Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

A p’rutah is a copper coin of little value (half a barley-corn of silver), which was used in the Talmudic age.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 244) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 224) include this as one of the 613 commandments of the Torah.

We have cited this as the source of the verse because the Hebrew states, אל תגנב, using a singular form of the word. Note Chapter 9, Halachah 1, which says that the verse from Exodus refers to kidnapping. Leviticus 19:11 states: “Do not steal” using a plural form. Sanhedrin 86a states that this refers to stealing property. In Sefer HaMitzvot, and in certain manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah, this latter verse is indeed used as the proof-text.

Whenever a person is liable to make compensation for the violation of a prohibition, he is not punished by lashes (Hilchot Gezeilah 1:1; Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2).

Implied also is that stealing from a gentile violates a prohibition of the Torah. See Chapter 7, Halachah 8, and the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 12:7).

Although one is not liable for the transgression of a commandment unless one steals the worth of a p’rutah, all theft is forbidden. To cite a parallel: one is liable for transgressing a prohibition only when one eats an amount of prohibited food equal to the volume of an olive. Nevertheless, eating even a smaller amount is forbidden by the Torah (Maggid Mishneh; Sefer Me’irat Einayim 348:1).

For this reason, it is customary in several communities not to “steal” the matzah on Pesach.

Rashi (Bava Metzia 61b) and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 348:1) interpret this to refer to a person who wants to give a colleague a sum of money that he knows he will not accept. Therefore, he intends to steal from him so that he will be liable to pay him double. There is, however, no hint of this interpretation in the Rambam’s words.

Bava Kama 79b derives this definition of robbery from the use of that verb in II Samuel 23:21, which speaks of Benayahu ben Yehoyada’s taking a javelin frpm a Philistine.
The distinction between a thief and a robber is important, because a thief is required to pay twice the amount of stolen property, and four or five times the amount if he steals and sells or slaughters a sheep or a cow. A robber is not obligated for such penalties.

I.e., he does not openly confront the owner, but rather attempts to steal without his knowledge. Even if he is later discovered, he is still considered a thief, because that was his original intent. He arms himself so that if he is discovered, he will be able to confront the owner. His intent, however, is that he be able to steal unnoticed.
The Maggid Mishneh offers this interpretation to resolve a question asked by the Ra’ avad, who maintains that an armed bandit is considered to be a robber. The Maggid Mishneh explains that there are two types of armed bandits: a highwayman who robs people at gunpoint, and an armed thief.

The Rambam considers the obligation to make double restitution and the other laws pertaining to the judgment of a thief to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah (Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandment 239). (See also Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 54.)

I. e, he need not purchase two of the stolen articles and give them to the victim of the theft. Financial restitution is sufficient.

See the Guide for the Perplexed, Volume III, Chapter 41, which explains that when a person desires to cause a colleague a loss, his atonement is to repay him the amount he desired him to lose. See also Deuteronomy 19:19, which states: “You shall do to him what he desired to do to his colleague.”

See Chapter 3, Halachot 8-9.

See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:7-8, which defines a fine, קנס in Hebrew, as a payment that is. more or less than the principal.

In the Guide for the Perplexed, Volume III, Chapter 41, the Rambam explains why these animals were set aside as distinct. They pasture in the fields and thus are easier to steal than other objects that are kept in a home. In order to deter their theft, the Torah mandated a more strict punishment.

When discussing the laws of theft, Exodus 21:37 specifically mentions “a man who steals.” Nevertheless, Bava Kama 15a equates a man and a woman with regard to all the punishments in the Torah.

Even if a woman is independently wealthy or earns her living, she cannot be obligated to pay, because her husband is entitled to her wages and the right to derive benefit from the property she owns. See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:21.

The wording that the Rambam uses implies that if the stolen article itself is found in the woman’s possession (or in her husband’s possession), it must be returned to its owner. If, however, it has been destroyed, the entire amount is considered to be a debt (Maggid Mishneh). The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 349:1) adds that if the woman possesses an article that she received in exchange for the stolen article, that must be given to the owner of the stolen property.

The same laws apply to a deaf mute or a mentally incompetent person (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 349:6).

For a child is not liable for any punishments, since he is not considered to be of sufficient mental competence to take responsibility for his conduct (Bava Kama 39a). Nor are his parents held liable for his deeds. See Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:20.

In contrast to a woman or a servant, the child was not at all responsible for his conduct at the time he stole.

For a servant does not have any independent financial capacity; everything he acquires belongs to his master. Nevertheless, since he is mentally. competent, the obligation remains incumbent upon him.

This rationale is provided by Bava Kama 4a.

For at that time, he becomes financially independent and must meet the obligation incumbent upon him.

Since a servant is past majority, he is capable of enduring more severe punishment than a child.

After stating that a stolen article must be returned, the Rambam discusses the particular laws regarding the return of such an article. The question arises: When the article increases in value after the theft, what must the thief return? Is it sufficient for him to return the value of the original article? Or must he return the added value as well?
The fundamental principle is that as long as the article is considered to belong to its owner, it and any increment must be returned to him. When the stolen article is acquired by the thief, the thief is entitled to the increment.
When does the thief acquire the article? As stated in the following halachah, when the stolen article undergoes a change that affects the nature of its being (נשתנית). Alternatively, even when the article still belongs to its original owner, if the owner despairs of its return (יאוש), the increment is acquired by the thief.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this applies when the sheep was pregnant and had wool at the time that it was stolen. This is evident from the Rambam’s wording in Hilchot Gezelah 2:7. When the sheep was already pregnant, the Rambam· maintains that bearing a lamb is not a change sufficient to cause the thief to acquire the article

I.e., he must pay the value of pregnant sheep and/or one prepared to be shorn. If the sheep was not pregnant, nor was its wool grown at the time of theft, and it became pregnant and bore a lamb afterwards or grew wool afterwards, those offspring and that wool belong to the thief. For this is obviously a change (Maggid Mishneh).
The Rambam’s opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 354:1). The Ramah quotes the opinion of the Ra’avad and the Tur, who maintain that even if the animal gives birth or is shorn before the owner’s despair of the animal’s return, the increase in value belongs to the thief. For this is considered a change in the nature of the stolen article. See Sefer Me‘irat Einayim 354:1; Siftei Cohen 354:4.

Since the increase in value is a direct result of the thief’s efforts, he is entitled to it.

Despite the owner’s despair, the thief is not able to acquire the stolen article, because Leviticus 5:23 commands: “And he shall return the article obtained by robbery.” As Bava Kama 66a explains, as long as the article has not undergone a fundamental change, it must be returned to its owner.
See the rulings of Rabbenu Asher and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 353), which mention that there is a Talmudic opinion that maintains that the owner’s despair enables the thief to acquire the stolen article. Although it is not accepted as halachah, with respect of this opinion, if a thief consecrates a woman with such an article, the marriage is considered as binding in certain contexts. For example, if the woman wants to marry someone else, she must be given a divorce.

E. g., he stole wood and used it to build furniture; he stole wool and used it as fabric for clothes. Alternatively, a calf grew and became an ox.

Although the owner demanded the return of the stolen article, it is not given to him. All the thief is required to do is to pay the owner the value of the article at the time of the theft.

By overworking it or underfeeding it.

Whether that is more or less than the animal’s present value.
The Ramah states that the consideration given the thief when the animal is fattened is granted only when the thief undertook to fatten the animal. Otherwise, the increase in the animal’s value is governed by the laws stated in the following halachah.
The Ramah 354:4 also states that this consideration is granted only when the thief returns the animal alive. If he slaughters it, he must pay its value at the time the matter is brought to court, as reflected in the following halachah.

Which would make him liable to pay four or five times its price.

Although this change comes about as a natural process, without any effort on. the thief’s part, it is sufficient to cause the status of the animal to change.

This halachah deals with an instance when the value of the article is reduced because of market fluctuations.

The thief is obligated to restore the article immediately after stealing it. It is the article’s value at that time which is significant. (See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 354:5-6.) Even if he possesses the stolen article after its value depreciates, it is not sufficient to return the article itself; he must pay the greater amount (Bava Kama 65a).

Until an animal is slaughtered or stolen, or a utensil is destroyed, it remains the property of its owner. Since the thief caused it to be destroyed, the amount for which he is responsible is calculated at that time. When quoting this and the following laws, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 354:3) does not mention the double payment, because today the obligations associated with fines are not imposed by the courts.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 354:7 explains that generally loss resembles negligence, and therefore the thief is liable, because the loss of the article is considered his fault. Ketzot HaChoshen and Netivot HaMishpat differ and maintain that even in an ordinary case of loss, the thief is not held responsible for the higher amount. It is only when he himself causes the article to be lost - e.g., he throws it in a river - that he incurs that obligation.

This time the principle mentioned in the previous note works against the thief’s interest, and he is obligated to pay the greater amount for both the principal and the fine.

According to the Sefer Me’irat Einayim (loc. cit.) this means that the negligence of the owner was not the cause of its loss.

Since the thief is not personally responsible for the animal’s death or the article’s loss, his obligation is for the value of the article at the time it was stolen, and the calculation of the double payment is also based on that amount.

I.e., the market value of these types of articles remained the same, but the particular article became damaged and its value was reduced.

This law was instituted for the benefit of the original owner. Our Sages·Jelt that a person would rather have the money with which he could purchase a new utensil than a broken utensil and the monetary difference in its value. The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling with regard to the double payment.

For the above law was instituted for the benefit of the original owner. If for any reason they desire to forgo this benefit, they may. (See Hilchot Gezelah 2:15.)

As long as the owner does not despair of the return of the stolen article, and the article remains unchanged, it continues to be the property of the original owner and must be returned to him.

When the owner despairs of the article’s return (יאוש) and it is transferred to another person (שינוי רשות), the transaction is effective and it becomes· the property of the purchaser.

For as mentioned above, the despair of an article’s return is not sufficient to cause it to be acquired by the thief.

Rashi, Bava Kama 62b, derives this from Exodus 22:6, which states that double restitution must be paid when an article is “stolen from a person’s house.” Implied is an exclusion when the article is stolen from the house of a thief.

For a change from a living animal to a slaughtered one is considered significant enough for it to be acquired by the thief. As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 11, שינוי, a fundamental change, is significant enough for the animal to be acquired by the thief.

Or four or five times its worth if he sells or slaughters it. Since the owner despaired of its return, and the stolen animal changed hands, the purchaser is considered to have acquired it as his own.

For the purchaser is not considered to have acquired the stolen animal.

The Temple treasury is considered the owner of all consecrated property. It is not a human being who can be referred to as “his colleague.”
The Ra’avad mentions that the Rambam’s wording is not exact. A person who steals consecrated property is considered to have misused that property (מעל). He is required to increase the value of the principal by one fifth (i.e., he adds a quarter of the principal, so the amount he adds is one fifth of the new total) and bring a guilt offering as atonement.

The principal must also be returned to a gentile, but the special consideration of receiving double payment is granted the Jewish people alone (see Chapter 3, Halachah 13).

Although a portion of the meat of sacrifices of lesser sanctity is eaten by its owner, the sacrifice is not considered his personal property. Note the Or Sameach, who states that this ruling appears to contradict the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:2.
The Or Sameach explains that there is reason to consider the consecrated animal as the person’s private property, because he is allowed to partake of a portion of its meat. Simultaneously, since he has consecrated it, it is no longer legally his. In the instance at hand, the double payment is a departure from the norm. Hence, the thief is not held liable. With regard to the damages the animal caused, by contrast, the fact that payment is not taken from the animal is a departure from the norm, and therefore the person whose property was damaged is allowed to collect his due after the animal is sacrificed.

When the owner is liable to replace the offering with another one, one might think that the animal is considered to be his private property.

Even when the consecrated animals have not been brought to the Temple, they are considered to belong to the Temple treasury.

See Chapter 9, Halachah 6, which states that a person who steals a servant is not liable for kidnapping.

I.e., all examples of movable property.

The only other references to inheritance in the Torah apply to landed property. The equation between servants and landed property does not refer only to this particular law, but instead encompasses all aspects of Jewish business law.

I.e., a promissory note is a record of a commitment. The note itself is not worth anything. Therefore, it is also excluded by the examples given in the above verse.

Exodus 13:13 states that “every firstling donkey must be redeemed with a sheep. If you do not redeem it, you must decapitate it.”

For as yet, it has not been redeemed.

Produce from which terumah and the tithes have not been separated.

Double restitution, as the Ra’avad notes.

Although tevel (and fats) are forbidden to be eaten and indeed, eating them is punishable by death by God’s hand, they are still the private property of their owner. Hence, one is liable to make restitution for them.

Once the terumah is separated, it is considered to be sacred and is not the private property of the person who separated it.

Thus, he actually pays less than four or five times the price of the animal, for he himself is also granted a share in his father’s estate.

Bava Kama 71b explains this law as follows: At the time of the animal’s sale or slaughter, the thief owned a portion of the animal itself. Therefore, he is not liable to pay four or five times the full worth of the animal. When the Torah said that a thief must pay four or five times the animal’s worth, it meant that he must pay four and five times its entire worth. If that is not required, this penalty is not imposed upon him. He must, however, pay double, for the original theft was forbidden.

This is not a continuation of the above concepts. These rules apply even when one steals from a person other than one’s father.

The consecration is effective and the animal becomes the property of the Temple treasury. Therefore, there is no obligation to pay four or five times its amount, as stated in Halachah 1. The thief must, however, pay double to the owner, because the animal was not consecrated when it was stolen. And he must pay the principal and an addition fifth to the Temple treasury for me’ilah as stated in Halachah 1.
The Ra’avad states that this applies only when one consecrates an animal as an offering, but not when one consecrates it to the Temple treasury. The Maggid Mishneh differs and explains that the Rambam’s ruling applies to all forms of consecration.

Consecrating the animal is equivalent to effecting a business transaction. The Temple treasury thus acquires the animal because its owner has despaired of its return, and the animal has been transferred from one domain to another.

For the animal continues to belong to the owners.

And not four or fives times its worth. The Torah requires such payment only when the animal is “slaughtered,” and killing it in this manner is not considered “slaughtering.”

Although in all these cases, the person either does not desire to eat from the meat or is forbidden to do so, he is considered to have slaughtered the animal and therefore is liable for the higher penalty.

Note the Kessef Mishneh, Hilchot Shechitah 2:3, who explains that according to Scriptural law, it is forbidden to eat the meat of a non-consecrated animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. It is the prohibition against deriving any benefit that is Rabbinic in origin.

For a Rabbinic prohibition cannot supersede an obligation of Scriptural law.

Bava Kama 77b derives this from the exegesis of a Biblical verse.

Although such an animal is taref and cannot be eaten, ritual slaughter prevents it from imparting the ritual impurity associated with a dead animal.

One might think that since he did not slaughter or sell a whole animal, he would not be held liable (Rashi, Bava Kama 78b).

This indicates that giving a present is considered equivalent to making a sale.

In general, we follow the principle that “One cannot charge an agent with performing a sin,” and whenever a person commits a misdeed, he himself is liable for the consequences. In this instance, an exception is made, and the person who sells or slaughters the animal is considered to be an agent of the thief, causing the thief to be liable for the more severe penalty.
The Mishneh Lamelech (gloss on Chapter 3, Halachah 6) notes that in Hilchot Me’ilah 7:2, the Rambam states that only with regard to the prohibition of me’ilah, making personal use of a consecrated article, is a principal liable for an agent’s actions.
The Or Sameach resolves this difficulty by stating that in selling and slaughtering a stolen animal - and similarly with regard to misappropriating an article for a watchman - the agent is acting on behalf of the principal and not for his own benefit. With regard to me’ilah, by contrast, the agent is himself benefiting from partaking of the consecrated object; he is not acting for the sake of the principal. Nevertheless, he is considered the agent of the principal, and the principal is held liable because of his actions. There is no other like instance in the Torah. (See also the Noda Biy’hudah, Even HaEzer, Responsum 75.)

Without receiving the money for the sale.

Although these are not ordinary types of sales, the animal is still considered to have been sold.

For the animal was returned before the sale became effective. If the thief was apprehended after 30 days had passed, there are opinions which maintain that he is not liable for the more severe payment, but most authorities differ.

On one hand, one might think that the thief would be required to make the extra payment, because he sold the animal. Nevertheless, since he retained ownership of a certain portion, the sale is not complete and there is reason to suppose that he should not be required to pay the extra amount.

Bava Kama 78b leaves unresolved the question whether in these instances the sale is considered completed, or whether the thief is still considered to have a share in the animal.

Since he has a share in the animal, the sale is not entirely forbidden.

As mentioned above with regard to the sale and slaughter of a stolen animal, a person can act as an agent for a colleague. In this instance, the person who sold or slaughtered the animal is liable for his share, and since his partner consented to his actions, he is considered to be his agent, causing him to be liable for the second share.

The thief who did not consent is not liable, because he had no part in the sale or the slaughter. The thief who did sell or slaughter the animal is not liable, because the entire responsibility for the stolen animal is not his.

“Go and pay him” is a clear cut ruling, obligating the thief to pay. If he ignores this ruling and does not pay, he is considered a robber (gazlan), and a robber is not liable to pay four and five times an animal’s worth (Bava Kama 68b).

Since the ruling was not issued in a definitive manner (see Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 7:6), the original theft is not concluded, and therefore he is liable for the additional payment.

Needless to say, he must return the stolen article itself if it is intact.
As the Rambam states in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 7:6), this teaching shows that a thief must perform a formal act of acquisition (kinyan) before he becomes liable for the stolen property.

He need not even pay for the lamb that died (Rashi, Bava Kama 79a).

Lifting the animal above the ground constitutes the kinyan of hagbahah. This is an effective means of transfer even if performed in the owner’s domain. Drawing it out of the owner’s domain constitutes the kinyan of meshichah. This formal transfer causes the thief to become liable for the stolen article.

In lieu of the five silver pieces required by Exodus 13:13 and Numbers 18:16.

Here too, since the animal was not formally acquired by the recipient, he is not liable.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam is speaking about an instance in which the recipient knew that the thief had stolen the animal. Although generally a person who receives stolen property from the thief is not liable for the double payment (see Chapter 1, Halachah 17), since the original thief did not ever formally acquire the stolen article, it is the recipient who is actually considered the thief.
The Ra’avad takes issue with the Rambam and offers a different interpretation of the source of this halachah, Bava Kama, loc. cit. (significantly, one that fits the Rambam’s own interpretation in his Commentary on the Mishnah).

For prodding it to move is considered an act of meshichah.

He is liable for the additional payments although he never took the stolen animal into his own domain.

Once the thief removes the animal from the owner’s domain, it makes no difference where he slaughters it.

Hilchot Na’arah Betulah 1:13 derives this concept as follows:
[Exodus 21:22] states: “If there will not be a [fatal] accident, he shall be punished.” Implied is that if there is a [fatal) accident, no punishment shall be levied.... [Leviticus 24:21] says: “A person who [fatally] strikes an animal shall reimburse [its owner] for it, and one who [fatally] strikes a man must die.” Just as Scripture did not distinguish between intentional and unintentional action for killing an animal to make him liable for payment, so too, it did not distinguish between intentional and unintentional action for killing a person to free him from financial obligation.

I.e., that involves capital punishment, even though the person will not actually receive this penalty.

And therefore will not receive capital punishment.

Ketubot 32b derives this concept from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 25:2-3. The interpretation of that passage emphasizes that the transgressor is liable for only one type of punishment, and that lashing takes precedence over the financial penalty.

In both these instances, he is not punished by lashing even though his deed warrants it.

The Rambam mentions the loss of the wallet because if it were not lost or destroyed, the thief would be required to return it (Sanhedrin 72a). When it is destroyed, however, the thief is not required to make restitution, even of the principal.
From the Rambam’s wording, the Maggid Mishneh concludes that even if the article was not lost at the time of the theft, but afterwards, the thief is not liable. The Ramban and Rav Meir HaLevi differ and maintain that if it is lost afterwards, the thief is liable. Note Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 351:1). (See also Chapter 9, Halachah 13 and notes.)

Propelling the arrow beyond four cubits and taking out the wallet violate the prohibition against transferring articles from one domain to another. Setting fire to the grain heap violates the prohibition against kindling a fire.

By lifting up the wallet, he performs a kinyan and is liable for stealing the article.

At this time, he violates the prohibition against transferring an article on the Sabbath.

All of these are prohibitions punishable by lashing.

For then he is not lashed.

If, however, he stole it during the week (and slaughtered it on the Sabbath) or stole it on the Sabbath in a manner in which a violation of the Sabbath laws is not involved at the time of the theft, he is liable for the double payment.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 10.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Talmud makes this statement within the context of the discussion of a minority opinion. He questions why the Rambam, who follows the majority opinion, quotes this phrase. Nevertheless, he offers a resolution.

The sale of an animal on the Sabbath or to a false deity is forbidden by Rabbinic decree, but not by Scriptural law.

For the death penalty that he incurs for the violation of the Sabbath takes precedence over the financial penalty.

Bava Kama 70b states that this refers to an instance where the thief threw the stolen animal from the domain of the original owner into the domain of the purchaser. Thus, he becomes liable for the violation of the Sabbath laws at the time when the animal comes to rest on the ground of the courtyard of the purchaser, the very same time when the sale takes effect.

Although the thief is responsible for the agent’s actions, that applies only with regard to the responsibility for the additional payment, and not for the liability for slaughtering on the Sabbath. In that context, we follow the general rule that a person is not liable for a transgression performed by his agent.

Chapter 2, Halachah 10.

Since the testimony of the one witness does not create a financial obligation, it is insignificant in this context. He is not even obligated to take an oath (Maggid Mishneh).

See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8, which states this principle and defines a fine as any financial obligation that is less or more than the principal. The laws that follow are general principles that apply not only to the payment of four or fives times an animal’s worth, but to all cases involving fines.

I.e., three judges.

E. g., he made his admission to three judges when he met them in the marketplace.

Even if they are in the midst of the arbitration of a dispute.

One might think that since he admitted that he sold or slaughtered the animal before witnesses came, he would not be required to make the additional payment. The Rambam, however, does not accept this rationale. When the thief admits his guilt before witnesses come, we can assume that he is repenting, and therefore he is not required to pay any additional penalty. When, however, he admits his guilt after witnesses have testified that he stole, it is to his advantage. For he is not obligating himself further. Therefore, he is not absolved of a penalty.
This is the opinion of Rav, Bava Kama 75a. Shmuel differs and maintains that since he admitted liability for the higher penalty before the second pair of witnesses testified, he shall not be held liable. Although generally, when there is a difference of opinion between Rav and Shmuel with regard to matters of business law, the halachah follows Shmuel’s view, in this instance the Talmud records a debate of the later sages regarding Rav’s view, and therefore the halachah is decided accordingly.

The Perishah, Choshen Mishpat 350:2, states that this applies only when the second claim is brought in a different court. If, however, the claim was made in the same court, the admission to the first partner applies with regard to the second as well.

As stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:10, when a person who causes damage to a colleague’s property possesses movable property, it shall be expropriated for payment first, for it is generally easier to sell than landed property.

This statement explains why the Rambam placed the laws governing theft in his “Book of Damages.”

The laws pertaining to the sale and treatment of a Hebrew servant are discussed in Hilchot Avadim, Chapters 1-3.

Sotah 23b cites an allusion for this in Scripture, for when Exodus 22:2 speaks of a thief’s being sold, it mentions his theft. The Rambam, however, considers this merely to be an asmachta and maintains that the law was transmitted via the Oral Tradition.

As soon as he acquires these resources, he is required to pay.
See the Or Sameach, who states that the money that the servant owes is not collected from the ha’anakah, the bonus he receives after he completes his servitude.

The court sells a Hebrew servant for a six-year period. Therefore, it is possible that his value will be less than the amount of the theft. He is not sold by the court for a longer period. A Hebrew servant who sells himself may sell himself for a longer period (Hilchot Avadim 2:3).

I.e., the seventh year after he was sold. A Hebrew servant must work in the Sabbatical year. He is, however, freed by the advent of the Jubilee year (ibid.:2).

Since the court sells a Hebrew servant for only a six-year period, it is possible that his value will exceed the amount of the theft. He is not sold for a shorter period.

I.e., after having been sold for the first theft.

Before being sold for the first theft.

I.e., even if one thief possesses enough resources of his own to pay for the entire amount of the theft, he is required to pay only his share. If the second thief cannot pay his share, he is sold into servitude.

This may work to the thief’s advantage, because it is likely that he will be worth more than half the amount of theft.