Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Which, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 2, is the proof-text requiring us to cease the performance of work on the holidays.

As evident from the continuation of the Rambam’s statements, here the definition of labor is not—in contrast to the Sabbath and holidays—the 39 labors necessary to build the Sanctuary, but rather labor in the conventional sense: mundane activity that will prevent one from appreciating the festive mood of the holidays.

There are several Talmudic passages (e.g., Jerusalem Talmud, Pesachim 4:1) that quote verses from the Torah prohibiting the performance of work on Chol HaMo’ed. Nevertheless, according to the Rambam (and his position is shared by the Tur, Orach Chayim 530), these verses are merely asmachtot, allusions cited by the Rabbis as support for the decrees they instituted. [Significantly, however, the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Mo’ed Katan 1:1) contains an expression that indicates that he conceives of the prohibition against work on Chol HaMo’ed as part of the Oral Tradition given to Moses on Sinai.]
There are, however, other authorities [Yereim (the conclusion of section 304), the Ramban, and the Rashba] who maintain that the prohibition against work on Chol HaMo’ed is Scriptural in origin. The Be’ur Halachah 530 quotes the opinions of many authorities who accept this view.
The difference between these two perspectives is not merely theoretical in nature. One of the basic principles of Torah law is that when there is a doubt with regard to a question of Scriptural law, the more stringent view must be adopted. When, by contrast, there is a doubt with regard to a question of Rabbinic law, the more lenient view may be adopted. If the prohibition against working on Chol HaMo’ed is Scriptural in origin, then the more stringent view must be adopted in cases of doubt. Should, however, the prohibition be Rabbinic in origin, a lenient view may be adopted.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 537:1) rules more stringently, stating that this is permitted, only when one had already begun irrigating the land before the commencement of the holiday.

For he will have to carry water in buckets continually to irrigate the entire field [Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Mo’ed Katan 1:1)].

For the water in the spring flows on its own accord (lbid.).

This and the other activities mentioned in this halachah are phases in the process of extracting oil from olives.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam on this point and allows the olives to be turned over only if they have been turned over once before. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 538:1) follows the Ra’avad’s view.

E. g., at night (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.:2). It is necessary to do this in a discreet manner, rather than publicly, for one cannot be sure that thieves will come. Thus, the loss is not inevitable (Maggid Mishneh, citing the Ramban). If, however, it is impossible to bring the produce in discreetly, one may do so in a manner that will attract attention.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the new dimension contributed by this law is that the grapes in question are still attached to the ground, and they may nevertheless be harvested.

Rav Moshe HaCohen and others have objected to the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that the court does not have the right to declare a person’s property ownerless. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 538:6) follows the Rambam’s ruling. The Ramah adds that if a person performs work with property belonging to others—e.g., a tailor or a scribe—and thus this punishment cannot be administered, he should be placed under a ban of ostracism and/or giving stripes for rebelliousness for working on Chol HaMo’ed.

Our translation is taken from Rav Kappach’s edition ofthe Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Mo’ed Katan 1:8). Others interpret this term to mean “sew the stitches far apart.” The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 541:5) interprets the phrase to mean “like a dog’s teeth.”
In his notes, the Ramah states that most ordinary people may be regarded as skilled with regard to sewing. Hence, everyone should employ this stringency.

One may not, however, use a trowel.

This ruling is based on a narrative in Mo’ed Katan 12b concerning Rav, who harvested his field during Chol HaMo’ed because he did not have any flour. From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that he allows this leniency even when the person has financial resources at his disposal; he lacks merely the grain itself.
Rav Moshe HaCohen differs with the Rambam’s ruling, stating that if the person possesses money and can buy flour in the marketplace, he is not allowed to harvest his field. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 537:15) quotes the Rambam’s decision.

The Mishnah Berurah 537:52 states that one is allowed to perform only that labor which is necessary to provide him with grain for the holiday. He is not allowed to do any more. Nevertheless, in his Sha’ar HaTziyun 537:49, he brings other opinions that would allow a person to do more work if no additional expense is required.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that the reason it is forbidden to use oxen is that it is necessary to depart from one’s ordinary routine. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo offers a different rationale—that using oxen will make the matter public knowledge.
The difference between these two views is not only theoretical. According to the Rambam, it would be permitted to use other animals—e.g., horses or donkeys—to thresh, for this would also represent a departure from one’s ordinary practice. According to Rav Yosef Karo, this would be forbidden because this would also become public knowledge. The Mishnah Berurah 537:52,53 quotes Rav Yosef Karo’s view.
The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) also states that if one is threshing the grain for others as well as for oneself, it is permitted to use oxen.

Mo’ed Katan lla mentions this concept with regard to pickling fish. The same principle can be applied to pickling vegetables, except that with regard to vegetables the pickling process usually takes longer and the vegetables will not be ready to be eaten during the festival if the pickling process was begun during Chol HaMo’ed. [See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 533:3) and commentaries.]

I.e., even if one catches far more than one needs for the festival itself. The rationale is that since some fish taste better than others, one can explain that one is continuing to fish to catch an especially tasty fish for the festival (Mishnah Berurah 533:18).

As was customary in Babylonia in Talmudic times.

For he can explain to others that he prefers fresh beer over aged beer (Mo’ ed Katan 12b). Moreover, the observers may not even know that he possesses aged beer (Mishnah Berurah 533:9).
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, stating that it follows only a minority opinion in Mo’ ed Katan 12b. ln support of the Rambam, the Or Sameach cites a passage in Shabbat 139b, which follows the same rationale. The Ramah (Orach Chayim 533:1) quotes the Ra’avad’s view, while the Mishnah Berurah (loc. cit.) states that one may rely on the Rambam’s view.

These and other professionals perform a large amount of work at one time. Therefore, even when such a professional is in fact preparing this work for the purpose of the holiday, an observer might not appreciate this and might think that he is producing work for after the holiday. A private individual, by contrast, does not perform a large amount of such work at one time, and an observer will realize that his intent is for the festival (Mishnah Berurah 533:22.)

These and other professionals perform a large amount of work at one time. Therefore, even when such a professional is in fact preparing this work for the purpose of the holiday, an observer might not appreciate this and might think that he is producing work for after the holiday. A private individual, by contrast, does not perform a large amount of such work at one time, and an observer will realize that his intent is for the festival (Mishnah Berurah 533:22.)

Rabbenu Asher (in his gloss on Mo’ed Katan 2a) gives one reason for this leniency: during the year, all the members ofthe community are involved in their own affairs and do not have the time to concern themselves with the public welfare. On Chol HaMo’ed, when people are freed from their own concerns, they can turn their attention to the needs of the community at large. Another reason is obvious from the quote from the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah cited in the notes on the following halachah.

With regard to cisterns and trenches belonging to a private individual, see Chapter 8, Halachah 4.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that this applies to cisterns or waterworks that are not necessarily needed for the holiday itself. Even though they will not be needed until afterwards, they may be fixed during Chol HaMo’ed because they are for the benefit of the public.

To be acceptable for the immersion of a man or woman, a mikveh must contain at least 40 se’ah. In contemporary measure, certain authorities maintain that this figure is equivalent to approximately 250 liters. Shiurei Mikveh mentions many views, concluding that the minimum acceptable figure is 454 liters, and that one should try to reach 921.6 liters. The Chazon Ish cites a figure of 573.3 liters.

lt is forbidden to sow two types of produce without adequate distinction in the same field (Leviticus 19:19). This prohibition is called the prohibition of kilayim.
In the beginning ofthe month of Adar (early spring), the court would send agents to notify farmers about this prohibition. From the fifteenth of Adar, they sent agents out to check if there were kilayim in the fields. Originally, the court’s agents would remove the kilayim from the fields. The farmers then became lax, and left this work to the court’s agents. Therefore, the Sages declared that whenever kilayim are found in a field, the court’s agents should declare the field ownerless. During Chol HaMo’ed Pesach, when the crops bloom, the court would send agents out again (Hilchot Kilayim 2:15-17).
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Mo’ed Katan 1:2), the Rambam explains the reason why this activity was performed during Chol HaMo’ed: The wages for the court’s agents were paid from the Temple treasury (terumat halishcah). Since there was very little other work available during Chol HaMo’ed, it would be easy to find people willing to work for low wages, and thus the Temple treasury would save.

The Hebrew term עֲרָכִין is discussed in Leviticus 27:1-8 and involves giving a specific sum to the Temple treasury for a person, depending on a person’s age. In some contexts, the term עֲרָכִין is also used with regard to fields and animals consecrated to the Temple treasury.

This term is used to refer to the Hebrew חֵרֶם, a term implying that a person renounces his ownership of his property and dedicates it either to the Temple treasury or to the priests.

This refers to an article consecrated to the Temple treasury. In all three instances, the sum the person who made the dedication is required to pay may be evaluated during Chol HaMo’ed.

A woman suspected of adultery (a sotah) is brought to the Temple and required to drink a mixture of water, dust, and ink from a scroll containing a curse. (See Numbers 5:23-24; Hilchot Sotah, Chapter 3.)

A person who became ritually impure through contact with a human corpse must be purified by having the ashes of a red heifer sprinkled upon hi1m (Numbers, Chapter 19). The slaughter of the red heifer and the preparation of these ashes is described in Hilchot Parah Adumah, Chapter 3.

When a corpse is found outside a populated area and the killer’s identity is unknown, Deuteronomy 21:4 specifies a process of atonement that involves decapitating a calf. (See Hilchot Rotzeach, Chapter 9.)

A Hebrew servant sold by the court who desires to remain in servitude rather than regain his freedom must have his ear pierced. (See Exodus 21:6; Hilchot Avadim 3:9.)

A leper becomes ritually impure. The purification ceremony is discussed in Leviticus, Chapter 14; Hilchot Tum’at Tzara’at, Chapter 11.

Priests are forbidden to contract the impurity that stems from a human corpse. One of the ways of contracting such impurity is by standing over a grave. For this reason, graves would be marked with lime. During the rainy season, the lime might wash off. (See Hilchot Tum’at Meit 8:9.)

The Jewish court does not summon litigants during Nisan and Tishrei (Hilchot Sanhedrin 25:9). Nevertheless, should they come on their own accord, sessions may be held during Chol HaMo’ed (ibid., 11:1, 13:5)

This refers to a legal record of the sale of property from a deceased person’s estate to provide for the support of his wife and daughters, or alternatively, a similar record required when a person goes on a journey and leaves his wife without support. (See Hilchot Ishut, Chapters 18 and 19.)

A childless widow is required to marry her deceased husband’s brother. She is released from this obligation through a ritual act referred to as chalitzah. (See Deuteronomy 25:7-10.) After this ritual is performed, the court composes a legal record for the woman. See Hilchot Yibbum UChalitzah 4:29.

When a girl’s father dies before she reaches the age of majority, our Sages gave. her the opportunity to marry on a conditional basis. If upon attaining the age of majority, or beforehand, she no longer desires to continue her marriage, she does not require a formal divorce. All she need do is state her desire to terminate the marriage. Should she do this, a legal record is composed and granted to her. (See Hilchot Gerushin, Chapter 11.)

Although the Torah and the Sages disqualified certain individuals from serving as witnesses or judges, a litigant may, nevertheless, agree to allow such an individual to serve in this capacity (Hilchot Sanhedrin, Chapter 7). The judges may desire to have a written record of the commitment the litigant made.

Rashi (Mo’ed Katan 18b) states that this leniency is granted because the person desires to depart on a journey, implying that if that is not the case, a bill of divorce may not be composed. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 545:5) quotes the law without qualification, reflecting the Rambam’s position. Note, however, Mishnah Berurah 545:20.

Although these are all personal matters, since they represent the ongoing needs of a community they are considered to involve the interest of the community at large (Mishnah Berurah 545:20). The Ra’avad differs and maintains that the reason is that the person may suffer a loss if these documents are not composed.

The Kessef Mishneh interprets this ruling as an indication that the Rambam maintains that one should not wear tefillin on Chol HaMo’ed. Significantly, in his gloss on Hilchot Tefillin 4: l 0, the Kessef Mishneh focuses on the latter half of this halachah and interprets it as an indication that one must wear tefillin at this time. (See the notes on that halachah for a more detailed discussion of this matter.)

This refers to an instance in which there is a scroll available for the communal Torah readings. If there is no scroll available, a Torah “scroll may be checked and corrected (Kessef Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 545:2). Following this line of thinking, all texts that are required to be studied on the holiday may be written.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin 2:6) relates that since a Torah scroll must be checked for accuracy against an existing scroll, a scroll was kept in the Temple Courtyard for that purpose. (See Hilchot Sefer Torah 7:2.)

There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis with regard to texts that are needed for the community at large, but are not required for the festival itself. From the Rambam’s wording, it is clear that he would forbid writing such texts. There are, however, more lenient opinions, and they are favored by the Ramah (loc. cit.:1).

This purple thread was used for tzitzit in Talmudic times.

According to the Rambam, there is no difference between writing tefillin and mezuzot, and other professions. Only when the wages he earns are required for his livelihood is he allowed to work.
The Ramah (loc. cit.:3) expresses a more lenient view. Since writing tefillin is a mitzvah, it is allowed on Chol HaMo’ed, provided the profits from one’s work will enable one to celebrate the holiday in a more lavish manner.

The Rambam is explaining that since one is not performing a skilled task, there is no prohibition against this labor. The Ra’avad and Rav Moshe HaCohen differ with the Rambam’s rationale and maintain that one is allowed to write social correspondence on Chol HaMo’ed because it is possible that after Chol HaMo’ed, one will have difficulty finding a person with whom to send the letter. One may keep one’s accounts, because this is necessary in order to be able to know how much to spend on the holiday.
Although most Sephardic authorities (including the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 545:5) follow the Rambam’s view, the Ashkenazic authorities tend towards the Ra’avad’s explanation and forbid writing on Chol HaMo’ed unless a loss is involved. The Ramah thus states that it is customary not to write on Chol HaMo’ed. Nevertheless, the Mishnah Berurah 545:35 states that the more lenient view is generally followed. When writing on Chol HaMo’ed, many do so in a slightly irregular manner, thus adding more halachic weight to the lenient position.

Even those that involve the performance of labors that require professional expertise (Mishnah Berurah 547:19).

Discretion is necessary, for if the boards are made in public, a passerby might not realize that they are intended for a corpse.

For if the deceased’s identity is well known, everyone will realize that the boards are for his coffin. ln later generations, the Ashkenazic custom was to cut the boards and make the coffin in the courtyard of the synagogue. For most people in a community are aware of a person’s death and the fact that the work is carried out in the synagogue courtyard indicates that it is not being performed for a private matter (Hagahot Maimoniot). (See also Mishnah Berurah 547:20.)

Although leprosy conveys ritual impurity, that status must be established through the inspection of the suspect portion of the body by a priest. (See Leviticus 13:2.) For the reason explained by the Rambam, the priest should delay his inspection until after the conclusion of the holiday.
As the passage in Leviticus continues, there are times when a person who is suspected of having leprosy must undergo a second (or third) inspection, and carrying out this inspection may be to his benefit. ln the Mishnah (Mo’ed Katan 1:5), there is a difference of opinion concerning whether these inspections are carried out during Chol HaMo’ed. Rabbi Meir maintains that they are. If the ruling is lenient, it is delivered; if it is stringent, it is withheld. The Sages maintain that no inspections are carried out during Chol HaMo’ed. Although it appears that the Rambam accepts their view, other opinions explain that he follows Rabbi Meir’s view.
Significantly, in Hilchot Tum’ at Tzara’ at 9:7, the Rambam states, “We inspect leprous blotches every day, with the exception of the Sabbath and yom tov.” The latter term does not usually include Chol HaMo’ed.
(We have translated tzara’at as leprosy for this is the common practice. In fact, the Biblical condition described by this Hebrew term differs from the disease known as leprosy today.)

The marriage of a person to his brother’s childless widow (Deuteronomy 25:5).

Torah law defines matrimony as a two-stage process involving betrothal (erusin) and marriage (nisuin). Betrothal establishes the husband-and-wife bond. From that time onward, a woman may not marry anyone else, but neither may the couple live together. Marriage, by contrast, signals the consummation of this relationship, the beginning of the couple’s life as a single unit. Today, the common Jewish practice is to complete both stages of the wedding bond in a single ceremony under the wedding canopy.

This refers to the remarriage of one’s divorcee. The act of remarriage is permitted during Chol HaMo’ed; a feast is not.

This refers both to cutting one’s hair and—for those who are accustomed—to shaving.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 531:1) states that it is a mitzvah to cut one’s hair on the day prior to a holiday.

A mourner is forbidden to cut his hair or launder his clothes. Indeed, the prohibition against cutting hair continues throughout the thirty days of mourning (Hilchot Eivel 6:2). On this basis, the commentaries question the Rambam’s statements. And although the commencement of a holiday nullifies the need to keep the prohibitions of the thirty days of mourning, this is true only when a person has observed a full seven days of mourning before the commencement of the holiday (lbid. 10:5-6).
For this reason, the Kessef Mishneh and the Radbaz (Vol. VI, Responsum 2164) interpret the leniency mentioned by the Rambam here as referring only to laundering. In his Shulchan Aruch, when mentioning the leniencies regarding cutting hair, Rav Yosef Karo makes no mention of a mourner.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 531:4) states that this applies even when a person had been imprisoned by Jews who would have allowed him to cut his hair before the holiday. Since he was upset because of his imprisonment, he did not desire to cut his hair (Mishnah Berurah 531:9).

For while under a ban of ostracism, it is forbidden to cut one’s hair or launder one’s clothes (Hilchot Talmud Torah 7:4).

The authority of a wise man to abrogate an oath is discussed in Hilchot Sh’vuot, Chapter 6.
From the wording ofthe Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Mo’edKatan 3:1), it would appear that this leniency applies only when one did not have the opportunity of approaching a wise man with this request before Chol HaMo’ed. Accordingly, if one had such an opportunity, it would appear that the vow cannot be abrogated until after the holiday. See Mishnah Berurah 531:11.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 531 :3) mentions that a person who was prevented from cutting his hair or laundering his clothes by forces beyond his control—e.g., he was detained by contractual negotiations, or he was sick—is not given the opportunity to perform these activities during Chol HaMo’ed. The Mishnah Berurah 531:5 mentions the reason for this stringency: In these instances, the factor holding the person back from cutting his hair or laundering his clothes is not publicly known. In contrast, in all the instances mentioned by the Rambam, the reason why the person did not cut his hair or launder his clothes is common knowledge.

After completing the term of his vow, a nazarite must shave his head and bring several sacrifices (Numbers 6:18; Hilchot Nezirut 8:2-3). Similarly, as part of his purification process a leper must shave off all the hair of his body twice (Leviticus 14:8-9; Hilchot Tum’at Tzara’at 11:1-2).

A person who is impure may not take part in the festive sacrifices of the Temple. Therefore, it is possible that he did not prepare himself for the holiday. Some also cite Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 112), which states that every person who is ritually impure must inform others about his state and make this evident from his physical appearance. One of the ways of doing this would be not to cut one’s hair (Rambam La’ Am).

For the reason for the decree—that one cut one’s hair before the holiday—is not relevant for a child, who is not responsible for his conduct.

From the Rambam’s wording, it appears that he is speaking about an extremely young infant. Nevertheless, the Pri Megadim interprets this as referring to any child under Bar Mitzvah age. (See Mishnah Berurah 531:16.)

The prophet Samuel and King David divided the priests into 24 watches, which rotated in the performance of the Temple service. Each watch would serve in the Temple for a week at a time. (See Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 4:3.)

This prohibition was instituted for a reason similar to the prohibition against cutting one’s hair during Chol HaMo’ed: By preventing the priests from cutting their hair during the week they served in the Temple, the Sages insured that they came to the Temple with their hair already cut (Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 1:12).

Both fmgernails and toenails (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 532:1).

Although the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, the Ramah states that it is customary not to cut nails with a utensil during Chol HaMo’ed. [Significantly, the Rambam’s ruling with regard to Chol HaMo’ed differs from his ruling regarding the mourning rites (Hilchot Eivel 5:2).]

Women are, however, forbidden to cut the hair from their head, as men are (Mishnah Berurah 56:16).

This was done to remove hair and make the woman’s complexion ruddier (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah; Mo’ed Katan 1:7).

Our translation is based on the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah and the citation of this law in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 546:5).

A male with a condition resembling gonorrhea, which causes a discharge from his organ other than semen or urine. Such a discharge renders him ritually impure. (See Leviticus 15:2-3; Hilchot Mechusarei Kapparah, Chapter 2.)

A woman who experiences vaginal bleeding at times other than when she expects her monthly period. This discharge renders her ritually impure. (See Leviticus 15:25, Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, Chapter 6.)

A woman who becomes impure because of her monthly menstrual bleeding. (See Leviticus 15:19; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, Chapters 4 and 5.)

The impurity of a woman who gives birth is mentioned in Leviticus, Chapter 12; Hilchot Mechusarei Kapparah, Chapter 1.

In the era when all the aspects of the laws of ritual impurity were observed, those who were ritually impure could not participate in the festive celebrations as others could. Therefore, they were not required to launder their clothes. Moreover, at times, these garments were themselves impure and required ritual immersion and laundering.
The Shulchan Aruch does not mention these laws. Although there are certain dimensions of the ritual impurity associated with a zavah, a niddah, and a woman who gives birth that are observed in the present era—e.g., the prohibitions against intimacy—since we are all ritually impure, these individuals’ state of impurity does not preclude them from joining in our festive celebrations. Hence, they must prepare their garments before the commencement of the holiday.

Our translation is based on the notes of Rav Kappach, who interprets this ruling as not merely a leniency allowing the person to launder his garment during Chol HaMo’ed, but as a charge obligating him to do so, so that he will not wear a soiled garment during the festival season.

Others interpret this term as referring to the coverings of sacred texts. (See Maggid Mishneh.)

The Hebrew phrase ןשתפ ילכ literally means “linen garments.” We have translated the term according to the function these items served in the Talmudic era.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 534:2) states that although this is the law, it is customary to be stringent and forbid this. The Mishnah Berurah 534:14, however, mentions certain leniencies—e.g., having them laundered by a gentile. At present when laundering clothes has become a much easier process, the Rabbis have granted greater leniency.

The Magen Avraham 539:1 explains that the rationale for this prohibition is that commercial activity involves much effort, and this runs contrary to the atmosphere desired by the Sages for Chol HaMo’ed.

As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether the loss of opportunity mentioned refers to a loss the person will suffer—he will either have to pay more for an article that he needs or will not be able to sell an article that he wishes to sell—or if it includes also the opportunity to realize a greater profit. ln his Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 539), Rav Yosef Karo explains that the majority of the Rabbis follow the more lenient view, and he rules accordingly in his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 539:5).
The Rabbis also ruled with regard to a situation that does not involve a departure from the norm—i.e., as opposed to the instance mentioned by the Rambam, no special situation like visiting merchants arose—but the situation is nevertheless such that were the person not to sell his goods during Chol HaMo’ed, he would not profit to the same degree as if he sold them afterwards. In such a situation, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 539:4) rules that one may sell the goods during Chol HaMo’ed, provided that he uses a portion of the profit he makes to enhance his celebration of the festival. Moreover, the Shulchan Aruch restricts this license to a person of moderate means. If the person is affluent and would celebrate the festival amply regardless, he is not allowed to sell his goods during Chol HaMo’ed, unless he will be forced to sell them for less than the principal afterwards.

The laws regarding the sale of these entities are more stringent than those involving other items, because the sale of these entities becomes public knowledge quickly.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 539:10) also mentions that these entities may be sold if their sale is necessary for the livelihood of the seller (as mentioned in Halachah 24). The Mishnah Berurah 539:40 adds that one may buy such entities from a gentile. (With regard to the purchase of land from a gentile in Eretz Yisrael, see Hilchot Shabbat 6:11) Others discuss whether it is permissible to buy such an entity during Chol HaMo’ed, if it is likely that a similar entity will not be available after Chol HaMo’ed.

All three items mentioned by the Rambam refer to articles that can be stored, and it is thus not directly obvious that one is purchasing the article for use during Chol HaMo’ed (Mishnah Berurah 539:34). If produce will not last beyond the festival, it may be sold during Chol HaMo’ed with no restrictions.

Shemini Atzeret, in contrast to the last days of Pesach, is considered a holiday in its own right. Therefore, it is proper to adom the marketplace with produce in its honor. Although this expression of honor is not allowed with regard to the last days of Pesach, it is permitted to sell one’s wares openly, without any restrictions, on the day preceding those holidays (Mishnah Berurah 539:37).

Or anyone else whose wares testify to the fact that they will be used during Chol HaMo’ed (ibid.:33).

There are two interpretations of the expression “does not have food to eat.” The Magen Avraham 542: l understands this simply; a person may not hire himself to perform labor unless he has no food whatsoever to eat. The Eliyahu Rabba, however, maintains that this refers to a person who possesses the minimum necessary for subsistence, but lacks the means to celebrate the festival in an ample way. As indicated by the Sha’ar HaTziyun 542:12, it appears that the authorities follow the more stringent view. Neither view, however, requires a person to pawn his household goods to purchase food instead of working to earn his livelihood.
See also the Mishnah Berurah 542:7, which states that even according to the more lenient views, an effort should be made to perform the labor discreetly. For an observer may not realize that the person performing the labor is doing so out of necessity.

See the Mishnah Berurah 542:8, which states that it is preferable for a person to sell merchandise instead ofworking during Chol Hamo’ed. Also, as reflected in the Sha’ar HaTziyun (loc. cit.), even the more stringent views that prevent a person from hiring himself out as a laborer if he possesses his minimum necessities grant him the leniency of selling merchandise in order to celebrate the festival in comfort.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this applies only to a building project that all know belongs to a Jew. It is, however, permissible for a gentile to take work home and perform it on a Jew’s behalf if he is hired as a contractor and not as a laborer. This conception is also borne out by the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 543:2).

In this regard, the laws regarding Chol HaMo’ed are more stringent than those applying to the Sabbath and the holidays. Since on the Sabbath and the holidays it is forbidden to go beyond the city’s Sabbath limits, the gentile’s performance of the task will not become public knowledge. On Chol HaMo’ed, by contrast, there are no restrictions on travel, and it is possible that many people will become aware of the gentile’s activities (Maggid Mishneh). (See also Hilchot Shabbat 6:14-15.)

This halachah is based on the principle discussed in Chapter 7, Halachah 2, which states: “When a person irrigates [such land], he should not draw water and irrigate [the land, using water] from a pool or rain water, for this involves strenuous activity. He may, however, irrigate it [using water] from a spring.” In all the instances mentioned in this halachah, the water is free-flowing. Hence, there is no need to fear that the person will draw the water using buckets.

If, however, an irrigation ditch does not pass through these pools, it is forbidden to use their water during Chol HaMo’ed, for the person will have to refill them by bringing water from a far-removed place. The strenuous activity this involves is not appropriate for the festive spirit of Chol HaMo’ed.
The Kessef Mishneh. explains that this applies even when the pool has enough water in it so that one would not have to draw water by hand throughout Chol HaMo’ed. This stringency was instituted to allow for a uniform ruling.

Or sold to be eaten by others (Ritba; Mishnah Berurah 537:14).

Since the preparation of food for the celebration of the festival is involved, this is permitted even though it involves strenuous effort (Maggid Mishneh).

As mentioned in Chapter 7, Halachah 2, it is permitted to irrigate parched land during Chol HaMo’ed, because excessive effort is not involved. In this instance, however, excessive effort is involved. Therefore, it is forbidden to draw water for vegetables. If, however, the vegetables are necessary for use during the holiday, this activity is permitted (Maggid Mishneh).

As the Rambam continues to explain [see also Rashi (Mo’ed Katan 4b)], this refers to the ditches becoming filled with silt and debris.

The Hebrew word for irrigation ditch המא also means “cubit.” A cubit is six handbreadths high. The fact that the ditch is a handbreadth deep is significant enough to enable the person to be allowed to dig it to its full depth.

This question is left unresolved by Mo’ed Katan (loc. cit.). Although the Nimukei Yosef and others differ with the Rambam, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 537:6) follows the Rambam’s ruling.

For trees, like parched land, require irrigation.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that it reflects a minority opinion among the Sages. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:7), however, follows the Rambam’s decision.

Since it has been watered already, irrigating it further does not require very strenuous activity.

The Kessef Mishneh cites this as an expression of a principle of greater scope: Even when the failure to perform a labor will result in significant loss, labor that involves strenuous activity is not performed during Chol HaMo’ed.

Compare to the laws pertaining to cisterns and the like constructed on behalf of the public, as described in Chapter 7, Halachah 10.

For drinking water.

Even when the person needs to dig a well because he lacks drinking water and would prefer to take water from a private well rather than carry water from a distant place. Needless to say, if the person has no water whatsoever to drink, he may dig a well during Chol HaMo’ed.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Mo’ed Katan 1:6). The Ra’avad and Rabbenu Asher interpret the Hebrew term as referring to a pit similar to a grave, and hence forbid digging it unless a person has already died.

I.e., the individuals who were given permission to do laundry. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 17.)

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Mo’ed Katan 1:4).

Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, Rabbenu Asher, and others allow one to snare mice in the ordinary manner in this instance as well. In his Kessef Mishneh and Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 537), Rav Yosef Karo explains that the difference between these two rulings depends on a difference of opinion regarding the correct version of the text of Mo’ed Katan 6b. Although he quotes both views in his ShulchanAruch (Orach Chayim 537:13), it appears that Rav Karo favors the more lenient ruling.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Mo’ed Katan 1:4, based on Mo’ed Katan 7a), the Rambam explains that this means that one may pile the stones one on top of the other, without placing mortar between them. One is not allowed to build it in an ordinary manner, because building involves professional craftsmanship, and there is not a possibility of great loss should others enter one’s garden (Mishnah Berurah 440:1-2).

Note the Be’ur Halachah, which cites the Ritba’s commentary interpreting this as referring to a guardrail on a roof upon which people do not frequently walk. If the roof is used frequently, one should construct a guardrail and fulfill the mitzvah of the Torah (Deuteronomy 22:8). The Be’ur Halachah notes, however, that none of the other commentaries make such a distinction.

A wall to one’s courtyard protects one’s house against thieves. Therefore, building it is considered necessary to prevent a loss and is permitted during Chol HaMo’ed.

The Ramban states that this leniency is permitted only when one constructs the bench as would an amateur; it is forbidden to build it in a professional manner. This conception is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 540:6).

Our translation is based on Rav Kappach’s edition of the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Mo’edKatan 1:10). Rashi (Mo’edKatan 11a), Rav David Arameah and the Mishnah Berurah 540:11 interpret the He, brew term as referring to an attachment for the hinge.

Even if doing so involves professional craftsmanship.

Chapter 7, Halachah 3.

The restrictions mentioned in this halachah stem from the fact that it is speaking about digging a grave for a person before his death. When the person has already died, there are no restrictions at all, as stated in Chapter 7, Halachah 15. The Ma’aseh Rokeach explains that the present halachah is speaking about a place where the cemetery is located on rocky terrain, and digging or building a grave takes several days.

The Radbaz (in his gloss on Hilchot Eivel) explains that this is a disgrace to the deceased.

For a person’s soul takes comfort in being buried together with his ancestors (Jerusalem Talmud, Mo’ed Katan 2:4).

See Hilchot Eivel 14:15; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 363:1. In the latter source, other reasons why one may disinter a corpse are also mentioned, including a) to re-inter it in Eretz Yisrael, b) because water might destroy it, or c) because it was buried initially with the intent that it be moved.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh’vi’it 2:4), the Rambam explains that foul-smelling material was applied to saplings so that insects would stay away from them.

These activities are forbidden because they involve strenuous activity (Mishnah Berurah 537:35).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh’vi’it 2:5), the Rambam explains that oil would be applied to trees and their fruit so that they would ripen more quickly. For this reason, this is permitted during Chol HaMo’ed, for it enables one to have fruit for the festival.

Our translation follows the interpretation of Rashi (Mo’ed Katan 12b), who explains that it was common to cover figs and dates with flax while they were being dried.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 8.

Or they are brought by a gentile shepherd (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 537:14).

The intent is that it is forbidden to hire even a gentile shepherd.

In this way, manure will be deposited throughout the entire field and not only in one portion.

Since the shepherd is not hired with the specific intent of working during Chol HaMo’ed, but rather Chol HaMo’ed is included within a responsibility of a greater scope (הַבְלָעָה), this is permitted.

Based on the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), the Mishnah Berurah 537:49 states that it is forbidden to hire a shepherd for this purpose during Chol HaMo’ed. (See also the Kessef Mishneh, where Rav Yosef Karo explains that the Rambam’s interpretation of Mo’ed Katan 12a differs from that of Rashi and the other Ashkenazic authorities.)

But one may not remove it unless a large amount accumulates (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 535:3).

In this and the following instances, the permitted intent involves preparing food for oneself or one’s beast that may be used during the festival. The forbidden intent involves performing a task that is not necessary for the festival and which will not necessarily lead to a loss if it is not performed.

And then he will catch them for use during the festival.

See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 2:5-8, where the Rambam illustrates how the person’s deeds reveal his intent. For example, when a person reוnoves both thin twigs and larger logs, it is obvious that he desires to clean his field. If he removes only larger logs, we may assume that his intent is to gather firewood. If he opens a dam, but does not leave a place for water to flow out, he intends to water his field. lf he also opens an outlet for the water, we may assume that his intent is to catch fish.

Which were made of clay.

Even if this involves professional activity, it is permitted, because it will enable a person to cook his food for the festival (Mishnah Berurah 540:18).

This upper layer serves as insulation and maintains the oven’s heat. It will serve this purpose even if it does not dry during the festival (Mishnah Berurah 540:20).

In the Talmudic era, the beds resembled hammocks. This is permitted only when one’s intent is to use the bed during the festival (Mishnah Berurah 541:4)

For the mill can produce flour that is necessary for the festival.

For we are allowed to perform labor during Chol HaMo’ed to prevent the occurrence of a loss.

Because of rain or dew.

For a garment often becomes stiff after it is laundered. (See Hilchot Shabbat 22:17.)

Unless the donkey’s nails are trimmed, they will cause it pain, and prevent it from working to its capacity (Mishnah Berurah 540:25).

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 540:5) specifies that the stall must be built without professional expertise.

The Mishnah Berurah 536:6 states that although we may not take an active role in the mating process, we may put a male and a female animal in the same corral and allow them to mate.

Although these activities are forbidden on the Sabbath (Hilchot Shabbat, Chapter 21). Moreover, one may perform any labors necessary to prepare drugs or medicines during Chol HaMo’ed. (Mishnah Berurah 532:5).

The Ra’avad (based on the Jerusalem Talmud, Mo’ed Katan 2:4) states that one may move from a rented apartment into one’s own home during Chol HaMo’ed, even if the rented apartment is more pleasant than one’s own home, because it is comfortable for a person to dwell in his own home. The Maggid Mishneh states that the Rambam does not mention this ruling because it conflicts with the statements of the Babylonian Talmud. Generally, when there is a difference of opinion between the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud, the rulings of the former are followed. The Ramah (loc. cit.:1) mentions that if one lives in a dangerous neighborhood, one may move during Chol HaMo’ed. The Mishnah Berurah 535:7 states that leniency may also be granted to allow a person to move from a non-Jewish neighborhood to a Jewish one.

This prohibition applies even when the articles were finished before the commencement of the festival. The Mishnah Berurah 534:16 mentions two reasons for this prohibition: a) because bringing these articles involves strenuous effort, b) because an observer might think that the person intended that they be repaired during Chol HaMo’ed.

The Mishnah Berurah 534:17 explains that we may pay the craftsman whether or not he has food to eat. He interprets the wording as meaning that even when he has nothing to eat, and it is therefore necessary to pay him, we may not take the article from him.

The Mishnah Berurah 534:18 explains that although he is permitted to work during Chol HaMo’ed, it is forbidden to carry the articles in public view because of the impression that it might create.

Here also the intent is not the labors forbidden on Sabbaths and holidays, but rather involvement in tasks that are not for the sake of the festival.

This refers to minchah k’tanah, nine and a half seasonal hours after sunrise (3:30 PM on a day when the sun rises at 6 AM and sets at 6 PM).

See Hilchot Shabbat 5:19-20.

This punishment is administered for violating a Rabbinic commandment, while the prohibition against doing work on these days is considered merely a custom.

As reflected in Chapter 1, Halachah 22, being placed under a ban of ostracism is a more severe punishment that receiving stripes for rebelliousness.

“It is not appropriate that a person should be involved in his everyday tasks while his sacrifice is being offered” (Jerusalem Talmud, Pesachim 4:1).
Although at present the Temple is destroyed and it is impossible to bring the Paschal sacrifice, the original decree is still in force and it is forbidden to perform labor at this time (Maggid Mishneh).

Note Tosafot (Pesachim 50a) and the Tzalach, who consider the fourteenth of Nisan to be a holiday established by the Torah itself.

As explained in Halachah 21.

During the night [until sunrise], however, there are no restrictions against performing labor (Pesachim 2b, 55a).

The Ramah (Orach Chayim 468:3) states that the Ashkenazic custom is not to perform labor before noon on this day. Nevertheless, subsequent authorities have not accepted this as a universal ruling, and maintain that everything is dependent on local custom.

The Rambam’s ruling is based on his interpretation of the Mishnah (Pesachim 4:7) as applying in a place where it is customary to perform labor on the fourteenth. Others (the Ra’avad and Rabbenu Asher) interpret the Mishnah as applying in a place where it is customary not to perform labor on the fourteenth.
This interpretation leads to a more lenient ruling: In a place where it is customary to perform labor, all labor may be performed on the fourteenth of Nisan. ln a place where it is not customary to perform labor, any labor that was begun before the fourteenth and is intended for the sake of the holiday may be completed before dawn. The three labors mentioned may be begun on the fourteenth of Nisan if they are performed for the sake of the holiday, provided they can be completed before noon. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 468:5) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, while the Ramah follows the more lenient approach.

Where people will see his actions.

I.e., people will see him departing from the local custom, and when he explains the reason for his actions an argument may arise.

This leniency applies provided he intends to return to his original locale.

In this instance as well, the ruling applies to a person who intends to return to his original locale. If he does not intend to return, he is not bound by the stringencies observed there (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 468:9).

This is a general principle applying not only on the fourteenth of Nisan, but to the entire year, provided the person intends to settle permanently in the city.
This principle does not, however, apply in most contemporary Jewish communities, because they were settled by people with different customs, and a fixed practice was never adopted for the city at large. Accordingly, in such an instance, a person should follow the customs of his ancestral home (Orach Mishpat, Responsum 17).

There are many idle people in the public thoroughfare who do not perform labor. The visitor should conduct himself like one of these individuals and not like a person who refrains from performing labor because of a prohibition (Pesachim 51 b).

These are also principles whose scope extends beyond the particular laws of the fourteenth of Nisan (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 468:14; Mishnah Berurah 468:22). Shulchan Aruch HaRav goes further and explains that if it is impossible for the person not to perform work without calling attention to his actions, he should perform the work, because maintaining peaceful social relations overrides the importance of preserving the customs of one’s native land.

Compare to Halachah 16.

Compare to Halachah 11.

Before three days have passed, the eggs would still be eaten by a person who is not fastidious about his food. Therefore, leniency is not granted (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 468:19; Mishnah Berurah 468:34).

Shulchan Aruch HaRav (loc. cit.) interprets the Rambam’s decision as forbidding the placing a chicken on eggs at the outset on the fourteenth of Nisan. The Mishnah Berurah, 468:36, however, mentions opinions that advise leniency in a case of need.

The Rambam begins each collection of halachot by stating the number of mitzvot described in the text. Rabbenu Manoach notes that, in this instance, the number of mitzvot described in these halachot corresponds to the number of chapters in this text.

Whenever the Torah uses the verb לכא (eat) in the context of a mitzvah or a prohibition, it ref ers to the consumption of at least a minimum amount, established by Eruvin 4b as the size of an olive.
It must be emphasized that the measure of a תיזכ (an olive’s size) cannot be determined by measuring an average olive today. Rather, it is dependent on the measure established by the Sages and this is the subject of debate by the Rabbinic authorities. The Pri Chadash (Orach Chayim 486) explains that the Rambam considers an olive. as one third the size of an egg,הציבכ (a more familiar Talmudic measure). In terms of modern measurements, this olive size would be between 16.6 and 24 grams, according to various Halachic opinions.
Tosefot (Chullin 103a) differs, and defines a תיזכ (the size of an olive) as one half the size of an egg (between 25.6 and 36 grams according to the various opinions). With regard to the practical application of the law (halachah l’ma’aseh), the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Orach Chayim 486) advises that in all questions of Torah law, Tosefot’s opinion should be followed. However, in questions of Rabbinic law, the more lenient opinion can be relied upon.

Eating less than this amount of chametz is also forbidden by Torah law. However, there is no punishment for its consumption, nor need a sacrifice be brought as atonement (See Halachah 7).

Any mixture made from grain or grain products that has come into contact with water and was allowed to become leavened. The following (and only the following) five species are referred to as grain: wheat, rye, barley, oats, spelt.

In the mitzvot mentioned above, the Rambam also mentions the prohibition against eating chametz from noon on the fourteenth of Nisan. However, the violation of that prohibition is not punishable by karet.

The prohibition against eating chametz on Pesach is counted as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. See Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 197; Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 19.

Moed Kattan 28a relates that a person who violated a sin punishable by תדכ would die bef ore reaching the age of fifty.
In his commentary on the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 9:6, the Rambam emphasizes that premature death does not represent the totality of the retribution these individuals will receive. In addition, “their souls will be cut off.”
In Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1, the Rambam elaborates on the latter dimension:
The good that is hidden f or the righteous is the life of the world to come... The retribution of the wicked is that they will not merit this life. Rather, they will be cut off and die.
This is the intent of the meaning of the term תדכ in the Torah, as [Numbers 15:31] states: “That soul shall surely be cut off.”

The Rambam adds the word “fixed” to indicate that he is referring to the standard sin offering described in Leviticus 4:27-35, in contrast to the offering to atone for certain sins mentioned in Leviticus, Chapter 5. (See Hilchot Shegagot 1:3.) The latter offering is not “fixed,” but rather is adjustable according to the financial state of the person liable.

Keritot 2a states that a person who unintentionally commits a transgression f or which one would be liable f or תדכ must bring a sin offering in atonement.

Though the Torah specifically mentions “eating,” Chullin 120a equates drinking a liquid made from chametz and water with the f ormer act. In his responsum (Vol. V, 1517), the Radbaz differentiates between mixing chametz with water (the instance in question here) and mixing chametz with other substances, as mentioned in Halachah 6. The punishment of תרכ applies only when nothing else but chametz and water is contained in the mixture.

As stated in Halachah 9, once chametz becomes forbidden on noon of the f ourteenth of Nisan, we may not derive any benefit from it.

for example, to sell it or use it f or purposes other than eating.

The bracketed additions are based on Rashi’s commentary on Pesachim 21b.

The Rambam’s statements are somewhat problematic. Pesachim 21 b records the f ollowing disagreement between the Sages:
Chizkiyah states: What is the source from which we learn that it is f orbidden to derive benefit from chametz? [Exodus 13:3] states: “Do not eat לכאי ()אל chametz”; i.e., it is not permitted [to be used to derive benefit that leads to] eating.
His decision is based on the fact that the T orah uses the expression לכאי.אל Had the Torah not written לכאי,אל we may presume that a prohibition against eating would be implied, but not a prohibition against deriving benefit. This contradicts the opinion of R. Abahu who states: Wherever theTorah states לכאת,אל לכאי אל or רלכאת,אל a prohibition against eating and deriving benefit is implied.
The Rambam’s statements in this Halachah quote the opinion of Chizkiyah. However, in Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 8:15, he quotes the opinion of R. Abahu as accepted halachah.
The Kessef Mishneh resolves the contradiction, explaining ihat in the halachah at hand, there is no diff erence in law between Chizkiyah and R. Abahu. Theref ore, although the Rambam generally accepts R. Abahu’s opinion, in this instance he quotes Chizkiyah’s statements because the manner in which the latter derives the concept is more explicit.

This prohibition is counted as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah: Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 200; Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 20.

This prohibition is counted as one ofthe 613 mitzvot of the Torah: Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 201; Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 11.

S’or refers to leavening agents, notably yeast.

Beitzah aד explains that Exodus 13:7 mentions both chametz (leaven), and שער (S’or, a leavening agent) in the same verse to emphasize that they are identical.
The Ra’avad comments that the equation between the prohibitions against chametz and S’ or is not complete. Among the differences between them are: Once chametz is no longer fit to be eaten by a dog, it is no longer prohibited. In contrast, yeast is never fit to be eaten and is prohibited even in that state. Nevertheless, the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh do not accept his statements.

this is the punishment given for the active violation of any of the Torah’s prohibitions that are not punishable by death.

The Tzafnat Paneach emphasizes that this law applies only to chametz purchased from a gentile. However, once chametz belonging to a Jew becomes prohibited, that Jew no longer has the authority to sell it. Thus, the purchaser will never really become the legal owner of the chametz (See Rashi, Sukkah 35a; Tosefot, Chullin 4b).
The Or Sameach questions how a person can become liable even for chametz purchased from a gentile, but resolves the issue based on the commentary of Rabbenu Nissim (Avodah Zarah, Chapter 3).

The Mishneh LaMelech raises a significant question: A person is not liable for lashes for violating any prohibition which he can correct by fulfilling a positive commandment קתינה (ואל:)השעל For example, if a person violates the prqhibition against taking both a mother bird and her eggs, he can free himself from the punishment of lashes by sending away the mother bird.
Tosefot (Pesachim 29b) states that the prohibition against chametz being seen in one’s property falls into the above category, because one can correct the violation of this prohibition by fulfilling the positive commandment fo destroy chametz. Thus, it appears that a person can never be held liable for lashes for this transgression.
Among the resolutions offered to this difficulty is that of Rav Chayim Soloveitchik, who explains that Tosefot’s statements apply only according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that chametz must be destroyed by burning. However, according to the Sages (whose opinion is accepted by the Rambam, Halachah 3:11), who maintain that chametz can be destroyed by any means, not necessarily burning, the prohibition against possessing chametz is not considered a השעל קתינה.ו
What is the essential difference between these opinions: Rabbi Yehudah maintains that the fundamental aspect of the mitzvah to destroy chametz revolves upon the article itself ;)הצפח (it is a mitzvah to destroy chametz. In contrast, the Sages maintain that the mitzvah centers on the person ;)הרבג (he is commanded to remove all chametz from his possession.
According to Rabbi Yehudah, since the commandment revolves around the chametz itself, its destruction directly “corrects” the sin of its possession. In contrast, according to the Sages, the positive commandment of ridding one’s house of chametz is merely a reinforcement of the prohibition against its possession, and the fulfillment of the positive commandment does not have the power to “correct” the violation of the prohibition.

However, should he remove it from his possession (by giving it to another person or declaring it ownerless) before Pesach, he is not liable even if he does not actually destroy the object.

Sh’vuot 21b states: “The transgression of any prohibition which does not involve a deed is not punishable by lashing.”

“Stripes for rebellious conduct” (מַכַּת מַרְדּוּת) is a punishment instituted by the Sages for violation of a Rabbinic prohibition. A person liable for lashing according to Scriptural Law receives a uniform number of 39 lashes unless he is physically incapable of bearing that number. In contrast, the number of lashes given to a person liable for “stripes for rebellious conduct” is left to the discretion of the court.

itself, in contrast to mixtures of chametz, as explained in Halachah 5.

in contrast to a gentile (Pesachim 28a).

This. prohibition applies to all Jews, not only to the owner of the chametz (Rabbenu Nissim, Pesachim 28). Thus, it is prohibited to buy chametz from a store owned by a Jew who did not observe the prohibition against possessing chametz on Pesach.

Pesachim 29a mentions Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion that the prahibition stems from the Torah itself. However, this opinion is not accepted as halachah.
The Tzafnat Paneach explains that the debate between Rabbi Y ehudah and Rabbi Shimon (who maintains that the Torah does not forbid ·benefiting from chametz after Pesach) revolves around an abstract concept. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that once Pesach comes, chametz itself becomes forbidden and, therefore, can never become permitted again. In contrast, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the prohibition does not affect the essence of the chametz itself. Thus, we are forbidden to benefit from it during Pesach, but after Pesach there is no prohibition.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the prohibition against using a Jew’s chametz after Pesach applies even when the prohibitions against possessing chametz are not violated. See Halachah 4:5.

e.g., he forgot that he possessed it.

The Nodah B’Yhudah (Orach Chayim 20) gives an example of such a case. A thief stole chametz from a person before Pesach and returned it to him after the holiday. Even though the person had no opportunity to destroy it before Pesach, it is forbidden.

intentionally

on the pretense that he had f orgotten about its existence.

Rabbenu Asher and the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol maintain that this principle does not apply until the holiday itself actually begins. Thus, even if chametz became mixed with other substances on the f ourteenth of Nisan, after the time chametz is f orbidden, the mixture is bound by the laws regarding the nullification of forbidden objects םירוסיא ()לוטיב that apply throughout the entire year.
The Kessef Mishneh maintains that a simple interpretation of the Rambam’s statements leads to the conclusion that he accepts this opinion. Though others, among them the Maggid Mishneh, do not accept this view, it is accepted as Halachah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 447:2).

Ordinarily, it is permissible to use a mixture of a prohibited substance and a permitted substance provided that the permitted substance is present in a greater amount, to the extent that the prohibition is nullified ררםיא(.)ל

When the prohibited substance is of the same kind as the forbidden substance (e.g., improperly slaughtered meat mixed with properly slaughtered meat), all that is required to nullify the prohibition is that the permitted substance constitutes the majority of the mixture (Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 15:1).

When the prohibited substance is of a different kind from the permitted (e.g., forbidden fats mixed with grain), the prohibition is ordinarily nullified if the taste of the forbidden article is not discernible, or the quantity of the permitted substance is at least 60 times as great as the forbidden article (ibid. 15:1, 6).

The above principles do not apply with regard to chametz on Pesach. Even the slightest mixture of chametz may not be eaten, nor may benefit be derived from it. In Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot (15:9), the Rambam explains that this stringency is instituted because chametz is a ןיריתמ רל שיש רבד (a substance which later will become permitted).
A ןיריתמ רל שיש רבד which becomes mixed together with a permitted substance of its own kind is never permitted to be used because of the f ollowing rationale: Since its use in its entirety will later become permitted, there is no need to grant a leniency allowing it to be eaten when forbidden.
Similarly, with regard to chametz on Pesach: There is no prohibition against using a mixture of chametz after Pesach. Hence, there is no need to grant permission to eat such a mixture on Pesach itself, even though the quantity of the permitted substance far surpasses that of the chametz.
Furthermore, there is a stricter dimension to chametz than to any other רל שיש רבד.ןיריתמ Generally, a ןיריתמ ול שיש רבד is permitted if it becomes mixed with a substance of another kind to the extent that its taste can no longer be discerned. However, this leniency is not granted regarding mixtures of chametz. Since Exodus 12:20 states: “You must not eat any leaven,” the severity of the prohibition obligates additional stringency.

for example, a dough containing yeast mixed with flour.

for example, a mixture of flour with any other substance.

The Ma’aseh Rokeach explains that this leniency applies whether the mixture occurred after Pesach or on the holiday itself. Nevertheless, the latter point should not be misinterpreted. Should such a mixture be discovered on Pesach, we are obligated to destroy it (Ramah, Orach Chayim 447:1). Nevertheless, if either intentionally or unintentionally, the mixture was not destroyed on the holiday itself, it may be used afterwards.

Pesachim 30a explains that since the penalty is of Rabbinic origin, it was applied only to chametz itself and not to mixtures.

as stated in Halachah 1

A mixture including sour milk, moldy bread crusts, and mineral salts (Pesachim 42a).

beer made of fermented barley, as our beer. Generally, the beer referred to in the Talmud was made from fermented dates (Rashi, Pesachim 42b).

Pesachim 42a also emphasizes that a person transgresses the commandments against possessing chametz if he owns any of the above mixtures.

different from eating chametz itself

The Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 198) and the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 12) consider this as one of the orah’s 613 commandments.
Nevertheless, this decision is a matter of debate among the commentators. The_ Ramban (Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot) does not accept the Rambam’s view, and explains that a person who consumes an olive size of chametz within the specific time period םרפ (תליכא) ידכ described below should be liable for תרכ as described in Halachah 1. See also Halachah 4:8 and commentary.
The Maggid Mishneh supports the Ramban’s view, noting that in Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 15:3, the Rambam himself explains that any person who eats a mixture containing an olive size of a forbidden food within this time period is liable, just as if he had eaten the forbidden food itself.
Based on the explanation of the Tur (Orach Chayim 442), the Drisha and the Pri Chadash interpret the Rambam as ref erring to a mixture to which the chametz does not impart any flavor and is added only for consistency and color.
The Tzafnat Paneach off ers a different interpretation, explaining that were chametz to be mixed with other foods, a person eating the mixture would be liable for תרכ as the Ramban states. However, the Rambam is talking about an instance when flour was mixed with another substance and became leavened as part of the mixture, without ever becoming a distinct entity of its own. The Torah considers this as a different category of chametz and holds a person who eats it liable for a lesser punishment.

It must be emphasized that the measure of a כְּזַיִת (an olive’s size) cannot be determined by measuring an average olive today. Rather, it is dependent on the measure established by the Sages and this is the subject of debate by the Rabbinic authorities. The Pri Chadash (Orach Chayim 486) explains that the Rambam considers an olive as one third the size of an egg (כַּבֵּיצָה, a more familiar Talmudic measure). In terms of modern measurements, this olive size would be between 16.6 and 24 grams, according to various Halachic opinions. Tosafot (Chullin 103a) differs, and defines a כְּזַיִת (the size of an olive) as one half the size of an egg (between 25.6 and 36 grams according to the various opinions). With regard to the practical application of the law (halachah l’ma’aseh), the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Orach Chayim 486) advises that in all questions of Scriptural Law, Tosafot’s opinion should be followed. However, in questions of Rabbinic law, the more lenient opinion can be relied upon. Eating less than this amount of chametz is also forbidden by Scriptural Law. However, there is no punishment for its consumption, nor need a sacrifice be brought as atonement (see Halachah 7).

In converting this figure to modern measures of time, there is also a difference of opinion. The shortest opinion limits this period to two minutes. The most commonly accepted view is four minutes and there are opinions of seven and eight minutes as well.

as explained above.

for as explained in the previous halachah, chametz can never be nullified within a mixture. As the f ollowing halachah explains, eating less than an olive size of chametz is also prohibited by Torah law. Nevertheless,

see Halachah 3.

The laws regarding mixtures of chametz were mentioned in the previous halachah.

The commentaries cite the source for the Rambam’s decision as Yoma 73b, which mentions Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion that all the Torah’s prohibitions against eating apply even when one consumes less than the size of an olive רועיש(,)יצח that measure being significant only as regards punishment.

The Kessef Mishneh questions why the Rambam cites this verse. Yoma (ibid.) derives the prohibition against eating less than an olive size of prohibited substances from another source.
The Radbaz (Responsa, Vol. V, 143) explains that the prohibition against יצחרועיש exists only when eating the prohibited substance itself. In contrast, רועיש יצח. of chametz is forbidden even when mixed with other substances, as explained in the previous halachah. He explains that since deriving benefit from chametz is forbidden according to Torah law, that prohibition also includes eating רועיש יצח in any form.

as stated in Halachah 1.

The Kessef Mishneh questions why the Rambam begins the halachah by describing the prohibition against “even the slightest amount” of chametz, and concludes with the expression “less than the size of an olive.”

Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 8:16 states that anyone who benefits from forbidden substances receives “stripes for being rebellious.” A person who eats less than the size of an olive of chametz also benefits, and hence is liable for this punishment

The Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 199) and the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 485) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. The Ramban and the Ra’avad take issue with this point, explaining that from noon on the fourteenth of Nisan until the beginning of the fifteenth at nightf all, there is a positive commandment to rid one’s house of chametz, but no negative command forbidding the possession or eating of chametz.

The intent of this expression is midday. However, in particular, the term needs elaboration: According to Torah law, a day begins at dawn רחשה(,)תולע the appearance of the first rays of sun, and ends when three stars appear םיבכוכה(,תאצ Berachot 2b). This period is divided into 12 and the resulting figure is referred to as one seasonal hour תינמז(.)העש [Other opinions consider the period to be divided into twelve as beginning at the appearance of the sun, המחה,ץנ and ending at sunset.]
Thus, if dawn were at 5:09 AM and three stars appeared at 6:45 PM, each seasonal hour would be an hour and eight minutes, and the beginning of the seventh hour would be 11:57 AM.

The Rambam explicitly states that lashes are never given for violating prohibitions against benefiting from forbidden articles (Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 8:16). The Mishneh Lamelech (Hilchot Yesodai HaTorah 5:8) elaborates on this principle in detail.

as opposed to the punishment of תרכ for eating chametz within Pesach, as described in Halachah 1.

Pesachim 5a

The Paschal sacrifice could be offered from midday on the fourteenth of Nisan until sunset (Hilchot Korban Pesach 1:1).

This is one of the Rabbinic commandments instituted as a “fence” and safeguard to Torah law.

This is also a “seasonal hour.” Thus, if as stated above, dawn of the fourteenth of Nisan is 5:09 AM and three stars appear at 6:45 PM, the beginning of the sixth hour is 10:49.

as stated in the previous halachah.

in the instance stated above from 9:41 until 10:49.

ln his commentary to the Mishnah (Pesachim 1:4), the Rambam explains that it is possible that a person may err in his estimation of the time by an hour and thus, transgress the Rabbinic prohibition against possessing chametz at the sixth hour.
In a Responsa, the Rambam replies to the following question: The passage in Pesachim which is the source for this halachah appears to imply that a person may make an error of over two hours. Indeed, Rav Yitzchak Alfasi states the matter as such in his halachot. If so, why did the Rambam alter the explanation of the law.
In a reply which reflects his overall purpose in the composition of the Mishneh Torah, the Rambam answers:
1 mentioned a mistake of an hour which is a common error because my intention
in composing this text is to bring the matters closer to our understanding or what
is general practice.

Since the restriction against benefiting from chametz during the sixth hour is only Rabbinic in origin, the Sages did not feel it necessary to forbid benefiting from chametz for another hour because of the mere possibility of error.

A portion of grain given to the priests.

A thanksgiving offering involves 40 loaves, ten of which are leavened (Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 9:17-18).

The Torah refers to Terumah as שדק (sanctified). Similarly, the breads of the thanksgiving offering have a sacrificial status. Therefore,

for the Sages did not desire to relax their prohibition against eating chametz. Nevertheless, the priests were allowed to benefit from chametz during this period, and hence could feed Terumah to their animals.

for it is forbidden to destroy sacred articles unless absolutely necessary. Therefore, Pesachim 13b explains that thanksgiving offerings were not brought on the fourteenth of Nisan. [This law is also relevant at present. From the fourteenth of Nisan until the conclusion of Pesach, the “Psalm of Thanksgiving” is omitted from the morning service.]

because of the Rabbinic prohibition mentioned above. As explained in Halachah 3:11, generally, chametz can be destroyed by other means as well. However, this halachah deals with bread brought as sacrifices; hence, it is proper that they be burned (Rabbenu Manoach).

as explained in the previous halachah.

Thus, during this time, a person may sell his chametz to gentiles or feed it to his animals.

The punishment given for transgressing a Rabbinic commandment. The Lechem Mishneh notes that the Rambam does not prescribe a punishment for a person who breaks the Rabbinic decree against eating chametz during the fifth hour.
The Tzafnat Paneach (Responsum 83) also differentiates between the fifth and sixth hours, calling the former, a Rabbinic safeguard, and the latter, a Rabbinic prohibition.

With regard to the prohibition against benefiting from chametz, see commentary, Halachah 8.

as explained in Halachah 8·.