Melachim uMilchamot - Chapter 9

Sanhderin 56a. relates that Adam was commanded regarding all seven commands. Nevertheless, the Rambam choose to quote from Bereishit Rabbah 16:6 which mentions the seventh command, the prohibition against eating flesh taken from a living animal, as being given to Noah. It appears that the Rambam chose the latter source because man was not permitted to consume flesh at all until after the flood. Together with the license to eat meat, God explicitly forbade Noah from eating flesh from a live animal.

The Midrash derives all these six prohibitions from the exegesis of Genesis 2:16: “And God the Lord commanded to man, saying: ‘You may eat of all the trees of the garden....’” As evident from Hoshea 5:11, tzav, “command,” serves as an allusion to the worship of false gods. This prohibition is discussed in Halachah 2.

The mention of God’s name develops an association between this verse and the prohibition against cursing God mentioned in Leviticus 24:16. This prohibition is discussed in Halachah 3.

The Hebrew terms translated as “to man” refer to the command against murder, as mentioned in Genesis 9:6. This prohibition is discussed in Halachah 4.

The word, “saying,” establishes an analogy between this verse and Jeremiah 3:1 which mentions this prohibition. It is discussed in Halachot 5-8.

This is derived from the license granted by the verse to eat from the trees of the garden, implying that otherwise, Adam would have been forbidden to do so because the property did not belong to him. This prohibition is discussed in Halachah 9.

This command is inferred from the word Elohim. For although that term also means “Lord,” Exodus 22:27 uses that term in reference to a judge. This command is discussed in Halachah 14.

This prohibition is discussed in Halachot 10-13.

Other commentaries explain that gentiles are obligated to perform other mitzvot, for example, honoring one’s parents (See Rashi, Genesis 11:32) and charity (See Eichah 4:6). The Ran (Sanhderin 56b) relates that the number seven only applies to prohibitions. However, there are other positive commands that gentiles are obligated to fulfill.

Genesis 17:10 related God’s command to Abraham: “This is My covenant between Me and you and your offspring... Circumcise every male.”
As the Rambam writes in Chapter 10, Halachah 7, from that time onwards, the Jews were obligated to observe the mitzvah of circumcision. However, Leviticus 12:3 repeats the command to circumcise. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Chullin 7:6), the Rambam explains the need for this repetition:
All the [mitzvot] we fulfill should be carried out because of God’s command transmitted by Moses... We do not circumcise ourselves because Abraham circumcised himself, but because God commanded us, through Moses, to circumcise ourselves.
At Mount Sinai, the Jews were singled out by God to be “a kingdom of priests and a holy nation.” Thus, the mitzvot given then differ, in purpose as well as in number, from the mitzvot given the gentiles. The gentiles’ seven mitzvot are intended to establish a stable and moral society. The purpose of the 613 mitzvot is to establish a complete bond between God and every aspect of man’s personality.
Similarly, the mystical nature of the commands differ. Kiddushin 31 a relates that one who carries out a mitzvah in fulfillment of God’s command is greater than one who does so out of his own volition. Why? Because by fulfilling a mitzvah commanded by God, man steps beyond his humanity and performs deeds that are Godly in nature. This quality was granted to the mitzvot at Sinai and not beforehand. Consequently, all the mitzvot previously commanded to the forefathers had to be repeated.

Genesis 19:27 relates how “Abraham rose early in the morning, [hurrying] to the place where he stood before God.” Berachot 26b infers that this applies to his morning prayers.
Kiddushin 82a states that Abraham fulfilled the entire Torah before it was given. This statement raises a question: Why does the Rambam only mention circumcision and the morning service as mitzvot which Abraham performed?
The commentaries explain that the Rambam only mentions those commands explicitly mentioned or clearly alluded to in the Torah. Furthermore, it is possible that the manner in which the Abraham and his descendants fulfilled the other commands differ from the manner in which we fulfill them today. For example, the Zohar writes that Ya’akov’s placing the rods before Laban’s sheep drew down the same spiritual energies as our donning of Tefillin.

Genesis 26:12 mentions how “Isaac reaped one hundred measures.” Bereishit Rabbah 64:6 explains that he measured his crop in order to give tithes.
The Ra’avad questions why the Rambam does not count tithes as one of the mitzvot instituted by Abraham for Genesis 14:20 explicitly mentions Abraham’s separation of tithes. The commentaries explain that Isaac and not Abraham, originated the mitzvah of tithing produce as mandated by the Torah. Abraham tithed the booty he conquered in war. In contrast, according to Scriptural Law, the mitzvah to tithe applies only to certain agriculture products.

Genesis 24:63 relates how “Isaac went out in the fields to pray toward evening.”

Genesis 32:26 relates that when Jacob was wrestling with Esau’s archangel, the latter was able to dislocate Jacob’s hip joint. Verse 33 continues: “Therefore, the children of Israel do not eat the displaced nerve on the hip joint.” The nerve in question is the major nerve of the lower extremity, running down the back of the leg.

Genesis 28:11 relates that “Jacob encountered the place and spent the night there, because the sun had set.” Berachot (loc. cit.) explains that implied by the Hebrew is the recitation of the evening prayers.

The Kessef Mishneh questions the source for the Rambam’s statements, asking which mitzvot were commanded to Amram. Some commentaries point to the statements of the Mechilta (Exodus 19:10) that before the giving of the Torah, Moses reviewed the mitzvot which the Jews had been given in Egypt. Since Amram served as the leader of the people, these mitzvot were probably given to him.
Others explain that the Mechilta could be referring to the mitzvot of matzah, marror, and the other elements of the Passover sacrifice given to Moses and not mitzvot given to Amram. They suggest that the Rambam is referring to the mitzvot of divorce and marriage. When Pharaoh commanded the Egyptians to drown the Jewish babies, Amram divorced his wife. Later, at the suggestion of his daughter, Miriam, he remarried her.

As explained above, there is a difference between the mitzvot given to the gentiles and those commanded the Jews.

Every false god has an accepted manner in which its adherents serve it. The idol worshippers established many [different] services for each particular idol and image. The service of one does not resemble the service of another (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:2). A person does not incur the death penalty unless he worships a false god in its appropriate manner.

In addition to the sin of serving an idol in its appropriate manner, the death penalty is also given for bowing to one, sacrificing to it, offering incense to it, or pouring libations to it, even if the idol is generally not served in that manner (ibid. 3:3).

For example, kissing the idol, embracing it, washing it, sweeping before it, and similar acts of affection and reverence (ibid. 3:6).

A structure which attracts people and motivates them to gather around it. Construction of such a structure is forbidden even as an act of reverence to God (ibid. 6:6).

A tree which is worshipped (ibid. 8:3). The Zohar (Vol. I 49b) relates that worshippers of the moon would employ such trees in their services.

This is not a general prohibition against all artwork. In Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:10, the Rambam explains that it only applies to sculptures of human faces. Other images and paintings, imprints, and tapestries of humans are not forbidden.

The Rambam uses the word berach which literally meaning “blesses” as a euphemism.

HilchotAvodah Zarah 2:7 explains that this refers to the name Adonai and, of course, the name Y-H-V-H which is only to be mentioned in the Temple.

The term kinui implies any name used to describe God and not necessarily, one of the seven names, e.g., El or Shaddai which are holy and may not be erased.

Hilchot Avodat Kochavim (ibid.) explains that a Jew is only liable if he mentions either the name Adonai or the name Y-H-V-H in the curse.
The obligation of gentiles in instances where Jews are exempt is not accepted by all Talmudic authorities (Note Sanhderin 56a). The Kessef Mishneh questions why the Rambam follows the more severe opinion.

Intentionally, see Halachah 10:1.

This refers to a person who intentionally delivered a blow to the mother which caused the fetus to die. A Jew would not be held guilty of murder for such an act (See Exodus 21:22, Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:1). However, a gentile is considered liable. It is obvious from this statement that abortion is equated with murder and is only permitted in certain instances where the mother’s life is threatened.

Genesis 9:6 states: “He who spills human blood shall have his own blood spilled.”

This refers to a person who is trefe, possessing a blemish or illness which would cause his death within twelve months. A Jew who kills such a person is not given the death penalty (Hilchot Rotzeach 2:8).

Other texts substitute “in a lion’s mouth” for the latter phrase.

With regard to a Jew who commits such an act, Hilchot Rotzeach 3:10 states:
A person who... starves a colleague to death or... sets a dog or snake upon him: in all cases of this nature, the person is not executed. Nevertheless, he is considered a murderer and the One who avenges blood will seek his blood.

A person is allowed to kill a person who is trying to kill or rape another individual (Hilchot Rotzeach 1:6-12). However, this leniency is only ‘granted when there is no other alternative.

For he is not allowed to kill him. In contrast, if a Jewish pursuer kills a Jewish attacker under similar circumstances, “he is considered guilty of murder and obligated to die. However, he is not executed by the court” (ibid. 1:13).

There are many more relationships forbidden to a Jew. See Leviticus, Chapter 17, Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, Chapters 1 and 2.

This applies even if she is not his father’s wife. See the following halachah.

This applies even if she is not his mother, and even after his father’s death.

As mentioned in the commentary to Chapter 8, Halachah 3, a Jew is not liable for adultery if he engages in relations with a gentile’s wife. Nevertheless, the marriages of gentiles are significant for other gentiles and they are executed for committing adultery.

But not his paternal sister as obvious from the verse quoted below.

I.e., homosexuality.

This verse concludes the Torah’s description of the creation of Eve and Adam’s union with her. Thus, it serves as a guide for the sexual behavior of all his descendants.

For otherwise, there would be no need for such a prohibition for relations with males are explicitly forbidden.

It is interesting to note that there is no prohibition against relations with a daughter.

Halachah 7 explain that this refers to a woman who is married (nissuin) and not merely consecrated (erusin).

Give birth to children (Rashi, on Genesis, ibid.).

I.e., children can never be born from such a union.

Abraham made this statement to Avimelech to excuse his behavior in calling Sarah his sister rather than his wife. Abraham explained that she was like his sister (she was his father's granddaughter). However, he was allowed to marry her because they shared a common paternal ancestor, but not a common maternal ancestor.

This law is derived from the inclusion of two prohibitions; one against relations with one’s father’s wife and one against relations with one’s mother. If the prohibition against relations with one’s mother only applied to a woman married to one’s father, only one prohibition would be necessary (Sanhderin 58a).

If not, there would be no need for this prohibition for she would be forbidden as any other married woman (ibid.).

A Jew is only liable for relations with a male nine years and over. Below that age, the Torah does not consider the child as sexually developed (Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 1:14). The Kessef Mishneh favors the view that the same laws apply to a gentile as to a Jew. The Radbaz maintains that a gentile is liable no matter what the age of the child.

The age of an animal is of no significance whatsoever. A person is sentenced to death for relations with an animal even on the day of its birth (ibid. 1:16).

The question of executing the animal was debated and left undecided by Sanhderin 55a. Since no decision was reached, the death penalty is not administered.

The animal is also executed lest it be seen in the street and the passersby comment: “See that animal! So and so was executed for having relations with it.”

I.e., vaginal, rather than anal intercourse.

“Before the Torah was given, a man would meet a woman in the market-place, if both he and she desired to marry, he would bring her to his home and possess her privately, thus, making her his wife.”
“Once the Torah was given, the Israelites were commanded [as follows]: Should a man desire to marry a woman, he must first acquire her in the presence of witnesses. Afterwards, she will become his wife” (Hilchot Ishut 1:1).
The latter paragraph describes the two stages in Jewish marriage: kiddushin and nissuin. Only a Jew is obligated to marry in this fashion. For a gentile, the law remains as it was before the giving of the Torah and the marriage bonds are established through sexual relations alone.

When Avimelech took Sarah, Abraham’s wife, God employed this phrase to warn him that relations with her were forbidden. From the use of the phrase “possessed by her husband” as opposed to “another man’s wife” or the like, our Sages derived that the marriage bond was established through sexual relations.

For capital punishment in the same manner as a Jew. With regard to relations with a Jewess, a gentile sexual offender is never granted greater leniency than a Jew.

Leviticus 20:22 uses a plural term, mishkavei ishah to describe sexual relations. This expression was chosen to teach us that one is liable for two forms of intercourse, vaginal and anal (Sanhderin 54b).

The latter term refers to a virgin girl between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half.

See Deuteronomy 22:23-24. In this specific instance, a more severe penalty is given than in other cases of adultery.
The Jerusalem Talmud (Kiddushin 1:1) mentions that whenever a gentile is given the same punishment as Jews, his trial is also governed by the same laws. Generally, a gentile’s trial is decided by a single judge on the basis of the testimony of a single witness. In this instance, there is obligation for twenty~three judges, two witnesses, a warning and all other elements required in capital cases involving Jews.
The Ran (Sanhderin 57b) does not accept this opinion. He brings proofs that the Babylonian Talmud, on which basis halachah is decided, does not differentiate between this case and other trials involving gentiles.

Once a couple have undergone the wedding ceremony, the penalty for adultery changes from being stoned to death to strangulation, a less severe means of execution.

Although a Jew would be sentenced to strangulation for the same sin.

In the former instances, no punishment would have been exacted for relations with a gentile woman. Hence, the offender is punished according to Jewish law. However, when a parallel offence exists among the seven mitzvot, a gentile is punished accordingly. Decapitation is considered a more severe means of execution than strangulation.

The slave must also have engaged in relations with the maidservant for the issue of adultery to be raised (Radbaz).

Sanhderin 57a mentions that a master should be executed for such an act. However, the reason for his execution is a matter of debate among the commentaries.
Rashi maintains that there is no concept of marriage with regard to slaves. The master is violating the prohibition against theft, taking the woman he had given to his slave, but not adultery. The Rambam does not accept this view for the slave never really acquired the woman. ‘Nor does he have the potential to do so, for “everything acquired by a servant becomes his master’s property” (Radbaz).

The fact that the slave had relations with her is not sufficient to establish a bond between them for slaves were known for their lewdness. Their “marriage” is not recognized until the matter is publicly accepted.

The masculine conjugation of the verb is used implying that it is the master who performs this act.

Married women are obligated to cover their hair (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 115) Even gentiles would observe this practice.

A Jew who desires to divorce his wife must give her a bill of divorce (get). This document must be composed by a scribe with expertise and training regarding all the particular laws involved. In contrast, gentiles do not require such a document. Their separation constitutes divorce.
Modern commentaries question whether these laws still apply to gentiles in the present age when most countries have instituted formal divorce proceedings. Since these proceedings are recognized by their court system and the laws established by a country must be observed by its inhabitants, a woman may be considered married until formally divorced.

This differs from Jewish law. According to Scriptural Law, a husband must initiate divorce and does not need his wife’s consent. In the Middle Ages, Rabbenu Gershon decreed that a woman may not be divorced against her will. However, the husband must willingly decide to grant the divorce.

The Rambam’s statements are based on the Jerusalem Talmud (ibid.) which states that the gentiles “do not have divorce.” The Ran (Sanhderin 58b) quotes an opinion which interprets that statement to mean that divorce is absolutely forbidden to a gentile couple.

The converse is also true. A Jew is prohibited against stealing from a gentile (Hilchot Genevah 1:2). However, he is not given the death penalty for such an act.

Genevah in Hebrew. In contrast to gezeilah, “robbery,” genevah involves taking someone’s money secretly without the owner’s or the public’s knowledge (Hilchot Genevah 1:3).

The command “Do not steal” in the Ten Commandments refers to kidnapping. Sanhderin 57a explains how this prohibition applies to gentiles.

For example, withholding rent due a landlord or the fee charged for the hire of a utensil or other property.

Deuteronomy 23:25 grants a worker the privilege of eating from the produce he is harvesting. However, this right is only given while he is actually working. Afterwards, taking from the produce is forbidden.

Though a Jew is also prohibited against all the above, there are different prohibitions involved. He is only labeled a robber if he forcibly taking money in the open.

A p’rutah was the smallest coin of the time. A Jew is also forbidden to steal less than this minimal amount. However, should he do so, the matter is not taken to court for surely, the owner is not concerned about the loss of such an insignificant amount (Hilchot Gezeilah 1:6).

With regard to Jews, though it is forbidden to steal from a thief, the fine the second thief is obligated to pay differs from that required of the first. See Hilchot Genevah 1:17.

The term limb implies a bone with sinews and nerves as well as meat.

The Sha’agat Aryeh explains that there is a problem implicit in the Rambam’s statements: A gentile is liable for eating even the slightest amount of meat. Since it is impossible for him to eat a limb that has no meat on it whatsoever, it appears superfluous to mention two prohibitions: one against eating a limb and the other against eating meat.

A Jew is also bound by these prohibitions. However, he is not liable for punishment until he consumes a minimum measure, the size of an olive (approx. one ounce), of these forbidden foods. Eruvin 4a explains that the concept of minimum amounts is part of the Oral Tradition which was given to Israel alone. Hence, the gentiles are liable for eating even the slightest amount of meat.

Genesis 9:4, the source for the prohibition against eating flesh from a living animal, states: “You may not eat flesh with its life, which is its blood.” Nevertheless, Sanhderin 59a relates that this verse does not prohibit a gentile from drinking blood taken from a living animal. In contrast, a Jew is prohibited against drinking all blood, whether taken from an animal before its slaughter or afterwards.

The term limb implies a bone with sinews and nerves as well as meat.

In Hilchot Ma’achalot A.ssurot (5:2), the Rambam writes:
One is not liable for [the prohibition of] a limb from a living creature unless the limb is separated... with its flesh, sinews, and bones. However, if only flesh is separated from a living creature, [a person who eats it] is liable for [the prohibition against eating] trefe [meat], but is not liable for [the prohibition against] a limb from a living creature.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that a gentile is permitted trefe meat and questions why he is prohibited against eating flesh from a living animal.
The Lechem Mishneh replies that the prohibition for Jews and for gentiles are derived from different verses. The verse that prohibits a gentile from eating a limb from a living creature states; “You may not eat flesh with its life,” explicitly mentioning flesh.

Though the Torah occasionally differentiates between these types of animals, in this instance, the same laws apply.

Throughout the Mishneh Torah, the use of this expression implies that the Rambam does not have an explicit Talmudic or Midrashic source to substantiate his statements. However, an analysis of the different references to the subject leads to this conclusion.

The Ra’avad does not accept this statement and maintains that a gentile is liable for eating flesh from a living bird. He is only exempt from eating flesh from a living creeping animal, sheretz in Hebrew.
The Radbaz defends the Rambam’s statements, noting that though Chullin 101b obligates Jews for eating flesh taken from a living bird, gentiles may be exempt from that prohibition. The verse which describes the gentiles’ prohibition mentions, basar “meat.” Nedarim 54b relates an argument among the Sages where meat from a bird is considered “meat” or not. Thus, though a gentile is forbidden from eating such meat, he is not executed as punishment.

Kosher slaughter involves slitting the gullet and the wind-pipe. Once this is done, the animal will surely die within moments.

After slaughter, an animal will frequently move its limbs convulsively for a short time.

The animal is considered alive until it stops moving. The Radbaz states that although a prohibtion exists, since the animal has been ritually slaughtered, a gentile is not executed for violating this prohibition.

In contrast, a Jew is only liable for eating a limb from a kosher species (Hilchot Ma’acholot Assurot 5:1). The prohibition against a Jew’s eating such meat is derived from the verse (Deuteronomy 12:23): “Do not eat the flesh with its life.” Chullin 102a explains that the prohibition only applies to flesh that we are permitted to eat. Such an exclusion does not apply regarding gentiles.

A Jew is not held liable under such circumstances. Chullin 121 b permits a gentile to eat flesh from an animal slaughtered in this fashion and the Rashbah and other authorities accept this view. However, the Rambam follows Chullin 33a which forbid a gentile from eating this meat.

Hilchot Sanhderin 1:1 obligates the Jews to set up courts “in every major city and town.” However, that obligation applies only in Eretz Yisrael. In the Diaspora, they are only obligated to establish courts in every major city (ibid. 1:2). Similarly, gentiles need not establish courts in towns.

The Ramban (Genesis 34:13) disagrees and explains that the main function of these courts was not to deal with the ritual elements of these mitzvot, but rather to deal with civil cases, e.g. petty theft, wage disputes, and fraud.

To cite a parallel: Tanna D’bei Eliyahu (Chapter 11) also stresses that a court’s responsibilities extend beyond the realm of judgement: “The Sanhderin is obligated to tie iron garters around their loins, lift their robes above their ankles... and travel throughout the villages of Israel... teaching the nation.”

In contrast to a Jew, a gentile offender is executed for the violation of even the slightest command. As mentioned in the commentary to Halachah 1 of this chapter, the gentiles were created in order to allow for the maintenance of a stable and orderly world. All the seven commands have that intent. Hence, by violating one of those seven commands, they contradict their very purpose for existence.

See the commentary to Chapter 3, Hachahah 8.

Genesis 33:1 8 relates that during Jacob’s return journey from Padan Aram to his father’s home, he camped outside the city of Shechem. Shechem, prince of the city, kidnapped Dinah, Jacob's daughter, and raped her.

As retribution, Shimon and Levi, two of Jacob’s sons slew every male in the entire city.
The Ramban (ibid.) does not accept the Rambam’s interpretation of those events. He notes that Jacob severely reprimanded his sons for their behavior and did not forgive them even on his deathbed. Had Shimon and Levi administered just and due punishment, Jacob surely would not have criticized them in this fashion.
Other commentaries defend the Rambam’s opinion, explaining that Jacob did not object to the sentence administered by his sons, but rather to the guile which they employed in order to enable them to execute it (see Genesis 34:13-25).

Two witnesses are required for even the slightest case in Jewish law (Hilchot Edut 5:1).

In Jewish law, capital cases are decided by 23 judges (Hilchot Sanhderin 5:2).

Jn contrast, a Jew is not punished for violation of a sin until he is warned that the act he is about to commit is a sin and that, in retribution, the appropriate punishment is given (Hilchot Sanhderin 12:1-2).

Hilchot Edut, Chapter 13 describes the relatives whose testimony is not accepted in court in cases involving Jews.

She is also disqualified in Jewish law (Hilchot Edut 9:2).