Shevitat Yom Tov - Chapter Seven

Which, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 2, is the proof-text requiring us to cease the performance of work on the holidays.

As evident from the continuation of the Rambam’s statements, here the definition of labor is not—in contrast to the Sabbath and holidays—the 39 labors necessary to build the Sanctuary, but rather labor in the conventional sense: mundane activity that will prevent one from appreciating the festive mood of the holidays.

There are several Talmudic passages (e.g., Jerusalem Talmud, Pesachim 4:1) that quote verses from the Torah prohibiting the performance of work on Chol HaMo’ed. Nevertheless, according to the Rambam (and his position is shared by the Tur, Orach Chayim 530), these verses are merely asmachtot, allusions cited by the Rabbis as support for the decrees they instituted. [Significantly, however, the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Mo’ed Katan 1:1) contains an expression that indicates that he conceives of the prohibition against work on Chol HaMo’ed as part of the Oral Tradition given to Moses on Sinai.]
There are, however, other authorities [Yereim (the conclusion of section 304), the Ramban, and the Rashba] who maintain that the prohibition against work on Chol HaMo’ed is Scriptural in origin. The Be’ur Halachah 530 quotes the opinions of many authorities who accept this view.
The difference between these two perspectives is not merely theoretical in nature. One of the basic principles of Torah law is that when there is a doubt with regard to a question of Scriptural law, the more stringent view must be adopted. When, by contrast, there is a doubt with regard to a question of Rabbinic law, the more lenient view may be adopted. If the prohibition against working on Chol HaMo’ed is Scriptural in origin, then the more stringent view must be adopted in cases of doubt. Should, however, the prohibition be Rabbinic in origin, a lenient view may be adopted.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 537:1) rules more stringently, stating that this is permitted, only when one had already begun irrigating the land before the commencement of the holiday.

For he will have to carry water in buckets continually to irrigate the entire field [Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Mo’ed Katan 1:1)].

For the water in the spring flows on its own accord (lbid.).

This and the other activities mentioned in this halachah are phases in the process of extracting oil from olives.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam on this point and allows the olives to be turned over only if they have been turned over once before. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 538:1) follows the Ra’avad’s view.

E.g., at night (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:2). It is necessary to do this in a discreet manner, rather than publicly, for one cannot be sure that thieves will come. Thus, the loss is not inevitable (Maggid Mishneh, citing the Ramban). If, however, it is impossible to bring the produce in discreetly, one may do so in a manner that will attract attention.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the new dimension contributed by this law is that the grapes in question are still attached to the ground, and they may nevertheless be harvested.

Rav Moshe HaCohen and others have objected to the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that the court does not have the right to declare a person’s property ownerless. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 538:6) follows the Rambam’s ruling. The Ramah adds that if a person performs work with property belonging to others—e.g., a tailor or a scribe—and thus this punishment cannot be administered, he should be placed under a ban of ostracism and/or giving stripes for rebelliousness for working on Chol HaMo’ed.

Our translation is taken from Rav Kappach’s edition ofthe Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Mo’ed Katan 1:8). Others interpret this term to mean “sew the stitches far apart.” The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 541:5) interprets the phrase to mean “like a dog’s teeth.”
In his notes, the Ramah states that most ordinary people may be regarded as skilled with regard to sewing. Hence, everyone should employ this stringency.

One may not, however, use a trowel.

This ruling is based on a narrative in Mo’ed Katan 12b concerning Rav, who harvested his field during Chol HaMo’ed because he did not have any flour. From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that he allows this leniency even when the person has financial resources at his disposal; he lacks merely the grain itself.
Rav Moshe HaCohen differs with the Rambam’s ruling, stating that if the person possesses money and can buy flour in the marketplace, he is not allowed to harvest his field. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 537:15) quotes the Rambam’s decision.

The Mishnah Berurah 537:52 states that one is allowed to perform only that labor which is necessary to provide him with grain for the holiday. He is not allowed to do any more. Nevertheless, in his Sha’ar HaTziyun 537:49, he brings other opinions that would allow a person to do more work if no additional expense is required.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that the reason it is forbidden to use oxen is that it is necessary to depart from one’s ordinary routine. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo offers a different rationale—that using oxen will make the matter public knowledge.
The difference between these two views is not only theoretical. According to the Rambam, it would be permitted to use other animals—e.g., horses or donkeys—to thresh, for this would also represent a departure from one’s ordinary practice. According to Rav Yosef Karo, this would be forbidden because this would also become public knowledge. The Mishnah Berurah 537:52,53 quotes Rav Yosef Karo’s view.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) also states that if one is threshing the grain for others as well as for oneself, it is permitted to use oxen.

Mo’ed Katan lla mentions this concept with regard to pickling fish. The same principle can be applied to pickling vegetables, except that with regard to vegetables the pickling process usually takes longer and the vegetables will not be ready to be eaten during the festival if the pickling process was begun during Chol HaMo’ed. [See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 533:3) and commentaries.]

I.e., even if one catches far more than one needs for the festival itself. The rationale is that since some fish taste better than others, one can explain that one is continuing to fish to catch an especially tasty fish for the festival (Mishnah Berurah 533:18).

As was customary in Babylonia in Talmudic times.

For he can explain to others that he prefers fresh beer over aged beer (Mo’ ed Katan 12b). Moreover, the observers may not even know that he possesses aged beer (Mishnah Berurah 533:9).
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, stating that it follows only a minority opinion in Mo’ ed Katan 12b. ln support of the Rambam, the Or Sameach cites a passage in Shabbat 139b, which follows the same rationale. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 533:1) quotes the Ra’avad’s view, while the Mishnah Berurah (loc. cit.) states that one may rely on the Rambam’s view.

These and other professionals perform a large amount of work at one time. Therefore, even when such a professional is in fact preparing this work for the purpose of the holiday, an observer might not appreciate this and might think that he is producing work for after the holiday. A private individual, by contrast, does not perform a large amount of such work at one time, and an observer will realize that his intent is for the festival (Mishnah Berurah 533:22.)

These and other professionals perform a large amount of work at one time. Therefore, even when such a professional is in fact preparing this work for the purpose of the holiday, an observer might not appreciate this and might think that he is producing work for after the holiday. A private individual, by contrast, does not perform a large amount of such work at one time, and an observer will realize that his intent is for the festival (Mishnah Berurah 533:22.)

Rabbenu Asher (in his gloss on Mo’ed Katan 2a) gives one reason for this leniency: during the year, all the members ofthe community are involved in their own affairs and do not have the time to concern themselves with the public welfare. On Chol HaMo’ed, when people are freed from their own concerns, they can turn their attention to the needs of the community at large. Another reason is obvious from the quote from the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah cited in the notes on the following halachah.

With regard to cisterns and trenches belonging to a private individual, see Chapter 8, Halachah 4.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that this applies to cisterns or waterworks that are not necessarily needed for the holiday itself. Even though they will not be needed until afterwards, they may be fixed during Chol HaMo’ed because they are for the benefit of the public.

To be acceptable for the immersion of a man or woman, a mikveh must contain at least 40 se’ah. In contemporary measure, certain authorities maintain that this figure is equivalent to approximately 250 liters. Shiurei Mikveh mentions many views, concluding that the minimum acceptable figure is 454 liters, and that one should try to reach 921.6 liters. The Chazon Ish cites a figure of 573.3 liters.

lt is forbidden to sow two types of produce without adequate distinction in the same field (Leviticus 19:19). This prohibition is called the prohibition of kilayim.
In the beginning ofthe month of Adar (early spring), the court would send agents to notify farmers about this prohibition. From the fifteenth of Adar, they sent agents out to check if there were kilayim in the fields. Originally, the court’s agents would remove the kilayim from the fields. The farmers then became lax, and left this work to the court’s agents. Therefore, the Sages declared that whenever kilayim are found in a field, the court’s agents should declare the field ownerless. During Chol HaMo’ed Pesach, when the crops bloom, the court would send agents out again (Hilchot Kilayim 2:15-17).
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Mo’ed Katan 1:2), the Rambam explains the reason why this activity was performed during Chol HaMo’ed: The wages for the court’s agents were paid from the Temple treasury (terumat halishcah). Since there was very little other work available during Chol HaMo’ed, it would be easy to find people willing to work for low wages, and thus the Temple treasury would save.

The Hebrew term עֲרָכִין is discussed in Leviticus 27:1-8 and involves giving a specific sum to the Temple treasury for a person, depending on a person’s age. In some contexts, the term עֲרָכִין is also used with regard to fields and animals consecrated to the Temple treasury.

This term is used to refer to the Hebrew חֵרֶם, a term implying that a person renounces his ownership of his property and dedicates it either to the Temple treasury or to the priests.

This refers to an article consecrated to the Temple treasury. In all three instances, the sum the person who made the dedication is required to pay may be evaluated during Chol HaMo’ed.

A woman suspected of adultery (a sotah) is brought to the Temple and required to drink a mixture of water, dust, and ink from a scroll containing a curse. (See Numbers 5:23-24; Hilchot Sotah, Chapter 3.)

A person who became ritually impure through contact with a human corpse must be purified by having the ashes of a red heifer sprinkled upon hi1m (Numbers, Chapter 19). The slaughter of the red heifer and the preparation of these ashes is described in Hilchot Parah Adumah, Chapter 3.

When a corpse is found outside a populated area and the killer’s identity is unknown, Deuteronomy 21:4 specifies a process of atonement that involves decapitating a calf. (See Hilchot Rotzeach, Chapter 9.)

A Hebrew servant sold by the court who desires to remain in servitude rather than regain his freedom must have his ear pierced. (See Exodus 21:6; Hilchot Avadim 3:9.)

A leper becomes ritually impure. The purification ceremony is discussed in Leviticus, Chapter 14; Hilchot Tum’at Tzara’at, Chapter 11.

Priests are forbidden to contract the impurity that stems from a human corpse. One of the ways of contracting such impurity is by standing over a grave. For this reason, graves would be marked with lime. During the rainy season, the lime might wash off. (See Hilchot Tum’at Meit 8:9.)

The Jewish court does not summon litigants during Nisan and Tishrei (Hilchot Sanhedrin 25:9). Nevertheless, should they come on their own accord, sessions may be held during Chol HaMo’ed (ibid., 11:1, 13:5)

This refers to a legal record of the sale of property from a deceased person’s estate to provide for the support of his wife and daughters, or alternatively, a similar record required when a person goes on a journey and leaves his wife without support. (See Hilchot Ishut, Chapters 18 and 19.)

A childless widow is required to marry her deceased husband’s brother. She is released from this obligation through a ritual act referred to as chalitzah. (See Deuteronomy 25:7-10.) After this ritual is performed, the court composes a legal record for the woman. See Hilchot Yibbum UChalitzah 4:29.

When a girl’s father dies before she reaches the age of majority, our Sages gave. her the opportunity to marry on a conditional basis. If upon attaining the age of majority, or beforehand, she no longer desires to continue her marriage, she does not require a formal divorce. All she need do is state her desire to terminate the marriage. Should she do this, a legal record is composed and granted to her. (See Hilchot Gerushin, Chapter 11.)

Although the Torah and the Sages disqualified certain individuals from serving as witnesses or judges, a litigant may, nevertheless, agree to allow such an individual to serve in this capacity (Hilchot Sanhedrin, Chapter 7). The judges may desire to have a written record of the commitment the litigant made.

Rashi (Mo’ed Katan 18b) states that this leniency is granted because the person desires to depart on a journey, implying that if that is not the case, a bill of divorce may not be composed. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 545:5) quotes the law without qualification, reflecting the Rambam’s position. Note, however, Mishnah Berurah 545:20.

Although these are all personal matters, since they represent the ongoing needs of a community they are considered to involve the interest of the community at large (Mishnah Berurah 545:20). The Ra’avad differs and maintains that the reason is that the person may suffer a loss if these documents are not composed.

The Kessef Mishneh interprets this ruling as an indication that the Rambam maintains that one should not wear tefillin on Chol HaMo’ed. Significantly, in his gloss on Hilchot Tefillin 4: l 0, the Kessef Mishneh focuses on the latter half of this halachah and interprets it as an indication that one must wear tefillin at this time. (See the notes on that halachah for a more detailed discussion of this matter.)

This refers to an instance in which there is a scroll available for the communal Torah readings. If there is no scroll available, a Torah “scroll may be checked and corrected (Kessef Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 545:2). Following this line of thinking, all texts that are required to be studied on the holiday may be written.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin 2:6) relates that since a Torah scroll must be checked for accuracy against an existing scroll, a scroll was kept in the Temple Courtyard for that purpose. (See Hilchot Sefer Torah 7:2.)

There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis with regard to texts that are needed for the community at large, but are not required for the festival itself. From the Rambam’s wording, it is clear that he would forbid writing such texts. There are, however, more lenient opinions, and they are favored by the Ramah (loc. cit.:1).

This purple thread was used for tzitzit in Talmudic times.

According to the Rambam, there is no difference between writing tefillin and mezuzot, and other professions. Only when the wages he earns are required for his livelihood is he allowed to work.
The Ramah (loc. cit.:3) expresses a more lenient view. Since writing tefillin is a mitzvah, it is allowed on Chol HaMo’ed, provided the profits from one’s work will enable one to celebrate the holiday in a more lavish manner.

The Rambam is explaining that since one is not performing a skilled task, there is no prohibition against this labor. The Ra’avad and Rav Moshe HaCohen differ with the Rambam’s rationale and maintain that one is allowed to write social correspondence on Chol HaMo’ed because it is possible that after Chol HaMo’ed, one will have difficulty finding a person with whom to send the letter. One may keep one’s accounts, because this is necessary in order to be able to know how much to spend on the holiday.
Although most Sephardic authorities (including the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 545:5) follow the Rambam’s view, the Ashkenazic authorities tend towards the Ra’avad’s explanation and forbid writing on Chol HaMo’ed unless a loss is involved. The Ramah thus states that it is customary not to write on Chol HaMo’ed. Nevertheless, the Mishnah Berurah 545:35 states that the more lenient view is generally followed. When writing on Chol HaMo’ed, many do so in a slightly irregular manner, thus adding more halachic weight to the lenient position.

Even those that involve the performance of labors that require professional expertise (Mishnah Berurah 547:19).

Discretion is necessary, for if the boards are made in public, a passerby might not realize that they are intended for a corpse.

For if the deceased’s identity is well known, everyone will realize that the boards are for his coffin. ln later generations, the Ashkenazic custom was to cut the boards and make the coffin in the courtyard of the synagogue. For most people in a community are aware of a person’s death and the fact that the work is carried out in the synagogue courtyard indicates that it is not being performed for a private matter (Hagahot Maimoniot). (See also Mishnah Berurah 547:20.)

Although leprosy conveys ritual impurity, that status must be established through the inspection of the suspect portion of the body by a priest. (See Leviticus 13:2.) For the reason explained by the Rambam, the priest should delay his inspection until after the conclusion of the holiday.
As the passage in Leviticus continues, there are times when a person who is suspected of having leprosy must undergo a second (or third) inspection, and carrying out this inspection may be to his benefit. ln the Mishnah (Mo’ed Katan 1:5), there is a difference of opinion concerning whether these inspections are carried out during Chol HaMo’ed. Rabbi Meir maintains that they are. If the ruling is lenient, it is delivered; if it is stringent, it is withheld. The Sages maintain that no inspections are carried out during Chol HaMo’ed. Although it appears that the Rambam accepts their view, other opinions explain that he follows Rabbi Meir’s view.
Significantly, in Hilchot Tum’ at Tzara’ at 9:7, the Rambam states, “We inspect leprous blotches every day, with the exception of the Sabbath and yom tov.” The latter term does not usually include Chol HaMo’ed.
(We have translated tzara’at as leprosy for this is the common practice. In fact, the Biblical condition described by this Hebrew term differs from the disease known as leprosy today.)

The marriage of a person to his brother’s childless widow (Deuteronomy 25:5).

Torah law defines matrimony as a two-stage process involving betrothal (erusin) and marriage (nisuin). Betrothal establishes the husband-and-wife bond. From that time onward, a woman may not marry anyone else, but neither may the couple live together. Marriage, by contrast, signals the consummation of this relationship, the beginning of the couple’s life as a single unit. Today, the common Jewish practice is to complete both stages of the wedding bond in a single ceremony under the wedding canopy.

This refers to the remarriage of one’s divorcee. The act of remarriage is permitted during Chol HaMo’ed; a feast is not.

This refers both to cutting one’s hair and—for those who are accustomed—to shaving.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 531:1) states that it is a mitzvah to cut one’s hair on the day prior to a holiday.

A mourner is forbidden to cut his hair or launder his clothes. Indeed, the prohibition against cutting hair continues throughout the thirty days of mourning (Hilchot Eivel 6:2). On this basis, the commentaries question the Rambam’s statements. And although the commencement of a holiday nullifies the need to keep the prohibitions of the thirty days of mourning, this is true only when a person has observed a full seven days of mourning before the commencement of the holiday (lbid. 10:5-6).
For this reason, the Kessef Mishneh and the Radbaz (Vol. VI, Responsum 2164) interpret the leniency mentioned by the Rambam here as referring only to laundering. In his Shulchan Aruch, when mentioning the leniencies regarding cutting hair, Rav Yosef Karo makes no mention of a mourner.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 531:4) states that this applies even when a person had been imprisoned by Jews who would have allowed him to cut his hair before the holiday. Since he was upset because of his imprisonment, he did not desire to cut his hair (Mishnah Berurah 531:9).

For while under a ban of ostracism, it is forbidden to cut one’s hair or launder one’s clothes (Hilchot Talmud Torah 7:4).

The authority of a wise man to abrogate an oath is discussed in Hilchot Sh’vuot, Chapter 6.
From the wording ofthe Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Mo’edKatan 3:1), it would appear that this leniency applies only when one did not have the opportunity of approaching a wise man with this request before Chol HaMo’ed. Accordingly, if one had such an opportunity, it would appear that the vow cannot be abrogated until after the holiday. See Mishnah Berurah 531: 11.

The Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 531 :3) mentions that a person who was prevented from cutting his hair or laundering his clothes by forces beyond his control—e.g., he was detained by contractual negotiations, or he was sick—is not given the opportunity to perform these activities during Chol HaMo’ed. The Mishnah Berurah 531:5 mentions the reason for this stringency: In these instances, the factor holding the person back from cutting his hair or laundering his clothes is not publicly known. In contrast, in all the instances mentioned by the Rambam, the reason why the person did not cut his hair or launder his clothes is common knowledge.

After completing the term of his vow, a nazarite must shave his head and bring several sacrifices (Numbers 6:18; Hilchot Nezirut 8:2-3). Similarly, as part of his purification process a leper must shave off all the hair of his body twice (Leviticus 14:8-9; Hilchot Tum’at Tzara’at 11:1-2).

A person who is impure may not take part in the festive sacrifices of the Temple. Therefore, it is possible that he did not prepare himself for the holiday. Some also cite Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 112), which states that every person who is ritually impure must inform others about his state and make this evident from his physical appearance. One of the ways of doing this would be not to cut one’s hair (Rambam La’ Am ).

For the reason for the decree—that one cut one’s hair before the holiday—is not relevant for a child, who is not responsible for his conduct.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that he is speaking about an extremely young infant. Nevertheless, the Pri Megadim interprets this as referring to any child under Bar Mitzvah age. (See Mishnah Berurah 531:16.)

The prophet Samuel and King David divided the priests into 24 watches, which rotated in the performance of the Temple service. Each watch would serve in the Temple for a week at a time. (See Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 4:3.)

This prohibition was instituted for a reason similar to the prohibition against cutting one’s hair during Chol HaMo’ed: By preventing the priests from cutting their hair during the week they served in the Temple, the Sages insured that they came to the Temple with their hair already cut (Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 1:12).

Both fmgernails and toenails (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 532:1).

Although the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, the Ramah states that it is customary not to cut nails with a utensil during Chol HaMo’ed. [Significantly, the Rambam’s ruling with regard to Chol HaMo’ed differs from his ruling regarding the mourning rites (Hilchot Eivel 5:2).]

Women are, however, forbidden to cut the hair from their head, as men are (Mishnah Berurah 56:16).

This was done to remove hair and make the woman’s complexion ruddier (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah; Mo’ed Katan 1:7).

Our translation is based on the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah and the citation of this law in the Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 546:5).

A male with a condition resembling gonorrhea, which causes a discharge from his organ other than semen or urine. Such a discharge renders him ritually impure. (See Leviticus 15:2-3; Hilchot Mechusarei Kapparah, Chapter 2.)

A woman who experiences vaginal bleeding at times other than when she expects her monthly period. This discharge renders her ritually impure. (See Leviticus 15:25, Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, Chapter 6.)

A woman who becomes impure because of her monthly menstrual bleeding. (See Leviticus 15:19; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, Chapters 4 and 5.)

The impurity of a woman who gives birth is mentioned in Leviticus, Chapter 12; Hilchot Mechusarei Kapparah, Chapter 1.

In the era when all the aspects of the laws of ritual impurity were observed, those who were ritually impure could not participate in the festive celebrations as others could. Therefore, they were not required to launder their clothes. Moreover, at times, these garments were themselves impure and required ritual immersion and laundering.
The Shulchan Aruch does not mention these laws. Although there are certain dimensions of the ritual impurity associated with a zavah, a niddah, and a woman who gives birth that are observed in the present era—e.g., the prohibitions against intimacy—since we are all ritually impure, these individuals’ state of impurity does not preclude them from joining in our festive celebrations. Hence, they must prepare their garments before the commencement of the holiday.

Our translation is based on the notes of Rav Kappach, who interprets this ruling as not merely a leniency allowing the person to launder his garment during Chol HaMo’ed, but as a charge obligating him to do so, so that he will not wear a soiled garment during the festival season.

Others interpret this term as referring to the coverings of sacred texts. (See Maggid Mishneh.)

The Hebrew phrase ןשתפ ילכ literally means “linen garments.” We have translated the term according to the function these items served in the Talmudic era.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 534:2) states that although this is the law, it is customary to be stringent and forbid this. The Mishnah Berurah 534:14, however, mentions certain leniencies—e.g., having them laundered by a gentile. At present when laundering clothes has become a much easier process, the Rabbis have granted greater leniency.

The Magen Avraham 539:1 explains that the rationale for this prohibition is that commercial activity involves much effort, and this runs contrary to the atmosphere desired by the Sages for Chol HaMo’ed.

As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether the loss of opportunity mentioned refers to a loss the person will suffer—he will either have to pay more for an article that he needs or will not be able to sell an article that he wishes to sell—or if it includes also the opportunity to realize a greater profit. ln his Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 539), Rav Yosef Karo explains that the majority of the Rabbis follow the more lenient view, and he rules accordingly in his Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 539:5).
The Rabbis also ruled with regard to a situation that does not involve a departure from the norm—i.e., as opposed to the instance mentioned by the Rambam, no special situation like visiting merchants arose—but the situation is nevertheless such that were the person not to sell his goods during Chol HaMo’ed, he would not profit to the same degree as if he sold them afterwards. In such a situation, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 539:4) rules that one may sell the goods during Chol HaMo’ed, provided that he uses a portion of the profit he makes to enhance his celebration of the festival. Moreover, the Shulchan Aruch restricts this license to a person of moderate means. If the person is affluent and would celebrate the festival amply regardless, he is not allowed to sell his goods during Chol HaMo’ed, unless he will be forced to sell them for less than the principal afterwards.

The laws regarding the sale of these entities are more stringent than those involving other items, because the sale of these entities becomes public knowledge quickly.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 539:10) also mentions that these entities may be sold if their sale is necessary for the livelihood of the seller (as mentioned in Halachah 24). The Mishnah Berurah 539:40 adds that one may buy such entities from a gentile. (With regard to the purchase of land from a gentile in Eretz Yisrael, see Hilchot Shabbat 6: 11) Others discuss whether it is permissible to buy such an entity during Chol HaMo’ed, if it is likely that a similar entity will not be available after Chol HaMo’ed.

All three items mentioned by the Rambam refer to articles that can be stored, and it is thus not directly obvious that one is purchasing the article for use during Chol HaMo’ed (Mishnah Berurah 539:34). If produce will not last beyond the festival, it may be sold during Chol HaMo’ed with no restrictions.

Shemini Atzeret, in contrast to the last days of Pesach, is considered a holiday in its own right. Therefore, it is proper to adom the marketplace with produce in its honor. Although this expression of honor is not allowed with regard to the last days of Pesach, it is permitted to sell one’s wares openly, without any restrictions, on the day preceding those holidays (Mishnah Berurah 539:37).

Or anyone else whose wares testify to the fact that they will be used during Chol HaMo’ed (ibid.:33).

There are two interpretations of the expression “does not have food to eat.” The Magen Avraham 542: l understands this simply; a person may not hire himself to perform labor unless he has no food whatsoever to eat. The Eliyahu Rabba, however, maintains that this refers to a person who possesses the minimum necessary for subsistence, but lacks the means to celebrate the festival in an ample way. As indicated by the Sha’ar HaTziyun 542:12, it appears that the authorities follow the more stringent view. Neither view, however, requires a person to pawn his household goods to purchase food instead of working to earn his livelihood.
See also the Mishnah Berurah 542:7, which states that even according to the more lenient views, an effort should be made to perform the labor discreetly. For an observer may not realize that the person performing the labor is doing so out of necessity.

See the Mishnah Berurah 542:8, which states that it is preferable for a person to sell merchandise instead ofworking during Chol Hamo’ed. Also, as reflected in the Sha’ar HaTziyun (loc. cit. ), even the more stringent views that prevent a person from hiring himself out as a laborer if he possesses his minimum necessities grant him the leniency of selling merchandise in order to celebrate the festival in comfort.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this applies only to a building project that all know belongs to a Jew. It is, however, permissible for a gentile to take work home and perform it on a Jew’s behalf if he is hired as a contractor and not as a laborer. This conception is also borne out by the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 543:2).

In this regard, the laws regarding Chol HaMo’ed are more stringent than those applying to the Sabbath and the holidays. Since on the Sabbath and the holidays it is forbidden to go beyond the city’s Sabbath limits, the gentile’s performance of the task will not become public knowledge. On Chol HaMo’ed, by contrast, there are no restrictions on travel, and it is possible that many people will become aware of the gentile’s activities (Maggid Mishneh). (See also Hilchot Shabbat 6:14-15.)