See Chapter 1, Halachah 1.
I.e., after coming into contact with liquids.
The Rambam is speaking about a non-kosher animal that was slaughtered for a gentile which is in its death-throes. Although it does not impart impurity as a carcass until it actually dies, it becomes susceptible to impurity from the time that it was slaughtered. If it comes in contact with a source of impurity at that time, it contracts impurity and can impart it to foods or liquids.
The Rambam proceeds to explain these general statements in this and the following halachot.
According to Scriptural Law, it is permitted to eat certain species of locusts. See Leviticus 11:22, Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 21:23. In practice, it is common in most communities not to partake of any species of locusts, because we are unsure of the identity of the kosher species (Turei Zahav 85:1).
As mentioned in Halachah 2, the designation of a substance as food depends on the prevailing attitude of the specific locale and varies from place to place. The inhabitants of rural areas have less sophisticated tastes and are willing to eat species that would not be eaten by the inhabitants of larger towns and cities.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Rambam’s ruling, although supported by the Tosefta, T’vul Yom 5:1, runs contrary to a ruling of the Mishnah Uktzin 3:9. He suggests that the Rambam had a different version of that mishnah. While that interpretation appears to be borne out by the conclusion of this halachah, even Rav Kapach’s version of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah does not provide support for such a thesis.
When an animal from a kosher species dies without ritual slaughter, its meat together with its fat are sold to gentiles who consider it as food. Hence, it does not require special intent.
Without ritual slaughter. The fat of a non-kosher animal is inherently impure like the meat of such an animal and the fat of a kosher animal that was slaughtered properly is pure. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Uktzin 3:9).
See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.) which explains that for the fat to become impure, it need not come into contact with a source of impurity. Instead, it is inherently considered as impure food. (Nevertheless, as explained in Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 1:5, this fat does not impart impurity like an animal carcass does.) As the Kessef Mishneh states in his gloss to ibid. 3:14, many authorities differ and maintain that it must come in contact with a source of impurity.
For they are not normally considered as human food.
The Rambam is speaking about meat that is not separated purposefully. If, however, one cuts the meat from the living being with the intent of using it as food, it contracts ritual impurity.
Such meat does not require exposure to liquids, because ultimately, an olive-sized portion of it becomes a source of impurity.
As stated in Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah, ch. 3 and mentioned below, the carcass of an unslaughtered kosher fowl is a source of impurity. This does not apply with regard to the carcass of a nonkosher fowl. If, however, a person had the intent of partaking of it, it is considered as food and, if exposed to liquids, can contract impurity.
Since the animal was slaughtered properly, its fat will be separated from its meat and sold to gentiles. In larger towns, there will be a market for such meat. In smaller villages, buyers may not necessarily be found and it is not considered as food.
The blood that flowed at the time of ritual slaughter, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 7.
Since it was not considered food at the time, the fact that it was exposed to liquids is not significant. Hence it must be exposed a second time after it was considered as food.
Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Uktzin 3:2) where he speaks of “the type of onions that is extremely sharp tasting.” Here the Rambam uses the term kashim which, while also meaning firm or hard, could be translated as above.
Uktzin 3:9 states “unkosher fish and locusts.” (As stated above, the Kessef Mishneh maintains that the Rambam had a different version of that mishnah.)
These vegetables are generally used as animal fodder, but are sometimes eaten by humans. Some commentaries offer a different translation.
After they dried. If they were still moist at the time of the person’s change of mind, however, they are considered to have been exposed to liquids.
In Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 14:7, the Rambam defines this term as referring to: “the meat that slipped by the knife at the time the animal was skinned and remains cleaving to the hide.”
I.e., an insignificant entity.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Zevachim 3:4), the Rambam explains that this is a general term referring to blood vessels, nerves, and sinews.
Our translation of these terms is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 1:2). There he explains that after the large feathers are plucked from a fowl’s wings, there still remain small, thin feathers. And after the feathers are plucked from its crop, there remain wooly hairs.
For these substances are not usually considered as food.
See Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah, chs. 1 and 3.
The rationale given by the Rambam applies with regard to the carcasses of fowl and animals from kosher species. Fat from kosher species does not require exposure to liquids, because it was exposed to the blood of the animal when it was slaughtered (Kessel Mishneh).
Since there are fewer people living in these areas, the carcass is unlikely to be used as food.
I.e., less than an olive-sized portion of these substances that is combined with other impure foods so that there is an egg-sized portion of impure food present (see Kessef Mishneh). Less than that amount will not impart ritual impurity.
The windpipe and the gullet.
Since ritual slaughter causes a kosher animal to be considered as food even before it actually dies, it also brings about such a change with regard to the status of a non-kosher animal. See Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 2:1.
After it dies, it imparts the impurity associated with an animal carcass.
Obviously, it is being considered as food.
For this is not acceptable slaughter. When the animal dies, it contracts the impurity associated with an animal carcass, but until then, it is pure.
Since slaughtering the animal in this manner would cause it to be considered as fit to eat if performed by a Jew, the animal is still considered as food when the slaughter was performed by a gentile.
For it was exposed to the blood of the slaughter.
The Ra’avad questions why stabbing a kosher animal does not cause it to be considered as food while it is in its death throes. Seemingly, since a slaughtered animal is considered as food when it is in its death throes, the categorization should also apply with regard to an animal stabbed with the intent of killing it. He offers two resolutions: a) Since it is being stabbed to death for a Jew, it is not fit to be eaten and it is therefore not considered as food. (Implied is that if the gentile stabbed it to death to partake of it himself, it would impart the impurity associated with food.) b) Since stabbing an animal to death is not considered as slaughter, the time of the animal’s death is not determined. It could be considered as a person who fainted, but is still alive.
The Or Sameach maintains that the Ra’avad’s question is based on his position (see his gloss to Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 2:10) that there is no difference whether a gentile slaughters an animal in the ritual manner or stabs it to death. The Rambam, however, maintains that ritual slaughter performed by a gentile has halachic significance. Hence, there is no’ room for the questions raised by the Ra’avad.
As stated in Hilchot She’ar Avot HaTum’ah 2:3, an entire limb severed from a living animal conveys the same impurity as an animal carcass. If, however, one cuts off meat from this limb, it does not have that status.
For it became a distinct entity before it was considered to be used as food.
Since it was considered as food while it was still part of the limb — and impure — it retains its impurity when its status changes.
The Ra’avad differs with the rationale given by the Rambam, based on Chulin 128b-129a. The Kessef Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s position.
The same law would also apply with regard to meat from a kosher animal, except, in that instance, it would not be necessary to have a special intent to use that meat as food. It would be taken for granted that it would be considered as food, even without that intent.
For a smaller measure of impure foods do not impart impurity.
Even that portion stemming from other foods.
Since it is wrapped in dough, one will not touch the impure meat, only the dough surrounding it.
As stated in Halachah 3, for the carcass of a non-kosher animal to be considered as food, it is necessary that one have a special intent concerning it.
I.e., were it to be carried.
As stated in the conclusion of Halachah 2.
For all humans see partaking of human flesh as revolting. Nevertheless, if a person explicitly has such an intent, it can be considered as food. The Ra’avad (on the basis of Keritot 21 b) objects and maintains that even if one has such an intent, it is of no consequence and the flesh is never considered as food. The Kessel Mishneh explains that the Talmudic passage can also be interpreted in a manner that supports the Rambam’s position.
Since it could ultimately be susceptible to more severe impurity, i.e., the impurity associated with a human corpse, it does not require exposure to water.
Even if a person or a k’li touches only the dough around the flesh. The rationale is that since there is an olive-sized portion of a human corpse present, the impurity pierces through its covering.
The Ra’avad objects to this ruling and maintains that it must be exposed to water, for flesh cut from a living human being does not impart impurity. This understanding is supported by Uktzin 3:2 (and perhaps alluded to in the Rambam’s Commentary to that mishnah). For this reason, there are some who maintain that the text is in error and should be changed. Note the apparent contradiction to Halachah 3 above.
Rav Yosef Corcus and the Kessef Mishneh explain that the flesh became exposed to liquids (i.e., blood) at the time it was cut off from the person. The Rambam is emphasizing that when the person changed his mind and thought to feed the flesh to a person rather than to an animal, the exposure to liquids that made it susceptible to impurity at that time is not affected by his change of mind (in contrast to the situations mentioned in Halachah 3 where the fact that a substance was not considered as food initially caused its exposure to liquids to be of no consequence).
[The Ra’avad raises another question: It would appear that the fact that the person cut the flesh off with the intent of serving it should cause it to be considered as food. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the mishnah in Uktzin does not represent a contradiction, because that mishnah refers to an instance where flesh was separated from a person’s body unintentionally.]
Where there are many people and hence, the animal carcass would ordinarily be considered as food (see Halachah 3).
And would not be considered as food.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Taharot 8:6), the Rambam speaks of having such an intent while the chick is in the vat.
Even though it would not normally be considered as fit for human consumption, since it was fit for animal consumption and a human thought of partaking of it, it can contract impurity (ibid.).
For it was not designated for human consumption.
Since they are not intellectually developed, their intent is not significant and it is not considered as if one thought of it as food for humans.
I.e., their intent was obvious from their actions.
I.e., susceptible to the impurity associated with foods.
This is a general principle, applicable in several contexts. See Hilchot Berachot 6:13, et al. See also Hilchot Keilim 8:11.
