Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

I.e., he set aside money to pay for the sacrifices of poor nazirites.

Even if there are not enough funds remaining to purchase an entire sacrifice, the remaining funds should be contributed toward the purchase of a sacrifice.

Since the money was set aside for that purpose, it should be used accordingly.

See Halachah 4 for more details concerning this concept.

Voluntary burnt offerings whose sacrifice embellishes the altar. Since the money was set aside for use for his own offerings, it should not be used for the offerings of another person. This is the meaning of the phrase (Shekalim 2:5:) “What is left over from a nazirite’s [offerings] should go for the sake of that nazirite.”

Brought to a place where it is impossible to benefit from it.

As the nazirite’s peace offering must be accompanied (see Chapter 8, Halachah 1).

Like the peace offering broqght by a nazirite in contrast to an ordinary peace offering which may be eaten for two days and one night.

Although a certain amount of the funds would have been used for a sin offering, since they have not been designated for that purpose, it does not become prohibited to use them for other purposes.

As is the law when the owner of a sin offering dies before the sacrifice of the offering (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:1).

Since it is known that he is required to bring these sacrifices, it is considered as if an appropriate amount has been allotted for each offering. Hence the money set aside for the burnt offering and peace offering should be used for such sacrifices and the money set aside for the sin offering should be taken to the Dead Sea.

I.e., a blemish that disqualifies it as an offering. See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach, chs. 1-2.

Since the animal is available for immediate sale, it is considered as if the owner has cash in hand.

In which case, she has no obligation to bring the sacrifices.

Although there are funds for a sin offering involved, since the purpose was not specified, they may be used for freewill offerings.

It is considered as an entirely ordinary animal, as if it had never been consecrated.

Hilchot Arachin 6:34.

This is a general principle, applicable in many contexts with regard to sacrifices. See Hilchot Arachin 6:21, 24; Hilchot Temurah 1:3.

Generally, all of a woman’s property is placed in her husband’s care during their marriage and all her earnings belong to him. How then can she have money or property that is entirely her own? When a person gives it to her as a present with the above stipulation. See Hilchot Ishut 22:27; Hilchot Nedarim 7:17; Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 3:13-14.

It is forbidden to benefit from the animal or to use it for any other purpose. Hence, it is left to die. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:1.

See Halachah 3.

The rationale is that when a husband nullifies a vow, his nullification does not uproot the vow from its source. Instead, his nullification affects only the future. Hence, she is liable for the repercussions of becoming impure and must bring a sacrifice. If, by contrast, she were to have had her vow nullified by a sage, it would have been nullified at its source and it would be as if she was never a nazirite. Hence she would not have to bring a sacrifice. See Hilchot Nedarim 13:2 (Radbaz).

See Chapter 2, Halachot 13-14.

See ibid.:15.

See Halachah 9.

The Radbaz explains that the·Rambam interprets our Sages’ statements in Nazir 13a as applying when the events occurred in this order. Others interpret the Talmud as speaking about a situation where the sacrifices were set aside after the woman miscarried. According to the Radbaz, the Rambam would not argue with that view. Instead, he is stating that the law applies even in the instance mentioned.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 17.

Since he is not bound by his nazirite vow after the miscarriage as stated in the cited halachah, it is possible that the consecration of the sacrifices is nullified. On the other hand, that is not a definite fact. Hence our Sages debated this issue.

These prohibitions apply with regard to all consecrated animals. Since these prohibitions are Scriptural in origin, they must be observed because of the doubt regarding these animals' status. See Hilchot Me'ilah 1:7-8.

See Halachot 16-17 which describe how such a situation could arise.

As the Rambam proceeds to explain, the nazirite who completed his vow in ritual purity is obligated to bring one set of sacrifices, while the one who became impure must bring a different set. Since it is not known which of these individuals became impure, there is a question which sacrifices they should bring. Neither can bring the sacrifices required by the other as a freewill offering, because the guilt offering that is required when emerging from impurity may not be brought as a freewill offering, nor may the sin offering that is required after completing one’s nazirite vow in a state of purity.

I.e., sharing the costs equally.

his applies when they both took a nazirite vow for the same number of days at the same time (Radbaz). If their nazirite vows conclude at different times, they must wait until the latest date.

The other makes similar statements and they both perform all of the rituals necessary in the bringing of the sacrifices. In this way, the one has fulfilled the obligation to bring the sacrifices required when emerging from impurity and the other, the obligation to bring the sacrifices that mark the completion of the nazirite vow.

In which they observe all the prohibitions incumbent on a nazirite.

In this way, the nazirite who became ritually impure has fulfilled the obligations incumbent on him at the conclusion of his nazirite vow.

The other one makes a similar statement and they each perform all the rites required when bringing these sacrifices.

More precisely, the person who was ritually pure was obligated to pay for half the sacrifices of the person who was ritually impure. Thus although no extra sacrifices were offered, he did suffer a slight loss. Nevertheless, this is obviously far preferential than for each one to have to bring the sacrifices required when emerging from ritual impurity on his own, as stated in the following halachah.

This is the practice followed whenever there is a question whether one is obligated to bring a sin offering or not. This sacrifice is burnt and not eaten (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 19:10).

This is for the sake of the offerings he is required to bring if he completed his nazirite vow in a state of purity. The peace offering and guilt offering are not absolute necessities. See Chapter 6, Halachah 12; Chapter 10, Halachah 8.

All three sacrifices, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

The nazirites who entered a situation in which a doubt arouse which of them was impure.

Who are not bound by the prohibition against shaving the corners of their heads. See Hilchat Avodat Kochavim 12:5.

Although a nazirite who is ritually impure and one who completes his nazirite vow in purity are allowed to shave their heads, that is permitted because there is a definite positive commandment which supercedes the prohibition. In these instances, however, we are unsure if there is a commandment obligating the nazirite to shave. Hence, no leniency is granted. The nazirite’s failure to shave does not prevent him from bringing his sacrifices, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 5.

See Hilchot Shaar Avot HaTumah 16:1. We assume that if the nazirite knew that he was ritually impure, he would not deny it, because we operate under the assumption that a person would not consciously avoid bringing a sin offering if he knew that he was liable (Keritot 12a).

Ibid.. The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam concerning this principle. The Kessef Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s view.

See Hilchot Shaar Avot HaTumah 14:11.

For the person’s own word supercedes the testimony of one witness.

The rationale is that since, because of the doubt inspired by the testimony of the witness, the person willingly accepted the observance of the nazirite vow, he is obligated to observe it (Radbaz).

I.e., even if the corpse is in full public view.

Thus he would contract ritual impurity by covering the corpse with his body (ohel).
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam concerning this issue, citing Nazir 63b as support. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh offer interpretations of the Talmud that support the Rambam’s position. In that source, the Talmud differentiates between a corpse that is visible and a corpse whose existence is unknown, as explained in Chapter 6, Halachot 18-19. The Rambam maintains that the distinctions apply only after the fact, when the blood from the sacrifices has already been sprinkled on the person. Before then, the ruling depends on the principle: When there is a doubt concerning ritual impurity in the public domain, the person is considered pure. If such a doubt arises concerning a question in a private domain, he is considered as impure.
In explanation of the Rambam’ s position, the Kessef Mishneh states that we are speaking about an instance where it is possible for the nazirite, albeit with difficulty, to pass by the corpse without touching it or passing over it. If that is not the case, he is certainly impure. The Radbaz states that we are speaking about any instance where the person could have - and we presume he did - move off the path so as not to touch the corpse.

In contrast, if it was not known that a corpse was located there, the nazirite is pure in the case of a doubt.

Because, as the Rambam proceeds to explain, it is almost impossible for the person not to contract ritual impurity.

And when riding or carrying a burden, the person will not be able to squeeze by.

As stated in Hilchot Tumat Tzara’at 11:1-3, after the signs of tzara’at have disappeared from a person’s flesh, he must undergo a twofold purification process that involves shaving his hair on the first and seventh days. Neither of these shavings can be considered as the same shaving as the one performed by a nazirite. The rationale is that the first shaving of the purification from tzara’at is for a different purpose than the shaving performed by a nazirite. For the intent of the shaving of a nazirite is to remove hair, while the intent of the first shaving performed by a person afflicted with tzara’at is to allow hair to grow (Nazir 60b, Radbaz). Similarly, the second shaving associated with tzara’at is not analogous to the shaving associated with the nazirite vow, for the shaving of a metzora is performed before the sprinkling of the blood and the shaving of a nazirite afterwards.

Which involves a prohibition against shaving. As stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 15, ordinarily, "When a nazirite contracts tzara'at and becomes healed in the midst of the days of his nazirite vow, he should shave all of his hair. The rationale is that] by shaving, he fulfills a positive commandment. [And] when there is [a conflict between] a positive commandment and a negative commandment... the positive commandment supercedes the negative commandment." There is also a positive commandment for a nazirite to grow his hair long and a negative commandment does not override a negative commandment and a positive commandment. Nevertheless, when a nazirite contracts tzara'at, that there is no positive commandment involved in growing his hair. Since it is possible that this is not the situation prevailing in this instance, he should not shave (Radbaz).

In this instance, it is questionable whether he is required to perform a shaving to emerge from ritual impurity (as explained at the beginning of Chapter 6) or not.

A person who seeks to emerge from the impurity associated from the state of ritual impurity associated with contact with a human corpse must have the ashes of a Red Heifer sprinkled upon him on the third and seventh days after he became ritually impure. He must also immerse himself in a mikveh (Hilchot Parah Adumah 11:1).

For only then will he complete all the shavings required because of the doubts and complete his nazirite vow.

For then he will have performed both of the shavings required of a person who contracted tzara’at and will have had the ashes of the Red Heifer sprinkled upon him to purify him from the impurity associated with contact with a human corpse.

The Rambam mentions this shaving first, because this is the only definite obligation.

For until then he is forbidden to shave because perhaps he is not impure and his nazirite vow must be observed. The details regarding the sacrifices that must be offered when shaving his hair are explained in Halachot 4-5.

As stated in Halachah 9, this applies only to a minor or a woman who took nazirite vows. If the nazirite is an adult male, he may not shave his head, because of the doubt.

According to certain commentaries, this refers to a kosher species of sparrows, according to others to a jay. See the notes of the Living Torah to Leviticus 14:4.

The Ra’avad writes that the Rambam’s statements are correct if he became ritually impure more than seven days before the end of his first year of nazirite observance. If, however, there is less than seven days left before the conclusion of the year, different rules apply, for he will have not fulfilled the seven days required before shaving to emerge from impurity. The Kessef Mishneh takes issue with the Ra’avad’s statements.

Were he to have indeed been a metzora.

And as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 9, the days when a person's status is defined as a metzora are not included as part of the fulfillment of his nazirite vow.

He could not wait only seven days, because it is possible he was not a metzora in which instance, he would not be permitted to shave his hair within the time of his nazirite vow.

Our translation follows the understanding of the Radbaz and others. This understanding is supported by Halachah 5. The standard published text follows a slightly different version.

And until he is ritually pure, the days he observes for his nazirite vow are not of consequence. He may not, however, perform these shavings earlier, because he is not definitely impure or a metzora.

I.e., the first three shavings.

Ordinarily, we are forbidden to benefit from the hair of a naziritc (see Chapter 8, Halachah 2), even if he became impure (Chapter 6, Halachah 14). Nevertheless, as the Rambam states in Chapter 7, Halachah 15, when a nazirite becomes afflicted with tzara’at, the holiness associated with his hair is nullified. Even with regard to the last shaving, his hair is not definitely forbidden, because it is possible that he already fulfilled his obligations with the first shavings (Radbaz).

This all follows the pattern explained in the notes to the previous halachah.

The full order of sacrifices that such a person would be required to bring were he in fact to have contracted ritual impurity and have been afflicted by tzara'at is the following: a) because of tzara'at: on the eighth day of the purification process, he must bring a guilt offering, a sin offering, and a burnt offering; b) because he became impure, he must bring a sin offering, a guilt offering, and a burnt offering; and c) upon completion of his nazirite vow in purity, he brings a burnt offering, a peace offering, and a sin offering.

Because, as will be explained, it is possible to bring a fowl as a sacrifice when there is a doubt involved, but not an animal.

See Hilchot Mechusrai Kapparah 5:10; Hilchot Shegagot 10:13.
A wealthy metzora must bring a ewe as a sin offering, while a poor one may bring two sets of doves or turtledoves. If the rich man retains possession of his property, he will not be able to bring a sin offering, because an animal can never be brought as a sin offering because of doubt (Radbaz).

For all of these are brought because of the doubt involved.

See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 19:10.

Chapter 8, Halachah 1. The Rambam does not mention the wild birds that must be brought as part of the purification process for a metzora, for they were not sacrifices brought within the Temple.

I.e., the sin offering brought after the first shaving.

Because of contact with a corpse alone and not afflicted with tzara'at.

The wild birds brought after the first shaving are not considered sacrifices, because they are not brought within the Temple. According to this possibility, it was not necessary for him to have brought the sin offering at the time of the first shaving. That first shaving cannot, however, serve two purposes as the Rambam explains.

See Halachah 2.

I.e., the lambs.

As required of a nazirite who completes his nazirite vow in purity.

For the burnt offering required when a nazirite completes his vow in purity is a lamb and that required from a nazirite emerging from ritual impurity is a dove or turtle dove.

I.e., for the second shaving, he should make the following stipulation: “If I were only ritually impure because of contact with a corpse, then the first sin offering marked the emergence from ritual impurity and this is the sin offering required at the conclusion of the nazirite vow. If I had contracted tza ‘arat, this is for the sake of purification from that affliction. And If I were neither ritually impure nor had contracted tzara ‘at, this is a freewill· offering.”
For the third shaving, he should stipulate: “If I were both ritually impure and afflicted by tzara ‘at, the second sacrifice marks the purification from tzara ‘at and this marks the emergence from the ritual impurity stemming from a corpse. If I had been afflicted by tzara ‘at, but not ritually impure, this is to complete the obligation of my nazirite vow. If I had not been afflicted by tzara ‘at, this is a freewill offering.”

I.e., a burnt offering, a sin offering, and a peace offering.

For a nazirite who became impure should not bring a lamb as a burnt offering.

We do not say that the burnt offering brought after the second or third shaving was the required offering, because perhaps he had been afflicted with tzara ‘at, in which instance those shavings were necessary to purify him (Kessef Mishneh).

With regard to a sin offering, the Rambam wrote in Halachah 5 that a metzora should not bring his sacrifice until after the second shaving. For this reason, the Ra’avad protests the Rambam’s statements. Nevertheless, as stated with regard to a related issue in Hilchot Ma ‘aseh HaKorbanot 18:9, a distinction can be made between a burnt offering and a sin offering, for the sin offering is the fundamental catalyst for atonement and the burnt offering is merely a present (Kessef Mishneh; Lechem Mishneh).

One of these burnt offerings was obviously a freewill offering, because only one burnt offering is required for the two shavings necessary to mark the purification from tzara ‘at. The other burnt offering is also a freewill offering, because the shaving is required lest he was also impure because of contact with a corpse. Nevertheless, the burnt offering required for such a shaving is not a lamb, but rather a dove or a turtle dove.

As explained above.

The fact that they are being brought much later than the burnt offering is not significant.

Hence they are not required in this complex situation.

See Chapter 6, Halachah 12, with regard to ·a nazirite and Hilchot Mechusrei Kapparah 1 :5 with regard to a metzora. The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the guilt offering is also an absolute requirement for the purification of a nazirite. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam’ s ruling.

The commentaries raise a difficulty with the Rambam’s statement, noting that as explained in Halachah 5, the sin offering for a metzora is brought in association with the second shaving, not the first. The Merkevet HaMishneh states the intent is that the sacrifice is brought because of the question of impurity stemming from contact with a human corpse.

For it is not known whether he was a metzora or not.

For if he does not bring an animal as a sacrifice, the shaving is not acceptable and in violation of his nazirite vow.

After the fourth shaving.

The fact that the remainder of the sacrifices are not brought until a significantly later time, i.e., after the fourth shaving, is not significant.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Halachah 13, a nazirite vow taken by a minor can be binding according to Scriptural Law.

For the prohibition against shaving the comers of the hair and the beard is not incumbent upon them (Hilchat Avodat Kochavim 12:5).

I.e., the first three shavings described above.

As explained above, when a mitzvah is involved in the shaving, we follow the principle: The perfonnance of a positive commandment supercedes the observance of a prohibition. This applies, however, only when we are certain that the observance of a positive commandment is indeed involved.

See Hilchot Tumat Tzara ‘at 11:4.

Shaving and bringing the appropriate sacrifices. The sequence when the shavings are performed and sacrifices are brought is not explicitly mentioned by the Rambam. However, as reflected in the gloss of the Lechem Mishneh, seemingly he may perform the shaving immediately. Since he is definitely afflicted with tzara ‘at, there is no prohibition against his shaving during the tenn of his nazirite vow.

This purifies him from the impurity associated with a human corpse. Unless he performs this act of purification, no sacrifices may be offered on his behalf (Hilchot Bi ‘at HaMikdash 2:12). The fact that he is still ritually impure because of tzara ‘at does not prevent him from purifying himself from the impurity associated with contact with a corpse (Hilchat Parah Adumah 11 :3).

After the completion of all the days of his nazirite vow. He is required to wait this amount of time, because perhaps he never became impure. Thus were he to perform the shaving earlier, he might be shaving in the midst of his nazirite vow.

Any observance of his vow before then is disqualified. Nor can he bring the sacrifices required when emerging from ritual impurity until he first purifies himself from the possibility of having been afflicted with tzara ‘at.

Since it is not certain that he has tzara'at, the shaving does not supercede his nazirite vow and thus he must wait until the observance of his nazirite vow is concluded.

For otherwise, he is ritually impure and may not partake of sacrifices. Our translation reflects an emendation of the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah, based on authoritative manuscripts.

To be purified from the ritual impurity stemming from contact with a human corpse, so that sacrifices may be offered on his behalf, as explained above.

For the reason explained in the following halachah.

I.e., he is required to wait this amount of time as explained in Chapter 6, Halachah 7, but seemingly, he has already waited these days, in the process of his purification from tzara ‘at.

See ch. 13 of Hilchot Nedarim. Halachot 24 and 25 of that chapter focus on the negative dimension of taking vows that involve prohibitions, but Halachah 23 explains that there are situations, i.e., when one feels challenged by his material desires, when taking such vows are praiseworthy. See the incident from Nedarim 9b quoted in the notes to that halachah.

This Hebrew term shares the same letters as the root of the word nazirite.

The translation “endowment evaluation” is used because the source of the word airech means “evaluate.” Nevertheless, the term is not appropriate, because these endowments do not involve an evaluation of the worth of the person (house or field), but instead, a standard figure. It refers to a donation given to the Temple treasury of one’s own free will to be used for improvements within the Temple or the like.

See Hilchot Nedarim 1:2. The Rambam makes this statement to explain why he discusses these mitzvot in Sefer Hafla ‘ah (Kessef Mishneh). They are mentioned last, because unlike the other subjects discussed in this book, they concern donations to the Temple rather than prohibitions one takes upon oneself (Radbaz).

See Hilchot Nedarim 1 :5 with regard to this prohibition.

The Rambam describes this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah, but does not explain it in these halachot, but instead, in Hilchot Ma ‘aseh HaKorbanot (in the introduction to those halachot and in Chapter 14, Halachah 13).

See Hilchot Nedarim 1 :4 with regard to this positive commandment.

See Leviticus, ch. 27. Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 114) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 350) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

I.e., the age of the person mentioned. The age of the donor is not significant.

Until an infant reaches his thirty-first day, we are concerned that he will not survive. See also Hilchot Bikkurim 11:17. Note, however, the contrast to Halachah 9.

For the Torah makes no mention of the construct of arachim with regard to utsensils.

I.e., he reached his sixth birthday.

A shekel is eight oz. of silver in contemporary measure.

With regard to the censuses taken in the desert, the person’s age at the beginning of the year was important. In this context, by contrast, the · reckoning is made for every person individually.

A coin widely used in the Second Temple era. It was somewhat larger than a shekel, weighing 384 barley corns of silver.

Hilchot Shekalim 1 :2.

A person whose genital area is covered by flesh and thus it is impossible to determine his gender.

A person with both male and female genital organs. See Hilchot Nezirut 2:11 for a detailed description of such a person's halachic status. See also Hilchot Ishut 2:24.

If, however, a tumtum or androgynus pledges the airech of a man or a woman, the pledge is binding (Arachin 2a). If an operation is performed on a tumtum and it is revealed that he is a niale or female, an airech may be given accordingly.

Arachin 5b derives this from Leviticus 27:2 which introduces this mitzvah with the phrase: “Speak to the children of Israel,” thus excluding gentiles from pledging endowment valuations. Nevertheless, the verse includes the word ish, “man,” seemingly unnecessarily, indicating that a pledge can be made concerning a gentile. This is the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Y ehudah derives the opposite concepts from the same verse.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that the halachah follows Rabbi Yehudah. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh support the Rambam’s ruling, citing Ezra 4:3 which states that the gentiles do not have a portion in building the Temple, the intent for which endowment valuations are given. See also Halachah 11.

Who are not liable in the observance of the mitzvot themselves, because they are not in control of their intellectual faculties.

This applies even to a Canaanite servant, not only a Jewish servant (Arachin 2a).

For, otherwise, all of his financial resources are acquired by his master.

Note the contrast to the following halachah.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 2.

The person’s age is of no consequence whatsoever.

An airech may not be pledged for these individuals (Halachot 3 and 5).

See Halachah 11.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 19.

The Rambam (and his sources) are borrowing the wording of II Kings 12:6.

I.e., for matters that are for the communal benefit (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Arachin I :2).

For it becomes consecrated and it is forbidden to benefit from it. See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 8:8; Hilchot Meilah 5:15.

Who is taking his last breaths, as stated in the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Arachin 1:3, Rav Kappach’s translation). Compare to Hilchot Gerushin 6:28.

Nor is an airech he takes binding (Arachin 6b). Note the contrast to the following halachah and note the gloss of the Radbaz.

Note, however, Hilchot Evel 4:5.

Since the Torah has condemned such a person to death, the matter is not dependent on the will of mortals. If, by contrast, one is condemned to death by a mortal king, these laws do not apply, because it is possible that the king will retract his decree (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.). Compare to Hilchot Gerushin 6:29.

Our translation follows the commentary of Rashi and others.

Even against the will of the heirs, for a binding obligation has been created on the · estate. Just as an estate is liable for the loans taken by the testator when supported by a legal document, so too, it is liable for the obligations established by Torah Law (the Rambam’ s Commentary to the Mishnah, Arachin 1 :3).

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Arachin 1:1), the Rambam explains that since these individuals are not liable for the redemption of the firstborn, one might think that they are not liable in this context as well. Hence, it is necessary to emphasize that they are.

As explained in Hilchot Nedarim 11:1-3, when a twelve year old boy and an eleven year old girl are aware of the significance of their vows, their vows are binding according to Scriptural Law. Below this age, their vows are not binding.

When he comes of age and has money of his own.

See Hilchot Nedarim 2:2. Since Leviticus 27:2 uses the term vow when speaking of these pledges, they are bound by the laws applying to other vows.

See Hilchot Nedarim 4:5,7.

The person making the pledge.

See Chapter 3, Halachot 2-3, which state that the minimum amount of an airech is a sela. The Lechem Mishneh rules that a sela must be given for each individual whose airech he pledged.

I.e., the airech specified by the Torah.

For arechim are vows and one vow can take effect upon another (Radbaz).

We assume that his obligation was for the smallest amount possible.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 2.

I.e., the obligation takes effect only when he appears before the priest for appraisal (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Arachin 5:3). Since he did not do that, his heirs are under no obligation (Radbaz). The Ra’avad, however, differs with the Rambam and maintains that as soon as a person pledges an airech, he is liable for it and an obligation is created for his estate. Hence, he differs with the Rambam’s ruling.
Apparently, the Rambam is saying that if a person pledges an airech, he must appear before a priest and state his age, so that the priest will establish his appraisal. The Merkevat HaMishneh notes that the literal meaning of the verse is that if a person is too poor to pay the airech, the priests will evaluate how much he can pay.

For once an airech is established, a binding obligation is incurred and his estate is required to pay.

Until an appraisal is established by the courts, the obligation is not defined. Hence, when he dies, all liability is removed from the estate because a deceased person has no worth (Arachin 20a).

According to early printings and authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. This clause should be part of the previous halachah and the present halachah begins: “Similarly, when a person says: ‘I pledge.... ‘”

This is a direct extension of the concepts stated in Halachah 21.

As the Rambam emphasizes in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Arachin 5:2), there is a difference in this regard between the pledge of an airech and the pledge of a person’s worth. When his airech is pledged, the person who made the pledge is liable as soon as he stands before the court for appraisal. Since the matter is dependent on his age alone, there is no need for an evaluation. When, by contrast, a person’s worth is pledged, that worth must be evaluated and until the evaluation is completed, there is no obligation.