Every festival has its own unique aspects and Pesach is no exception. This is particularly so in a year when the first day of Pesach falls on Shabbos, as shall be explained.

The Gemara teaches1 that the reason we do not blow the shofar on Rosh HaShanah if it falls on Shabbos is because “All are obligated to blow the shofar, but not all know how…. It has [therefore] been prohibited, for he may take it [a shofar] in hand, bringing it to an expert in order to learn, and in doing so, will carry it four cubits within the public domain,” thereby committing a Torah transgression.

The Rabbis ask:2 According to the above reasoning, there should also be a decree prohibiting the eating of matzah and maror, drinking the four cups of wine, and reciting the Haggadah when the first day of Pesach falls on Shabbos! For, inasmuch as there are far more detailed laws regarding these mitzvos than apply to the mitzvah of shofar, we should surely worry that some ignorant person might carry these Pesach items to an expert through a public domain.

There are those3 who answer that people who are well versed in the laws would go around on Pesach even to the houses of those unfamiliar with the laws, in order to conduct the Seder and recite the Haggadah for them. Accordingly, there is no need to worry about an unlettered person going to the house of an expert and inadvertently carrying in the public domain on Shabbos, for the expert would come to him.

This answer leaves much to be desired. Surely, there were people who were ashamed to admit they were not conversant with the laws — an expert would therefore not visit their homes. So, there is still a risk that these people would surreptitiously go to the houses of experts and “possibly carry.”

In many chassidic discourses,4 we find the following question: Why did our Sages set aside the positive Torah commandment of blowing the shofar merely because of a possibility that some individual might unwittingly transgress?

Chassidus concludes that when Rosh HaShanah falls on a Shabbos, it is not necessary for the shofar to be blown, for all those things that are accomplished by sounding the shofar (after the destruction of the first Beis HaMikdash) are accomplished on Shabbos as a result of the day itself.

But this must be understood: There is an established principle in Jewish law5 that, in certain situations, our Sages may indeed set aside something from the Torah. Why then is the question asked: “Why did our Sages set aside….”?

The explanation is as follows: G‑d constantly renews creation,6 whose purpose is fulfilled by the Jewish people and Torah.7 It is thus inconceivable for something to exist within creation that would make it impossible for a Jew to perform the Torah and mitzvos he desires to perform.

If, as originally thought, there is indeed an obligation to sound the shofar on Shabbos, then there can be no justification in nullifying the command because “possibly he will carry it.” For that would be like saying that G‑d created the world in a manner such that it is impossible to perform the mitzvah of shofar when Rosh HaShanah falls on Shabbos!

Since our Sages did, however, accept the possibility that “he will carry it” as justification for ruling that, when Rosh HaShanah falls on Shabbos, the shofar should not be blown, we must conclude, says chassidus, that when Rosh HaShanah falls on Shabbos, we do not need to sound the shofar, for whatever is accomplished by the sounding is accomplished by the Shabbos day itself.

We thus understand that the reason this type of decree does not apply to Pesach when it falls on Shabbos is because those things that are accomplished through eating matzah, etc., are unique, and thus cannot be accomplished through the day of Shabbos itself; they must be done even when Pesach falls on Shabbos.

This also points to yet another unique aspect of Pesach: Its sanctity is such that, during this holiday, we need not worry that a person will sin inadvertently and “carry”; the sanctity of the festival assures Shabbos observance.

Based on Likkutei Sichos, Vol. VII, pp. 48-53