Introduction

Throughout our nation’s spiritual history, we find scholars who were masters of the Talmud and the Jewish legal tradition, yet wrote little, if anything, about ethics or philosophy and were not overly involved in our mystical tradition. Conversely, there have been others who focused primarily on Jewish mystical knowledge, making minimal, if any, written contributions to Jewish law and practice. Moreover, even many of the scholars who made contributions to both saw these two branches of Torah study – nigleh and pnimiyus haTorah – as discrete and unrelated.

Beginning with the Alter Rebbe, whose name Shneur is a composite of the words shnei or, “two lights,”1 Chabad teachings have always emphasized the fusion and absolute unity of these two branches of study. There is only one Torah, with a body, (the legal tradition) and a soul (the mystical tradition).2 All of the Lubavitcher Rebbeim demonstrated excellence in both fields of study and, moreover, wove them together in their Torah insights. In many of his sichos, the Rebbe exemplified this approach, giving creative explanations of Talmudic or halachic concepts and then finding a corresponding application in the Torah’s ethical and mystical traditions.

The sichah to follow is a paradigm of such an approach. The Rebbe begins with an exposition of a familiar Talmudic passage3 that describes the laws pertaining to four categories of people entrusted with an object belonging to another person: an unpaid watchman, a paid watchman, a renter, and a borrower.

The laws pertaining to the obligations of three of these categories – the unpaid watchman, the paid watchman, and the borrower – are mentioned in the Scripture3 and detailed in the Talmud.4

• An unpaid watchman is liable only if the entrusted object is lost or destroyed due to negligence. If it is lost, stolen, or destroyed due to forces beyond his control, he is exempt.

• A paid watchman is also liable if the entrusted object is lost or stolen. However, he is exempt if it is destroyed due to forces beyond his control.

• A borrower is liable in all instances. He is only exempt if the owner of the entrusted object was employed in an enterprise of the borrower (shemirah bebaalim) at the time the object was borrowed.5

• The fourth category, the renter, is mentioned in the Torah,6 but the laws applying to him are not spelled out. Accordingly, there is a difference of opinion among the Sages regarding his obligation if the rented object is destroyed due to loss or petty theft. Is he considered like an unpaid watchman and exempted, or like a paid watchman and held liable?

The Mishnah3makes a statement: “There are four [categories of] watchmen.” The Gemara discusses that statement, noting that this is somewhat problematic since only three sets of laws governing these four types of watchmen are actually mentioned.

The Rebbe probes into the underlying dynamics of these laws, explaining that according to one of the Sages who ruled regarding this issue, Rabbi Meir, there are in fact four categories of watchmen. Although, according to his understanding, a renter and a paid watchman are governed by the same set of laws, the nature of their relationship with the owner is entirely different. A paid watchman is fundamentally a watchman, i.e., the entrusted article enters his domain in order that he guard it. By contrast, an article enters the renter’s domain for his own sake, in order that he make use of it.

Building on the insights of Shelah,7the Rebbe then demonstrates the parallels of the four categories of watchmen in our relationship with G‑d, for each of us have been entrusted with a certain portion of the world to care for and improve. Shelah explains that each of the four categories reflects a different approach regarding that task.

• The unpaid watchman acts solely for G‑d’s sake; he does not seek anything for himself.

• The paid watchman sees himself as responsible to G‑d but also desires to benefit from his service.

• The renter is concerned with his own benefit. Nevertheless, he realizes that it is G‑d’s world and he must perform a service in return for benefiting from it.

• The borrower does not observe the Torah and its mitzvos as an act of service. He sees the world as “loaned” to him, to do with it as he desires. However, he realizes that, ultimately, he has a responsibility to G‑d and must make restitution to Him.

Here we see the parallel to the laws of watchmen mentioned at the outset. Although these individuals share four fundamentally different relationships with G‑d, it can be said that they are governed by three laws because the renter and the paid watchman share a common perspective.

In the relationship of a paid watchman and the owner of the object, both the owner and the one watching the object derive benefit – one is having his object guarded and the other is receiving remuneration. Similarly, in the relationship of the owner and the renter, both receive benefit – the owner receives the fee and the renter makes use of the object. In the corresponding relationship with G‑d, both these types of individuals understand that the world is in essence G‑d’s and they are responsible to Him. However, they both seek personal benefit. Nevertheless, even though these two share a similarity, as explained above, there is a difference between them. The renter is acting principally for his own sake, while the paid watchman is acting primarily for G‑d’s sake.

The Rebbe then goes beyond explaining the correspondence suggested by Shelah. He also offers an explanation that allows us to see the “borrower” in a favorable light, based on the principle,8 “A person should always engage in the Torah and its mitzvos even though it is not for G‑d’s sake, for through involvement that is not for G‑d’s sake, he will arrive at involvement for G‑d’s sake.” Since even the borrower performs a service – albeit only for his own sake – it is nevertheless a service of G‑d. Thus, ultimately, even such an individual will perform Divine service that is genuine.

A Problematic Talmudic Passage

1

The Mishnah states:9

There are four [categories of] watchmen:10 an unpaid watchman, a borrower, a paid [watchman], and a renter:

An unpaid watchman [may absolve himself of liability] by taking an oath in all instances [of loss].

A borrower must reimburse [the owner] in all instances [of loss].

A paid [watchman] and a renter [may both absolve themselves of liability] by taking an oath [if the entrusted object or animal is] broken [or injured,] captured, or dies, but they must reimburse [the owner if it is] lost or stolen.

א

תְּנַןא: אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים הֵןב שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל נוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם נִשְׁבָּע עַל הַכֹּל וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל מְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַכֹּל וְנוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר נִשְׁבָּעִים עַל הַשְּׁבוּרָה וְעַל הַשְּׁבוּיָה וְעַל הַמֵּתָה וּמְשַׁלְּמִין אֶת הָאֲבֵדָה וְאֶת הַגְּנֵבָה.

The Gemara discusses that teaching:11

Who is the Sage [who taught that] there are four [categories of] watchmen? Rav Nachman says… “It is Rabbi Meir.”

Rava said to Rav Nachman: “Is there any Sage who does not accept [the premise] that there are four [categories of] watchmen?”, (i.e., we are forced to say that we find four [categories of] watchmen, Rashi).12

[Rav Nachman] responded to him: “This is what I am saying to you: Who is the Sage [who maintains that the laws pertaining to] a renter are the same as [those pertaining to] a paid watchman? It is Rabbi Meir.” (He maintains that a renter must pay whenever a paid watchman is [required to].)

[The Gemara questions], “If so,13 [why does the mishnah mention] four [categories]?” There are [only] three.

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak14 responded, “There are four [categories of] watchmen, [who are governed by] three [sets of] laws.”15

וּבִגְמָרָאג: מַאן תַּנָּא אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן . . רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא. אָמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן מִי אִיכָּא דְּלֵית לֵיהּ אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִין (עַל כָּרְחָךְ אַרְבָּעָה מִינֵי שׁוֹמְרִין אַשְׁכְּחָן. רַשִׁ"יד) אָמַר לֵיהּ הָכִי קָאֲמִינָא לָךְ מַאן תַּנָּא שׂוֹכֵר כְּנוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא (דִּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ שֶׁהַשּׂוֹכֵר מְשַׁלֵּם כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר) . . אִי הָכִיה אַרְבָּעָה שְׁלֹשָׁה נִינְהוּ אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק ד' שׁוֹמְרִין וְדִינֵיהֶם שְׁלֹשָׁהו.

Clarification is necessary: The simple meaning of Rav Nachman’s words, “This is what I am saying to you…,” implies that by saying, “Who is the Sage [who maintains that the laws pertaining to] a renter resemble [those pertaining to] a paid watchman? It is Rabbi Meir,” Rav Nachman did not retract his original statement, “Who16 is the Sage [who taught that] there are four [categories of] watchmen?...” Instead, he was explaining the intent of the rhetorical question he originally asked.

“This is what I am saying to you…” means to say that the question, “Who is the Sage [who maintains that the laws pertaining to] a renter resemble [those pertaining to] a paid watchman?” is not a new and different query, but an explanation of his original question, “Who is the Sage [who taught that] there are four [categories of] watchmen?” That question is answered, as it was originally, “It is Rabbi Meir.”

וְצָרִיךְ בֵּאוּר:

מִפַּשְׁטוּת לְשׁוֹנוֹ שֶׁל רַב נַחְמָן "הָכִי קָאֲמִינָא לָךְ כו' " מַשְׁמַע, שֶׁבִּדְבָרָיו "מַאן תַּנָּא שׂוֹכֵר כְּנוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא" לֹא חָזַר מִמַּה שֶּׁאָמַר לִפְנֵי זֶה "מַאןז תַּנָּא אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים כו' ", אֶלָּא שֶׁבְּזֶה בֵּאֵר דְּבָרָיו הָרִאשׁוֹנִים – "הָכִי קָאֲמִינָא לָךְ"; כְּלוֹמַר, הַשְּׁאֵלָה "מַאן תַּנָּא שׂוֹכֵר כְּנוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר" (אֵינָהּ שְׁאֵלָה אַחֶרֶת וַחֲדָשָׁה, אֶלָּא) הִיא בֵּאוּר וְהַסְבָּרַת הַשְּׁאֵלָה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה "מַאן תַּנָּא אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים" (הַמִּתְיַשֶּׁבֶת כְּדִלְעֵיל מִנֵּיהּ בְּתֵרוּצוֹ "רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא").

On the surface, clarification is needed regarding the above explanation of these two questions. [From the assertion in the explanation of his question given by Rav Nachman: “[the laws pertaining to] a renter resemble [those pertaining to] a paid watchman,” i.e., there isn’t a separate category of laws governing a renter, it appears that there are three categories of watchmen. In his first question, however, Rav Nachman asked, “Who isthe Sage [who taught that] there are four [categories of] watchmen?”17

The apparent contradiction between Rav Nachman’s explanation of his question and the question itself is evident from the fact that the Gemara asks immediately after Rav Nachman’s explanation, “If so, [why does the mishnah mention] four [categories]? There are [only] three.”18

וְלִכְאוֹרָה בִּשְׁתֵּי שְׁאֵלוֹת אֵלּוּ – מִזֶּה שֶׁ"שּׂוֹכֵר כְּנוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר" (דְּהַיְנוּ שֶׁאֵין לַשּׂוֹכֵר דִּין בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ) יוֹצֵא שֶׁהֵם שְׁלֹשָׁה שׁוֹמְרִים, דְּלֹא כְּ"תַנָּא אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים"ח (וּכְהֶמְשֵׁךְ הַגְּמָרָא תֵּכֶף לְאַחֲרֵי זֶה "אִי הָכִי אַרְבָּעָה שְׁלֹשָׁה נִינְהוּ"ט).

Delineating a Renter’s Obligation

2

It is possible to offer the following explanation: Rashi19 clarifies the reason for the difference of opinion between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah regarding whether a renter is governed by the laws pertaining to an unpaid watchman or a paid watchman. He states that the reasoning of Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that a renter is judged like an unpaid watchman, is based on the logic that “he pays a fee for working [with the object] and he does not receive any payment for taking care of the object.” The intent is that, although a renter benefits from the use of the object, that benefit is not viewed as a wage that causes him to be considered a paid watchman. The benefit he receives does not come as payment for taking care of the object; rather, “he pays a fee for working [with it].” Hence, since “he does not receive payment for taking care of the object,” Rabbi Yehudah considers him as an unpaid watchman.

ב

וְיֵשׁ לוֹמַר בְּזֶה:

בְּרַשִׁ"יי מְבֹאָר טַעַם פְּלֻגְתַּת רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אִם הַשּׂוֹכֵר דִּינוֹ כְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם אוֹ כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר:

הַמַּאן-דְּאָמַר דִּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ שֶׁדִּינוֹ כְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם הוּא מִפְּנֵי "דְּקָא יָהִיב אֲגַר מְלַאכְתּוֹ וְאֵינוֹ נוֹטֵל שָׂכָר עַל שְׁמִירָתוֹ". כְּלוֹמַר, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַשּׂוֹכֵר יֵשׁ לוֹ הֲנָאָה מֵהַחֵפֶץ (בְּזֶה שֶׁמִּשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בּוֹ), מִכָּל מָקוֹם לֹא נַעֲשֶׂה עַל יְדֵי זֶה שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, לְפִי שֶׁהֲנָאָה זוֹ לֹא בָאָה בְּתוֹר שָׂכָר עַל שְׁמִירָתוֹ, שֶׁהֲרֵי "יָהִיב אֲגַר מְלַאכְתּוֹ", וּמִכֵּיוָן שֶׁ"אֵינוֹ נוֹטֵל שָׂכָר עַל שְׁמִירָתוֹ" הֲרֵי הוּא שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם.

The reasoning of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that a renter is considered a paid watchman, is based on the logic that:11

Since [the entrusted object] is in his possession for his benefit, even though he pays a fee for working [with it], he is considered as a paid watchman. Were he not to pay a fee, he would be considered as a borrower and would be liable [even] if [the entrusted object was destroyed] due to circumstances beyond his control. Since he does pay a fee, he is not [considered] a borrower, but a paid watchman.

Rashi’s wording implies that, according to Rabbi Meir, fundamentally, a renter should be governed by the laws pertaining to a borrower. Nevertheless, since “he does pay a fee, he is not [considered] a borrower, but [as] a paid watchman.”

וְטַעְמוֹ שֶׁל הַמַּאן-דְּאָמַר דְּדִינוֹ כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר הוּא – "הוֹאִיל וְלַהֲנָאָתוֹ הוּא אֶצְלוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנּוֹתֵן שְׂכַר פְּעֻלָּתוֹ שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר הוּא דְּאִי לֹא יָהִיב שָׂכָר הָוֵי שׁוֹאֵל וְחַיָּב בְּאֹנָסִין הַשְׁתָּא דְּיָהִיב לֵיהּ אַגְרָא לֹא הָוֵי שׁוֹאֵל וְהָוֵי שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר". וּמִלָּשׁוֹן רַשִׁ"י מַשְׁמַע, דִּבְעֶצֶם הָיָה צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת לַשּׂוֹכֵר דִּין שׁוֹאֵל, אֶלָּא שֶׁמִּכֵּיוָן דְּ"יָהִיב לֵיהּ אַגְרָא לֹא הָוֵי שׁוֹאֵל וְהָוֵי שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר."

The intent is that Rabbi Meir does not consider the renter’s obligation to take care of the entrusted object as a further payment in addition to the fee he pays for benefitting from the object. Were that to be true, the benefit from the object would be considered as payment for taking care of it and he would therefore be considered a paid watchman for that reason.20 Instead, the entire reason for the renter’s liability is that the entrusted object is in his possession for his benefit. In this, he resembles a borrower.21 Nevertheless, since “he does pay a fee, he is not” actually “[considered] a borrower, but” merely “a paid watchman.”

כְּלוֹמַר, אֵין הַפֵּרוּשׁ שֶׁמַּאן-דְּאָמַר זֶה סְבִירָא לֵיהּ שֶׁהִתְחַיְּבוּתוֹ שֶׁל הַשּׂוֹכֵר לִשְׁמוֹר הַחֵפֶץ הִיא בְּגֶדֶר תַּשְׁלוּם נוֹסָף (לִדְמֵי הַשְּׂכִירוּת עֲבוּר הֲנָאָתוֹ מֵהַחֵפֶץ), וְנִמְצָא שֶׁהֲנָאַת הַחֵפֶץ הִיא קַבָּלַת שָׂכָר עַל שְׁמִירָתוֹ וְלָכֵן הָוֵי שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָריא – אֶלָּא כָּל חִיּוּבוֹ שֶׁל הַשּׂוֹכֵר הוּא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַחֵפֶץ נִמְצָא אֶצְלוֹ "לַהֲנָאָתוֹ" דִּבְזֶה נַעֲשֶׂה כְּמוֹ שׁוֹאֵליב (וְרַק מֵחֲמַת דְּ"יָהִיב לֵיהּ אַגְרָא לֹא הָוֵי שׁוֹאֵל (מַמָּשׁ) וְהָוֵי (רַק) שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר").

To explain the issue: There is a fundamental difference between the basis for obligations of both an unpaid and a paid watchman and those of a borrower. A watchman is one who, as indicated by the meaning of the term, accepts responsibility and obligates himself to take care of another person’s object until he returns it to that person intact.22

[The obligations of an unpaid watchman and a paid watchman are not the same. Since a paid watchman receives payment for taking care of the entrusted object, he is obligated to guard it more scrupulously,23 guarding not only against negligence, but also against the object being stolen and him losing it. By contrast, since an unpaid watchman does not receive payment for taking care of the entrusted object, it is sufficient that he guard it less diligently. Hence, he is not liable for theft and loss. However, they share this common factor: Their obligation stems from the commitment they made.]

In comparison, a borrower’s obligation does not stem only from his commitment to watch24 the object belonging to the lender. Instead, it is as if he acquired the object25 entirely and is obligated to return it; it is like a loan. Since the benefit is entirely his,26 he acquires the object17 in that he becomes liable even if it is destroyed due to circumstances beyond his control (even though a person cannot guard against such situations, and they are not included in the obligations of a watchman.)27

הַסְבָּרַת הָעִנְיָן: קַיָּם חִלּוּק יְסוֹדִי בֵּין סִבַּת חִיּוּבֵי הַשּׁוֹמְרִים (שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם וְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר) וְחִיּוּבֵי הַשּׁוֹאֵל: הַשּׁוֹמֵר כִּשְׁמוֹ כֵּן הוּא – שֶׁעִנְיָנוֹ, וְקִבֵּל עַל עַצְמוֹ וְהִתְחַיֵּב לִשְׁמוֹר חֶפְצוֹ שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי עַד שֶׁיַּחֲזִירֶנּוּ בִּשְׁלֵמוּת לִבְעָלָיויב* [וְסִבַּת הַחִלּוּק בֵּין חִיּוּבֵי שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם וְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – דְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר שֶׁמְּקַבֵּל שָׂכָר עַל שְׁמִירָתוֹ חַיָּב לִשְׁמוֹר הַחֵפֶץ בִּשְׁמִירָה מְעֻלָּה יוֹתֵריג, לִשְׁמוֹר גַּם מִגְּנֵבָה וַאֲבֵדָה, וְשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְקַבֵּל שָׂכָר עַל שְׁמִירָתוֹ דַּיּוֹ בִּשְׁמִירָה פְּחוּתָה וּפָטוּר עַל גְּנֵבָה וַאֲבֵדָה]; מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן חִיּוּבֵי הַשּׁוֹאֵל אֵינָם בָּאִים (רַק) מֵהִתְחַיְּבוּתוֹ לִשְׁמוֹריד הַחֵפֶץ שֶׁל הַמַּשְׁאִיל, אֶלָּא דְּהָוֵי (גַּם) כְּאִלּוּ קָנָה הַחֵפֶץטו לְגַמְרֵי וּבְמֵילָא חַיָּב לְהַחֲזִירוֹ (עַל דֶּרֶךְ הַלְוָאָה), דְּמִכֵּיוָן שֶׁ"כָּל הֲנָאָה שֶׁלּוֹ"טז קָנָה הַחֵפֶץטו לְהִתְחַיֵּב גַּם בְּאֹנָסִין (שֶׁאֵין שַׁיָּךְ לְהִשָּׁמֵר מֵהֶם, אֵין גֶּדֶר שְׁמִירָה בָּהֶםטז*).

This is Rashi’s intent in explaining Rabbi Meir’s opinion that the obligations of a renter are the same as those of a paid watchman, “since [the entrusted object] is in his possession for his benefit.” According to this approach, the basis for the renter’s obligation is not that he accepted an obligation to guard the object, but rather that the entrusted object is in his possession, and it is there, not for the sake of him guarding the object on behalf of its owner, but for his own sake, so that he can use and benefit from it. In this, he resembles a borrower. Nevertheless, “since the renter does pay a fee, he is not [considered] a borrower, but a paid watchman.” The fact that the benefit is not entirely his – for he pays for the benefit he receives – reduces and lessens his obligation from that of a borrower. Hence, “he is not [considered] a borrower, but a paid watchman.” Paying the fee lessens the obligations that the renter would inherently have, were he a borrower, removing his liability for loss due to circumstances beyond his control. Hence, he remains liable only for theft or loss, like a paid watchman.28

וְזוֹהִי כַּוָּנַת רַשִׁ"י בְּבֵאוּר דַּעַת הַמַּאן-דְּאָמַר דְּשׂוֹכֵר הָוֵי כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – "הוֹאִיל וְלַהֲנָאָתוֹ הוּא אֶצְלוֹ": יְסוֹד חִיּוּבוֹ שֶׁל שׂוֹכֵר (לְמַאן-דְּאָמַר זֶה) הוּא לֹא מֵחֲמַת הִתְחַיְּבוּתוֹ בִּשְׁמִירַת הַחֵפֶץ, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם שֶׁהַחֵפֶץ נִמְצָא אֶצְלוֹ (לֹא לְשֵׁם שְׁמִירַת הַחֵפֶץ עֲבוּר הַמַּפְקִיד, אֶלָּא לְהֵפֶךְ –) "לַהֲנָאָתוֹ", שֶׁיָּכוֹל לְהִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בּוֹ – כְּמוֹ הַשּׁוֹאֵל; אֶלָּא מִכֵּיוָן דְּ"יָהִיב לֵיהּ אַגְרָא לֹא הָוֵי שׁוֹאֵל וְהָוֵי שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר", הַיְנוּ שֶׁמִּכֵּיוָן שֶׁאֵין "כָּל הֲנָאָה שֶׁלּוֹ" שֶׁהֲרֵי מְשַׁלֵּם עֲבוּר הֲנָאָתוֹ, הֲרֵי זֶה מְמַעֵט וּמְנַכֶּה מֵחִיּוּבוֹ כְּשׁוֹאֵל וְ"לֹא הָוֵי שׁוֹאֵל וְהָוֵי שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר", כְּלוֹמַר שֶׁתַּשְׁלוּם הַשָּׂכָר מְגָרֵע מִדִּין שׁוֹאֵל שֶׁבּוֹ לְהִתְחַיֵּב בְּאֹנָסִין וְנִשְׁאָר עָלָיו רַק חִיּוּב גְּנֵבָה וַאֲבֵדָה (כְּמוֹ שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר)יז.

Thus, a renter is an intermediate category between a paid watchman and a borrower. Regarding the fundamental definition and nature of his obligation, he is a borrower, since the object is in his possession for his benefit. Nevertheless, regarding the extent of his obligation and the laws that apply to him, he is a paid watchman because the owner of the object receives benefit from the renter’s having the object in his possession.

וְנִמְצָא שֶׁהַשּׂוֹכֵר הֲרֵי הוּא כְּעֵין "מְמֻצָּע" בֵּין שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר וְשׁוֹאֵל – בְּאֵיכוּת חִיּוּבוֹ וּמַהוּתוֹ הוּא שׁוֹאֵל (וּבְכַמּוּת חִיּוּבוֹ וְדִינוֹ הוּא שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר).

How are the Categories of Watchmen Defined?

3

On this basis, the questions regarding the Talmudic passage mentioned in sec. 1 can be fully understood. The question – “Who is the Sage who taught that there are four [categories of] watchmen?” – stems from the fact that the mishnah mentions a specific number of watchmen, stating: “There are four [categories of] watchmen.” Whenever a number is specified in a mishnah, there is an inference to be derived from that fact. Hence, when discussing such mishnayos, the Talmud frequently asks:29 “Why is the number mentioned?” Accordingly, Rav Nach­man concludes that the division into four categories of watchmen is not merely an external matter – that in practice there are four ways an entrusted object can be found in the possession of a watchman (as Rashi states,30 “one is an unpaid watchman, another a paid watchman, [the third] a borrower, and [the fourth], a renter”). Instead, the four categories are also of a fundamentally distinct nature.

ג

וּמֵעַתָּה מוּבָן שַׁפִּיר הֶמְשֵׁךְ דִּבְרֵי הַגְּמָרָא הַנַּ"ל (סְעִיף א):

כַּוָּנַת הַשְּׁאֵלָה "מַאן תַּנָּא אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים" הִיא: מִזֶּה שֶׁהַתַּנָּא נָקַט מִנְיָנָם ("אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים הֵן") – דְּלִכְאוֹרָה מִנְיָנָא לָמָּה לִייח? – לָמַד רַב נַחְמָן, שֶׁחֲלֻקָּתָם לְ"אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים" אֵינָהּ רַק חִלּוּק חִיצוֹנִי, שֶׁבִּמְצִיאוּת יֶשְׁנָם אַרְבָּעָה אוֹפַנִּים בְּהִמָּצְאוֹ שֶׁל הַחֵפֶץ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ שֶׁל הַשּׁוֹמֵר (בִּלְשׁוֹן רַשִׁ"ייט "זֶה בְּחִנָּם וְזֶה בְּשָׂכָר זֶה שׁוֹאֵל וְזֶה שׂוֹכֵר"), אֶלָּא שֶׁהֵם חֲלוּקִים גַּם בְּגִדְרָם וּמַהוּתָם.

This is the intent of Rav Nachman’s question, “Who is the Sage [who taught that] there are four [categories of] watchmen?” and of his answer, “It is Rabbi Meir.” Only according to Rabbi Meir, who maintains that a renter’s liability is that of a paid watchman, can it be said that there are four fundamentally distinct categories of watchmen.

וְלָכֵן אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן "(מַאן תַּנָּא אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים . .) רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא" – כִּי דַוְקָא לְשִׁיטָתוֹ דְּשׂוֹכֵר מְשַׁלֵּם כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר יִתָּכֵן לוֹמַר שֶׁאַרְבַּעַת הַשּׁוֹמְרִים יֵשׁ לָהֶם ד' גְּדָרִים מְחֻלָּקִים:

According to Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that a renter’s liability is that of an unpaid watchman, it is true that, in actual fact, a renter who pays a fee does not resemble an unpaid watchman, as mentioned above. Nevertheless, with regard to the obligation to care for the entrusted object incumbent on the renter as a watchman, the renter is exactly the same as an unpaid watchman, because he does not receive a fee for taking care of the object. Therefore, there are only three types of categories of watchmen, not four.

לְמַאן-דְּאָמַר שֶׁהַשּׂוֹכֵר מְשַׁלֵּם כְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, הֲרֵי אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַשּׂוֹכֵר (בְּשָׂכָר) אֵינוֹ דוֹמֶה לְשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, כַּנַּ"ל, מִכָּל מָקוֹם לְעִנְיַן גֶּדֶר חִיּוּב הַשְּׁמִירָה הַמֻּטָּל עַל הַשּׁוֹמֵר (אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים הֵם) הֲרֵי הַשּׂוֹכֵר הוּא מַמָּשׁ כְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם (כִּי "אֵינוֹ נוֹטֵל שָׂכָר עַל שְׁמִירָתוֹ") וּבְמֵילָא אֵין כַּאן אֶלָּא שְׁלֹשָׁה (מִינֵי הַגְדָּרוֹת שֶׁל) שׁוֹמְרִים וְלֹא אַרְבָּעָה.

By contrast, according to Rabbi Meir who maintains that a renter’s liability is that of a paid watchman, the intent is not that the definition of, and rationale for, the renter’s liability is the same as that of a paid watchman. Instead, it is only that, in actual practice, he is governed by the laws applying to a paid watchman, i.e., it is only the extent of his liability that resembles that of a paid watchman. However, the nature of his obligation resembles that of a borrower. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider him as a distinct type of watchman. As such, the mishnah states that there are not three, but four categories of watchmen.

מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן לְדַעַת רַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּהַשּׂוֹכֵר מְשַׁלֵּם כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – אֵין זֶה מִשּׁוּם שֶׁגֶּדֶר וְסִבַּת חִיּוּבוֹ שֶׁל הַשּׂוֹכֵר הוּא גֶדֶר חִיּוּבוֹ שֶׁל הַשּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, אֶלָּא רַק דִּינוֹ כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר (הַיְנוּ, שֶׁהוּא דוֹמֶה לְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר רַק בְּכַמּוּת חִיּוּבוֹ, אֲבָל בְּאֵיכוּת הַחִיּוּב הֲרֵי הוּא כְּשׁוֹאֵל). וְלָכֵן הֲרֵי הוּא שַׁפִּיר סוּג שׁוֹמֵר מְיֻחָד, וְהַיְנוּ ד' שׁוֹמְרִים.

This is the intent of Rabbi Nachman’s response when Rava asked him, “Is there any Sage who does not accept that there are four [categories of] watchmen?” Rava’s conception was that the division into four categories of watchmen referred to the actual ways in which a person becomes a watchman, and hence he states, “We find [the mishnah explicitly mentioning] that there are four [categories of] watchmen.”

Rav Nachman responded to him: “This is what I am saying to you,” my intent – in asking “Who is the Sage [who taught that] there are four [categories of] watchmen?” and answering, “It is Rabbi Meir” – is to point out that the emphasis of the mishnah, “There are four [categories of] watchmen,” (i.e., that fundamentally, the statement that there are four intrinsically distinct categories of watchmen) applies only according to the understanding of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that a renter is governed by the laws governing a paid watchman, as explained above.

וְזֶהוּ מַה שֶּׁבֵּאֵר רַב נַחְמָן כְּשֶׁשְּׁאָלוֹ רָבָא "מִי אִיכָּא דְּלֵית לֵיהּ אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִין" (בְּחָשְׁבוֹ שֶׁהָעִנְיָן דְּ"אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִין" הוּא מִפְּנֵי חֲלֻקָּתָם בִּמְצִיאוּת, וַהֲרֵי "עַל כָּרְחָךְ אַרְבָּעָה מִינֵי שׁוֹמְרִין אַשְׁכְּחָן") – "הָכִי קָאֲמִינָא לָךְ" (דְּמַה שֶּׁאָמַר לִפְנֵי זֶה "מַאן תַּנָּא אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים . . רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא", הַכַּוָּנָה בְּזֶה) כִּי הַיְנוּ הַךְ: הַדְגָּשַׁת הַתַּנָּא בְּמִשְׁנָתֵנוּ "אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים הֵן" – שֶׁיֵּשׁ ד' גְּדָרִים חֲלוּקִים בְּשׁוֹמְרִים, אָתֵי שַׁפִּיר רַק לְדַעַת רַבִּי מֵאִיר שֶׁסְּבִירָא לֵיהּ דְּשׂוֹכֵר כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, כַּנַּ"ל.

This is also the intent of the Gemara’s give-and-take at the conclusion of the passage:

If so, [why does the mishnah mention] four [categories]? There are [only] three.

There are four [categories of] watchmen, [who are governed by] three [sets of] laws.

According to the approach of the Sage who questions Rav Nachman’s reasoning, there is an implied contradiction. If a renter and a paid watchman differ not only in the actual way in which they incur the responsibilities of a watchman, but also in the fundamental definition of their obligation, how is it that they share the same liability? Since there is no difference in the extent of their liability, we are forced to say that there are – fundamentally, not only regarding their obligations – only three 31 intrinsically distinct categories32 of watchmen.

To this, the Talmud answers, “There are four [categories of] watchmen, [who are governed by] three [sets of] laws.” The fundamental characteristics of a paid watchman and a renter are different. Thus, there are four distinct categories of watchmen, each one with fundamentally unique characteristics. Nevertheless, as explained above, they are divided into three groups with regard to the laws governing their liability.

וְזוֹהִי גַּם כַּוָּנַת הַגְּמָרָא בְּמַסְקָנָא, "אִי הָכִי אַרְבָּעָה, שְׁלֹשָׁה נִינְהוּ . . ד' שׁוֹמְרִין וְדִינֵיהֶם שְׁלֹשָׁה": לְפִי סְבָרַת הַמַּקְשָׁן הֲרֵי הֵם תַּרְתֵּי דְסָתְרֵי – אִם הַשּׂוֹכֵר וְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר חֲלוּקִים (לֹא רַק בִּמְצִיאוּת, אֶלָּא) בְּעֶצֶם גִּדְרָם וּמַהוּתָם, אֵיךְ יִתָּכֵן שֶׁיִּהְיוּ שָׁוִים בְּחִיּוּבֵיהֶם? וּמֵאַחַר שֶׁאֵין נַפְקָא-מִנָּהּ בֵּינֵיהֶם בְּכַמּוּת חִיּוּבֵיהֶם, עַל כֵּן צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר דִּ"שְׁלֹשָׁה נִינְהוּ"כ גַּם בְּעֶצֶם גִּדְרָםכא. וְעַל זֶה מְתָרֵץ "ד' שׁוֹמְרִין וְדִינֵיהֶם שְׁלֹשָׁה", שֶׁאָמְנָם חֲלוּקִים הֵם לְאַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים, וּבְכָל זֶה אֵין זוֹ סְתִירָה שֶׁלְּעִנְיַן דִּינָא נֶחְלָקִים רַק לִשְׁלֹשָׁה, כַּנַּ"ל.

A Spiritual Counterpart

4

The above explanation – that “There are four [categories of] watchmen, [who are governed by] three [sets of] laws” – is based on the understanding that a paid watchman and a renter differ in the fundamental nature of the obligation that they undertook to care for the owner’s object. Therefore, “There are four [categories of] watchmen.” However, regarding the laws governing liability, a renter is liable to the same extent as a paid watchman. Therefore, “[they are governed by] three [sets of] laws.”

ד

הַהֶסְבֵּר הַנַּ"ל, בְּהָא דְּ"ד' שׁוֹמְרִין וְדִינֵיהֶם שְׁלֹשָׁה" – שֶׁהַשּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר חֲלוּקִים הֵם בְּעֶצֶם מַהוּת הִתְחַיְּבוּת הַשְּׁמִירָה שֶׁלָּהֶם (שֶׁלָּכֵן יֵשׁ "ד' שׁוֹמְרִים") אֶלָּא שֶׁבְּכָל זֶה לְעִנְיַן דִּינָא הַשּׂוֹכֵר מְשַׁלֵּם כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר (– "דִּינֵיהֶם שְׁלֹשָׁה") –

It is possible to say that the above explanation relates to the spiritual counterpart of the four categories of watchmen in our Divine service.33 As Shelah states,34 “Just as there exist four [categories of] watchmen [in relationships] between man and man, so too, there exist [four similar categories in the relationship] between man and the Omnipresent, blessed be He.”

יֵשׁ לוֹמַר שֶׁמַּתְאִים עִם בֵּאוּר עִנְיַן הַד' שׁוֹמְרִים בַּעֲבוֹדָה רוּחָנִיתכב. וְכִדְאִיתָא בְּשַׁלָ"הכג דִּ"כְמוֹ שֶׁד' שׁוֹמְרִים נוֹהֲגִין בֵּין אָדָם לַחֲבֵרוֹ כֵּן (נוֹהֲגִין) בֵּין אָדָם לַמָּקוֹם בָּרוּךְ הוּא".

To explain this concept:35

וְיֵשׁ לוֹמַר בֵּאוּר הָעִנְיָןכד:

As is well known,36 the existence of the world is dependent on the Jews’ observance of the Torah and its mitzvos. Thus, the Jews are “watchmen,” as it were, in whose care G‑d entrusted His world.37 This parallels the charge G‑d gave Adam, the first man, whom He placed in the Garden of Eden and commanded to “till it and care for it.”38Similarly, the Jews are to care for the world through their observance of the Torah and its mitzvos.

יָדוּעַ שֶׁקִּיּוּם הָעוֹלָם תָּלוּי בְּקִיּוּם הַתּוֹרָה וּמִצְווֹת שֶׁל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵלכה. וְנִמְצָא, שֶׁבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל הֵם בְּגֶדֶר "שׁוֹמְרִים", שֶׁהַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא מָסַר עוֹלָמוֹ לִרְשׁוּתָם שֶׁהֵם "יִשְׁמְרוּ" אוֹתוֹכו, וְעַל דֶּרֶךְ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַרכז "לְעָבְדָהּ וּלְשָׁמְרָהּ", וּשְׁמִירַת הָעוֹלָם הִיא עַל יְדֵי קִיּוּם הַתּוֹרָה וּמִצְווֹת.

According to a straightforward understanding, the four categories of watchmen are divided into three general groupings with regard to the way a watchman relates to the entrusted object and its owner:

a) In the instance of an unpaid watchman, all the benefit for his caring for the entrusted object is the owner’s. The watchman does not benefit from caring for the object at all, for he does not profit from doing so. He acts solely for the benefit of the owner.

b) A borrower derives the entire benefit from the object. The owner does not receive any benefit from it while it is in the domain of the borrower.

c) A paid watchman and a renter are linked in one group because they share a common denominator: In each of these instances, both the owner and the watchman derive benefit.39 In the instance of a paid watchman, the owner benefits from having his object guarded in a superior manner and the watchman benefits from the fee he receives for his effort. With regard to a renter, he benefits from the use of the owner’s object and the owner benefits from the rental fee he receives in return.

וְהִנֵּה לְפִי פְשׁוּטוֹ נֶחְלָקִים ד' הַשּׁוֹמְרִים לְג' סוּגִים כְּלָלִיִּים בְּעִנְיַן יַחְסָם לְהַחֵפֶץ הַנִּשְׁמָר וּבְעָלָיו: (א) שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם שֶׁכָּל הַהֲנָאָה מִשְּׁמִירָה זוֹ הִיא לְהַמַּפְקִיד (כִּי אֵין הַשּׁוֹמֵר מַרְוִיחַ כְּלוּם מִשְּׁמִירַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן, שֶׁאֵינָהּ אֶלָּא בִּשְׁבִיל תּוֹעַלְתּוֹ שֶׁל הַמַּפְקִיד); (ב) שׁוֹאֵל – שֶׁכָּל הֲנָאָה שֶׁלּוֹ (כִּי אֵין הַמַּשְׁאִיל מְקַבֵּל שׁוּם הֲנָאָה מֵהַחֵפֶץ); (ג) שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר, שֶׁהַנְּקֻדָּה הַמְּשֻׁתֶּפֶת בֵּינֵיהֶם הִיא, שֶׁבִּשְׁנֵיהֶם יֵשׁ הֲנָאָה הֵן לַבְּעָלִים וְהֵן לַשּׁוֹמֵרכח [בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – הַמַּפְקִיד נֶהֱנֶה מִזֶּה שֶׁחֶפְצוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ נִשְׁמָר (וּבִשְׁמִירָה מְעֻלָּה), וְהַשּׁוֹמֵר מְקַבֵּל שָׂכָר עֲבוּר טִרְחָתוֹ; וְשׂוֹכֵר יֵשׁ לוֹ הֲנָאַת הִשְׁתַּמְּשׁוּת בְּחֶפְצוֹ שֶׁל הַמַּשְׂכִּיר, וְהַמַּשְׂכִּיר מְקַבֵּל תְּמוּרַת זֶה דְּמֵי הַשְּׂכִירוּת].

According to this, it is possible to explain the definition of the four categories of watchmen in “the relationship between man and the Omnipresent, blessed be He,” as Shelah, loc. cit., states:40

וּלְפִי זֶה יוּבַן גַּם תָּכְנָם שֶׁל הַ"שּׁוֹמְרִים" בְּהָעִנְיָן שֶׁ"בֵּין אָדָם לַמָּקוֹם בָּרוּךְ הוּא" (כִּמְבֹאָר בְּשַׁלָ"הכט):

“An unpaid watchman represents the loftiest category, [one who acts] without the intent to receive a reward at all; he watches for [G‑d’s] sake alone.”

To elaborate, using the wording of Rambam:41

He serves [G‑d] out of love… for no ulterior motive… nor in order to acquire benefit – not even to receive a share in the World to Come.42 “Rather, he does what is true because it is true,” [serving G‑d,] “because He is the Master [and] it is fitting to serve Him.”43

"שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם הוּא הַמַּעֲלָה הָעֶלְיוֹנָה שֶׁלֹּא עַל מְנָת לְקַבֵּל פְּרָס כְּלָל, הוּא שׁוֹמֵר רַק לְמַעַן שְׁמוֹ יִתְבָּרֵךְ", וּבִלְשׁוֹן הָרַמְבַּ"םל – "עוֹבֵד מֵאַהֲבָה . . לֹא מִפְּנֵי דָּבָר בָּעוֹלָם . . וְלֹא כְּדֵי לִירַשׁ הַטּוֹבָה (אֲפִלּוּ לֹא כְּדֵי לִזְכּוֹת לְחַיֵּי הָעוֹלָם הַבָּאלא) אֶלָּא עוֹשֶׂה הָאֱמֶת מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא אֱמֶת . . מִפְּנֵילב שֶׁהוּא הָרַב רָאוּי לְשַׁמְּשׁוֹ".

“A paid watchman serves in order to receive a reward.”44 Similarly, a renter45 “is like one who says, ‘[I am giving] this sela46 to tzedekah so that my son will live,’ ”47i.e., he also seeks to derive personal benefit from his service. See sec. 6, below.

"שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – הָעוֹבֵד עַל מְנָת לְקַבֵּל פְּרָס", וְכֵן הַשּׂוֹכֵרלג – "הוּא עַל דֶּרֶךְ הָאוֹמֵרלד סֶלַע זֶה לִצְדָקָה עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּחְיֶה בְּנִי" (וּכְדִלְקַמָּן סְעִיף ו).

“A borrower; ‘all the benefit is his’…. He does not believe [that G‑d metes out] reward and punishment.”36 As Shelah explains,48 this category refers to the wicked who are not at all involved in Divine service.

"שׁוֹאֵל שֶׁכָּל הֲנָאָה שֶׁלּוֹ . . אֵינוֹ מַאֲמִין בִּגְמוּל וְעֹנֶשׁ", וְכִמְבֹאָר בְּשַׁלָ"הלה שֶׁהֵם הָרְשָׁעִים שֶׁאֵינָם עוֹסְקִים כְּלָל בַּעֲבוֹדַת הַשֵּׁם.

Looking at a Borrower Generously

5

Perhaps it is possible to explain Shelah’s words and also interpret the concept of a borrower49 in a more favorable light so that the interpretation can also refer to one who observes the Torah and its mitzvos. (This appears to be appropriate since, in a simple sense, all the subjects in the four categories mentioned above are referred as “watchmen,”50 who guard the world, as explained above, through their observance of the Torah and its mitzvos.)51

ה

וְאוּלַי יֵשׁ לְבָאֵר דְּבָרָיו וְכֵן – לְבָאֵר בְּדַקּוּת עִנְיַן הַ"שּׁוֹאֵל" בְּאֹפֶן שֶׁתִּתָּכֵן דַּרְגָּא זוֹ גַּם בְּשׁוֹמֵר תּוֹרָה וּמִצְווֹת (וְתֻמְתַּק פַּשְׁטוּת הָעִנְיָן, שֶׁכָּל הַד' סוּגִים נִקְרָאִים שׁוֹמְרִיםלו – שׁוֹמְרֵי הָעוֹלָם (כַּנַּ"ל) שֶׁהִיא עַל יְדֵי הֱיוֹתָם שׁוֹמְרֵי תּוֹרָה וּמִצְווֹתלז) – וּבְהַקְדִּים:

As an introduction: The entire world was created for the sake of the Jewish people, as Rashi52 states in the beginning of his commentary on the Torah: the world was created “for the sake of Israel who are called, ‘the first.’ ” Accordingly, every Jew can rightfully claim and demand53 all of his material needs – an abundance of children, life and health, and sustenance – even without performing any activity or service on his part, just because he is a descendant of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov. This is reflected in the opinion mentioned in the mishnah,54 that when an employer promises to provide his workers with food, he does not fulfill his obligation to them “even if… he provides them with [a meal] like the feasts of [King] Shlomoh at [the height of his prosperity,”] because they are “the descendants of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov.” As a descendant of the Patriarchs, every Jew is worthy of a feast of even greater magnitude.55

מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁכָּל הָעוֹלָם נִבְרָא בִּשְׁבִיל יִשְׂרָאֵל (כַּמַּאֲמָרלח "בִּשְׁבִיל יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנִּקְרְאוּ רֵאשִׁית") הֲרֵי כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל יָכוֹל לִדְרוֹשׁ וְלִתְבּוֹעַלט – וּבְצֶדֶק – אֶת כָּל צְרָכָיו הַגַּשְׁמִיִּים, בָּנֵי חַיֵּי וּמְזוֹנֵי רְוִיחֵי, בִּגְלַל הֱיוֹתוֹ בֶּן אַבְרָהָם יִצְחָק וְיַעֲקֹב (בְּלֹא שׁוּם פְּעֻלָּה וַעֲבוֹדָה מִצִּדּוֹ). עַל דֶּרֶךְ הַדֵּעָהמ גַּבֵּי הַפּוֹסֵק מְזוֹנוֹת לַפּוֹעֵל דַּ"אֲפִלּוּ . . עוֹשֶׂה לָהֶם כִּסְעוּדַת שְׁלֹמֹה בְּשַׁעְתּוֹ" לֹא יָצָא יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁ"הֵן בְּנֵי אַבְרָהָם יִצְחָק וְיַעֲקֹב", דְּמִכֵּיוָן שֶׁהוּא בֶּן אַבְרָהָם יִצְחָק יַעֲקֹב הֲרֵי הוּא רָאוּי לִסְעוּדָה גְדוֹלָה מִ"סְּעוּדַת שְׁלֹמֹה בְּשַׁעְתּוֹ"מא

(The logic of the Sage in the mishnah who offers a different view, maintaining that the employer is only required to provide for a worker according to the common local custom,46 is not that he doesn’t consider every Jew worthy of the above. It is only that he maintains that the employer, when promising to provide his workers with food, merely intended to provide them with the meals ordinarily given to workers in his region. Hence, legally, the employer cannot be obligated to provide them with more.

[וְהַתַּנָּא הַחוֹלֵק וְאוֹמֵר "הַכֹּל כְּמִנְהַג הַמְּדִינָה"מ אֵין טַעְמוֹ מִשּׁוּם דִּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ שֶׁאֵין כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל רָאוּי חַס וְשָׁלוֹם לְזֶה, אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁסְּבִירָא לֵיהּ שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל הַבַּעַל הַבַּיִת לְסַפֵּק לוֹ מְזוֹנוֹת אֶלָּא כְּפִי מִנְהַג הַמְּדִינָה (כּוֹלֵל – הַפּוֹעֵל בִּמְדִינָה זוֹ) וְלָכֵן אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְחַיְּבוֹ יוֹתֵר].

This is the spiritual counterpart of a borrower – one who derives the entire benefit himself. He benefits from the world, receiving everything he needs, without any payment, i.e., Divine service, on his part.

וְזֶהוּ עִנְיַן הַ"שּׁוֹאֵל" (בְּרוּחָנִיּוּת) שֶׁכָּל הֲנָאָה שֶׁלּוֹ – שֶׁנֶּהֱנֶה מִן הָעוֹלָם (בְּקַבָּלַת כָּל צְרָכָיו כו') לְלֹא "תַּשְׁלוּם" (עֲבוֹדָה) מִצִּדּוֹ.

Now, a borrower of an object acquires it, as it were.17 Since it is he who derives all the benefit from the object, he is liable if it is destroyed due to circumstances beyond his control. Similarly, on the spiritual plane, when a person desires to benefit from the world without Divine service, the very benefit he receives obligates him to return, i.e., to pay for his portion of the world to G‑d in its totality. He fulfills that obligation by observing the Torah and its mitzvos because the world’s existence is dependent on their observance, as explained above. He cannot claim that he is exempt due to circumstances beyond his control, even if those circumstances are extremely challenging.56

אֶלָּא שֶׁכְּשֶׁם שֶׁשּׁוֹאֵל (כִּפְשׁוּטוֹ) הֲרֵי הוּא קוֹנֶה אֶת הַחֵפֶץ לְהִתְחַיֵּב בְּאֹנָסִין מֵאַחַר שֶׁכָּל הֲנָאָה שֶׁלּוֹ – כָּךְ הוּא בְּרוּחָנִיּוּת, דְּמִי שֶׁרוֹצֶה לֵהָנוֹת מִן הָעוֹלָם בְּלִי כָּל עֲבוֹדָה, הֲרֵי קַבָּלַת הֲנָאָה זוֹ גּוּפָא מְחַיֶּבֶת אוֹתוֹ "לְהַחֲזִיר" אֶת חֶלְקוֹ בָּעוֹלָם לְהַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא בִּשְׁלֵמוּת – שֶׁזֶּהוּ עַל יְדֵי קִיּוּם הַתּוֹרָה וּמִצְווֹת שֶׁבָּהֶן תָּלוּי קִיּוּם הָעוֹלָם כַּנַּ"ל – וְאִי אֶפְשָׁר לִפְטוֹר אֶת עַצְמוֹ בְּטַעֲנַת "אֹנֶס" (וַאֲפִלּוּ לֹא "אֹנֶס גָּדוֹל"מב).

Thus, the “borrower” does not observe the Torah and its mitzvos as an act of service: i.e., the service of G‑d implies a responsibility, submitting oneself to perform service for the sake of a Master, G‑d. Instead, the “borrower’s” observance is an obligation that results from his benefitting from the world.57 This resembles the liability of a borrower in a simple sense, in which instance – since he derives the entire benefit from his use of the object – it is as if he acquired it. As a result, he is liable even in circumstances beyond his control. In such an instance, his obligation to make restitution is an obligation owed to himself, as it were.

In the spiritual parallel, such a person desires to benefit from the world; that is his goal. Since that benefit requires observance, he fulfills the mitzvos. However, he does not do so in order to serve G‑d, but to receive the benefits that accrue from his service. Thus, he is serving himself, as it were.58

וְנִמְצָא שֶׁקִּיּוּם הַתּוֹרָה וּמִצְווֹת שֶׁל הַ"שּׁוֹאֵל" אֵינוֹ בְּגֶדֶר עֲבוֹדָה, "עֲבוֹדַת הַשֵּׁם", שֶׁעִנְיָנָהּ לְחַיֵּב וּלְשַׁעְבֵּד עַצְמוֹ בַּעֲבוֹדָה בִּשְׁבִיל הָאָדוֹן הַשֵּׁם בָּרוּךְ הוּא, כִּי גַּבֵּי הַשּׁוֹאֵל הֲרֵי זוֹ הִתְחַיְּבוּת הַמְסֻבֶּבֶת מֵהֲנָאָתוֹ (כְּמוֹ חִיּוּבֵי הַשּׁוֹאֵל הַמִּסְתַּעֲפִים מִזֶּה שֶׁכָּל הֲנָאָה שֶׁלּוֹ, דְּהָוֵי כְּאִלּוּ קָנָה אֶת הַחֵפֶץ וּבְמֵילָא חַיָּב גַּם בְּאֹנְסִין, וַהֲרֵי זֶה כְּעֵין חִיּוּב כְּלַפֵּי עַצְמוֹמג).

Acting for G‑d or Acting for One’s Own Sake

6

We can now appreciate how the spiritual counterpart of these laws corresponds to the explanation of the four categories of watchmen mentioned at the outset. Based on the above explanation of Rabbi Meir’s understanding of the difference between a renter and a paid watchman, it is possible to elaborate further on Shelah’s explanation of the spiritual counterpart of these categories. Shelah states that a paid watchman is one who serves G‑d in order to receive a reward and a renter is comparable to a person who says, “[I am giving] this sela to tzedekah so that my son will live.” It is not only that they approach the reward and the benefit they receive for their Divine service differently; they represent two distinct categories.

ו

עַל פִּי הַמְבֹאָר לְעֵיל בְּבֵאוּר דַּעַת רַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּהַהֶפְרֵשׁ בֵּין שׂוֹכֵר לְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר יֵשׁ לִכְאוֹרָה לְהוֹסִיף בֵּאוּר גַּם בְּדִבְרֵי הַשַּׁלָ"ה בְּבֵאוּר עִנְיָנָם בְּרוּחָנִיּוּת – שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר הוּא הָעוֹבֵד עַל מְנָת לְקַבֵּל פְּרָס וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר "הוּא עַל דֶּרֶךְ הָאוֹמֵר סֶלַע זֶה לִצְדָקָה עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּחְיֶה בְּנִי" – שֶׁאֵינָם רַק אוֹפַנִּים שׁוֹנִים בְּיַחַס קַבָּלַת הַשָּׂכָר (וְהַתּוֹעֶלֶת) שֶׁל הָעֲבוֹדָה, אֶלָּא שֶׁהֵם סוּגִים שׁוֹנִים.

To explain: As clarified at length above, conceptually, a renter and a paid watchman are two fundamentally distinct categories. A paid watchman is – as the name implies – first and foremost a watchman. He obligated and indebted59 himself to take care of the object belonging to the owner and receives his wage accordingly. By contrast, the fundamental goal of the renter is entirely different. He desires that the object enter into his domain for his benefit and he pays a rental fee to attain that goal.

וְהַבֵּאוּר: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁשּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר וְשׂוֹכֵר כִּפְשׁוּטָם מְחֻלָּקִים זֶה מִזֶּה בְּעֶצֶם מַהוּתָם (כַּנַּ"ל בַּאֲרֻכָּה), שֶׁהַשּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר עִקָּרוֹ הוּא – שׁוֹמֵר, שֶׁהִתְחַיֵּב וְשִׁעְבֵּד אֶת עַצְמוֹמד לִשְׁמוֹר חֶפְצוֹ שֶׁל הַמַּפְקִיד, וּבַעֲבוּר זֶה הוּא בָּא עַל שְׂכָרוֹ; מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן אֵצֶל הַשּׂוֹכֵר הוּא לְהֵפֶךְ, שֶׁעִקַּר מַטָּרָתוֹ הִיא שֶׁהַחֵפֶץ יִמָּצֵא אֶצְלוֹ לַהֲנָאָתוֹ, וּכְדֵי לְהַשִּׂיגוֹ הֲרֵי מְשַׁלֵּם דְּמֵי שְׂכִירוּת –

Similar concepts apply with regard to the spiritual counterpart of these concepts. The fundamental purpose of the paid watchman is the service of G‑d. He desires to carry out G‑d’s will and take care of the world for His sake. Nevertheless, he has not reached the level of an unpaid watchman, who serves without the intent of receiving a reward. The paid watchman cannot say that a reward is not important to him. On the contrary, he looks forward to receiving a reward for his Divine service.

By contrast, a renter has a fundamentally different approach. He wants and desires to benefit from the world, to receive all his needs. However, he knows and feels that he is obligated to pay G‑d, the Owner of the world, for the benefit he receives. He therefore observes the Torah and its mitzvos.

כְּמוֹ כֵן הוּא גַם בְּרוּחָנִיּוּת: רֵאשִׁיתוֹ וְעִקָּרוֹ שֶׁל הַ"שּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר" הוּא – עֲבוֹדַת הַשֵּׁם – הַיְנוּ שֶׁרוֹצֶה לְקַיֵּם רְצוֹנוֹ יִתְבָּרֵךְ וְלִשְׁמוֹר הָעוֹלָם לְמַעֲנוֹ יִתְבָּרֵךְ, אֶלָּא שֶׁעֲדַיִן לֹא הִגִּיע לְדַרְגָּא שֶׁל "שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם" (שֶׁלֹּא עַל מְנָת לְקַבֵּל פְּרָס) בְּאֹפֶן שֶׁעִנְיְנֵי שָׂכָר לֹא יִתְפְּסוּ מָקוֹם אֶצְלוֹ, וְלָכֵן הוּא מְצַפֶּה לְקַבֵּל שְׂכַר עֲבוֹדָתוֹ; אֲבָל עִקָּרוֹ שֶׁל הַ"שּׂוֹכֵר" הוּא לְהֵפֶךְ – רְצוֹנוֹ וְחֶפְצוֹ הוּא לֵהָנוֹת מִן הָעוֹלָם (וּלְקַבֵּל כָּל צְרָכָיו כו'), אֶלָּא שֶׁהוּא יוֹדֵעַ וּמַרְגִּישׁ שֶׁעָלָיו "לְשַׁלֵּם" לְהַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא (בַּעַל הַבַּיִת שֶׁל הָעוֹלָם) עֲבוּר הֲנָאָה זוֹ, וְלָכֵן מְקַיֵּם תּוֹרָה וּמִצְווֹת וכו'.

For this reason, Shelah cites the example of one who says, “[I am giving] this sela to tzedekah so that my son will live.” This example emphasizes that the fundamental reason he is giving the tzedekah is that he needs salvation from G‑d – he wants his son to live.60

[וְלָכֵן מֵבִיא הַשַּׁלָ"ה עַל זֶה הַדֻּגְמָא דְּ"עַל מְנָת שֶׁיִּחְיֶה בְּנִי", שֶׁבְּזֶה מֻדְגָּשׁ שֶׁעִקַּר נְתִינַת הַצְּדָקָה מְסֻבָּב מִזֶּה שֶׁהוּא זָקוּק לִישׁוּעַת ה' – שֶׁ"יִּחְיֶה בְּנִי"מה].

Thus, the spiritual counterpart of a renter is intrinsically distinct from the spiritual counterpart of both a borrower and a paid watchman. He is not like a borrower, since he views his observance of the Torah and its mitzvos as payment due G‑d for the benefit he receives from the world. Thus, his observance of the Torah can be considered serving G‑d, i.e., Divine service performed for G‑d’s sake and not for his own. (In contrast, a borrower demands that his needs be fulfilled without cost and his observance of the Torah and its mitzvos is not considered as “the service of G‑d,” as explained in sec. 5, above.)

וְנִמְצָא שֶׁהַשּׂוֹכֵר בְּמַהוּתוֹ אֵינוֹ לֹא כְּשׁוֹאֵל וְלֹא כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר:

כְּשׁוֹאֵל לֹא הָוֵי, דְּמִכֵּיוָן שֶׁקִּיּוּם הַתּוֹרָה וּמִצְווֹת שֶׁלּוֹ יֵשׁ בּוֹ עִנְיָן שֶׁל "תַּשְׁלוּם" לְהַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא עֲבוּר הֲנָאָתוֹ מִן הָעוֹלָם, וְלָכֵן הֲרֵי זֶה בְּגֶדֶר עֲבוֹדַת הַשֵּׁם, שֶׁעוֹשֶׂה עֲבוֹדָתוֹ לְמַעֲנוֹ יִתְבָּרֵךְ (וּדְלֹא כְּשׁוֹאֵל, הַדּוֹרֵשׁ צְרָכָיו בְּחִנָּם, שֶׁקִּיּוּם הַתּוֹרָה וּמִצְווֹת שֶׁלּוֹ אֵינוֹ בְּגֶדֶר שֶׁל "עֲבוֹדַת הַשֵּׁם", כַּנַּ"ל סְעִיף ה).

Nevertheless, neither can a renter61 be considered as a paid watchman. The difference is that the Divine service of a paid watchman in his observance of the Torah and its mitzvos is for G‑d’s sake. (In a halachic context, the benefit a paid watchman receives for serving as a watchman does not come from the actual physical object entrusted to him. The wage he receives is a tangential dimension of the arrangement between him and the owner.)62 By contrast, from the very outset, a renter sees his observance of the Torah and its mitzvos as payment to G‑d for the benefit he receives from the world. He is not acting as watchman, as one who cares for G‑d’s world.

אֲבָל גַּם כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר אֵינוֹ, שֶׁהֲרֵי הַשּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, עֶצֶם עֲבוֹדָתוֹ בְּקִיּוּם הַתּוֹרָה וּמִצְווֹת הִיא לְמַעֲנוֹ יִתְבָּרֵךְ (כִּי אֵינוֹ נֶהֱנֶה בִּשְׁמִירָתוֹ מִגּוּף הַפִּקָּדוֹן, וּשְׂכָרוֹ הוּא בְּעִנְיָן צְדָדִי); מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן הַשּׂוֹכֵר שֶׁקִּיּוּם הַתּוֹרָה וּמִצְווֹת שֶׁלּוֹ מֵעִקָּרָא הוּא בְּגֶדֶר "תַּשְׁלוּם", תְּמוּרַת הֲנָאָתוֹ מִן הָעוֹלָם, וְאֵינוֹ לְמַטָּרָה שֶׁל "שְׁמִירָה".

Seeing Every Jew as G‑d’s Servant

7

Nevertheless, although the fundamental definition of a renter is different than that of a paid watchman, they are judged by the same laws. As such, the four categories of watchmen “[are governed by] only three [sets of] laws.”

ז

אֶלָּא שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי כֵן דִּינוֹ שֶׁל הַשּׂוֹכֵר הוּא כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, וּבְמֵילָא "דִּינֵיהֶם (דְּהָאַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים רַק) שְׁלֹשָׁה":

Since, ultimately, “the renter” acts in the service of G‑d, he is therefore judged as belonging in the category of “servants of G‑d,” just as a paid watchman, serving Him, albeit not for His sake.63

סוֹף-סוֹף, מֵאַחַר שֶׁגַּם אֵצֶל הַשּׂוֹכֵר יֵשׁ פְּעֻלּוֹת שֶׁל "עֲבוֹדַת הַשֵּׁם", לָכֵן דִּינוֹ לְהִכָּלֵל בְּהַסּוּג שֶׁל "עֲבוֹדַת ה' (עַל כָּל פָּנִים) שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ" כְּהַשּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָרמו,

We have been adjured,64 “A person should always engage in the Torah and its mitzvos even though it is not for G‑d’s sake, for through involvement that is not for G‑d’s sake, he will arrive at involvement for G‑d’s sake.”

וְנִצְטַוִּינוּמז – "לְעוֹלָם יַעֲסוֹק אָדָם בַּתּוֹרָה וּמִצְוֹת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ שֶׁמִּתּוֹךְ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ בָּא לִשְׁמָהּ",

Thus, ultimately, everyone – even a borrower, one engaged in the lowest level of service that is not for G‑d’s sake – will perform Divine service out of love, without any concern for his own self, to the extent that, to quote Rambam, “His soul is bound up in the love of G‑d. Thus, he will always be obsessed with this love…. He will abandon everything in the world except for this.”65 And, as Rambam assured in that same text, “Eventually, good will come because of it,”66i.e., ultimately, G‑d will also grant him benefits in this material world.

דְּהַיְנוּ, שֶׁסּוֹף סוֹף יַגִּיעַ כָּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד – גַּם הַשּׁוֹאֵל (הַדַּרְגָּה הֲכִי תַּחְתּוֹנָה בְּ"שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ") – לְהָעֲבוֹדָה מֵאַהֲבָה, שֶׁלֹּא אִכְפַּת לוֹ מְצִיאוּתוֹ הוּא, וְעַד שֶׁתְּהֵא "נַפְשׁוֹ קְשׁוּרָה בְּאַהֲבַת ה' וְנִמְצָא שׁוֹגֶה בָּהּ תָּמִיד . . וְיַעֲזוֹב כָּל מַה שֶּׁבָּעוֹלָם חוּץ מִמֶּנָּה"מח – "וְסוֹף הַטּוֹבָה לָבֹא בִּגְלָלָהּ"מט.

Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 31, p. 112ff. Adapted from a sichah delivered on Shabbos Parshas Vayishlach, 5747 [1986]

(משיחת ש״פ וישלח תשמ״ז)