Tum'at Met - Chapter 1

As will be explained in Hilchot Parah Adumah, there is an entire process which an impure person must undergo to regain ritual impurity. Nevertheless, this process cannot be completed without him abiding in impurity for at least seven days.
At present, we do not have the ashes of the Red Heifer with which to purify ourselves from the ritual impurity associated with a human corpse. Hence, we are all considered as ritually impure. Nevertheless, the laws that follow are still applicable with regard to a priest. For, as stated in Hilchot Evel, ch. 3, a priest is forbidden to contract the ritually impurity imparted by a human corpse. Even though he is ritually impure, he may not enter situations which would cause him to contract such impurity. Hence all of the laws to be mentioned are relevant in that context.

Our translation is an oversimplification. See Halachah 11 for details.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 107) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 398) include the observance of the laws of ritual impurity imparted by a human corpse as one of 613 mitzvot. Ramban differs and maintains that this should not be considered as a mitzvah.

I.e., a fortiori reasoning. This deductive process, called kal vechomer in Hebrew, is one of the Thirteen Principles of Biblical Exegesis taught by Rabbi Yishmael (the beginning of the Sifri, repeated every day before the morning prayers).

I.e., if the person immerses himself in a mikveh on the day he contracts this impurity, he regains ritual purity at nightfall on that day.

See Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah 1:1; 10:1.

Generally, the Rambam considers laws derived through the Thirteen Principles of Biblical Exegesis as midvrei sofrim, a term which means “from the words of the Rabbis,” i.e., apparently of human, and not Divine, origin. This categorization also affects the flexibility granted in the observance of the law. When there is a question concerning a law of Scriptural origin, we rule stringently, while if a law is of Rabbinic origin, we rule leniently. Moreover, there is a general principle that punishment is not given for prohibitions derived through the logic. Thus, seemingly, one would not be liable for punishment for violations concerning impurity contracted through carrying a human corpse.
For this reason, the Rambam emphasizes that the status of the impurity incurred by carrying a corpse is that of Scriptural Law. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Oral Tradition conveys this concept and the kal vechomer is merely an allusion (asmachta). (It must be emphasized that the Rambam’s principle - that laws derived through Biblical exegesis are considered of Rabbinic origin - is not accepted by all authorities. Many maintain that since such laws can be derived from the Bible through accepted techniques, it is considered as if they were stated explicitly and they are considered of Scriptural origin. See the explanations of this concept with regard to the Rambam’s statement that the consecration of a woman with money is of Rabbinic origin in Hilchot Ishut 1:2.)

This expression indicates a concept which the Rambam derived through a process of deduction without relying on an explicit statement in a prior Rabbinic source.

The prohibition is derived through an inference from a lesser matter to a more severe one, i.e., if the daughter of one’s daughter is forbidden, how much more so should one’s daughter be forbidden.
When mentioning the list of forbidden intimate relations (Leviticus, ch. 18), the Torah does not mention a prohibition against relations with one’s daughter. In Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 2:6, the Rambam writes—as he writes here—that although the prohibition against relations with one’s daughter is derived through Biblical exegesis, it is considered of Scriptural origin. Indeed, it is even considered as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The Torah mentions the prohibition against cooking meat in milk three times. Our Sages explain that in addition to the prohibition against cooking such a mixture, there is a prohibition against partaking of such food and, indeed, consider the prohibition against partaking of the food a mitzvah of Scriptural origin (Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 9:2). Thus although the prohibition is not stated explicitly, but derived through exegesis, it is considered as if it were stated explicitly.

As will be described in this volume, there are several objects — e.g., the corpse of a dead animal or lizard — that cause a person to incur ritual impurity.

And not a covering over it. As will be explained (see Halachah 7), however, even though a person does not come in direct contact with a corpse, he may become impure because of other reasons, e.g., he moved it without touching it directly.

The tongue is singled out in this manner because — unlike the other limbs — it is naturally enclosed within a person’s mouth. Nevertheless, since it is often exposed, it is not considered as part of one’s inner body (Kiddushin 25a). Note, however, Hilchot Parah Adumah 12:1 that explains that this applies only with regard to contracting ritual impurity. With regard to purification, the tongue is considered as part of the inner body.

I.e., parts of the body that would not usually be considered as “flesh.” Ohalot 3:3 (quoted in Chapter 3, Halachah 13) states that touching teeth or hair that is attached to a corpse causes one to incur ritual impurity. The Rambam deduces that if these are considered as parts of the body of a corpse, they may also be considered as parts of a living body. Although the teeth are covered by one’s mouth, since they are revealed when one opens his mouth, they are not considered as “inner organs” (Kiryat Sefer).

Although it was swallowed and thus did touch the inner parts of his body.

He may, however, become impure for carrying the source of impurity. See Halachah 8.

The Rambam is interpreting the term kishut found in Mikvaot 9:4. The Ra’avad offers a different interpretation of the term.

Because it is ultimately shed (Kessef Mishneh).

The hair on his head, by contrast, is considered as part of his body and contact with it causes him to incur impurity.

As will be explained, a person who immerses himself in a mikveh may not have substances intervening between his flesh and the water. The substances mentioned above are not considered significant enough to be considered as intervening substances. Nevertheless, if a source of impurity touches them, it is not considered to have touched the person’s body and he remains pure.

If an impure person touches others with these substances.

If a source of impurity touches these substances, but not the person’s body.

This Hebrew word, the plural of k’li, is a general term used to refer to an article that is used for a specific purpose. It refers to containers, garments, furniture, cooking utensils, tools, weapons, containers, and many other types of useful articles. As will be explained, there are certain distinctions between containers and other articles referred to as keilim. Therefore, at times, we will translate k’li as “container,” at times, as “implement,” and, at times, we will use the Hebrew term.

Whether on the inside or on the outside.

Hilchot Keilim 13:1.

An av tum’ah. This statement is true according to Scriptural Law. Nevertheless, it does not appear in the manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah and the commentaries consider it to be a later addition. For that reason, we have enclosed it in brackets. See also Hilchot Sha’ar Avot HaTum’ah, ch. 7, which explains that, according to Rabbinic decrees, both persons and keilim can contract impurity from derivatives of impurity.

The commentaries explain that according to the Rambam, a person contracts impurity for carrying an article because of its presence on his person, even if he did not move his body or the article at all. See the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Zavim 5:3).

Which never becomes impure. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Keilim 1:2), the Rambam writes that even if there are 1000 intervening substances between the person and the source of impurity, if he is holding the containers that hold the source of impurity; he becomes impure.

Even when one does not lift it.

I.e., in one of his inner organs which are not exposed.

As stated in Halachah 3.

In which case it is considered as part of the person and not as an independent entity. See Chapter 20, Halachot 1-2.

Similarly, food or drink do not contract ritual impurity in such a situation [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (loc. cit.), based on the Sifra to Leviticus 11:28].

Keilim 1:4 states that because the impurity associated with a human corpse imparts impurity to a building, it is the most severe type of impurity for which no parallel exists.

The Sifri derives this concept from the exegesis of Numbers 19:14 “Anyone who enters the tent... shall become impure.” Kol, the term translated as “anyone,” can also mean “anything.” Implied is that inserting any part of one’s body causes the entire body to be considered as impure.

The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam’s intent in the use of this term: Must he do more than touch the lintel? And if so, what must he do to “join his hand to the lintel”? Or is the wording explaining the rationale for the law: he is impure because by touching the lintel, he is considered to have joined his hand to it?

I.e., even a portion of the doorframe that projects outward from the doorway. Our Sages decreed that the person should be impure for touching this portion as a safeguard to prevent a person from touching the portion under the lintel (Rambam LeAm).

For this portion is considered as part of the earth and not part of the building (Kessef Mishneh).

For touching the house in which a human corpse is located is considered like touching a grave (ibid.; see Chapter 2, Halachah 15).

Although the Rambam’s perspective is accepted by most halachic authorities, there are some who maintain that a gentile corpse does not convey impurity at all (Yereim, et al).

Tosafot, Yevamot 61a, differs and maintains that a gentile’s corpse can impart this type of impurity as well. The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 372:2, states that it is proper for a priest to be stringent and not to walk over the graves of gentiles. The Rama mentions the Rambam’s view, but agrees that it is proper to follow the more stringent approach.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (the Introduction to the Order of Taharot), the Rambam cites another means of exegesis based on Yevamot, loc. cit. The impurity of ohel is derived from Numbers 19:14: “When a man (adam) dies in a tent....” The term adam refers solely to the Jews as Ezekiel 34:31 states: “You are My flock... You are adam.” Implied is that the term refers to “you” and not to non-Jews. There the Rambam, however, states that this is merely an asmachta, a support. For the law is not derived from exegesis, but rather conveyed by the Oral Tradition.

Even a Jewish corpse.

Although the Rambam uses the term beheimah which refers to domesticated animals, here his intent is any living beast, fish, or fowl. None become ritually impure during their lifetime, as stated in the following halachah.

The term zav refers to a person who experiences a discharge from the male organ that is released because of an internal sickness that affects the organs of the body (Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 2:1). As stated in Hilchot Metamei Mishkav UMoshav, ch. 1, such discharges render a male ritually impure.
According to Scriptural Law, even if a gentile has such a physical condition, he does not impart such impurity. Nevertheless, as a safeguard lest a gentile man seek intimacy with a Jewish child, our Sages placed all gentile men in this category (Rashi, Nidah 34a).

After certain animals die, however, their carcasses do impart ritual impurity.

I.e., this refers to Scriptural Law and with regard to other forms of impurity besides the impurity resulting from a human corpse.

A term which could be interpreted as an exclusion, applying only to an adult.

This collective term also includes minors.

This also applies to a child born in the seventh month, because such an infant may also live.

The term quoted by the Rambam is taken from Shabbat 135a. The implication is that an infant born in the eighth month will certainly die. Therefore, even while alive, it is considered as if it had already died with regard to certain contexts. (It must be emphasized that today, efforts are made to save all infants, even those born in the eighth month and in many instances, the doctors have been successful in enabling such infants to live.)

Our translation is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Ohalot 1:7).

The gullet and the windpipe. For ritual slaughter to be effective, these two organs must be slit.

Although he has no hope of living, until he is actually dead, he does not impart ritual impurity (ibid.).

For in such an instance, the person is no longer alive.