Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Exodus 20:12 commands: “Honor your father and mother.” Leviticus 19:3 commands: “A man shall fear his mother and father.” See Hilchot Mamrim, Chapter 6, for a discussion of these mitzvot.

All the particulars of this halachah apply only regarding רבו מובהק, a teacher from whom one has learned the majority of one’s wisdom (Bava Metzia 33a; see also the commentary to the next halachah). However, every teacher under whom one has studied Torah deserves a certain measure of respect (Halachah 9).

I.e., he sired him and provided him with his fundamental necessities.

A person’s Torah study and the mitzvot it motivates are the means through which he will attain a portion of the world to come. The reason given by the Rambam has its source in Bava Metzia, loc. cit. Keritot 28a states a different reason: “He and his father are both obligated to honor his teacher.” The Rambam quotes this rationale in Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 209).

Therefore, he should tend to his teacher’s article first. Only after returning it should he tend to his father’s.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah, Keritot 6:9, the Rambam equates removing a load with returning a lost article and redeeming a person from captivity in all respects. Accordingly, as explained below, if one’s father is also a Torah scholar, he should be given priority. However, the Kessef Mishneh explains that where there is no danger to life or property, and only honor is involved, priority should be given to one’s teacher, even if one’s father is a Torah scholar of equivalent stature.

Note Hilchot Matanot Aniyim, 8:10-18, for a discussion of the importance of this mitzvah.

Even if he is not equivalent to his teacher (Kessef Mishneh).

This decision is disputed with regard to the return of a lost object, as explained below. Nevertheless, with regard to the redemption of captives, all agree that because of the life-and-death nature of the question, one’s father is given priority if he has achieved some level of scholarship.

The commentaries have noted the apparent contradiction between this statement and Hilchot Aveidah 12:2, which states:
[The following rule applies when] one sees a lost object belonging to his teacher and a lost object belonging to his father: If his father was equal in stature to his teacher, his father’s [lost article] is given precedence. If not, his teacher’s is given precedence. This applies only to a person’s primary teacher, from whom he learned the majority of his wisdom.
The text of Bava Metzia (loc. cit.), the source for this decision, is closer to the text in Hilchot Aveidah. Indeed, on that basis, the Hagahot Maimoniot and others maintain that our text contains a printing error. However, that conclusion is difficult to accept, since in his Commentary to the Mishnah, Keritot, loc. cit., the Rambam gives a father who is a Torah scholar priority over a person’s teacher, without requiring that the father be of greater stature.
The Lechem Mishneh explains that our text refers to a situation when it is possible to retrieve both lost objects, and the only question is whose is given priority. In contrast, Hilchot Aveidah refers to a situation where it is possible to return only one of the lost objects. Alternatively, the Tashbetz (Responsa, Vol. III, 275) and the Radbaz (Responsa, Vol. V, 1493) explain that here we are referring to a father who has also instructed his son (albeit, not to the same degree as his teacher). In contrast, Hilchot Aveidah refers to a father who has not instructed his son at all.

Avot 4:15.

In his commentary to that Mishnah, Rashi notes that Pesachim 22b equates the deference due a Torah scholar to that due God. Surely, that applies to a sage under whom one has studied.

Sanhedrin 110a. The Rambam quotes the entire passage that follows below in Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 209, in his description of the commandment to honor a Torah scholar.

I.e., “comes out against his decisions... teaching and granting decisions, without his permission” (Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit.).

This verse describes Korach’s revolt. Though ostensibly, the revolt was directed against Moses, the Torah considers it as directed against God, Himself.

Numbers 20:1-3 describes how, because of a lack of water, the Jews began quarreling with Moses.

When the Jews complained against him and Aaron because of a lack of food, Moses gave them this reply.

Explaining his statements and actions in an unfavorable light (Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit.)

In this case as well, the people directed their criticism over a lack of food and water to Moses; however, the Torah considers it as being directed against God.

As mentioned in the commentary to the previous halachah, Halachah 9 states:
When does the above apply? To one’s outstanding teacher (מובהק רבו), from whom one has gained the majority of one’s wisdom. However, a person who has not gained the majority of his wisdom under a teacher’s instruction is considered to be both a student and colleague. One is not obligated to honor him in all the above matters,

And renders halachic decisions. The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 242:7 (see also Kessef Mishneh) explains that the prohibition applies only to rendering halachic decisions on matters directly related to practice. There is no difficulty involved in teaching on a merely theoretical level. However, it is not clear whether the Rambam would accept this view. The Rishon Letzion explains that this prohibition applies even to establishing a house of study under one’s own direction, even though one does not render any halachic decisions.

A person granted permission by his teacher is allowed to render halachic decisions outside his teacher’s presence. The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 242:14) equates a teacher’s granting permission to a student to render halachic decisions to the concept of semichah within its present context (in contrast to its definition in Talmudic times).

It is a mark of disrespect to one’s teacher to set oneself up to be an equivalent authority. Eruvin 62b relates that as long as Rav Huna was alive, Rav Chisda, his disciple, would not render any decisions, even those concerning as obvious a matter as dipping “an egg in a mixture of sour milk and bread.” After the teacher’s death, there is no restriction, provided one is fit to render Torah judgments. See Halachot 3 and 4.

This can be derived from Eruvin 63a, which states that Rav Hamnuna would not render judgments in Rav Huna’s lifetime, even though they lived in different cities.

Even though a person has been granted permission by his teacher to render halachic judgments in general. The only exceptions are the instances mentioned in the following halachah. The Vilna Gaon explains that this includes even teaching a halachic concept incidentally, outside the context of a house of study.

The Rambam defines this term in the next halachah. Ketubot 60b relates that, without considering the question of respect due one’s teacher, there is an additional problem. Spiritual influences will cause a student who renders a halachic judgment in his teacher’s presence to err. The Maharik (Responsum 169) states that if a student has reached a stature approximate to that of his teacher, he is permitted to render halachic judgments even in his teacher’s presence. He points to many Talmudic passages which record halachic decisions given by Resh Lakish in the presence of Rabbi Yochanan (his teacher).Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 242:12) explains that it is possible to say that the Rambam would accept this decision. However, there is no intimation of such a concept in the Rambam’s words.

Eruvin 63a explains that Nadav and Avihu, Aharon’s sons, died (Leviticus, Chapter 10) because of this sin. (See also Berachot 31b.) Rendering a judgment outside one’s teacher’s presence without his permission and rendering a judgment in his presence with his permission, although forbidden, are not deserving of such a punishment. It must be emphasized that today, when most of our Torah knowledge is gained from the study of texts and not from personal instruction, many authorities maintain that this entire concept does not apply. (See Hagahot Maimoniot, Lechem Mishneh, Halachah 5.) However, this opinion is not accepted by all authorities. (See Maharik, Responsum 169.)

A mil is 2000 cubits, approximately a kilometer in modern measure.

Even though he was not granted permission by his teacher, as explained below.

This applies both in his actual physical presence and within a radius of twelve mil.

Eruvin 63a relates that while Ravina was in the presence of Rav Ashi, his teacher, he saw a man tie a donkey to a date palm on the Sabbath. At first, he shouted at him [so that he would know it is forbidden]. When he did not respond, he placed him under a ban of ostracism. When Rav Ashi saw this, he questioned Ravina, because the latter’s actions appeared to be disrespectful. Ravina explained that since a transgression was involved (making use of a tree on the Sabbath), he was obligated to take these steps.

Eruvin, ibid., derives this from Proverbs 21:30: “There is no wisdom, no understanding, and no counsel against God.” The teacher’s honor stems from the honor of the Torah and the honor of God. Hence, in all cases, priority is given to the Torah.

This refers to the first clause, which mentions the license to respond to a question outside one’s teacher’s presence.

Since this is a casual occurrence and his teacher is not present, the student’s response is not considered to be disrespectful.

For this clearly implies that the student considers his authority as equivalent (or at least, similar) to that of his teacher. Doing so without permission is considered to be an affront to his teacher’s honor.

I.e., geographic distance is not a factor.

At which point the honor due him takes on a different dimension.

Since the teacher has given permission for the student to answer questions, doing so is not considered to be an affront to the teacher’s honor. Although a student was not granted permission by his teacher to render halachic decisions during the latter’s lifetime, he may assume that authority after his death.

Avodah Zarah 19b requires a student to be forty years of age before he is considered to be worthy of rendering halachic judgments. In summation of that entire passage, Rabbenu Nissim writes that a Torah scholar is not entitled to render a halachic judgment until he reaches 40 unless there is no sage of equivalent status in his city. He questions why the Rambam makes no mention of this requirement.
Among the resolutions offered for the Rambam’s decision are:
a) The Rambam interprets the passage from Avodah Zarah to mean that only until he is forty years old can a worthy student hold himself back from rendering judgment because of his humility. He does not mention this law here, since the unworthy students have become so numerous, and at present, no worthy student should hesitate from rendering judgment at all (Kessef Mishneh).
b) The Talmud’s decision refers only to a student who received his instruction from an individual teacher. At present, since students gain their knowledge from texts which are always available, there is no such restriction (Lechem Mishneh).
c) The Rambam places the entire emphasis on a student’s capability and does not pay attention to the age factor (Merchevat Hamishneh). Though the latter paragraph is included in this halachah in the published texts of the Mishneh Torah, many manuscripts include it in the following halachah.

The Rambam’s statements are based on Avot 4:9, which uses these adjectives to describe a person who “renders halachic judgments casually.” In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam states that this applies to one who “does not worry about rendering a judgment and proceeds to do so without fear or proper consideration.”

Almost parenthetically, in the midst of his critique of the underdeveloped who render halachic judgments too casually, the Rambam explains that, nevertheless, a person who is qualified should not hesitate from rendering halachic judgments. On the contrary, if he does hesitate, he is also guilty of improper conduct.
[A teacher once told a student to serve as the Rabbi of a particular community. The student protested, claiming that he was afraid of the responsibility of rendering halachic judgments for such a large community. The teacher responded: “Whom should I send? Someone who is not afraid?”]

In Hilchot Sanhedrin 20:8, the Rambam makes similar statements, except that there he qualifies his condemnation of “a sage who is worthy of rendering halachic judgments and refrains from doing so” as applying only when “the generation needs him.” In contrast, if [the sage] refrains because he knows that there is another individual fit to render halachic judgments, “he is praiseworthy.” Similarly, in Hilchot Sanhedrin 3:10, the Rambam praises sages who flee from seeking appointment as judges.

The Rambam is referring to those who are intellectually unaware or spiritually handicapped.

The word עצומים (prodigious) is related to the word עוצם, meaning to close one’s eyes (Kessef Mishneh).

The Kessef Mishneh notes that although the Mishneh Torah was composed as a timeless book of halachah, the Rambam’s harsh criticism here may have resulted from the prevalence of unqualified students who sought rabbinical positions in his time.

I.e., the people of Israel (see Isaiah 5:7).

Sanhedrin 100a describes such a person as an epicurus (nonbeliever). Rashi states that he should state a descriptive phrase before mentioning his teacher’s name, following the example of Joshua (Numbers 11:28), who said: “Moses, my master, imprison them.” Compare to Hilchot Mamrim 6:3, which describes the reverence due to a father: “He should not call him by name neither in his lifetime, nor after his death. Rather, he should say, ‘My father, my teacher.’”

Even if he is in a different country entirely.[The version of the text which follows is based on the Oxford manuscript of the Mishneh Torah. The commonly printed text appears to contradict the passage from Hilchot Mamrim. See also Kessef Mishneh and Taz, Yoreh De’ah 242:4, who have noted difficulties with the printed text.]

I.e., his teacher’s name.

As Hilchot Mamrim (loc. cit.) states: “If his father’s or teacher’s name resembles the name of others, he should change their name.” We find an example of this in the Talmud. Abbaye’s name was actually Nachmani. However, since his teacher, Rabbah’s father had that name, he coined a new name for his disciple (HaAruch).

Hilchot Mamrim (loc. cit.) continues:
It appears to me that one must take care in this regard only when the name is unique.... However, if the name is one which many people are called by — e.g., Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, or Moses —... one may call others by this name outside his [father’s] presence.
Thus, if the teacher’s name is common, it is permitted to refer by name to another person with the same name. Nevertheless, the Rambam’s words raise questions concerning the commonly followed practice of naming a child after one’s parent or teacher, even when that name is unique.

Berachot 27b states: “A person who greets his teacher causes the Divine Presence to depart from Israel.” Rashi explains that this refers to greeting him casually without a show of reverence.

Note Sofrim 18:5, which mentions such a practice.

Bava Kama 73b states that it is improper for a student to greet a teacher at all, as implied by Job 29:8: “The lads saw me and hid.”

Note the interchange between Rabbi Yosse and Elijah, the prophet, quoted in Berachot 3a.
It must be noted that the phrase שלום עליך רבי, “peace be upon you my master,” has been given halachic significance in totally different contexts. For example, a person who takes an oath is allowed to retract his statements if he changes his mind תוך כדי דיבור (in the midst of speaking). What is considered “in the midst of speaking”? The time it takes to say עליך רבי שלום (Hilchot Sh’vuot 2:17). Similar laws apply with regard to witnesses who want to retract testimony made in court.

Rav David Arameah notes that this law is found in the Shimusha Rabbah. His version of that text leads him to the interpretation “before,” rather than “in the presence of” — i.e., first, the teacher should remove his tefillin, and then the student. However, the Shibbolei HaLeket and others render the Shimusha Rabbah as translated here. The Kessef Mishneh cites Sanhedrin 101b, which forbids removing one’s tefillin in the presence of a king. Since Horiot 13a relates that a Torah scholar is more deserving of a honor than a king, there are those who quote this as a source for our halachah.

Note Hilchot Chametz U’Matzah 7:8, which mentions this prohibition even on the Seder night, when it is a mitzvah to recline.

Because, as mentioned in Horiot, loc. cit., a Torah scholar deserves greater honor.

Standing with one’s back to one’s teacher is a mark of great disrespect.

Rashi, Berachot 27a, explains that doing so would be an expression of pride, implying a degree of equivalence to his teacher.

Yoma 37a states: “A person who walks at his teacher’s right is a boor.” Compare with Chapter 6, Halachah 5.

I.e., standing slightly to his side and slightly behind him.

For it is not respectful to be together with him while naked. However, if the teacher needs his assistance it is permitted, as the Rambam states in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:16.

This and the following points are taken from the statements in Kiddushin 31b regarding the respect due a father. Similar statements are found in Hilchot Mamrim 6:3.

This translation is based on the Rambam’s definition of the latter expression in one of his responsa. Others define it as “favor his teacher’s opinion,” explaining that doing so is a mark of disrespect, because it implies that the teacher needs the student’s support.

However, if one is in a different place or after the teacher’s death, one is allowed to voice a different opinion. Note Hilchot Shechitah 11:10, where the Rambam states that his father held a more stringent view, while he, himself, followed a more lenient perspective. (See also Eruvin 32a.)

The Midrash Rabbah, Ruth 4:2, makes similar statements, based on Boaz’s instructions to the elders of Bethlehem.

Derech Eretz Rabbah, ch. 5, states: “A person should not depart from a teacher or a colleague unless he takes leave of him or receives permission from him.”

For turning one’s back to one’s teacher is not a sign of respect.

. Yoma 53a relates that the priests and Levites would follow this procedure when departing from the Temple service. It continues to recommend that the same procedure be adopted by students when departing from their teachers.

Contrast to Chapter 6, Halachah 5, which states that a person is not obligated to stand before a sage who is not his teacher until the latter comes within four cubits of him.

The halachah cited above states that as soon as the other sage passes him, the person may sit. The requirement to show an extra degree of respect to one’s own teacher can be derived from the example of Rabbi Elozar, who showed such deference to his teacher, Rabbi Yochanan (Yoma 53a).

Sukkah 27b relates:
An incident occurred concerning Rabbi Ellai, who journeyed to visit his teacher, Rabbi Eliezer, in Lod during a festival. He told him: “Ellai, you are not one of those who rests on the festivals.”
Rabbi Eliezer would say: “I praise the lazy ones who do not leave their homes during the festivals, because it is written: ‘And you shall rejoice on your festivals.’”
That is unacceptable, because Rabbi Yitzchak taught: What is the source for the obligation that a person has to visit his teacher on the festival? It is written: “Why are you going to him today? It is not a day of rest or a new moon.” From this we can infer that on a day of rest and on the new moon, a person is obligated to visit his teacher. There is no difficulty: the [latter reference] applies when he can go back and forth in one day.
The Rambam interprets Rabbi Yitzchak’s statement simply, because, in a number of other instances (Sukkah 10b, 26a), the Talmud relates how students would visit their teachers on festivals. The Nodah BeYhudah, Orach Chayim, Vol. II, Responsum 94, notes that this law is not quoted by the Tur or the Shulchan Aruch. Therefore, he explains that it applies only in the time of the Temple. In contrast, at present, since the Temple is destroyed and the festival pilgrimages are no longer made, it is improper to make a special visit to one’s teacher. Doing so would imply that one is showing him greater deference than is shown the Divine Presence. This view is not accepted by many commentators. Indeed, the Talmudic references to visiting one’s teacher during the festival cited above took place in the period after the destruction of the Temple.
Based on the statement quoted in Halachah 1, “Your fear for your teacher should be equivalent to your fear of Heaven,” Kin’at Eliyahu explains that there is a parallel between a visit to one’s teacher and a pilgrimage to the Temple.

Honoring a student in the presence of his teacher may be interpreted to be an affront to the latter’s position.

Since the teacher himself shows the student deference, he will not be upset by others doing so (Rashi, Bava Batra 119b).

At that time, it was customary to wear tefillin the entire day. Nevertheless, for some reason, this student was not wearing tefillin.

I.e., a “Canaanite servant,” who is not considered to be a full-fledged Jew.

I.e., he is freed from the performance of any menial tasks which might create this impression.

When a student has the opportunity to appreciate not only the intellectual gifts of his teacher, but the totality of his behavior, he becomes aware of how a Torah lifestyle is an all-encompassing commitment, affecting every aspect of his daily activity. This leads to complete fear of heaven.

Berachot 27b makes this statement regarding one who prays behind his teacher or who greets his teacher in a casual manner. (See Halachot 5 and 6.) The Rambam extrapolates that the concept also applies regarding other acts of disrespect to one’s teacher.

Kiddushin 32a makes similar statements regarding a situation when one saw one’s father transgress Torah law. The Rambam inferred that a similar concept applies regarding one’s teacher (Kessef Mishneh). Others point to Berachot 16a-b, which quotes Rabban Gamliel’s students as reproaching him in such a manner after carrying out a number of deeds which appeared to contradict his teachings.

Sanhedrin 99b, 101a states:
Who is an epicurus (nonbeliever)? A person who relates a concept from another source that occurred to him while he was sitting before his teacher, and states: “This is what is said there,” rather than “This is what you taught us, master.”
Similarly, Mo’ed Katan 7b relates that once Rabbi Chiyya mentioned a teaching before his teacher, Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi, and prefaced his statements with the expression: “You have taught us the following, master.” [From that passage, it appears that Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi had not actually made that statement, and Rabbi Chiyya’s remarks were merely a polite token of respect.]

In general, there is an obligation to mention a concept in the name of its author (Megillah 15a). However, in this instance, there is a particular obligation to do so, lest it be assumed that this teaching was authored by one’s teacher.

With regard to the rending of one’s garments until one’s heart is revealed, see Hilchot Eivel 8:3, 9:2 and Mo’ed Katan 22a.

Mo’ed Katan 26a equates garments torn over a teacher’s passing with those torn over a father’s passing, with regard to the latter law. On this basis, the Rambam concludes that the same principle applies regarding the extent one rends his garments. The Rambam draws this comparison from Elisha’s behavior at the death of Elijah, his teacher. II Kings 2:12 relates: “He cried out, ‘Father, Father, Chariot of Israel,’.... He took hold of his clothes and rent them into two....” (Hilchot Eivel 9:5).
[At present, it is very uncommon to see a student rend his garments at his teacher’s passing. Among the rationalizations for the present custom is the opinion of the Hagahot Maimoniot and the Lechem Mishneh mentioned above, that at present we derive most of our knowledge from books. Accordingly, the concept of a רב מובהק does not apply.]

As mentioned above, the commentaries interpret this to be a reference to all the tokens of reverence and respect mentioned in the previous halachot.

Of the latter. Rashi, Eruvin 63a, defines the term תלמיד חבר (a student and a colleague) as a sage of equivalent stature who has learned some concepts from the “teacher.”

He should show some signs of respect.

When he comes within four cubits of him (Kessef Mishneh)

Bava Metzia 33a praises the students of Babylon for showing these tokens of respect to each other.

I.e., one’s brother, sister, spouse, son, daughter, and parents. Many commentaries note the apparent contradiction between this halachah, which implies that it is sufficient to rend one’s garments a handbreadth, and Hilchot Eivel 9:11, which states that one is obligated to rend one’s garments over the passing of a sage (even if he is not one’s outstanding teacher) until one reveals his heart.
The Kessef Mishneh writes that the law in Hilchot Eivel applies only to a sage accepted as a city’s halachic authority, while the present halachah refers even to a personage of lesser stature. The Lechem Mishneh writes that the law in Hilchot Eivel is incumbent on the common people, while a person who is himself a Torah scholar is not obligated to make such a large gesture of mourning.

Pirkei Avot 6:3 states:
A person who learns from a colleague a single chapter, a single law, a single verse... or a single letter must show him honor. So we find concerning David, King of Israel: He learned from Achitofel only two things, yet he called him his teacher, his guide, and his mentor

Bava Metzia 33a relates that the Sage Shmuel rent his garments at the passing of a student from whom he learned only one concept.

Whose intellect and emotions are well-trained (Rambam, Commentary to the Mishnah, Avot 5:6)

Avot (ibid.) states:
There are seven traits that characterize an underdeveloped person and seven [that characterize]
a wise man. A wise man does not speak in the presence of anyone who is wiser than he.

This is the Rambam’s own addition.

Kiddushin 32a relates a difference of opinion between the Sages concerning this matter. Rav Chisda maintains that a teacher is not entitled to forgo his honor, because the honor is not due him personally, but to the Torah. Rav Yosef maintains that once he has mastered the subject matter he studies, it is considered as his own. Hence, he is entitled to forgo the honor due him because of it.

Kiddushin 32b relates that Ravva and Rav Pappa relaxed certain formalities and served their students at weddings.

I.e., he may restrict these leniencies to only a small number of students or extend them to all, as he desires.

I.e., he must stand in front of him, refrain from sitting in his place, and the like. The student’s failure to do so would be considered an act of disrespect for the Torah.

Our translation is based on Avodat HaMelech. That text notes the apparent redundancy in the Rambam’s statements and explains that even if the teacher is willing to forgo these minimal tokens of respect, the student is obligated to grant them to him, because it is improper that such respect not be shown to the Torah.

Though we should treat all men with respect and affection, a teacher should make a special effort to display these qualities to his students.

Avot 4:15.

Avot D’Rabbi Natan, Chapter 27, quotes as an example of this behavior Moses’ instructions to Joshua (Exodus 17:9): “Choose men for us,” where Moses equated Joshua with himself.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 2.

First, as described in the next halachah, students deepen a teacher’s comprehension of the subject matter. Also, their success and progress generate great feelings of satisfaction.

For a student’s actions and study increase the merit of his teacher, who led him to these righteous paths.

Ta’anit 7a and Makkot 10a quote two different sages who made the following statement.

Ta’anit, loc. cit., makes these statements within the context of the explanation of Deuteronomy 20:19: “Is man a tree of the fields?”

In order to answer a student’s questions, a teacher must probe to the essence of the subject. For himself, he might have been willing to be content with a more superficial understanding. However, when a student questions him, he must penetrate to a deeper comprehension of the matter to provide him with an answer.

In Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 209), the Rambam counts this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. (See also Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvah 257.) In the Guide for the Perplexed (Vol. III, Chapter 36), the Rambam explains the motivating principle for this mitzvah: If respect is not shown to the scholars, their teachings will not be upheld and Torah study will be neglected.

In which case more severe measures of honor are necessary, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 244:1) states that this obligation applies only to another scholar who surpasses oneself in knowledge.

Even if he is young. The definition of a Torah scholar is a matter of debate. Kiddushin 49b states:
“On the condition that I am a student” — we do not say that he must be comparable to
Shimon ben Azzai or Shimon ben Zoma. Rather, anyone who can be asked about any
matter in the area where he is studying and can reply....”
On the condition that I am a wise man” — we do not say that he has to be like the
Sages of Yavneh.... Rather, anyone who can be asked about any Torah subject and
can reply...
The Rambam quotes this statement in Hilchot Ishut. Nevertheless, since he does not specify such a definition here, in Hilchot Talmud Torah, one may therefore assume that in this context, he does not limit himself to that definition. The Siftei Cohen (Yoreh De’ah 244:2) addresses himself to this issue and explains that here we are referring to a Torah scholar who possesses a prodigious amount of knowledge and is considered unique within his community.

Kiddushin 33a states that once the scholar comes this close, standing before him can easily be appreciated as a sign of respect. Note the contrast between this halachah and the measure of respect due one’s own teacher, as mentioned in Chapter 5, Halachah 7. Once the scholar passes, one may sit, in contrast to the requirement regarding one’s teacher mentioned in the previous chapter.

I.e., in the inner rooms where people stand undressed. The general principle followed is: in the places where it is permitted to recite words of Torah, one must honor a scholar; where one may not recite words of Torah, one should not honor a scholar (Kessef Mishneh).

And in these places, there is no honor in standing for a person. This law is not mentioned with regard to one’s own teacher, since, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 6, one may not enter a bathhouse together with one’s teacher (Rav Kapach).

The commentaries disagree whether a craftsman may interrupt his work to show a scholar this token of respect or not. The Kessef Mishneh states that a craftsman is permitted to do so, and rules accordingly in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 244:5). In contrast, Rabbenu Nissim (Chulin 54b) maintains that a craftsman is not permitted to stand, because the general impression that will be created — i.e., some craftsmen standing in honor of the scholar and some not — will not be favorable.
This difference of opinion exists only with regard to craftsmen working independently. All authorities agree that a craftsman hired by others may not stand. His time is not his own, and by standing, he steals time from his employer.

The Lechem Mishneh objects to these statements, noting that the Rambam’s phraseology is not an exact quote from Kiddushin 33a, which is his source. Nevertheless, it can be explained that the Rambam is not quoting that Talmudic passage, but rather explaining a concept that can be inferred from it.

Kiddushin (ibid.) states that we would not suspect that a person would fail to honor a scholar when the latter is actually close to him. Rather, this implies that it is forbidden for one to turn away when he sees the scholar approaching from afar, so that when the latter approaches, he will not be obligated to stand.

Who probes man’s heart and understands his inner feelings.

Kiddushin 33b derives this concept through the exegesis of the verse from Leviticus quoted above.

Kiddushin 33a promises a scholar long life for following this practice.

Kiddushin (ibid.) mentions that Abbaye and Rabbi Zeira would follow this practice. The Bnei Binyamin notes an apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s statements and Bamidbar Rabbah 15:17. There, the Midrash relates that Rav Abba Cohen would always avoid crowds, lest he trouble them by causing them to rise. When he mentioned this to Rabbi Yosse, the son of Rabbi Zevida, the latter reprimanded him, explaining that he would be doing them a great favor by having them stand before him, because this would lead to the fear of God, as implied by Leviticus (loc. cit.): “Stand up before a white-haired [man]... and you shall fear your God.”
The Bnei Binyamin explains that everything depends on the scholar’s intention. A righteous man who is not at all motivated by self-interest may appear before crowds. However, a person who is concerned with his own pride should avoid them.

I.e., we do not say that since the scholar is seated on his animal, it is not considered as if he is walking. However, in other contexts — see Hilchot Kri’at Shema 2:2-3 — the Rambam considers riding as comparable to sitting.

Kiddushin 33a relates that Abbaye would stand as soon as he saw the donkey of Rav Yosef, his teacher, approach.

This addition was made on the basis of the Hagahot Maimoniot, who maintains that this law does not apply when each individual is journeying separately, involved in his own affairs.

Following slightly behind him. For one who walks alongside his teacher is considered a boor (Yoma 37a; see Kessef Mishneh and also Chapter 5, Halachah 6 above).

Yoma (loc. cit.) derives this formation from the pattern in which the angels who visited Abraham (Genesis, Chapter 18) walked. This formation was also employed by the High Priest and his subordinates when he would serve in the Temple.
The Pri Chadash and other commentaries question the Kessef Mishneh’s interpretation. One point of difficulty with the halachah in general is that it appears to refer to one’s personal teacher, and thus it would more appropriately have been mentioned in the previous chapter.

This halachah in its entirety is quoted from the Midrash Hagadol, Shmot 33:8. (With slight textual differences, it also appears in Kiddushin 33b.) Nevertheless, the question arises: Why does the Rambam mention this particular clause? It appears redundant in light of Halachah 1. Perhaps his intent was to emphasize the contrast between an ordinary scholar and others of greater stature.

The sage second in stature to the nasi, and who acts as the latter’s assistant (Hilchot Sanhedrin 1:3).

I.e., as soon as the av beit din appears on the horizon.

In Hilchot Sanhedrin (loc. cit.), the Rambam describes this position as follows: The wisest sage among them is appointed to be the head. He is the Rosh Yeshivah. He is the person whom the Sages referred to as nasi in all the sources, taking the place of Moses, our teacher

Kiddushin (loc. cit.) derives this from Exodus 33:8, which relates that: “Whenever Moses went out to the tent, all the people would rise. Each person would stand near his tent, gazing at Moses until he came to the tent.”

I.e., although people are obligated to honor the nasi, should he desire to forgo those honors, there is no objection. In contrast, a king may never forgo his honor and must constantly be treated with reverence. (See Hilchot Melachim 2:3.)
Kiddushin 32b relates the following discussion of this law:
An incident occurred when Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Tzadok were
participating in the wedding feast of Rabban Gamliel’s son, and Rabban Gamliel
poured drinks for them. He offered a cup to Rabbi Eliezer, but he refused to accept it.
He offered a cup to Rabbi Yehoshua and he accepted it.
Rabbi Eliezer told him: “Yehoshua, what is this? We are sitting and Rabban Gamliel
is pouring drinks for us!”
He replied to him: “We find [a precedent where] a person of greater stature served
others. Abraham surpassed all others in his generation, yet [Genesis 18:8] relates that
‘he stood over them [to serve them’]. Do not think that he thought they were angels;
he thought they were Arabs. If so, why shouldn’t we let Rabban Gamliel serve us?”
The above laws refer to instances when a scholar is sighted in the public thoroughfare. The following laws apply when he enters the house of study (Hagahot Maimoniot; see Horiot 13b).

At present, when we are used to auditoriums with fixed seats, the setting for this law is difficult to picture. However, in Talmudic times, the people would sit on the floor. When the av beit din arrived, the people sitting between the entrance and his place would stand and create a path for him two rows wide.

On the surface, it is difficult to understand why the av beit din is given lesser honor in the house of study than in the marketplace. Perhaps the reason is to minimize the neglect of Torah study. Horiot 13b relates that, originally, the people would show the same token of respect to the av beit din and other sages as to the nasi. In order to preserve the authority of his office, Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel, the nasi, ordained that a lesser degree of respect be shown to all other sages.

The house of study, a path is not made for him.

Avodat HaMelech notes that this figure is not found in Horiot 13b, the source for this law. Rather, it was added by the Rambam, based on the logic that no less respect should be paid to a scholar when he enters the house of study than is paid to him in the marketplace.

And allow him to pass.

I.e., there are many students whose presence is an invaluable asset to their teacher, for through their questions they enable their teacher to penetrate to the core of the subject matter. Therefore, they are allowed to proceed to their places at the front of the house of study, even if doing so is somewhat discourteous to the people who have already taken places.

Indeed, Berachot 43b lists this as one of six undesirable tendencies that a scholar should guard himself against acquiring.

Doing so is considered an act of laziness, which causes unnecessary difficulty to the people sitting there.

I.e., to use the toilet (Horiot loc. cit.). Alternatively, the term לצורך can be translated as “for a necessary purpose” — i.e., for a purpose that benefits the people at large (Tosafot, Yevamot 105b).

However, if he leaves for other reasons, he should try not to return to his original place.

Are not mature enough to merit a distinguished position in the house of study in their own right are allowed to sit before their parents as a gesture of respect to the high communal position the latter have attained (Rashi, Horiot 13b).

Horiot (ibid.) states that the children are allowed this privilege only during their father’s lifetime, but not afterwards.

Avodat HaMelech notes that the latter word is the Rambam’s addition to this teaching quoted from Kiddushin 33b. The addition implies that this restriction applies only to those students who are constantly in attendance at the house of study. In contrast, those who come from time to time must stand as often as necessary. (See also Tosafot, Kiddushin, ibid.)

In the house of study. In contrast, if a student sees his teacher in the marketplace, he is obligated to show him respect at every opportunity, lest others consider him to be disrespectful to his teacher (Kessef Mishneh).

Tosafot (loc. cit.) notes that the expression אינו רשאי can be rendered “is not obligated,” and suggests that meaning in this context. However, since rising more frequently can be construed to be an affront to God, it is questionable whether that interpretation can be accepted.

I.e., twice daily we accept the yoke of God’s service by reciting the Shema (Kessef Mishneh).

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 244:1) explains this as referring to a man of seventy. Others, emphasizing that the Rambam uses the term “exceedingly advanced age,” see that as a reference to Gittin 28a, which describes a person ninety years old with such terminology.

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 244:1) emphasizes that there is no obligation to stand before a wicked man. The commentaries have raised questions concerning this law, noting that it reflects a difference of opinion between two Talmudic sages, and yet the Rambam’s statements do not conform exactly to either position. Kiddushin 32b states:
“Stand up before a white-haired [man].” Does this apply even with regard to a
common person of advanced age? The Torah continues [mentioning] “an elder.” [The
term] “elder” refers only to a wise man, as implied by [Numbers 11:16]: “Assemble seventy of Israel’s elders.”
Rabbi Yosse HaGalili states: [The word] “elder” means “one who has acquired
wisdom...”
Issi ben Yehudah states: “Stand up before a white-haired [man]” — Every white-haired man is
included therein.
The Talmud explains that although the first opinion is similar to that of Rabbi Yosse HaGalili, there are minor differences between them. From the Rambam’s statements in Halachah 1, it would appear that he follows Rabbi Yosse HaGalili’s position. However, this halachah appears to echo Issi ben Yehudah’s view.

However, anyone other than a scholar is obligated to rise to his full height (Tur, Yoreh De’ah, 244).

Kiddushin 33a relates that Rabbi Yochanan would stand in deference to an aged gentile, explaining: “How many experiences has he gone through!”

Kiddushin (ibid.) notes that Rabbah would follow this practice.

Kiddushin (ibid.) notes that Abbaye would follow this practice.

The commentaries question: If, in fact, the verse refers even to gentiles, and Rabbi Yochanan would follow such a practice, why doesn’t the Rambam obligate standing in the presence of an aged gentile?

However, the scholars must bear their share of the cost of such projects (Hilchot Shechenim 6:6). The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 243:1-2) adds that they are obligated to pay only the cost of the raw materials. They need not hire workers to take their place. This applies only when the work is performed by the members of the community. However, if workers are hired by the community to complete the task, the scholars must also pay their share.

In Hilchot Shechenim (6:6-7), the Rambam gives some examples of such projects: fixing roads and thoroughfares and digging irrigation channels.

Bava Batra 8a explains that if the common people see the scholars performing menial tasks, they might cease to respect them.

In Hilchot Shechenim (loc. cit.), the Rambam explains the rationale for this law. Torah scholars are freed from any obligation incurred to ensure the city’s protection, because they are protected by the merit of their study.

The order in which this law is taught is somewhat questionable. Bava Batra 8a, the source for these laws, mentions a scholar’s lack of obligation to contribute to a present for the king as part of his absolution from taxes, and not as a leniency granted to him because “his Torah protects him.”

Bava Batra (ibid.) also mentions that Artashta, the Persian king who sent Ezra to rebuild Jerusalem, freed all those involved in this holy work from all forms of taxes and tribute. (See Ezra 7:24.) The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 243:2) states that even if the gentile government levies taxes on a Torah scholar, the community is obligated to pay the tax on his behalf. The commentaries question whether there are scholars today who are worthy of these benefits. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 243:2) explains that these privileges should be extended only to those scholars who devote the majority of their time to Torah study and limit their business involvement to the minimum necessary to earn a livelihood. Other authorities have voiced other opinions, some stricter and some more lenient. (See Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 243:7; Choshen Mishpat 163:14.)

יתנו, translated as “will give,” can also be interpreted as “study,” alluding to the verse’s connection with scholars.

An allusion to the payment of taxes.

An allusion to the scholars’ exemption.

Rav Kapach notes that in the original, there is no vav before the word שרים. However, the quotation of the verse in Bava Batra (loc. cit.) does include one.

Although the Rambam harshly forbade a Torah scholar from taking money from charity because of his knowledge (see Chapter 1, Halachah 7 and Chapter 3, Halachah 10), he allows a scholar these privileges in earning his livelihood. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 243:4) states that this law applies only when the market is controlled by Jews. However, if there are gentiles who will sell their goods regardless, the other Jewish merchants are not obligated to risk suffering a loss.

I.e., a case to be tried at court.

Sh’vuot 30a relates:
Rav Ullah, the son of Rav Ilai, was involved in a judgment before Rav Nachman.
Rav Yosef sent [Rav Nachman a message:] “Ullah is our colleague in Torah and
mitzvot.”
Rav Nachman said: “Why did he send this [notice] to me? To curry favor before
me.” Afterwards, he said: “[His purpose was] so that I try his case first.”
Tosafot questions this teaching, noting that there is a positive commandment to try every case in the order that it comes before the court. Two resolutions are offered:
a) If both cases come to the court at the same time, the court should try the case of the scholar first;
b) The positive commandment to honor a scholar overrides this positive commandment. Hence, the scholar’s case is tried first, even if it came before the court later. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 15:1) accept the latter position. (See also Hilchot Sanhedrin 21:6.)

Sh’vuot (loc. cit.) states: “’And the two men shall stand’ (Deuteronomy 19:17): it is a mitzvah for the litigants to stand.” Nevertheless, as a token of respect for the scholar, he is invited to sit. The same privilege is also granted to the litigant opposing him, because otherwise, this gesture would be considered to be an unfair advantage granted to the scholar.

Sanhedrin 99b equates such sinners with apikorsim — total unbelievers.

Shabbat 119b. This refers to the destruction of the city by the Babylonians.

Although the teaching is quoted from the Talmud, the Talmud does not itself define which of the verse’s clauses refers to the disgrace heaped upon the scholars. It is interesting to note that the Rambam’s interpretation differs from that of Rashi — who equates the Sages with “His prophets” — and of the Maharsha, who interprets “the messengers of God” as the reference to the Sages. (See also Guide for the Perplexed, Vol. II, Chapter 42 and Lechem Mishneh.)

Which precedes the list of curses to befall the Jews.

See Sifra, Bechukotai.

In Hilchot Teshuvah 3:14, the Rambam mentions the sin of disgracing the scholars in a list of transgressions concerning which he writes: “a person who frequently commits these sins will not receive a portion in the world to come.”

I.e., even though, as stated in the previous halachah, a person who disgraces a scholar will receive the ultimate punishment after his death, he is also subject to punishment in this world.

The Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 334:96, states that proper witnesses are not required, and even the testimony of women or slaves may be accepted.

The details of this ban are discussed in the following chapter — in particular, in Halachah 4 there. An example of a scholar placing individuals under such a ban for embarrassing a scholar can be found in Mo’ed Katan 16a.

The Beit Yosef, Yoreh De’ah 243, cites an example of the public announcement of such a ban from Kiddushin 70a. However, the section he quotes is not mentioned in our text of the Talmud.

A Talmudic measure equal to approximately 168 grams.

Hilchot Chovel UMazik 3:5-6 relates:
One who embarrasses a scholar is obligated to pay him the full extent of the damages
even though he embarrassed him only verbally. The decision has already been
rendered that whoever embarrasses a scholar — even with words alone — is fined..
eight and three quarter sela’im of gold.
It is an accepted tradition that this fine is collected everywhere, whether in Eretz
Yisrael or in the Diaspora. Decisions of this nature were frequently rendered before
us in Spain. Some scholars would forgo payment, and that is commendable. Others
would demand payment, but accept a compromise. However, the judges would tell
the person who caused the embarrassment: “you are obligated to give him a litra of
gold.”
The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 243:7) states that, at present, there are no scholars whose stature is that great that they are to be awarded “a litra of gold,” if they are publicly shamed. However, a person who embarrasses a scholar is obligated to pay damages. This is the general opinion of most authorities at present. However, in the generations before the Rama — and in certain communities, even after his decision — this fine was, in fact, imposed if someone publicly embarrassed a scholar.

The use of this term implies that this is a lesser transgression than embarrassing a scholar in his lifetime (Rivash, Responsum 120).

Eduyot 5:6 relates that the court imposed such a ban when someone made disparaging remarks about the scholars Shemayah and Avtalion. (See also Berachot 19a.)

The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Rambam’s statements appears to imply that the ban is not lifted until the offender actually appeases the scholar. He questions that decision, since it is possible that even though the offender genuinely asks for forgiveness, the scholar will refuse to grant it. Note Hilchot De’ot 6:6 and Hilchot Teshuvah 2:10, which advise a person who has been wronged to be generous and forgive the offender for his actions.

Acting on his own initiative, without bringing the matter to a court.

The Kessef Mishneh states that this expression implies that although a scholar can be placed under ban for embarrassing a scholar of greater stature, that ban may not be issued by the scholar alone, and can be put into effect only by a Rabbinic court. Nevertheless, he postulates that if the scholar who was embarrassed is of far greater stature than the scholar who made the insult, the former is allowed to issue the ban himself, without a court.

See Kiddushin 70a.

The Rama (Yoreh De’ah 243:8) mentions a difference of opinion whether, at present, there are scholars of the stature that allows them to issue a ban of ostracism without taking the matter to court. See also Pitchei Teshuvah 243:7.

I.e., the ban may be imposed without following the standard judicial process.

Even individuals who are not scholars worthy of sitting on a Rabbinic court (Chapter 7, Halachah 7).

The Rambam does not require the offender to ask forgiveness from the scholar (see Hilchot Teshuvah 2:11) or repent. Perhaps this leniency is granted because the ban was imposed by the scholar himself and not by an objective court.

If the scholar was publicly disgraced, disciplinary action must be taken, or else the honor of the Torah would suffer.

The Mishneh LeMelech notes that this leniency is granted only regarding matters between man and man. If a person is obligated to be placed under a ban of ostracism for matters between man and God — e.g., uttering God’s name in vain — the ban must be put into effect even though the individual repents. (See also Tosafot, Yevamot 22b.)

I.e., the case was not tried in court, but the teacher issued the ban of ostracism on his own initiative, as mentioned in the previous halachah.

For they are obligated to protect his honor. The Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah 334) maintains that one can infer from the Rambam’s words that the ban need not be observed by the other scholars, even those of lesser stature than the teacher, who are not his students.

For he is not obligated to honor his student to this extent.

Of a lesser Torah stature (Beit Yosef, Yoreh De’ah 334)

As mentioned in the following halachah, this applies only when the student imposed the ban to protect his honor. If he imposed the ban because the person violated a prohibition, his teacher would be obligated to observe it.

Whom all Israel are obligated to honor. This law is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 334:21. Note the commentary on Halachah 6, which questions the applicability of the term nasi within the context of our present-day experience.

Even an esteemed scholar.

For he is not obligated to honor others to this degree. In this case as well, were the ban imposed for other reasons, the nasi would be bound by it.

The Beit Yosef and the Rama (Yoreh De’ah 334:20) maintain that even a city whose Torah stature exceeds that of the city which issued the ban is obligated to abide by it.

Because he treated them disrespectfully.

But other cities of lesser Torah stature are required to observe it (Rama, ibid.).

Leniency that frees certain people from abiding by the requirements of the ban of ostracism

The Hagahot Maimoniot notes that a ban can be imposed only because of disrespectful behavior. However, this punishment may not be administered for failing to honor the scholar.

Many commentaries have noted the difficulty in the Rambam’s words. This statement implies that there is a certain leniency with regard to a ban imposed because of the embarrassment of a Torah scholar. However, the first of the 24 reasons the Rambam lists for imposing a ban of ostracism that must be observed by every Jew is disgracing a Torah scholar, implying that it is the most severe (see Avodat Hamelech). Among the resolutions of the difficulty offered is that there is a difference between a ban imposed by a court according to Torah law and a ban issued by a scholar individually to protect his own honor.

Mo’ed Katan 17a relates that Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi’s maidservant declared a ban of ostracism on a person, and the entire Jewish people observed that ban for three years.

See Chapter 7, Halachah 7.

Most of the instances where the Talmud mentions a ban of ostracism concern men. However, a number of cases (see Rosh HaShanah 31b, Mo’ed Katan 16b, and Nedarim 7b and 50b) also involve women.

Berachot 19a mentions that this is the number of reasons for which a person can be placed under ban, but explains only several of these twenty-four reasons. A significant number of reasons are also mentioned in the Jerusalem Talmud (Mo’ed Katan 3:1); however, the majority of the reasons mentioned by the Rambam below were gathered by him from many different passages throughout the Talmud.

Berachot 19a relates that a ban was imposed on a person for disgracing the scholars Shemayah and Avtalion, even after their passing.

Kiddushin 70b relates that Rav would impose a ban of ostracism for this reason.

See Kiddushin 28a.

See Bava Kama 112b and also Hilchot Sanhedrin 25:8.

Eduyot 5:6 relates that Eliezer ben Chanoch was placed under ban for raising difficulties regarding the practice of washing one’s hands, a Rabbinic ordinance.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Rambam uses the expression, “treats with disrespect.” If a person transgresses a command, he is punished by other means. However, ostracism is imposed for causing others to view a Torah or Rabbinic law disparagingly.

Bava Kama 113a serves as the source for this law. Note the slight difference between the Rambam’s statements here and those in Hilchot Sanhedrin loc. cit.

This concept, with these two examples, is quoted from Bava Kama 15b.

Bava Kama 112a mentions this point. Tosafot postulates that this restriction applies only when a Jewish colleague is prepared to pay the same amount as the gentile. However, if the gentile offers more than the Jew, the owner is not liable to sustain the loss. However, in Hilchot Shechenim 12:7, where the Rambam quotes this law, he does not make such a provision. Furthermore, in several of his responsa, he forbids selling property that borders on the property of a fellow Jew to a gentile, even when substantial losses are involved (Rav Kapach).

See Bava Kama 113b. In Hilchot Sanhedrin 26:7, the Rambam writes:
Whoever has his case judged by gentile judges and courts... is wicked and is considered as if
he cursed... the Torah of Moses.... If gentiles rule his society and his fellow litigant is strong-
willed, and it is thus impossible to collect [one’s due] from him according to Jewish law, he
should call him to a Jewish court first. If he refuses to come, he should receive the court’s
permission to preserve his property through secular law

But not a priest who slaughters for his personal use (Hilchot Bikkurim 9:8)

The foreleg, jaw, and the maw, which must be given to a priest from every animal slaughtered. (See Deuteronomy 18:3; Hilchot Bikkurim, Chapter 9.)

Chulin 132b.

See Pesachim 52a.

The Or Sameach explains that the Rambam added this clause because he had already stated that a person who disgraces a Rabbinic ordinance is liable to be banned. Hence, he clarifies that, at present, since we use a fixed calendar, the observance of the second day of the festivals is no longer considered to be a Rabbinic decree and is only a custom. (See Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 6:14.)

Pesach eve is singled out because the Paschal sacrifice was offered at that time. (See Pesachim 50b; Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 8:17.)

See Nedarim 7b; Hilchot Sh’vuot 12:9.

This is derived from the Jerusalem Talmud (Mo’ed Katan 3:1), which quotes how, in a time of drought, Choni HaM’agel drew a circle on the ground and called out to God: “I will not move from here until You provide rain.”
Shimon ben Shetach told Choni that his act warranted ostracism, because if God had not answered his prayers, many of the people would have lost faith. Nevertheless, Shimon ben Shetach did not enforce that punishment after he saw how God answered Choni’s prayers.

Berachot 19a relates how Todus of Rome instituted the custom of roasting lambs on Pesach eve in a manner similar to the Paschal sacrifice. The sages told him that, were it not for his other personal virtues, he would have been placed under ban, for it is possible that someone would actually consider his lamb as a Paschal sacrifice.

Berachot 63a relates that Isaiah 2:3: “Out of Zion will come forth the Torah...” implies that the above decisions must be made in Eretz Yisrael, and prescribes this punishment for someone who makes them in the Diaspora.

Note the commentaries to Leviticus 19:14 and also Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 232).

Mo’ed Katan 17a relates that Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi’s maidservant issued a ban of ostracism on a father who physically beat his son after the latter had reached adulthood. By doing so, he was goading his son into rebelling against his father. This ban was respected by all the scholars.

See the Jerusalem Talmud, Mo’ed Kattan 3:1. See also Hilchot Teshuvah 4:1.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes Sanhedrin 25a as teaching that Rav Nachman administered such a punishment. However, in our texts of the Talmud, that passage does not mention ostracism specifically.

See Chullin 18a. In Hilchot Shechitah 1:26, the Rambam states that this halachah applies even if later the knife was inspected and found to be kosher. The Kessef Mishneh notes that leniency is taken in this matter, because it has become customary for ritual slaughter to be performed only by experts. (See Tur, Yoreh De’ah 18.)

Niddah 13b; for by doing so, he leads himself to immodest thoughts, at the very least. (See also Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:18.)

After divorce, a couple should have as little contact with each other as possible, lest the familiarity they previously enjoyed lead them to intimacy outside the bounds of marriage. (See also Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:27.)

Mo’ed Katan 17a relates how Rabbi Yehudah passed a ban of ostracism on a sage for this reason.

Mo’ed Katan 17a relates the following episode: Resh Lakish was employed as a watchman and noticed a thief. Although he shouted at him, the thief did not stop. Therefore, Resh Lakish proclaimed: “You are under a ban of ostracism.”
The thief replied: “Although I am obligated to repay him, I am not obligated to be ostracized. You should be ostracized.” When the matter was related in the House of Study, the scholars stated that Resh Lakish’s ban was not justified, but the thief’s was.
The Ra’avad and other commentators mention other acts in which a ban of ostracism is in order. Indeed, in a number of cases (e.g., Hilchot Gerushin 13:20), the Rambam himself mentions this punishment. The commentaries explain that the Rambam limits himself to 24 instances, because that is the figure mentioned in the Talmud. However, these can be considered to be general categories including other instances as well.

In contrast to a ban issued against a common person, which is announced publicly (Chapter 6, Halachah 12).

Mo’ed Kattan 17a relates that a special ordinance was passed to this effect in Usha.

The first king of the ten tribes, who set up idols and led the people away from Torah practice. (See also Hilchot Teshuvah 3:10.)

Mo’ed Kattan (loc. cit.) states that a scholar is given this consideration even if he repeatedly violates the same transgression. The Kessef Mishneh notes that a ban of ostracism was passed against Rabbi Eliezer (see Bava Metzia 59b), despite his being one of the more prominent Sages. Nevertheless, he explains that this measure was taken lest strife and division arise among the Jews. Alternatively, even that ban was carried out in a private manner.

As interpreted by Mo’ed Kattan (loc. cit.).

The phrase is borrowed from II Kings 14:10.

I.e., a scholar of lesser stature than those mentioned in the previous clause (Kessef Mishneh).

Before he would pronounce a ban of ostracism against a fellow Sage, Mar Zutra would pronounce such a ban against himself, so that he would appreciate the suffering his colleague would undergo (Mo’ed Kattan loc. cit.).

Rav Pappa would boast that he never took part in such an activity (ibid.).

The minimum punishment received for violating one of the Torah’s prohibitions.

The punishment received for violating a Rabbinic prohibition or failing to perform a positive commandment (Chulin 14b). Pesachim 52a relates that a Rabbinical student was punished in this manner for traveling beyond the permitted limits on the second day of Shavuot.

I.e., they mention the person’s name.

The commentaries have not found a direct source for this or the other pronouncements quoted in this and the following halachah. Rav Kapach suggests that the Rambam is quoting a tradition conveyed to him verbally by his teachers.
The Rambam uses the Hebrew שמתא, suggesting that its implication is the same as נידוי. The Tur, Yoreh De’ah 334 differs and explains that they represent two different levels of bans. According to the Tur, there are three bans, one more severe than the other: נידוי,שמתא and חרם. The Rambam differs and recognizes only two levels: נידוי and חרם.

A more severe ban, as explained in Halachah 5.

I.e., if a court made such a pronouncement, it would have these implications. (See also Hilchot Sanhedrin 26:3.)

I.e., if the ban is lifted in the person’s presence.

The Mordechai (Mo’ed Kattan 935) quotes a responsum of the Geonim which also mentions forgiveness in the statement nullifying a ban. Note also the similarities between these expressions and those used in the release of oaths; see Hilchot Sh’vuot 6:5 and the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim 10:8.

Note Halachah 13, which states that a ban that was issued in a person’s presence must be lifted in his presence.

There is no list of such practices in previous sources. Rather, the Rambam compiled this list himself based on various Talmudic passages.

See Hilchot Eivel 6:2.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that Bava Metzia 59b relates that when Rabbi Eliezer was notified of the ban issued against him, he removed his shoes. He explains that this was also the common practice in Spain for a person placed under a ban of ostracism.

Recited before grace (see Hilchot Berachot 5:2).

I.e., a minyan for communal prayer or the like. See Hilchot Tefilah 8:4-6. The Kessef Mishneh explains that this is an essential element of a ban of ostracism. The purpose of such a punishment is to separate the person from the entire Jewish community. Including such a person as part of a minyan would defeat that purpose. This concept is not explicitly mentioned in our texts of the Talmud. Nevertheless, the Ba’al Halachot Gedolot quotes the following passage from Mo’ed Kattan 16a, which is lacking in our versions of that text:
How do we know that he is separated from the community? [Ezra 10:8] states: “Whoever does
not come... his property will be expropriated and he will be set apart from the community of
exiles.

This is derived from Bava Metzia 59a, which relates that when Rabbi Akiva visited Rabbi Eliezer after the latter was placed under ban, he would keep this distance from him.

To work for other Jews.

I.e., have other Jews to work for him. Mo’ed Kattan raises questions about other restrictions — e.g., may a person who was ostracized be greeted or may he wear tefillin — and leaves them unresolved. The Rambam’s failure to mention them indicates that he takes a lenient view. Rav Yitzchak Alfasi and Rabbenu Asher explicitly adopt the lenient position.
Nedarim 20b states that a person who is ostracized is forbidden to engage in marital intimacy. The Rambam quotes this law in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 21:12.

Eduyot 5:6 relates how the Sages carried out this practice.

The following restrictions are not mentioned explicitly in the Talmud.

I.e., nothing is done in his honor. However, his family may be paid the respects given to other mourners (Beit Yosef, Yoreh De’ah 334).

Indeed, the nature of a חרם is so severe that there are many great sages who would not even utter that word, but would refer to it only by allusions or numerical equivalents.

Because any contact with him and others is discouraged.

For he is still considered a Jew and is obligated in all the mitzvot.

Since he is still considered to be part of the Jewish people, he is granted the possibility of earning a livelihood.

Generally, a ban of ostracism is imposed for this amount of time.

Should the ostracized person repent for his previous behavior and seek to be released, the ban may be lifted even before this time period elapses. Indeed, this is the goal of the ban: to motivate him to alter and improve himself with respect to his previous deeds.

In Hilchot To’en ViNitan 1:5, based on Kiddushin 12b, the Rambam states that if a person does not repent after a ban of ostracism, he is beaten. There are other slight differences between these two halachot.

Avodat HaMelech notes that in Hilchot Sanhedrin 25:11, the Rambam writes that excommunication is imposed after only one thirty-day period of ostracism. However, the difference between these halachot can be resolved, for the latter halachah refers to a case when a warning was issued before the first ban of ostracism was imposed.

From the phraseology used by Sanhedrin 68a, which mentions the release of Rabbi Eliezer ben Hurcanus from his ban upon his death, the Rambam learns that releasing a person from a ban of ostracism is comparable to the release of vows. As explained in Hilchot Sh’vuot 6:5, the latter procedure requires three judges.

The Lechem Mishneh notes that the people who release a person from the ban need not be of the same stature as the court who imposed the ban. However, he qualifies that statement, allowing the leniency only after the person has already corrected his behavior. Also, this only applies when the ban was imposed because of improper behavior and not because one spoke arrogantly to a scholar.

“Who has studied both the Written and Oral Law, can appreciate the motivating principles of the law, and compare one case to another” (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 5:1).

In Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:11, the Rambam states that a judge with unique expertise can adjudicate cases requiring a court of three. Nedarim 8b states that such license is granted with regard to releasing a person from a ban of ostracism.

Rav Kapach notes that many ancient manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah do not include these words. He maintains that their addition is a printing error.

The Ra’avad maintains that generally the court that releases a person from a ban must include the same number of judges as the one which imposed the ban. However, he suggests that this might apply only during the ban. However, once the thirty-day period of the ban is concluded, even a lesser number of judges may release the ban.

Nedarim 8b explicitly states this leniency.

Our text follows the practice of most printed copies of the Mishneh Torah, which skip the number 8 entirely, and proceed from Halachah 7 to Halachah 9. The Rambam La’am suggests that perhaps this omission is made because the letter ח is the first letter of the word חרם, which means “excommunication.” It is not proper that the chapter that deals with such a severe punishment should contain any allusion to it.

Our text follows the practice of most printed copies of the Mishneh Torah, which skip the number 8 entirely, and proceed from Halachah 7 to Halachah 9. The Rambam La’am suggests that perhaps this omission is made because the letter ח is the first letter of the word חרם, which means “excommunication.” It is not proper that the chapter that deals with such a severe punishment should contain any allusion to it.

To a different place.

Even common people of lesser stature, as mentioned in the previous halachah.

However, if he does not improve his behavior, the ban must be observed by all Jews, even the nasi, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 14.

The commentaries explain that this refers to a person who insulted a Torah scholar. However, when the ban was imposed for other reasons, it can be lifted by others if the person placed under ban improves his behavior, as explained in the previous halachah.

Who, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 13, is not bound by a ban of ostracism imposed to protect the honor of other Sages.

I.e., so and so will be ostracized if he does the following....

This law is derived as follows: Makkot 11b teaches that Judah’s promises to Jacob concerning Benjamin (Genesis 43:9) implied that Judah would be placed in ostracism if he did not bring Benjamin home. Although Judah fulfilled that condition, our Sages explain that he remained in ostracism — even in the spiritual realms — until Moses prayed for him. (See also Rashi, Deuteronomy 33:7.)
Tosafot (Makkot, loc. cit.) explains that this principle applies only when — as in the case of Judah — the person who issued the conditional ban does not have the power to fulfill the condition himself. However, if he can fulfill that condition — e.g., a person who says: “May I be in ostracism if I do not put on tefillin today” — the ban does not take effect if the condition is fulfilled.
[The Ra’avad and other commentaries raise the question: Why didn’t Judah, Jacob, or any other of the brothers lift the abovementioned ban? Furthermore, the narrative in Genesis does not appear to imply that it was observed by Joseph and his brothers. The Tashbetz (Vol. III, Responsum 182) explains that Judah’s words implied only a ban of ostracism in the spiritual world, but not a ban in the simple sense. Therefore, it could not be nullified until it took effect; nor were Judah’s brothers obligated to observe it.]

Our translation is based on two of the Rambam’s responsa, which explain the phrase על דעת in this manner.

The She’iltot D’Rav Achai Gaon (Miketz 329) explains that this applies even when the ban was issued by a minor or a slave.

Nedarim (loc. cit.) concludes: We do not say: “A person who is imprisoned cannot release himself from jail.”

The She’iltot D’Rav Achai Gaon (Miketz 329) explains that this applies even when the ban was issued by a minor or a slave.

I.e., it is not sufficient for him to ask that person to release the ban (Tosafot, Nedarim 7a).

I.e., who study Talmud (Kessef Mishneh).

The circumstances imply that perhaps, the person was banned by a Divine decree. Therefore, such a ban is more severe than a ban imposed by a person on the material plane.

Approximately four kilometers in contemporary measure.

A lesser rung of study.

For the Divine Presence rests among any group of ten Jews, regardless of their level of learning.

As is a normal ban, as mentioned above, Halachah 7. The She’iltot D’Rav Achai Gaon (loc. cit.) explains that even though the three people do not have the effect of ten, they are able to draw down Divine mercy.

Commenting on Nedarim 7b, Rabbenu Asher explains that this gesture is made as a token of respect for the person who was ostracized. Since the shame of ostracism was imposed upon him in his presence, as a courtesy that ban is also lifted in his presence. (Note that Rabbenu Nissim offers a different explanation.) After the fact, when a ban issued in a person’s presence is lifted outside his presence, the person is released from the ban.

There is no preference for either alternative.

Note Halachah 6 which implies that the standard span of a ban of ostracism is 30 days. The Hagahot Maimoniot explains that the latter figure refers to the minimum length of a ban imposed on one who embarrassed a scholar. However, a ban imposed for other reasons can be lifted immediately, as stated in this halachah. Nevertheless, other commentaries note that the Rambam himself does not explicitly make such a differentiation and, hence, they do not accept it.

This latter clause is not mentioned in Nedarim (loc. cit.), the source for this halachah. However, all commentaries agree that it is an explanatory and understandable addition.

Mo’ed Kattan 16a mentions how a ban of ostracism was maintained for three years.

Even if the punishment is not extended to excommunication, as mentioned in Halachah 6.

Without issuing a ban of ostracism beforehand.

Because this person violated the ban of ostracism, an even more serious punishment may be imposed upon him. Nevertheless, there is no requirement that this punishment be imposed for this reason (Mo’ed Kattan 16a).

See the Rambam’s Commentary to Avot 1:1.

As explained in detail in Chapter 6, Halachot 12-14.

The verse continues: “for often, your heart knows that you have also cursed others.” One should realize how a person’s statements are often made in anger without any serious intent.

Yoma 23a states:
Those who are insulted and do not insult [others], who hear their shame and do not respond,
who serve [God] out of love,... concerning them [Judges 5:31] states: “And those that love
Him will be as the sun as it comes out in its might.”
See Hilchot De’ot 2:3 where this quote is explained in detail

Megillah 28a relates that, before retiring at night, Nechunia ben Hakanah and Mar Zutra would forgive anyone who wronged them. Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi incorporated a declaration to that effect in his text of Kri’at Shema al HaMitah.

The Jerusalem Talmud, Mo’ed Kattan 3:1, relates that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi related that he had never issued a ban of ostracism.

I.e., fewer than ten Jews witnessed or were informed about the incident.

Although Kiddushin 32b states that a Torah scholar is entitled to forgo his honor, this refers only to instances where he releases a person from the obligation to show him tokens of respect. However, he does not have the right to forgive a public display of disrespect towards him. (See Chapter 5, Halachah 11 and our commentary.)

And not his personal honor.

If people see that Torah scholars can be treated with disrespect, they will lose deference for the totality of Torah and mitzvot.

Yoma (loc. cit.) states that “Any scholar who does not seek vengeance and carry enmity like a snake is not a [genuine] scholar.”
The comparison to a snake is significant. Based on Ecclesiastes 10:11, Arichin 15b explains that a snake does not bite for his own benefit, but merely as a messenger of God. When a Torah scholar seeks revenge, he must have a similar intent. He should have no thoughts of his personal honor or pride. Rather, his intent should be the defense of the Torah’s honor (Chanukat HaTorah).

Hilchot Teshuvah 2:10 relates:
It is forbidden for a person to be cruel and refuse to be appeased.... When a person who
wronged him asks for forgiveness, he should forgive him with a complete heart and a willing
spirit. Even if he distressed and wronged him very much, he should not seek revenge or bear a
grudge.