket one. Tosafos’ interpretation is based upon the general rule that for a melachah to be permitted on a festival according to Scriptural Law, the activity must lead to a person experiencing some satisfaction.

Thus, the Alter Rebbe’s ruling here seems to follow Tosafos’ understanding of the School of Hillel’s ruling, that there is no fundamental difference between meleches ochel nefesh and other forbidden melachos. However, when meleches ochel nefesh is performed for the sake of the preparation of food to be enjoyed on the festival or for any other purpose that brings a person satisfaction on the festival, it is not considered meleches avodah and is therefore permitted. Nevertheless, this ruling does not permit performing the activities considered meleches ochel nefesh on a festival in all instances. Although a given activity is classified as meleches ochel nefesh, if, in a particular instance, it will not directly lead to a person’s satisfaction, it is forbidden on a festival.

These two interpretations can be summarized as follows: According to Rashi, activities that are categorized as meleches ochel nefesh were never forbidden by Scriptural Law. Tosafos, by contrast, maintains that these activities are only permitted because they are associated with the preparation of food or another purpose that will result in a person’s satisfaction. If, however, one performs this type of labor without such a purpose, it is forbidden.

On this basis, the Alter Rebbe’s ruling here can be understood as follows: The Alter Rebbe cites the prooftext: “No melachah shall be performed on them,” implying that as Tosafos maintains, fundamentally all melachah is forbidden on the festivals. Nevertheless, the end of the verse implies that when a given activity is associated with the preparation of food for the festival or another factor that brings a person satisfaction on the festival, its performance is permitted by the Torah.

As to the statement at the beginning of subsection 1, where the prooftext cited could be understood that there was never any prohibition placed on activities that are not meleches avodah, Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 11, p. 40, explains that since the first verse in the Torah that refers to melachah on festivals is the verse from Shmos 12:16, which states, “No melachah shall be performed on them,” all subsequent statements regarding melachah must be understood in this context.

Shmos 12:16.

See subsection 4, below. In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that there is another category ofactivities called machshirei ochel nefesh. These are tasks involved in the preparation of food that are not performed directly with the food or drink, or in its preparation. Indeed, in certain instances, the food could not be prepared without performing these tasks. Since they are not directly involved in the preparation of food and are not performed with the food itself, these activities are not usually permitted on a festival.

One might think that making a fire should be placed in the category of machshirei ochel nefesh because one does not make a fire with the food itself. However, the Alter Rebbe proceeds to negate this supposition, explaining that making a fire has a direct effect on the food, “since through [fire], one makes food fit [to be eaten].”

The Alter Rebbe’s rationale for classifying making a fire as meleches ochel nefesh rather than as machshirei ochel nefesh differs from that given by other authorities. In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1) to this section, the Alter Rebbe discusses his ruling, explaining that the rule stated in the main text – that the tasks that are considered meleches ochel nefesh must be performed with food itself – has its source in Maggid Mishneh (Hilchos Shevisas Yom Tov 1:4), which is cited by Magen Avraham, introduction to sec. 518.

Magen Avraham raises the question implied by the Alter Rebbe’s ruling here: How can making a fire be considered meleches ochel nefesh when it is performed with wood used as kindling rather than with the food itself (see Magen Avraham 501:3). Magen Avraham proceeds to present a possible resolution to this question offered by Rabbeinu Nissim in his commentary to Beitzah 17b, stating that it is permitted to make a fire on a festivalbecause a person can derive direct benefit from the fire because he can warm himself with its heat.

In this Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe rejects this resolution, explaining that according to this logic, chopping a large piece of wood into small pieces to be used as kindling would be permitted on a festival, for the wood is used directly for making a fire. Since the majority of Rishonim and Acharonim forbid chopping wood into small pieces on a festival, maintaining that this activity is considered machshirei ochel nefesh, rather than meleches ochel nefesh, itis clear that Rabbeinu Nissim’s opinion is not widely accepted. (Chopping wood into large pieces is permitted on a festival provided one deviates from the way he ordinarily chops wood. See sec. 501:2, 3.) Therefore, the rationale offered by the Alter Rebbe in the main text – that making a fire is considered meleches ochel nefesh because it makes food fit to be eaten – is the preferred explanation.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe explains why he defines the melachah of havarah, kindling a fire, as either making or increasing a fire. The Alter Rebbe explains that there are two ways of defining this melachah: a) as creating or increasing fire, or b) as making a fire which burns and destroys its fuel.

The Alter Rebbe cites the ruling (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 12:1, based on Shabbos 106a) that a person who kindles a fire on Shabbos is only liable if he requires the ash produced by the fire. This ruling appears to support the second approach. Nevertheless, in Hilchos Shabbos 12:1, Rambam also states that, “one who heats iron… is liable for [performing] a derivative [of the melachah] of kindling.” In his gloss to that ruling, Maggid Mishneh explains that even though the iron is not reduced to ash, since “it glows and burns,” the person who heated it is considered to have kindled a fire. (This concept is cited by many modern authorities when discussing whether turning on a light bulb is considered havarah, kindling a fire. See Encyclopedia Talmudis, entry Chashmal, sec. 3 and the sources quoted there.)

Similarly, Rambam rules that one is liable for kindling a lamp. Rambam based his ruling on Kerisos 20a, from which it appears that the person is liable even if he does not require the ash produced by the lamp’s burning wick. Thus, this ruling seems to support the first definition of havarah. (As such, it would seem that the reason Rambam rules that one is only liable for kindling if he needs the ash is so that the act of kindling is not considered a destructive one [mekalkel]. See Shabbos, loc. cit.)

How the melachah of havarah is defined is essential to the Alter Rebbe’s explanation as to why kindling a fire is considered meleches ochel nefesh (see footnotes 17 and 18 above). The rationale is that if one only performs the melachah of havarah when the resulting fire produces ash, it could not be said that havarah is directly related to preparing food. In this instance, kindling a fire would not be considered a meleches ochel nefesh. However, as explained above, since the essential definition of kindling a fire constitutes either lighting a fire or increasing an existing flame and it is this very flame that cooks the food, kindling a fire is considered a meleches ochel nefesh, a melachah necessary for the food itself.

Often, the Rishonim and Acharonim use this wording to imply that this is a halachah LeMoshe MiSinai, a law that was conveyed to Moshe at Sinai. Such halachos have the strength of Scriptural Law. However, in their commentaries to Beitzah 12a, Meginei Shlomoh and P’nei Yehohsua appear to understand that this concept is derived from the exegesis of Shmos 12:16. In either case, the wording the Alter Rebbe proceeds to use, “the Torah permitted them…,” is appropriate.

Beitzah 12a. See also sec. 518:1, where the Alter Rebbe discusses this principle.

See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 11, p. 34ff. In that source, the Rebbe presents the discussion among the halachic authorities regarding whether the requirement that the task provide some benefit on the festival itself is of Scriptural or Rabbinic origin. The Rebbe concludes that the Alter Rebbe maintains that this requirement is of Scriptural origin.

See sec. 503:1, where the Alter Rebbe rules that the fact that the task provides benefit for a person after the festival is not sufficient to permit the task to be performed on the festival. Rather, the benefit from the task must be derived on the festival itself.

Examples of such mitzvos include the obliteration of chametz (see sec. 446:5), kindling lights to honor the festival (see sec. 514:13), carrying a child to the place where he will be circumcised or holy texts to places where they will be studied (see sec. 518:1), and carrying a corpse in the public domain (see sec. 526:3).

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe brings support for his ruling that prohibitions of the festival are only overridden to enable a person to observe a mitzvah whose fulfillment is limited to that day.

The Alter Rebbe cites Shabbos 24b, which forbids circumcising a child on a festival when the circumcision is not being performed on the eighth day of the infant’s life. This prohibition is based upon the prohibition to create a wound on a festival. The exception to this rule is if creating the wound somehow enhances a person’s enjoyment of the festival. Therefore, according to Scriptural Law, it is permitted to slaughter an animal for the purpose of eating its meat on the festival (see subsection 2, above). Seemingly, since it is permitted to create a wound on a festival for a purpose associated with a festival, it should also be permitted to create a wound as the means of observing a mitzvah (see Kesubos 7a). Thus, it would seem that all circumcisions should be permitted on the festival, including those that are not performed on the eighth day of the infant’s life.

However, the Alter Rebbe explains that there is a significant difference between a circumcision performed on a child who is eight days old and one performed on a child who is more than eight days old. Once an uncircumcised baby is more than eight days old, there is no halachic requirement as to which day the circumcision should be performed. As such, there is no halachic difference if the infant is circumcised on the festival or on the day after it. Therefore, there is no need for that mitzvah to be performed on the festival. (True, one should not purposely delay a circumcision, even when it is not being performed on the eighth day. Nevertheless, after the eighth day, there is no mitzvah to circumcise the child on any particular day.) Hence, such a circumcision should not be performed on the festival.

By contrast, there is a specific mitzvah to circumcise a baby on his eighth day. This mitzvah cannot, obviously, be fulfilled on any other day. Hence, such a circumcision supersedes the festival prohibitions (see sec. 331:1).

The Alter Rebbe then notes that as mentioned in sec. 526:3, certain melachos are permitted to enable a corpse to be buried on a festival. In this instance, as well, there would seem to be no difference whether the corpse is buried on the festival or afterwards. However, there is a commandment to bury a person’s corpse on the day of his passing (Devarim 21:23, as interpreted by Sanhedrin 46b). Since the Jewish day begins at night, a person’s corpse must be buried before sunset of the day he passed away; it is not sufficient that it be buried on the night following the festival. Hence, burying a corpse is a mitzvah that must be fulfilled on that day.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe writes that satisfaction or benefit that only pampered people appreciate is not considered as sufficient grounds for releasing the prohibition against performing a melachah.

The Alter Rebbe cites this source to emphasize that only the satisfaction of a Jew is taken into consideration when permitting melachah on a festival. In contrast, the satisfaction that could be experienced by a non-Jew or the benefit an animal might derive from the task is not cause for forbidden activities to be permitted.

See sec. 518.

See sec. 511. See also sec. 514:13.

Beitzah 28b.

In the Alter Rebbe’s times, people commonly cooked in wood fired ovens.

See sec. 501:2, where the Alter Rebbe discusses the restriction against chopping a large piece of wood into small pieces. See also footnote 18 above, where this restriction was discussed.

The Alter Rebbe is emphasizing that even if forbidding a person to perform a given activity means that he will have to fast on the festival, the activity is nonetheless considered as merely machshirei ochel nefesh, and not as meleches ochel nefesh.

See Kuntreis Acharon (note 4), where the Alter Rebbe elaborates on this concept. In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that there are two ways to understand the difference between meleches ochel nefesh and machshirei ochel nefesh:

a) The conception stated in this subsection and subsection 2 is that meleches ochel nefesh refers to activities performed with the food itself or performed while preparing the food itself. In contrast to this, the term machshirei ochel nefesh, refers to activities that although they make it possible to partake of the food, are not performed with the food itself or while preparing the food itself.

b) Others explain that the term meleches ochel nefesh refers to activities without which the food could not be prepared. In contrast to this, the term machshirei ochel nefesh refers to activities that are not absolutely necessary for the preparation of the food.

In the Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe proves that a majority of the Rishonim and many Acharonim support the first way of classifying these melachos. In the course of his explanation, the Alter Rebbe touches on the point mentioned in subsection 3 above, that even melachos that would otherwise be forbidden may be permitted, “even though they are not [being performed] for the sake [of preparing food] to be eaten, but rather for the sake of some [other] physical satisfaction.”

Shmos 12:16.

Beitzah 28b.See also the Kuntreis Acharon (note 2) to sec. 510, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this point.

Although the Alter Rebbe uses the phrase erev yom tov, which generally would be translated as “the day before the festival.” Our translation omits the words “the day,” because the Alter Rebbe’s intent is that the activity be performed before the festival begins so that the article in question is ready to be used when the festival commences. This is evident from the Alter Rebbe’s explanation regarding fashioning a spit before the festival, in the continuation of this subsection. The day when the preliminary task is performed is not important.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), the Alter Rebbe focuses on the difference between fixing a utensil on the festival that broke on the festival (or so close to the onset of the festival that the owner was not able to fix it before the festival), and making a new utensil on the festival.

As the Alter Rebbe rules in the main text, fixing a utensil which broke on or right before the festival is permitted, provided the person has no other means of preparing food. In contrast, the Alter Rebbe proceeds to rule that it is forbidden to make a new utensil on the festival, even though on the day before the festival the person was unable to fashion one.

The explanation for these rulings lies in Rashi’s interpretation of Beitzah 28b. In that source, Rashi grants permission to clean an oven when its plaster fell on the day before the festival, provided the owner was not aware of the situation before the festival. In his gloss to Beitzah 28b, Rabbeinu Nissim quotes Tosafos asruling that such permission is granted only if the plaster fell on the festival itself. Tosafos’ ruling implies that since cleaning out the oven is not performed with the food itself, the activity is forbidden on the festival if it could have been performed before the festival. The Alter Rebbe states that since a Scriptural prohibition is involved, it would appear that stringency should be favored. Nevertheless, since Maharshal (see Yam shel Shlomoh, Beitzah 4:13)and Magen Avraham (see sec. 507:7; see also sec. 509:2), cited by the Alter Rebbe in sec. 509:1, rule according to Rashi’s perspective, Rashi’s ruling is accepted.

The rationale for Rashi’s ruling is that since the utensil either broke without the owner’s knowledge and was only discovered shortly before the commencement of the festival, or broke so close to the commencement of the festival that there was no time to fix it, it is considered as if the utensil broke on the festival itself.

Nevertheless, since there is a basis for stringency, greater leniency than stated explicitly by Rashi should not be taken. Hence, since Rashi speaks only about fixing a utensil one possesses, not about fashioning a new one, a new utensil may not be fashioned on a festival even if the need to do so arises on the festival itself.

Beitzah 28b. See also sec. 509:1, 3, where the Alter Rebbe focuses on this leniency. See also the Kuntreis Acharon (note 2) to sec. 510, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this point. See also sec. 331:7, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this concept with regard to performing actions that enable a circumcision to be performed when those enabling actions could not be performed before Shabbos.

Beitzah, loc. cit. See also subsection 2 above and sec. 512:1, which mention other concepts that can be derived from the interpretation of this verse.

See subsection 6, below and sec. 510:5. In these two sources, the Alter Rebbe offers examples of activities prohibited for this reason.

See also the Kuntreis Acharon (note 2) to sec. 510, where this concept is discussed.

See sec. 501:3, sec. 504:1, and sec. 506:3, where the Alter Rebbe lists instances when it is permitted to perform certain melachos if the person deviates from the ordinary manner in which he performs the task.

See Rashi to Shabbos 134a.

In these and all similar instances, the fresher the bread, food, or meat, the better its flavor.

See sec. 502:1, where the Alter Rebbe rules that one may not kindle a new flame on festivals.

E.g., to bake or cook fresh bread or food.

It is not clear what type of pasta the Alter Rebbe is referring to. Perhaps the intent is vermicelli.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the prohibitions mentioned in subsections 4-6, above.

See the Kuntreis Acharon (note 2) to sec. 510, where the Alter Rebbe discusses the concept of rejoicing on the festivals. See also sec. 308:1, where the Alter Rebbe makes similar statements regarding muktzeh.

I.e., lest a person be prevented from rejoicing on the festivals, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to state.

See sec. 498:4 and sec. 504:3, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this concept.

Talmud Yerushalmi, Beitzah 1:10. In that source, the Sages rule that all the melachos involved in making bread that precede the melachah of kneading, are forbidden by Scriptural Law on festivals. Many of the melachos mentioned by the Alter Rebbe in this subsection are included in this prohibition. See the Kuntreis Acharon (note 1 to sec. 506), where the Alter Rebbe mentions this concept, and cites several Rishonim who follow this approach.

See sec. 501:7, which mentions this restriction.

See sec. 504:6, which mentions this restriction.

See the end of this subsection, where the Alter Rebbe rules that it is generally permissible to separate one type of kitniyos from another on a festival.

Beitzah 3a.

See sec. 305:28, where the Alter Rebbe explains: “Threshing is one of the primary categories (avos) of forbidden labor. Anyone who extracts (mefareik) food or liquid from a place in which it was concealed… performs a derivative of threshing, for one who threshes (dosh) is also extracting grain from its husks.”

See also sec. 320:1, where the Alter Rebbe focuses on the melachah of squeezing liquids from produce, which is a derivative of the melachah of threshing. As the Alter Rebbe explains in that source, Scriptural Law only prohibits squeezing grapes and olives on Shabbos. Nevertheless, our Sages expanded the prohibition to include squeezing juice from other types of produce as well.

See sec. 510:12, where the Alter Rebbe mentions that it is prohibited to make cheese on a festival because people normally make large quantities of cheese, which will suffice for many days.

In sec. 498:11, the Alter Rebbe rules that if a person performs melachah on a festival intending to benefit from it after the festival, he only transgresses a Rabbinic prohibition. The rationale for this ruling is that it is possible that guests will arrive on the festival, and the person will be able to serve them the extra food item prepared by that melachah.

In light of this ruling we can understand why, in this subsection, the Alter Rebbe does not state that it is forbidden to perform melachos that usually involve large quantities simply for the fear that one may perform these melachos for the purpose of benefitting from them after the festival. To do so would be to erect “a safeguard for a safeguard,” i.e., it would be a Rabbinic decree enacted lest one violate a different Rabbinic decree. Therefore, the Alter Rebbe states that the rationale for the ruling in this subsection is that one will not have the opportunity to rejoice appropriately on the festival. See Chikrei Halachos, Vol. 1, p. 27b. See also Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav 495:2. See also sec. 503:2 and sec. 527:1, where the Alter Rebbe makes similar statements.

Beitzah 23b-24a. See also sec. 497:1, where the Alter Rebbe details when this melachah is permitted and when it is forbidden. The melachah of hunting involves setting snares to trap, not shooting game.

See sec. 305:28, where the Alter Rebbe explains that milking an animal on Shabbos is considered a derivative of the melachah of threshing, and is therefore forbidden. However, since milking an animal directly involves producing food, one might think that it is permitted on a festival. See sec. 505, where the Alter Rebbe discusses milking an animal on a festival in greater detail.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 6), the Alter Rebbe cites Ramban (Milchamos HaShem, Shabbos, ch. 22) who explains that it is forbidden to milk an animal into an empty container on Shabbos because the resulting milk is considered to be nolad, an entity that first comes into existence on Shabbos. (See subsection 13 below where the Alter Rebbe explains the prohibition of nolad. See also sec. 505:3, where the Alter Rebbe elaborates concerning nolad with regard to milking.) According to Ramban, it is forbidden to milk an animal on a festival because the resulting milk will be forbidden on the festival. The rationale is that one may only perform a melachah on a festival if a Jew will benefit from the task on the festival. In this instance, the resulting milk will be forbidden on the festival. Therefore, one will only be permitted to benefit from the melachah of milking that was done on the festival, after the festival. Hence, it is forbidden to milk an animal on a festival.

However, Rashba (cited in Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 505), maintains that the prohibition against nolad does not apply to milk from animals that were designated to be slaughtered. This opinion is cited by the Rama (505:1) and Magen Avraham (505:3), and is fundamentally accepted by the Alter Rebbe (see the Kuntreis Acharon, note 5 to sec. 518). However, in the main text here, the Alter Rebbe is teaching that milking is always forbidden on a festival, even if the resulting milk is not nolad. Accordingly, the Alter Rebbe offers an alternate reason for the prohibition of milking an animal on a festival that will apply to all instances.

Before refrigeration, people would drink milk soon after the animal was milked. Nevertheless, people would milk their entire herd at one time, and use the milk they did not drink to make butter and cheese. See sec. 510:11-12, where the Alter Rebbe states that butter and cheese are usually made in large quantities.

The term kitniyos is often translated as “legumes.” However, it refers to a far broader category of foods, including, for example, rice, millet, and corn. See sec. 453:3ff.

In that section, the Alter Rebbe describes how to grind salt and spices for a festival.

In that section, the Alter Rebbe describes how to select kitniyos.

The term shvus refers to an activity that although it is not Scripturally forbidden, was nevertheless forbidden by a Rabbinic decree, either because it resembles a melachah or because it might lead to the performance of a melachah (see Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 21:1).

See sec. 306:5, where the Alter Rebbe states: “Instructing a non-Jew to perform [a forbidden task] on Shabbos is [forbidden] as a shvus by Rabbinic decree, even if one gave [the non-Jew] these instructions before Shabbos.” See sections 243-247, sec. 252, sec. 276, sec. 306, sec. 307 and sec. 325, where this prohibition is discussed in depth. As explained in those sections, although a non-Jew is not obligated to rest on Shabbos, a Jew may not ask a non-Jew to perform melachos on his behalf. The Alter Rebbe states three reasons for this prohibition:

a) the non-Jew is considered to be working for the Jew, and hence, is deemed (according to Rabbinic Law) to be his agent (see sec. 243:1);

b) the non-Jew’s activities are forbidden, “so that people at large will not consider the Shabbos [prohibitions] a trivial matter and come to perform [forbidden labors] themselves” (ibid.);

c) instructing a non-Jew is prohibited as part of [the injunction to refrain from] “pursuing your [mundane] concerns,” as stated in sec. 306:5.

See sec. 246:7, where the Alter Rebbe explains that “a person is commanded to have his livestock rest on Shabbos, as it is written [Shmos 23:12], ‘…So that your ox and your donkey may rest.’ ”

In sec. 246:19, the Alter Rebbe states:

>>Just as a person is obligated to have his animals rest on Shabbos, so too is he obligated to have them rest on festivals. Therefore, all of the detailed laws that were explained with regard to lending or renting out an animal to a non-Jew [on Shabbos] or [engaging] in a partnership with him on Shabbos also apply on the festivals. For there is no difference between [the observance of] the festivals and [that of] Shabbos except [for the license to perform] those labors permitted because [they involve the preparation of] food as it is written: “No work shall be performed on them, except for what will be eaten by any person….”

>>There are authorities who maintain that on a festival, a person is not commanded by Scriptural Law to have his animal rest. For with regard to festivals, we were commanded only not to perform labor [ourselves. Work] performed by our animals, [by contrast,] is not considered as our labor, only [the labor] of the animals. Even with regard to Shabbos, the prohibition [against having an animal perform work] is not derived from [the prohibition]: “Do not perform any work,” for [the animal’s work] is not at all considered as our labor. Instead, [the requirement that our animals rest] is mandated by another mitzvah: “So that your ox and your donkey may rest.” This charge does not apply to festivals at all.

The Alter Rebbe concludes there, “With regard to actual practice, one should be stringent and follow the first opinion [since] a Scriptural command is involved.” The Alter Rebbe then refers to the main text here, where he concludes that the reason for not having an animal transport items on festivals is because we do not want to denigrate the festival by doing activities that are done on regular days.

Thus, even according to the authorities who maintain that it is prohibited to have an animal perform melachah on a festival (see sec. 246:19; see also footnote 62 above), transporting articles from one domain to another is not considered melachah on a festival. Thus, even according to this opinion, having an animal transport articles on a festival is not considered as having the animal perform melachah. The melachos forbidden for an animal would only be plowing, threshing, and the like.

The Alter Rebbe mentions this rationale in many other places in Hilchos Yom Tov, including: sec. 498:15, sec. 504:4, 7, sec. 510:9, sec. 516:10, and sec. 522:1, 3.

See subsection 12, below.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe states:

>>One may not ride on an animal [on Shabbos], nor may one hang on to it, nor lean on it, because it is forbidden to make use of an animal in any manner. [The rationale is that] our Sages included making use of an animal in any way in their decree against riding, which they forbade lest one cut off a branch from a tree connected [to the earth, for the purpose of using the branch] to direct the animal he is riding.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe states:

>>One may not climb a tree on Shabbos…. Nor may one hang from it, (nor lean against it), nor may one use [the tree] for any purpose, e.g., to place an article on it or to take one from it, to tie an animal to it, or anything of that nature. All [these restrictions were instituted] as a decree lest one climb a tree and detach its fruit, leaves, or branches.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that this category of muktzeh includes “utensils of great value that are used for an activity forbidden [on Shabbos]… but the person avoids using them for any other purpose so that their value will not diminish.” The examples the Alter Rebbe gives of such utensils are, “a knife used for ritual slaughter or circumcision, a razor used by barbers, and a knife used by scribes to sharpen their quills.”

The Alter Rebbe uses the expression nidchah bi’ydei adam, which literally mean, “pushed away by a person’s hand.”

See sec. 279:1 and sec. 310:4, where the Alter Rebbe mentions this prohibition.

In sec. 310:4, the Alter Rebbe defines the prohibition as follows:

>>Any object that was forbidden to be moved bein hashmashos [remains forbidden to be moved throughout the entire Shabbos] even though the factor that [originally] caused [the object] to be forbidden becomes no longer relevant on Shabbos….

>>When does the above apply? When the person “pushes away [the object] by hand,” i.e., [he intentionally performs an act that] causes [the object] to be forbidden. For example, [one] kindled a lamp while it was still day [on Friday] and it burned out after bein hashmashos.

>>[Even though] oil remained in [the lamp], this oil was “pushed away” by human action [i.e., by placing it in the lamp, the person] made it unfit [for use] on Shabbos. For when [the person] kindled [the lamp], it became forbidden to use the oil in that lamp on Shabbos, because [doing so would involve] the prohibition of extinguishing [a fire]. Accordingly, it is forbidden to use [the oil on Shabbos] even after the lamp burns out and the prohibiting factor is removed. Since [the possibility of using the oil] was removed from the person’s thoughts during bein hashmashos, the time when Shabbos commences – for he removed the thought of using it from his mind when he caused it to be forbidden – it became muktzeh for the entire Shabbos.

In sec. 310:2, the Alter Rebbe writes:

>>[Figs and grapes] are forbidden to be eaten or moved from the time they are set aside in a designated place until they have dried out thoroughly. [The rationale is that] shortly after they have been moved to that place, they become unfit to eat until they have thoroughly dried out, because they become repulsive in the interim. Therefore, they are forbidden [to be moved] on Shabbos [since] they are [deemed] muktzeh.

See also sec. 310:5, where the Alter Rebbe also mentions this prohibition.

See sec. 308:2, where the Alter Rebbe writes:

>>[The license mentioned above applies] even to a k’li used to perform an activity that is forbidden [when that k’li] is [also] muktzeh [i.e., set aside, not to be used] because it is repugnant, i.e., a person diverts and turns his attention away from [the k’li] because it is repugnant and he will not use it for another permitted activity. For example, a used earthenware lamp which was not kindled on that Shabbos is not considered as muktzeh, set aside [in an absolute sense] for that reason. Even though [such an article] is not fit to be used for another permitted activity because it is objectionable and repugnant, for example a lamp, even a metal [lamp] in which kerosene was burnt, is not considered muktzeh and is not [entirely] forbidden to be moved. Instead, it may be moved [according to the guidelines that apply to] other keilim used for forbidden activities, since it is, nevertheless, fit to be used to cover containers.

The Alter Rebbe gives another example of this category of articles in sec. 310:1, stating: “A board on which fish are [usually] hung to dry, even though it is repulsive, is permitted to be moved.”

The Alter Rebbe mentions this subject in sec. 308:3, stating:

>>Even a utensil that is set aside not to be used for any purpose, e.g., utensils prepared and ready to be sold as merchandise, which are not commonly used for any purpose [are not necessarily deemed as muktzeh]. If the person is not careful never to use them at all [for his personal use], he is not considered to have diverted his attention from using them entirely. Therefore, they are not deemed muktzeh and thus, are not forbidden to be moved.

The Alter Rebbe gives another example of this category of articles in sec. 310:2, stating: “The laws of muktzeh do not apply to any food that is fit to be eaten on [that] Shabbos, even if it is set aside as merchandise, e.g., dates, almonds, and other fruits that were set aside to be transported to another place to be sold.”

The Alter Rebbe mentions this opinion in many other sources in Hilchos Yom Tov, including: sec. 498:18, sec. 501:1, sec. 505:3, sec. 513:19, et al.

See sec. 498:24 and sec. 501:1, where the Alter Rebbe explains that according to this opinion, it is permitted to move nolad on a festival.

See sec. 509:16, where the Alter Rebbe discusses this halachah in more detail. In that source, the Alter Rebbe gives the example of moving a stone lying on produce so that one can partake of the produce.

If, however, an object was set aside and considered muktzeh due to human activity, all authorities agree that it is muktzeh on both Shabbos and festivals (see footnote 70, above).

See sec. 310:2, where the Alter Rebbe rules that it is permitted to move such articles on Shabbos. See also Kuntreis Acharon (note 9) to this section, which is explained in footnote 97 below.

The Alter Rebbe mentions this opinion in many sources in Hilchos Yom Tov, including: subsection 14 below; sec. 497:14, sec. 498:8, and sec. 518:12. In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3) to sec. 499, the Alter Rebbe explains that according to this view, nolad is forbidden on festivals, but not on Shabbos.

Beitzah 2b.

Aruch HaShulchan (Orach Chayim 495:29) points out that generally, the laws applying to Rabbinic prohibitions on Shabbos are stricter than those applying to Rabbinic prohibitions on festivals (see sec. 313:15, sec. 519:1, 5, 6, and sec. 521:2), because the punishment for violating the prohibition against performing melachah on Shabbos is more severe than the punishment for violating the prohibition against performing melachah on festivals. Nevertheless, this principle applies only with regard to matters that do not arise on a regular basis. The laws of muktzeh, however, involve situations that continuously arise. Since it is permitted to perform melachah on festivals which enables people to prepare food to be eaten on the festivals, the Sages felt the need to apply additional safeguards regarding the stricter observance of the laws of muktzeh, so that people would be conscious of the sanctity of the sacred days of the festivals.

This ruling follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah in Shabbos 19b. See sec. 497:14, which also mentions this point.

See subsection 14, below.

I.e., the broken pieces can be used for a totally different purpose than the original utensil. See sec. 308:24-25 and sec. 501:11, where the Alter Rebbe discusses this point.

See sec. 308:60. In that source the Alter Rebbe discusses moving bones on Shabbos, and mentions the differences between muktzeh and nolad. See also sec. 499:8, 10, and sec. 501:16, which focus on this matter.

Consumption by animals is considered as an entirely different purpose than human consumption.

The Alter Rebbe issues similar rulings in many other places in his Shulchan Aruch, including: sec. 252:12, sec. 308:23, 60, sec. 497:28, sec. 499:8, 10, sec. 501:1, 11, and sec. 505:3.

The Alter Rebbe issues similar rulings in sec. 308:23-24 and in several other places. However, it should be noted that in sec. 305:32, the Alter Rebbe rules that an entirely new entity that did not exist in any form before Shabbos but comes into being on Shabbos is forbidden as nolad, even on Shabbos.

See sec. 498:9 and sec. 518:15, where the Alter Rebbe mentions that the custom is to follow this ruling.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 7), the Alter Rebbe explains that the source for this ruling is Maharshal (Yam shel Shlomoh, Beitzah 5:19). Nevertheless, the Alter Rebbe notes that there is a slight difference between his own understanding of the issue and that of Maharshal. However, since that difference of understanding does not affect actual practice, the Alter Rebbe does not mention it in the main text.

To explain: Maharshal maintains that an article that is classified as muktzeh due to a prohibition that did not result from human activity is forbidden to be moved on a festival. For example, food that was forbidden to be eaten at bein hashmashos is classified as muktzeh, and may not be moved on a festival. Maharshal supports this understanding by citing a passage in Shabbos 156b, which Tosafos explains is referring to a non-kosher animal that died on a festival. Tosafos maintains that in such an instance, it is forbidden to cut up the animal’s carcass on the festival and feed the meat to dogs, because the carcass is muktzeh.

However, the Alter Rebbe states that, as he will explain in Kuntreis Acharon (note 6) to sec. 497, although he agrees with Maharshal, that it is forbidden to cut up such an animal’s carcass on the festival, he disagrees with Maharshal’s reasoning in arriving at this conclusion. Rather, the Alter Rebbe explains that based on Magen Avraham 499:9, it is forbidden to cut up the carcass and feed the meat to dogs because the carcass is considered to be nolad, not muktzeh. (The rationale for considering the carcass to be nolad is that a live animal is not considered as food for animals. Hence, as long as the animal was alive, it was not considered food for animals. However, once the animal dies, its carcass is placed in that category. Therefore, since the animal died on the festival, the possibility for using its carcass as food for animals came into existence on the festival. Accordingly, the carcass is considered as nolad.) Thus, the Alter Rebbe explains that there is no instance where, at the onset of a festival an entity is muktzeh due to a prohibition on a festival, yet would be permitted on the festival were it not to be deemed nolad.

The Alter Rebbe questions his thesis because tevel, produce that is forbidden to be eaten until terumah and the tithes were separated from it should seemingly be considered as muktzeh on a festival because of the prohibition against partaking of it. Nevertheless, after the terumah and tithes are separated, the produceis not deemed nolad.

The Alter Rebbe addresses and resolves that question by citing Beitzah 34b. That passage states that although it is forbidden to separate terumah and the tithes from tevel on a festival, nevertheless, if one does make these separations on a festival, the food is no longer forbidden. That leniency is granted because the prohibition against making the separations on a festival is only Rabbinic in origin. Were the produce that was tevel at bein hashmashos before the festival, to be considered muktzeh, that produce would be forbidden throughout the festival, even after the necessary separations were made, because at bein hashmashos, it was still forbidden as tevel. However, since our Sages permitted partaking of the produce once the separations are made, it is apparent that tevel is not considered as muktzeh.

Since the object was only deemed muktzeh because of the person’s thoughts and intent, i.e., he decided not to use the object, a change in his intent changes the status of the object.

See subsection 13, above.

See subsection 13, above, where the Alter Rebbe rules that one should act stringently regarding nolad on the festivals. (It should be noted that this ruling is universally accepted.) This ruling has ramifications regarding the laws of milk expressed from a cow on a festival.

To explain: If a person designated a cow to be slaughtered for its meat, then the cow and the milk in its udders are considered food. In such an instance, it is permitted to express the cow’s milk into a container of food on a festival. The rationale is that when the milk is in the cow’s udders, it is considered food, and as long as it is expressed directly into food it is still considered food. However, one may not express its milk into an empty container on a festival, because then the expressed milk is considered a liquid, and the person milking the cow would have violated the prohibition against performing the melachah of mefareik – extracting a liquid from a solid. Indeed, this is how the Alter Rebbe rules in sec. 305:32:

>>… on a festival, an animal – and the milk it carries – is fit to be eaten. For if a person desired, he could slaughter [the animal] and also partake of the milk generated on the festival, because [the milk] is secondary to [the animal] and batel (auxiliary) to it. As such, even when the animal is milked while it is alive, there is no prohibition… since it is considered as food that is separated from food. For [the milk] and the animal’s body are considered as the same entity, because both of them are in the category of food.

This logic is reflected in the Alter Rebbe’s ruling in sec. 505:1:

>>It is, however, permitted to express milk into a container containing food. [The rationale is that] liquid that is expressed into food is considered as food. Thus, the milk was never placed into the category of a liquid, rather it was considered as food. [The person] is considered as separating food, [i.e., the milk,] from food, [i.e., the animal,] when milking it. This is not considered as mefareik, “extracting,” since he is not expressing in an ordinary manner, i.e., expressing milk, a liquid from the body of the animal, which is food.

It must be emphasized that as the Alter Rebbe explains in sec. 505:3, all of the above only applies to a cow that was designated for slaughter and to have its meat eaten. The rationale is that, at the commencement of the festival the cow could have been slaughtered on the festival, and its meat eaten on the festival. Therefore, the cow and the milk it is carrying are considered as food.

If, however, the animal in question was designated solely to produce milk, then the owner has diverted his attention from ever using this animal as food. Therefore, any milk expressed on a festival would be considered nolad on the festival. The rationale is that since the animal was set aside and designated solely to produce milk, it was never considered as food. Therefore, the milk in its udders was not considered food before the festival. As such, the milk is considered as if it first came into being when it was expressed from the animal’s udders on the festival. Thus, to refer back to the Alter Rebbe’s statements in this subsection, even those authorities who permit the use of muktzeh on a festival, would forbid using such an animal’s milk.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 8), the Alter Rebbe elaborates in support of the ruling in the main text that a person can change an object’s status by merely deciding to use it for a different purpose, without explicitly making such a statement. The Alter Rebbe cites the statements of Rambam (Hilchos Shevisas Yom Tov 1:18), that one can change the status of an ox used for plowing or a hen used for laying eggs by merely deciding to make the change. Rambam rules that no verbal statement is necessary.

The Alter Rebbe then cites a ruling in Shabbos 50a, that if a person had set aside date fronds to be used as kindling, and then, before Shabbos, he decided to use those date fronds to sit on, his decision alone changes the status of the date fronds, whether or not he verbally expressed his new intention. This ruling is explained in Magen Avraham 308:40, and cited by the Alter Rebbe in sec. 308:50:

>>“If, however, [before Shabbos,] one changed his mind concerning [the date fronds] and designated them to be used for sitting until the time when it would become necessary to move them, this [later] thought removes [the fronds] from the [category in which they were previously placed because of the person’s] original thought.”

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the original intent to use the animal solely for its milk.

See sec. 310:2. In that source the Alter Rebbe explains that these grapes and figs are forbidden on Shabbos because: “Shortly after they have been moved to that place, they become unfit to eat until they have thoroughly dried out, because they become repulsive in the interim.” When the grapes and figs are in that repulsive state they are muktzeh because they are utterly unfit to be eaten or used for any purpose.

Beitzah 34a-b.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe states:

>>When figs and raisins have dried to the extent that they are somewhat [but not entirely] ready [to be eaten] – i.e., there are some people who would eat them and others who would not – it is permitted to partake of them on Shabbos if [their owner] designated them to be eaten while it was still day [on Friday. The rationale is that] since [the owner] revealed his thought – that [the fruits] are fit for him – they are removed from the category of muktzeh. If [the owner] did not [designate the fruits to be eaten, they remain] forbidden. [The rationale is that] since he did not reveal [his change of] mind, [the fruits] remain in the category of muktzeh into which they were initially placed when they were not fit [to be eaten] by anyone.

As the Alter Rebbe explains in sec. 310:2, the laws applying to figs and raisins are more stringent than those applying to other fruits, because “other produce never becomes entirely repulsive.” Hence, even though a person took other produce up to a roof to dry, he is not considered to have entirely diverted his attention from eating it. Therefore, such produce is not muktzeh on Shabbos, and is only forbidden to be moved on a festival by those authorities who forbid moving muktzeh on festivals (see subsection 13, above).

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 9) to this section, the Alter Rebbe focuses on the difference he makes in the main text between objects that were set aside through intent alone and those that were set aside through an action. On this basis, the Alter Rebbe analyzes which category produce or wood that was brought into a storeroom should be placed. This is significant because items that are set aside with an action can only be permitted to be used on a festival due to an action which changes their status. Hence, if the produce or wood are considered to have been set aside by an action, then an action would be needed to permit these items to be used on a festival.

Magen Avraham 495:10 maintains that bringing produce or wood into a storeroom causes them to be classified as muktzeh because they were set aside by an action. Therefore, they require an action, marking them, to permit them for use on a festival. However, Rama (Orach Chayim 495:4) maintains that merely bringing produce or wood into a storeroom is not considered as setting them aside by an action. Rather, they are classified as muktzeh due to the owner’s intent. Hence, Rama maintains that it is not necessary to mark produce or wood that is kept in a storeroom to prepare these items for use on a festival.

The Alter Rebbe rules like Rama, concluding that these items are not considered to be set aside because of an action. Therefore, it is not necessary to mark them as being set aside for use on the festival. Rather, merely deciding to use the produce or wood on the festival is sufficient. The Alter Rebbe notes that the exception to this general rule would be produce that, like figs and raisins, may not be fit for consumption during the drying process. See Kuntreis Acharon (note 10) to this section, which is summarized in footnote 98 below. See also Kuntreis Acharon (note 2) to sec. 518.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 10), the Alter Rebbe discusses why he specifies that a person “must approximate how much [of the produce] it will be necessary to take on the festival.” The Alter Rebbe begins by stating that this view is not shared by all halachic authorities. For example, Pri Chadash (Orach Chayim 495:4) maintains that a person may designate a large amount of fruit for consumption on a festival, even though he knows that he will not consume all of it. Then, on the festival, he can eat however much of the fruit he desires.

However, the Alter Rebbe cites Rishonim, including Tosafos (Beitzah 34b) and Shitah Mekubetzes (Beitzah 34a), and Acharonim, including Magen Avraham (495:10), who maintain that one must designate no more than the amount of produce he plans to eat on the festival. These authorities maintain that the laws governing produce that is set aside to be used on a festival are more stringent than those governing doves that one sets aside to use on the festival.

This approach is evident from the mishnah (Beitzah 10a), where the Sages rule that it is sufficient for a person to make a verbal statement that he will take specific doves on a festival, while with regard to produce, one must make an actual mark designating which produce he desires to take.

In sec. 497:19, the Alter Rebbe rules in accordance with Rama that one must designate exactly which doves he is planning to take and slaughter on a festival. Furthermore, the Alter Rebbe explains that if one intentionally designated more doves than he required, he should not be allowed to take any of the doves on the festival. As such, these laws should certainly apply regarding the designation of figs or raisins that were set out to dry.

True, a distinction can be made between the two instances. As the Alter Rebbe explains in sec. 497:19, one is not permitted to intentionally designate more doves for use on a festival than he requires for if he is allowed to do so, he may pick up a dove intending to take it but, upon noticing another dove of superior quality, he will put it down again. That restriction was instituted because by picking up and putting down the dove, the person will have retroactively moved an article that is muktzeh (see sec. 497:18). This rationale does not apply with regard to figs and raisins, for they are all similar.

Nevertheless, the ruling regarding selecting doves on a festival applies to figs or raisins for a different reason: Once a person has performed an action to set something aside and make it muktzeh, that action can only be reversed by a definitive decision, not one that is unspecific. As the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain here, once the person brought the figs or raisins up to the roof to be dried, they were considered to be set aside as muktzeh. Hence, only an intentional act can change their classification, i.e., the person would have to actively separate and mark the figs and raisins he intends to eat on the festival so they will no longer be considered muktzeh.

The Alter Rebbe uses the words he’elan beyadav, which literally means, “he brought it up with his hands.”

In the era when the first day of each month was determined by witnesses reporting the sighting of the moon, if the moon would not be sighted on the night of the 29th of the month before the festival, an extra day would be added to that month. This would affect the determination of the day on which the festival would be celebrated. Since news of the sighting of the new moon was relayed by messengers to the Jews living in the Diaspora, the possibility existed that the inhabitants of the Diaspora would not receive the news regarding the exact date the festival was to be celebrated until after the festival. To ensure that these people observed the festivals on the correct day, the Sages required those living in the Diaspora to celebrate the festivals for two days. See sec. 600:1-2, where this concept is explained in depth.

The Alter Rebbe uses the term אי אפשר, literally “impossible,” which we have translated as “forbidden.” We made this change because, in a physical sense, the possibility to make the demarcation exists.

See subsection 14 above, where the Alter Rebbe rules that to change the status of the produce, an actual mark must be made before the festival, delineating the produce to be set aside for the festival.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that on Shabbos, a person may touch an object which is muktzeh with his hand, as long as he does not shake even a portion of it. However, it should be noted that in sec. 310:10, the Alter Rebbe quotes an authority who maintains that this license is only granted when one is touching muktzeh object for the sake of an object that is not muktzeh.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 11), the Alter Rebbe expands on this rationale, explaining as in the main text, that the permissibility to prepare muktzeh on the first day of the festival for the second day is based on the logical argument: “If the first day is an ordinary weekday…. And if the first day is holy….” He explains that our Sages (Beitzah, 17a) use similar logic to permit establishing an eruv tavshilin and eruv chatzeiros on the first day of a festival for the second day. It should be noted that the Sages do not accept this argument with regard to establishing on the first day of a festival an eruv techumim to be used on the second day. However, that is only because making an eruv techumim involves figuratively establishing a certain spot as one’s residence. Such an act, like the acquisition of a dwelling, is forbidden on a festival (see the Kuntreis Acharon, note 2 to sec. 261 (see sec. 261, footnote 24, in this series where this Kuntreis Acharon is discussed). Hence, as the Alter Rebbe explains in the main text, in the Diaspora, there is no difficulty in using such logic to permit preparing muktzeh on the first day of the festival to be used on the second day of the festival.

In this Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe also notes the wording of Turei Zahav 495:5, which states that merely stating on the first day of a festival that one desires to use an article that is muktzeh on the second day of the festival is sufficient to cause the article to be permitted for use.The only exception to this rule is livestock, which must be designated for use on the festival by preparing them through a specific action, as stated in sec. 497:18).

The Alter Rebbe concludes by explaining that the reason it is forbidden to change the designation of livestock on the first day of the festival so that they can be used on the second day of the festival is not because the preparation involves an action. Rather, it is because the preparation involves selecting, and thus handling, an object that is muktzeh, which is forbidden on a festival.