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In the Talmud, by contrast, the terms bateil and pasul do not have these specific meanings. There are times when pasul is used to connote a get that is unacceptable according to Scriptural Law, and bateil to refer to a get that is unacceptable according to Rabbinic Law (Maggid Mishneh). (See also the responsum of the Rambam quoted by the Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on Chapter 8, Halachah 4.)

The Ra’avad differs and maintains that the priest should be forbidden to remain married to a woman he divorced with such a get, lest the impression be created that the prohibition against a priest’s marrying a divorcee can be waived. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 150:3), however, accepts the Rambam’s ruling.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 5.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam considers the proof-text that he quotes as an asmachta — i.e., a support from the Torah cited by the Rabbis to uphold their decree. The Maggid Mishneh himself differs, noting that Gittin 82a appears to indicate that the prohibition is of Scriptural origin.
Kin’at Eliyahu explains that the Rambam’s conception can be resolved based on his statements in Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 2), that any law that is not explicitly stated in the Torah, but rather derived through the Thirteen Principles of Biblical exegesis, is considered to be Rabbinic in origin (midivrei soferim). This classification does not, however, in any way diminish the status of this practice, and it is as though it were explicitly stated in the Torah. (See the commentaries on Hilchot Ishut 1:2.) Similarly, in this instance the prohibition is not explicit in the Torah, but rather derived through exegesis. Thus, it has the status of Scriptural Law, but is considered to be Rabbinic in origin.
It must be emphasized that just as the woman is prohibited from remarrying a priest if divorced, she is also prohibited from remaining married to her husband, if he is a priest [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 150:3)].

I.e., according to Scriptural Law, the divorce is binding. Our Sages, however, disqualified the divorce and forbade the woman from remarrying until a get is given that presents no halachic difficulties.

Similarly, if her first husband is a priest, he may no longer become impure while caring for her burial (Hilchot Eivel 2:13).

Since her divorce is effective according to Scriptural Law, our Sages did not abrogate her second marriage.

I.e., in these instances, our Sages were unsure whether or not the get is valid according to Scriptural Law. Because of the doubt, the woman is not allowed to engage in marital relations with anyone other than her first husband until an acceptable get is given. The first husband can no longer annul her vows, nor does he have the right to inherit her property if she dies in his lifetime.

The Rambam’s intent is somewhat questionable. The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mish- neh explain that even in this situation, the husband must consecrate his wife a second time.

For the marriage blessings should not be recited if there is a doubt whether they are necessary. Even with regard to a get that was disqualified by Rabbinic Law, since the woman should not remarry, the blessings should not be recited (Maggid Mishneh).

The marriage contract states: ‘‘When you [may] marry another person, you may collect the sum mentioned within.’’ Since such a woman is not fit to remarry, and she could not collect the money due her by virtue of her original marriage contract, that contract remains in effect (Maggid Mishneh).

Although her second marriage is void, and thus, according to Scriptural Law there is no need for a get, our Sages established such a requirement because of the impression that might be created.

When a woman commits adultery, she is forbidden to engage in marital relations both with her husband and with the adulterer (even after being divorced from her husband). In this instance, the woman’s second marriage is an adulterous relationship. Therefore, she may not remain married to either of her husbands.

I.e., the abovementioned prohibition stems from Scriptural Law. It applies, however, only when the prohibition against adultery was willfully violated. Nevertheless, even when adultery was committed unwittingly, the woman is forbidden to both husbands: to her second husband, because her marriage to her first husband has not been terminated, and to her first husband, because of the Rabbinical decree mentioned by the Rambam.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut 4:9, a deaf-mute’s mental capacity is considered insufficient for him to establish a marriage bond. Nevertheless, our Sages ordained that if a deaf-mute man or woman enters into a marriage relationship, that relationship is binding according to Rabbinic Law, regardless of whether the mate is also a deaf-mute or is fully mentally competent.
Since a deaf-mute’s marriage is not effective according to Scriptural Law, there is room to suppose that the woman should be allowed to remarry her first husband, for the difference between a deaf-mute’s marriage and an ordinary marriage is obvious. And conversely, one might assume that since a deaf-mute is not held responsible for his actions, if a woman’s second husband were a deaf-mute, they would be allowed to remain married. For these reasons, it is necessary to state that the stringencies apply in these instances as well.

Since the woman did not enter into forbidden marital relations, there is no reason to penalize her (Yevamot 89a).

The second husband is not entitled to the article, because he is not truly her husband. The first husband is not entitled to it because our Sages granted a husband rights to ownerless articles his wife discovers to prevent friction from arising in the home, and in this instance, since he is required to divorce her, there is no need to prevent friction (Yevamot 90b).

A husband is granted the profits from his wife’s work in return for providing for her sustenance. Since neither of the husbands is required to provide for her, neither is entitled to this benefit (ibid.).

The Torah granted a husband the right to annul his wife’s vows so that she will remain attractive to him. In this instance, the husband should not be attracted to the wife (ibid.).

Our Sages explained that the woman should have been entitled to be recompensed for these benefits. Nevertheless, they were withheld from her as a penalty for her actions. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:56) does rule that the benefits that her second husband received after her first husband returned (or after the get was discovered void) should be returned to her.

Our Sages instituted the requirement of a marriage contract so that a husband would be deterred by the financial burden he would have to bear, and would not consider divorce a light matter. In this instance, however, our Sages desire the divorce. Therefore, they did not impose a financial burden (Yevamot 89a).

It is only when a woman is entitled to the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract that the stipulations apply (ibid.).

I.e., she is judged as a woman who was divorced because of adultery, who is penalized, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 24:10. She is, however, entitled to take all her property that remains intact [Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.)].

Property for which the husband takes financial responsibility (Hilchot Ishut 16:1).

For when she received the funds, they were not aware of the prohibition (Jerusalem Talmud, Yevamot 10:1).

As reflected in the following halachot, based on Yevamot 94b, it appears that only when the woman has been merely consecrated is a get required from the second husband. For it is possible for an onlooker to think that perhaps the first kiddushin were given conditionally, and the marriage to the second brother is binding. Lest a misconception arise and one think that a married woman can be released without a get, the second husband is required to give a get.
If she was married to — not merely consecrated by — her first husband, a get is not required from the second husband, because when his brother returns, everyone will realize that his marriage to his brother’s wife is not binding. Rabbenu Asher makes a further distinction and states that when the woman was married to — not merely consecrated by — the first brother, she and her first husband may continue living together as man and wife, despite the fact that she erred and performed the rite of yibbum. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 159:4) follows the Rambam’s ruling, while the Rama follows that of Rabbenu Asher.

It is forbidden to marry two sisters in each other’s lifetime. Once a man’s wife dies, however, he may marry her sister. (See also Hilchot Yibbum 3:11.)

The intent is the Hebrew term arayot, a word with a specific meaning. As explained in Hilchot Ishut 1:5, this refers to a woman with whom sexual relations are forbidden and punishable by karet.

E. g., one was unaware of the family connection.

For, as mentioned, a marriage bond cannot be established with one of the arayot.

The wording used by the Rambam here is somewhat confusing. For the scribe should give the get to the husband, who should give it to his wife. The intent appears to be, as in Gittin 80a, that the scribe gave the man the receipt and the woman the get, and they exchanged them. Thus, the woman was never given the get by her husband.

Indeed, we do not even require that, as a safeguard, the first husband give her the get while she is married to her second husband (Beit Shmuel 151:2).
The Beit Shmuel also states that this law applies even if the woman was merely consecrated by the second husband, but their marriage had not been consummated.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Gittin 8:7), the Rambam explains that the husband is acting out of spite, seeking to prevent his divorcee from remarrying. Rashi (Gittin 80a) offers a different rationale.

See Hilchot Ishut 24:16.

This represents the Rambam’s interpretation of Gittin 45b, 46b. Other halachic authorities view this situation slightly differently. The various views are listed in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 10:3).

I.e., it is as if he gave her the get on the condition that she remain unchaste, and, because of her repentance, that condition was not fulfilled. Most authorities maintain that since this condition was not actually stated, such a complaint would not be heeded by the court. Nevertheless, since the matter might become a subject for gossip, her first husband is bound by these restrictions (Tosafot, Gittin 46a). From one of the Rambam’s responsa, however, it appears that he maintains that the get would actually be void in such an instance.

If, however, she was consecrated by another man, even if she was divorced before their marriage was consummated, she may not remarry her first husband and must be divorced by him if they do remarry, as stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 12.

A woman who lacks female physical characteristics. She is unable to bear children.

See Hilchot Ishut 25:8-9.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 5. If, however, a person brings a get from one place in Eretz Yisrael to another, the permission granted to the woman to remarry does not depend on his statements. Therefore, he is permitted to marry her (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 12:1).

See Chapter 12, Halachah 15.

I.e., a woman took a vow that caused her to be forbidden to derive benefit from her husband, in which case he is required to divorce her. She asked a sage to annul the vow, but he could not find a halachic basis to do so (Yevamot 25b).

For this would substantiate the initial rumor and make the couple a subject of gossip (Yevamot 24b). On this basis, there are authorities who rule that if the rumor is substantiated — e.g., a couple are openly living together, or were married in a secular court — the woman should be encouraged to convert, and they should be married according to Jewish law.
Indeed, we find a responsum of the Rambam himself regarding a man who had an attractive female servant and it was rumored that they had spent time together in private. The Rambam advises that the man be compelled to free the servant and either marry her or send her away. He acknowledges that doing so would violate the Rabbinic decree mentioned in this halachah, but states that because of the permissive state of morals prevalent in his society, there is no alternative.

From Yevamot (loc. cit.), it would appear that the reason for this restriction is that people should not say that the man converted in order to marry. This is undesirable. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 13:14.) With regard to this prohibition as well, it has become customary in the present time to show leniency.

There are opinions that state that if the woman has merely been consecrated, but the marriage bond has not been consummated, the couple should be forced to separate. (See Maggid Mishneh; Beit Shmuel 12:2). There are other opinions, however, that maintain that the consecration is equivalent to the consummation of the marriage. Rav David Arameah cites Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:31 as an indication that the Rambam follows the latter view.

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as maintaining that a witness who brought a get and said ‘‘It was written and signed in my presence,’’ should be forced to divorce the woman if he marries her. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 12:1) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. See Chelkat Mechokek 12:1.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 12:4) writes that if the man’s wife was sick at the time that the woman became eligible for marriage, the prohibition remains in effect. For it possible that he was waiting for her to die.
The Chelkat Mechokek 12:2 extends this stringency to include a man and wife whose marriage was known to be plagued by strife. Even if the divorce came at the woman’s initiative, it is possible that the man expected it and had planned another alternative.

It is unlikely that two individuals will sin so that one may benefit (Jerusalem Talmud, Yevamot 2:12). The Hagahot Maimoniot, nevertheless, state that ‘‘a master of his soul’’ should avoid such a marriage.

Lest the woman later regret her decision (Yevamot 109b).

If the woman has remarried and divorced, however, the presumption stated does not apply, for it is forbidden for her first husband to remarry her (Beit Shmuel 149:2).

Although this would make it appear more likely that the man was relating to her as a prostitute and not as a wife, it is not sufficient cause for us to negate our presumption (Gittin 73b).

The Beit Shmuel 149:3 interprets this to mean that if another person consecrates her afterwards, we consider it as if he had consecrated a married woman, and he is not required to divorce her.

It is not sufficient for one to have observed them in private at one time, and the other at a different time, for the two witnesses who observe the consecration of a woman must be together at that time.

Hilchot Ishut 3:5.

The previous halachah dealt with an instance in which relations were observed; hence, no distinction was made whether the couple was divorced before or after their first marriage was consummated. In this instance, they merely entered into privacy together. If, however, we know for a fact that a couple shared familiarity before the marriage bond was completed, a second get is required (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 149:2).

A son borne by a maidservant is not considered to have any connection to his father. These authorities, however, suspect that the woman was freed and then married, and that the child thus shares a connection with his father. According to this opinion, chalitzah is, nevertheless, required.

For until the maidservant is freed, she cannot be married.

These authorities do not even require chalitzah.

See Hilchot Ishut 7:23.

The Radbaz and others state that if the witnesses know that the woman is in the niddah state, we do not assume that the couple entered into relations for the sake of marriage. If they are prepared to violate the prohibition of niddah, we assume that they will have no hesitation to conduct relations outside marriage. [Some modern authorities consider taking this concept even further. Although a man and a woman claim that their intent is ‘‘marriage,’’ if they violate the laws of niddah, their conception of marriage is not kedat Moshe viYisrael, ‘‘according to the faith of Moses and Israel,’’ and Torah law does not require a divorce. See the responsum of the Rivash cited below.]

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam on this matter and maintains that if a man is in general known to be moral and observant, we assume that he will not enter into sexual relations with a licentious intent. This applies even if he entered into relations with a maidservant. If, however, the man has a reputation for wanton behavior, this assumption is not applied. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 149:5) follows the Rambam’s view.
In the law that follows, the Shulchan Aruch explains that if a Jewish man and woman marry according to gentile law, we do not consider them to be man and wife according to Torah law. This ruling is based on a ruling of the Rivash (Responsum 6), which explains that a Jewish marriage must be ‘‘according to the faith of Moses and Israel,’’ and a couple who marry according to gentile law, regardless of their desire to live together, are not establishing their union on this foundation.

See Hilchot Nachalot 4:6.

In this instance, the Ra’avad accepts the Rambam’s ruling, for it is impossible for a man to compel a woman to convert.

Thus, if her husband was a priest (who may not marry a divorced woman), he may remain married to her. We do not suspect that he divorced her and remarried her. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 17:20.)

See Hilchot Ishut 9:22.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and interprets Gittin 88b, the source for this halachah, as referring to an instance where there is one rumor that says that the woman was consecrated and then divorced. Although Rashi and others interpret the passage as the Rambam does, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 46:7) appears to merge both views into a single understanding.

If the man informs a woman that he intends to divorce her, he may marry her for a brief amount of time (Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:28; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 119:1).

He did not intend to divorce her originally, made this decision after they married, but lives together with her as husband and wife with the thought of divorcing her in the future.

Children conceived during this time will have severely tainted personalities, as stated in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:12.

There is somewhat of a difficulty with the Rambam’s ruling. The opinion he cites is that of the School of Shammai, as mentioned at the conclusion of the tractate of Gittin. The School of Hillel differs and maintains that if a woman wrongs her husband, even with regard to as insignificant a matter as burning his meal, he may divorce her. Rabbi Akiva goes even further and maintains that even if a person finds a more attractive woman, he may divorce his wife.
Most authorities agree that in this, as in most other instances, the halachah follows the School of Hillel. Why then does the Rambam (and the Shulchan Aruch [Even HaEzer 119:3]) follow the opinion of the School of Shammai?
Among the resolutions offered is that the difference of opinion between the Schools of Shammai and Hillel applies only with regard to a second marriage. With regard to a first marriage, by contrast, even the School of Hillel accepts the School of Shammai’s stringency (Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer 119).
Note also the statements of the Rama, who rules that the prohibition applied only during the Talmudic era, when a woman could be divorced against her will. In the present era, when a woman must willingly accept a divorce, this prohibition does not apply.

See Gittin 90b, which states that whenever a man divorces his first wife, the altar itself cries.
On the surface, the wording used by the Rambam is problematic. First he says that it is forbidden to divorce one’s first wife, and then he states that one should not hurry, implying that one may, but that it is ethical not to be impulsive about the matter. The Chelkat Mechokek 119:2 offers two resolutions:
a) The prohibition exists only when, as was possible in the Talmudic era, the husband is divorcing his first wife against her will. If she is willing to accept the divorce, there is no prohibition; one should, however, proceed without haste.
b) Even when one hears about improper sexual conduct, one should not be hasty about the matter. Instead, the incident should be investigated carefully to determine if in fact any wrongdoing occurred.

Although divorce is undesirable, an unhealthy marriage is even more undesirable, and a marriage should be terminated if there are severe ill feelings between a couple.

The implication is both that she is continually contending with her husband and that she is immodest. In such an instance, it is a mitzvah to divorce her, even if she is a man’s first bride (Chelkat Mechokek 119:4).

See Hilchot Ishut 24:12.

This refers to a situation in which a woman married while fully capable and became a deaf-mute while married. Since a deaf-mute is considered to be mentally incapable, such a person is unable to establish a marriage bond that is binding according to Scriptural Law. Our Rabbis made certain provisions for the marriage of such individuals, as explained in Hilchot Ishut 4:9. In this instance, however, since the woman was not a deaf-mute at the time of marriage, the marriage is binding according to Scriptural Law.
The law teaches us that since according to Scriptural and Talmudic Law, a woman can be divorced against her will, the fact that the woman is mentally incapable does not prevent her husband from divorcing her. Since a woman who is a deaf-mute is not totally incapable of caring for herself, our Sages did not make provisions for her, as they did for a woman who becomes mentally unsound.

This also refers to a situation in which the woman lost control of her faculties after marriage. If, however, she was mentally unstable at the outset, any marriage that she enters into is not binding at all (Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.).

He must, however, put at the woman’s disposal the money due her by virtue of her marriage contract and the money due from her dowry (Chelkat Mechokek 119:9).

This ruling does not apply in the Ashkenazic community, nor in other places where the custom is to follow the ban of Rabbenu Gershom not to divorce one’s wife against her will. In these communities, the husband is required to provide for his wife’s sustenance and garments from his own resources. The rationale is that since he is not able to divorce her — for she is not capable of consenting to the divorce — he remains liable to bear the financial burden of supporting her (Chelkat Mechokek 119:9).
The husband is not, however, obligated to give her conjugal rights. The Bayit Chadash (Even HaEzer 119) and the Chelkat Mechokek 119:12 state that in such a situation, the husband may be granted license to marry a second wife by 100 rabbis.

Even according to the law in Talmudic times, many differ with the Rambam’s thesis and maintain that the husband is obligated for his wife’s medical expenses.
The Ra’avad protests that in many instances, a person with mental disorders can be rehabilitated, and he maintains that the husband should be required to pay for such treatment.
The Beit Shmuel 119:11 states that even the Rambam would agree to such an obligation.
In the Ashkenazic community today, just as a husband is required to supply his wife with her sustenance in such a situation, he is also held liable for all her medical expenses (Rama, Even HaEzer 119:6; Chelkat Mechokek 119:12).

As the Ra’avad mentions, in an instance when a woman has lost mental competence to the extent that she cannot safeguard the get she was given, all authorities agree that the divorce is not binding. Even when she has that degree of mental competence, there are many authorities that maintain that the divorce is not effective. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 119:6) quotes the Rambam’s view, as interpreted by the Ra’avad. The Rama follows the more stringent views.

I.e., even though a father has the right to consecrate his daughter before she reaches majority and arrange for her marriage, ‘‘it is not proper for him to act in this manner.’’ Instead, our Sages enjoined that a person should not consecrate his daughter while she is a minor until she matures and says, ‘‘I would like [to marry] so and so’’.

Our Sages ordained that an orphan girl below the age of majority could be married, so that someone would care for her and protect her. With regard to such a marriage, theRambam writes in Hilchot Ishut 4:8: ‘‘The consecration is not absolutely binding according to Scriptural Law; it is merely a Rabbinic institution. [According to Scriptural Law, the outcome] is tentative. If she continues living with her husband until she reaches the age of majority, the kiddushin are finalized, and she becomes a married woman in the complete sense of the term. There is no need for [her husband] to consecrate her again after she attains majority. If she does not want [to continue] living with him, she must perform mmi’un; she then leaves [the relationship] without a divorce.’’

In which instance, the marriage is binding according to Scriptural Law and cannot beannulled through mi’un.

Once a girl is married, her father no longer has any authority over her, even though he is alive (Hilchot Ishut 3:12).

In the instance of a minor, her right to annul the marriage lasts only until she reaches majority. With regard to a deaf-mute, by contrast, there would be no limit to this privilege. This would be regarded unfavorably by a husband (Yevamot 113a).

I.e., if her husband dies without children and she does not desire to marry the yavam, she can dissolve the marriage.

Although a girl has the right to marry and dissolve her marriage as often as she desires, our Rabbis did not approve of such conduct and counseled that the Jewish court should arrange a marriage of a minor only when it does not appear likely that she will seek to dissolve the marriage (Hagahot Maimoniot).

I.e., when she becomes twelve years old and manifests physical signs of maturity, as explained in Hilchot Ishut 2:3.

A woman who does not manifest any female physical characteristics. If she shows clear signs of such a condition, she is placed in this category at age 20. If she does not show such signs, but also does not manifest signs of female physical maturity, she is not placed into this category until age 35 (ibid.:4).

That a girl can annul her marriage despite the fact that she has passed the age of twelve, when she has not manifested female physical characteristics.

Hilchot Ishut 1:2.

I.e., our ordinary assumption is that a woman has manifested signs of maturity. Therefore, if a woman wants to annul the marriage after she reaches the age of twelve, she must undergo a physical inspection to show that she has not manifested signs of physical maturity. If no signs are discovered and she has not engaged in relations with her husband after reaching the age of twelve, she may exercise the right of mi’un.

In which no signs of physical maturity were discovered.

Since no signs of physical maturity were discovered, it is possible that the girl is still aminor and that the annulment of her first marriage— and thus her subsequent consecration— is acceptable. But it is also possible that, as mentioned in the previous halachah, pubic hairs grew and fell off, and that through engaging in marital relations she had been consecrated by her first husband. Because of the doubt involved, she must be divorced by both men.

Since it is possible that her first marriage is binding, the legitimacy of a child fathered by her second husband is in doubt. And conversely, since it is possible that the marriage to her second husband is binding, there are also doubts concerning the legitimacy of a child fathered afterwards by the first husband.

I.e., even if she had not yet been divorced by her first husband. Since the second man’s consecration has the power of Scriptural Law, it takes priority.

Which is forbidden, as stated in Halachah 12.

The resemblance is that the woman married a second husband before her marriage with the first was severed.

Because her marriage to her first husband is not binding according to Scriptural Law.

For her second marriage is binding according to Scriptural Law.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 155:2) quotes opinions that maintain that the above applies only when the girl’s marriage was arranged by her brother or her mother. If she arranged themarriage herself, it is not binding, even according to Rabbinic Law. The Ra’avad mentions third opinion, which states that for a girl between the ages of six and ten, the marriage must be arranged by her family to be binding. After the age of ten, it is binding even if she arranged it herself.

Our translation is based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Yevamot 13:2), which explains that this refers to an instance in which a girl’s family members prepared her for marriage without informing her who her groom would be.

Rabbenu Chanan’el and other authorities maintain that, a priori, three individuals should be present. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 155:4) mentions this opinion, the Rambam’s view appears to be favored.

I.e., a deed of mi’un is merely a legal record. The act of mi’un— i.e., the girl’s statement that she no longer desires to live with her husband— is what nullifies their marriage. In contrast, it is the transfer of the get, the bill of divorce, that causes the divorce to take effect.

Yevamot 107b-108a relates that originally, the Sages would have a legal record of mi’un written using wording that somewhat resembled a bill of divorce. They saw, however, that this created the impression that the husband was forbidden to marry the girl’s close relatives. Since this is not the case, as mentioned in Halachah 16, they altered the wording used for the legal record.

Our additions are made on the basis of the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 155:8). We assume that the other witnesses were aware of the law and would have objected to the girl’smaking such statements if they did not know her identity and that of her husband. (See parallel in Hilchot Yibbum VaChalitzah 4:29. Note, however, the Beit Shmuel 155:11 whodiffers.)

I.e., from the creation or from the beginning of Alexander the Great’s rule, as stated inChapter 1, Halachah 27.

I.e., she was checked by women on whom the court can rely, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 2:20.

Needless to say, the Rambam is not speaking about an instance in which the woman is still married to her second husband. That would be adultery, a sin punishable by execution. Rather, this applies even if the first husband remarries his wife after she is divorced by hersecond husband.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 356) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 580)count this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.

Note the Kessef Mishneh, which cites an apparent contradiction between the Rambam’statements here and those in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 1:22 and Hilchot Sanhedrin, Chapter 19, from which it would appear that a man is not punished by lashes for engaging in relationswith his wife in such a situation.

But not a priest. (See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 18:27.)

Or who engaged in adulterous relations unwittingly. (See Hilchot Ishut 24:19.)

I.e., a sotah.

Stripes for rebellious conduct is the punishment given for the violation of a Rabbinic injunction. It refers to a form of corporal punishment that was usually less severe than lashes.

Chapter 2, Halachah 17.

Since the marriage to the deaf-mute is not binding according to Scriptural Law, it is as if she had never married a second husband. Based on a difference in the version of the Jerusalem Talmud (Yevamot 14:1) that was available to him, the Ra’avad differs with theRambam’s ruling.

Divorce nullifies a marriage from the time of divorce onward. Mi’un, by contrast, voids the marriage entirely, causing it to be considered as if it had never taken place.

The mi’un that terminated the second marriage reveals that the first marriage was nonbinding according to Scriptural Law, and that a get was not actually required. (See Rashi,Yevamot 108a.)

Yevamot 108b explains that she is not permitted to remarry her first husband because we are afraid that he will change his mind and influence her to nullify her marriage to hersecond husband via mi’un. We suspect that she will be able to be influenced by him, because she still is attracted to him— for it was he who divorced her, not she who nullified themarriage through mi’un. In the first instance, we do not harbor such suspicions, for it was she who rejected her first husband, nullifying the marriage through mi’un.

The Rashba and the Ramban differ, and maintain that the woman is forbidden to the other relatives of the deceased, with the exception of his brothers. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 155:11) mentions both opinions, but favors that of the Rambam.

She may, however, become engaged to be married during this time, provided she does not enter into privacy with her fiance (Rama, Even HaEzer 13:1).

The laws governing forbidden marital relationships revolve around paternal relation-ships, as do the laws of yibbum. For these reasons, it is very important to determine who infact is the father of a child.

And thus it is impossible that he be the father of the woman’s child. (See Chapter 3, Halachah 5; Chapter 8, Halachah 2.)
The Rama (Even HaEzer 13:1) differs and quotes Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that the counting should begin from the day the get reached the woman for whom it was intended.

Yevamot 42b explains that this decree was applied universally lest people begin to search for loopholes.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 13:5) interpret this to be referring to a woman who was married as a non-Jew, and not one who was unmarried. Note the Radbaz (Vol. I, Responsa 196), who differs and maintains that this applies evento an unmarried gentile woman.

A female captive who is taken as a wife by her captor, as described in Deuteronomy 21:11 and Hilchot Melachim, Chapter 8.

This refers to the second time the captor has relations with her. It is possible for a child to be conceived during their first sexual encounter, in which instance the child also has the status of a convert.

If, however, the woman was old enough to conceive a child while married to the man with whom relations are forbidden, she is required to wait. For it is necessary to discern if a child was conceived in the forbidden relationship or not.

The Ra’avad states that the intent of the ban of ostracism should be to compel the manto divorce his wife. (See the Rama, Even HaEzer 13:10, who quotes this opinion.)

The Rama (loc. cit.) states that he is advised to flee.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 13:11) mentions that leniency is often shown in instances where a pregnant woman would be likely to engage in sexual relations with the father of the child or with other men during this interim period, with the hope that marriage will prevent her from unchaste conduct.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 13:11) states that in a leap year, the extra month should be counted as one of the 24. The Rama, however, states that, a priori, in such a situation, an additional month should be added to the restriction. (Note Beit Shmuel 13:22.)

Rashi (Ketubot 60b) states that the restriction is upheld lest women be encouraged totake these options rather than continue nursing their children.
If, however, the woman gave her child to a nursemaid in her first husband’s lifetime or is physically incapable of nursing, there are no restrictions against her remarrying (ShulchanAruch, Even HaEzer 13:11).

The Ra’avad states that he is placed under a ban of ostracism until he divorces her. This ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 13:12).

Who may not remarry his divorcee.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 13:12) is more stringent and equates consecration with marriage.

She is not contradicting her original statements, but rather adding information, and that information serves as the basis for changing her status. This ruling applies even if she makes her second statement after a significant time has passed since she made her first statement(Maggid Mishneh). Rav Moshe HaCohen objects, maintaining that her second statement must be made directly after her first statement. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer152:6) quotes both opinions, it appears that the Rambam’s opinion is favored.

I.e., we do not know for certain that she has been married, but she and her husband have lived together as man and wife.

Instead, she is considered to be married to her husband until she brings proof to the contrary. If she remarries, she is forced to leave her second husband (Maggid Mishneh; Shul-chan Aruch, Even HaEzer 152:7). There is a difference of opinion among the authorities regarding whether her second husband is required to give her a formal divorce. (See Beit Shmuel 152:12.)

I.e., should her present husband die, she would not be allowed to marry a priest. (SeeHalachah 3.)

I.e., we do not accept her statements entirely, and therefore require her to undergo chalitzah. Nevertheless, because there is a possibility that her statements are true, we do not allow her to undergo yibbum, for if she had in fact been divorced, relations with her late husband’s brother would be forbidden.

Chapter 7, Halachah 24. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, the Ra’avad differswith the Rambam concerning this issue. Both opinions are quoted by the Shulchan Aruch(Even HaEzer 142:13-14), but later (loc. cit. 152:9), the Shulchan Aruch mentions only theRambam’s view.

I.e., these two phrases are part of a single claim. This translation is based on manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah that state um’zuyaf, ‘‘And it is a forgery.’’ The standard printed version omits the first vav leading to the conclusion that the Rambam is speak-ing about two claims. This conception is also reflected in the statement of the law in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 152:10).

See Chapter 7, Halachah 2.

See Halachah 1.

I.e., although we do not accept her statements, we require her to abide by all the stringencies they imply.

There are several qualifications to this principle: First, the woman must make this state-ment in the presence of her husband. If he is not present, we fear that she will speak brazenly(Hilchot Ishut 4:13). And, as implied by Halachot 6 and 14 of this chapter, if there is one witness who supports the woman’s statements, her word is not accepted. We fear that the support the witness gives her will encourage her to lie. Similarly, as reflected in the following halachah, if her husband supports her, her word is not accepted.
In Hilchot Ishut (loc. cit.), the Ra’avad states that the woman’s word should be accepted only insofar as to require her to receive a get if she remarries. She is not given license toremarry, nor may she collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah from her first husband unless she proves that she has been divorced. The Rama (Even HaEzer 17:2) quotes both views. He states, however, that in the present age, since brazen behavior is more common, the presumption upon which the Rambam’s ruling rests is no longer a viable support.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 3.

I.e., that she will remarry and then he will prove that her second marriage is adulterous, in which case she will be bound by all the stringencies stated in Chapter 10, Halachot 4 and 7.

The testimony of the witnesses is to the effect that the divorce was not carried out in an adequate manner.

This assumption has sufficient legal power to counterbalance the prevailing assumption that the woman is still married. (See Beit Shmuel 152:5.)

If they do not all live in such proximity, there is no question, and a priori, she is given permission to remarry (Beit Shmuel 152:6).

We assume that if in fact she had been divorced, the matter would have attracted the attention of all those dwelling in the courtyard.

I.e., both witnesses say that she was married and only one says that she was divorced. Note the contrast to the parallel situation with regard to kiddushin as mentioned in Hilchot Ishut 9:31.

See Halachah 3. In this respect, there is no difference between the woman’s agent and herself.

The Rambam’s ruling applies even when the husband, the wife and the agent are all in thesame city. Even though one might think that in such an instance, if the husband’s intent was to divorce his wife, he would have given the get to her directly and not to an agent, the agent’sword is accepted.
There is another opinion in Gittin 64a, which maintains that in the same city, the agent’sword is not accepted, and several Rishonim follow this view. Both opinions are mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:55), but the Rambam’s opinion appears to be favored. The Rama states that the agent’s word is accepted only while he is in possession of the get.

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) appears to favor an opinion that accepts the woman’s corroboration of the agent’s statement, even when she is not in possession of the get.

I.e., even though the agent is no longer in possession of the get, his word is accepted. Since the woman has the potential to return it to him, it is considered as if it is still in his possession (Beit Shmuel 141:83).

When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:56) states that it applies when there are no witnesses who saw the get in the woman’s possession.

This halachah is speaking about an agent who acts on behalf of the husband, giving theget to his wife.

On one hand, there is a legal principle: ‘‘One can assume that an agent has carried outhis mission.’’ Our Sages, however, maintain that this construct should be accepted only with regard to the stringencies it implies (Gittin 64b). As such, with regard to marrying intothe priesthood and the like, the woman is considered as if she has been divorced. Nevertheless, she is not given permission to remarry unless she has the signatures of the witnesses to the get verified, or if the witnesses to its transfer testify to that effect.

See Chapter 9, Halachah 32 and the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh on that halachah.

See Halachot 4 and 6.

The reference is to Halachah 11. There is a slight difference in this instance, because the original agent is not necessarily making these statements to the court himself. Nevertheless, as long as witnesses saw the get in the possession of the original agent, the statements of the agent who gave the get to the woman are accepted.

As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 11, there are opinions that maintain that this applies only when the husband, the agent and the woman are located in different cities. If all three are located in the same city, these opinions maintain that the husband’s word should be accepted if he states that he gave the agent the get for safekeeping. In this instance, as well, although both views are mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:57), the Rambam’s view is favored.
Moreover, as mentioned in those notes, the Rama maintains that if the get is no longer in possession of the agent, his word is not accepted.

As will be explained, different rules apply if the couple is known to quarrel (Chapter 13, Halachah 1), or war prevails throughout the world (Chapter 13, Halachah 2).

As reflected by the Rambam’s statements at the conclusion of Chapter 13, it appears that according to Scriptural Law, the testimony of one witness is accepted in instances of this nature.

The testimony of such individuals is never accepted according to Scriptural Law. The acceptance of such testimony in this instance is a leniency adopted by the Sages so that Jewish women will be able to remarry. (See the conclusion of Chapter 13.)
This halachah begins the discussion of the subject of agunot, women whose husbands are missing and presumed to have died. In previous generations, this was a recurrent difficulty, for business journeys were replete with danger, and moreover, pogroms and persecution were constant threats. Often, men disappeared and were presumed to have died or to have been killed, and yet there was no conclusive proof to that effect. Indeed, a significant amount of the Rabbinic literature of previous generations was devoted to questions of this nature.
In the present age, with the communications revolution and the advent of more highly developed means of identification, these problems have been minimized. But they still arise. After each of Israel’s wars, lengthy investigations were necessary before permission to re-marry was granted to the wives of the casualties. And when, heaven forbid, there are Jews killed in plane crashes and the like, Rabbis must make careful inquiries based on the principles reflected in the halachot that follow.

See Halachah 24, which states that the testimony of these women is not considered at all, regardless of whether they say that the woman’s husband is alive or that he has died.

I.e., we fear that out of hatred, these women will testify that a woman’s husband hasdied so that she will marry another person, and when her first husband returns she will be forced to leave both relationships.
The Kessef Mishneh states that the phrase ‘‘although he is still alive’’ is meant to exclude an instance in which a woman’s husband died and she remarried. The five women who share these close family ties with her first husband are not disqualified from giving testimony with regard to the death of her second husband. The implication is that these women’s hatred hasa specific objective: to cause the woman to be divorced from her husband. Once she is no longer married to him, they no longer harbor such feelings.
The Beit Shmuel 17:13 and Rabbi Akiva Eiger question this ruling on the basis of theRambam’s wording in Chapter 7, Halachah 3, which states: ‘‘These are the women who we presume hate each other... another woman married to the same man— this applies even if this woman has since remarried.’’ Nevertheless, this halachah can be interpreted to mean that although the other woman has remarried, she wants the woman who was married to her first husband also to be forbidden to him.

Who we assume would identify with her mother. Moreover, the daughter of the mother in law may have a personal grudge, because the other woman will enjoy the inheritance of her parents’ estate.

I.e., the woman married to her husband’s brother, whom her husband would have to marry if his brother died without children. Since it is possible that they will share the same husband, there may be enmity between them.

I.e., she is jealous of the woman who took her mother’s place. Because of the bad feelings that characterize the relationship between these pairs, testimony is also disqualified in the reverse of the above situations. For example, if the husband of the daughter of a woman’s husband is missing, the woman may not testify about the matter, although she has no natural reason to hate the other woman.

See Chapter 13, Halachah 11, which explains that when the gentile makes statements casually, relating events that took place, his word is accepted.

This refers to two categories of individuals: a) one who transgresses a prohibition punish-able by lashes, and b) one who violates a prohibition of Scriptural Law that involves taking money unjustly. (See Hilchot Edut, Chapter 10.)

We fear that he is able to be bribed to give false testimony.

E. g., a person who takes interest forbidden by Rabbinic Law, or a gambler (Hilchot Edut10:3). (See also Hilchot Edut 11:1-5, which mentions other base individuals whose testimony was disqualified.)

Although our Sages disqualified the testimony of such individuals in other instances, they relaxed this restriction in this regard, so that the woman would be granted the opportunity to remarry.

The Rama (Even HaEzer 17:37) follows the ruling of Rabbenu Asher, who maintains that the woman should not remarry because of the gossip that might ensue.

Or, as in the case at hand, the testimony of one witness that is considered to be equivalent to that of two.

When the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:37) quotes this law, it states that the wit-ness who says that the husband did not die came before the woman was granted license toremarry. See Beit Shmuel 17:110.

In the previous instance, a ruling was already delivered, and the testimony of one witness is not sufficient to detract from that ruling. In this halachah, by contrast, a ruling has not been issued, and one witness has no more halachic power than the other.

See Hilchot Shegagot 8:3, where the Rambam states that the woman and her second husband are obligated to bring the guilt offering sacrificed to bring atonement when one is in doubt of whether or not one committed a transgression.

This is interpreted by most commentaries to mean: ‘‘I know that he died.’’ Rashi (Ketubot22b) states that it means: ‘‘I know that if he were alive, he would have returned by now,’’ but this interpretation is not accepted by the later authorities.

The rationale for this decision is stated above in Halachah 7. At the outset, however, sheshould not remarry, not even to this witness (Beit Shmuel 17:113). There are, moreover, significant halachic authorities who rule that she must leave her second husband. Their opinion is also mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), but the Rambam’s opinion appears to be favored.

I.e., the stringency mentioned at the conclusion of the previous halachah.

I.e., the number is not significant. The same law applies whether two or 200 come.

Thus, she may not marry at all (and if she marries, may not remain married to hersecond husband unless she marries the witness, as the Rambam continues in Halachah 19). The Maggid Mishneh and the Rama (Even HaEzer 17:37) emphasize that this applies only when the women or the witnesses who are usually disqualified come before the woman is granted permission to marry. If, however, she is granted permission to marry on the basis of the testimony of an acceptable witness, the testimony of these individuals does not cause that license to be rescinded.

The wording used by the Rambam is slightly confusing, for we are speaking about an instance when only one acceptable witness testifies on her behalf. (See Beit Shmuel 17:118.)

According to the Maggid Mishneh, this applies even if the woman was granted license toremarry before the other witness came. This opinion is reflected in the ruling of the ShulchanAruch (Even HaEzer 17:38). If, however, two women testify that a woman’s husband hasdied, and permission is granted for the woman to remarry, the testimony of a single accept-able witness is not sufficient for that license to be revoked (Maggid Mishneh; Rama, Even HaEzer 17:38).

I.e., if the same situation occurred with regard to acceptable witnesses, the laws stated in the following halachah would apply. With regard to acceptable witnesses, as long as twowitnesses dissent, it makes no difference how many witnesses support the other opinion.

This applies even when the woman married after receiving license from a Rabbinic court. If two witnesses come afterwards and testify that her first husband is still alive, we give credence to their statements (Beit Shmuel 17:128).

See Halachah 15.

I.e., she is marrying with the intent that the other wife will follow suit and also marry. Then her first husband will return, and they will both become forbidden to him. In describing this sequence, Yevamot 120a recalls Samson’s prayer (Judges 16:30): ‘‘May I die together with the Philistines’’ — i.e., she will harm herself in order to harm her rival.

The fact that their testimonies contradict each other is not significant.