Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 224) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 594) consider this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Chapter 5, Halachah 4.

I.e., the judges must have semichah. The witnesses must have given a warning to the transgressor before he violated the commandment, and the witnesses are thoroughly questioned and cross-examined (Kessef Mishneh). Note the explanation in Halachah 4.

I.e., the matter is not dependent on whether or not the Temple is standing, or whether or not the High Court holds session in the Chamber of Hewn Stone.
This concept is not accepted by all authorities. The Sefer Mitzvot Gadol and the Sefer Yirayim differ and maintain that lashes are administered only during the time the High Court holds session.

I.e., not only in Eretz Yisrael.

For the prooftext cited in the previous verse speaks of “the judge,” i.e., a judge who has been granted semichah. See also the Introduction to the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah which explains the order of the tractates of the Talmud and states that Sanhedrin is followed by Makkot, “for it is not within the province of any man other than the judges to administer punishment and lashes.”

I.e., judges who did not receive semichah. Thus in the present age, lashes are not administered, because there are no longer any judges who have been granted semichah, as explained in Chapter 4.

I.e., judges who have not received semichah.

As reflected by the Rambam’s statements in Chapter 24, Halachot 4-9, all judges have the right to administer punishments that are not mandated by the Torah if they think that it is necessary to do so. One of the punishments that was traditionally given by the Rabbis - even during the time when the judges possessed semichah was “stripes for rebellious conduct.” This punishment is given to individuals who violate a Scriptural commandment without acknowledging a warning, disobey a Rabbinic commandment, fail to fulfill a positive commandment, or perform other undesirable acts. Unlike the lashes administered by Scriptural decree, there are no firm and fast rules governing this Rabbinic punishment.

In a manner similar to the warning issued for transgressions punishable by execution. See Chapter 12, Halachah 2.

See Hilchot Edut 3:2.

To cite an example of a negative commandment that can be corrected by a positive commandment: It is forbidden to take a mother bird while she is sitting on her chicks. Instead, one must first drive the mother bird away and then take the chicks. Even if one transgresses and takes the mother bird together with the chicks, it is possible to correct one’s transgression by fulfilling the positive commandment and sending the mother bird away. If the transgressor in fact corrects his violation, he is not punished by lashes (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., the witnesses administering the warning can never be certain that the violator will receive punishment.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that in Hilchot Sh’vuot 5:2, the Rambam issues an opposite ruling concerning an instance when a warning that is delivered with uncertainty. For example, a person takes an oath dependent on the actions of others, in which instance, the witnesses can never give a warning with certainty, because the others may carry out the actions mentioned in the oath. The Rambam explains the distinction between the two cases as follows. In the instance mentioned in this halachah, the prohibition is explicitly mentioned in the Torah. With regard to Hilchot Sh’vuot, by contrast, there is no such explicit prohibition. The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam’s source for making such a distinction.
The Radbaz explains the Rambam’s position as follows: In other cases, when a warning is delivered with uncertainty, the uncertainty involves whether the transgression will be violated or not. In this instance, the transgression will certainly be violated, the question is whether the person will correct the violation or not.

As Leviticus 22:28 states, it is forbidden to sacrifice an animal and its offspring on the same day. That prohibition is punishable by lashes. When, however, the animal(s) are sacrificed to a false divinity, the same act involves a greater transgression. See also Hilchot Shechitah 12:7.

Makkot 13b interprets Deuteronomy 25:2 as teaching that a person is responsible for only one type of punishment for every transgression he performs.

Since he was not given a warning for execution, that punishment cannot be administered. Hence, it is as if he performed an act that was punishable only by lashes.

Which is forbidden by Leviticus 3:17 in contrast to other types of fat that may be eaten.

In which they are forbidden, as stated in Deuteronomy 22:9.

The term zonah refers to a woman who engaged in relations with a person prohibited to her. A priest is forbidden to engage in relations with such a woman, as stated by Leviticus 21:7.

For as Gittin 2b states, the word of one witness is accepted with regard to prohibitions. See also Hilchot Shegagot 3:2.

Whenever there is a contradiction, the testimony of two witnesses is necessary to establish a prohibition.

After his transgression, his denial of the prohibition is of no consequence. If, however, he remains silent originally, but afterwards protests before he transgresses, the protest is of consequence (Kessef Mishneh).

The pillar was two cubits (a little more than a yard) high. Thus the transgressor is required to bend over when receiving the lashes as stated in Halachah 10. See Makkot 22b.

At the collar.

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Sotah 1:5). Others translate nifrimu as “bursts at the seams.”

Makkot 23a derives this concept from the fact that directly after mentioning the obligation to give lashes, the Torah mentions the prohibition against muzzling an ox.

Makkot, loc. cit., derives this from Isaiah 1:3: “An ox knows its owner and a donkey, its master’s feeding trough.” Let one who recognizes his master’s feeding trough take retribution from one who does not.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam writes that the person administering the lashes should not be an abuser with sadistic tendencies.

Makkot 23a derives this concept from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 25:2: “He shall strike him before him according to his wickedness with the appropriate number.” Lifanav translated as “before him” can also mean “on his front.” And bimispar, translated as “with the appropriate number” can be interpreted as “with a double number.” Thus the verse can be understood as intimating that the person receives lashes on his front and twice that number elsewhere, i.e., on his back (see Torah Temimah).

Some have explained that this is required for the safety of the person receiving the lashes. The judge must pay attention and make sure that the person receiving the lashes is not endangered. Others explain this as a measure of empathy. Even though the punishment the judge ordained is justified, he must himself see the pain it causes.

For then, the judge would not be able to focus on either of them.
Our translation and explanation follow the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah. There are, however, other versions of the text which view this as a separate clause. They read: “‘And he shall strike him’ - This teaches....” According to this version, the concept is derived from the use of a singular form for the object. Significantly, the Sifri derives this concept through a similar process of exegesis, but focuses on a different verse.

Keritot 11a derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 19:20. That verse refers to lashes. One of the words in it, bikoret, can be interpreted as meaning “while reciting.”

The passage begins with the verse the Rambam cites and continues, concluding at Deuteronomy 29:8. In the standard published text of the Talmud, the Mishnah (Makkot 22b) also mentions that the judge should recite the verse (Psalms 78:38): “He, being merciful, pardons sin....” The Rambam does not mention this concept here and it is not included in his version of the Mishnah. (Nor is it present in the version of the Mishnah found in the Jerusalem Talmud.)

By the time he finishes the passage.

Needless to say, he is not liable for intentional murder, for he had no intent to kill him. He is not even liable for exile for unintentional killing. As Makkot 8a explains, from Deuteronomy 19:5, it is evident that a person is liable for exile when he performs an activity that he has the choice to perform or not. Implied is that if he is commanded to perform that activity - as in the present instance - he is not liable if a person dies as a result.

See the first halachot of the following chapter.

Since he is not commanded to administer this blow, the principle stated in the previous halachah does not apply. He is nevertheless only exiled and not judged for capital punishment, because he did not intend to kill the person receiving the lashes. Hence, it is a case of accidental death.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 300) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 495) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

But not a gentile. Since a servant is obligated to perform some of the mitzvot, he is placed in this category (Hilchot Chovel UMazik 5:3).

A p’rutah is the smallest amount of money that is considered significant. The court will not deal with any smaller amount of funds (see Hilchot Gezeilah 7:3; Hilchot Toen ViNitan 3:6). Hence if the damages are not worth that amount, there is no financial penalty and the offender receives lashes instead.

Of the two penalties, Ketubot 32b states that he should be required to make financial restitution rather than receive lashes. This concept is derived from the exegesis of Leviticus 24:19 which uses the term yinatein, meaning “be given.” Implied is that the punishment involves “something given from hand to hand,” i.e., money. This concept applies not only in this instance, but in every case where a person is liable for both lashes and financial payment for the same act.
This is a Scriptural decree. Even if the victim states: “I don’t desire financial reimbursement. I want to see him receive lashes,” the offender must make financial reimbursement and is not lashed (Radbaz).

Hilchot Na’arah Betulah 1:11; Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:9.

I.e., the court makes an estimation how many lashes he personally can bear as the Rambam continues to explain.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Makkot 3:12, according to Rav Kappach’s translation in contrast to the version of the standard text), the Rambam explains that this wording indicates that an individual assessment should be made for each person.

Sanhedrin 10b states: “The Torah says (Deuteronomy 25:3): ‘And your brother will be humiliated before your eyes.’ [Implied is that] even after he is lashed [and ‘humiliated’], ‘your brother’ will remain alive ‘before your eyes.’”

Makkot 22a. The Rambam’s wording indicates that the reduction of the number of lashes to 39 is a Rabbinic decree. According to Scriptural Law, according to this understanding, a person capable of bearing the full measure of 40 lashes would be given that amount, our Rabbis, however, reduced that number. This interpretation is strengthened by the continuation of that passage (ibid.b) which states: “How foolish are people? They rise before a Torah scroll, but do not rise before a sage of stature. For the Torah states: ‘Strike him 40 [times],’ and our Sages came and reduced the number by one.” This quote indicates that the Sages made the reduction on their own initiative.
The commentaries, however, question that interpretation, noting that the Sages (Makkot, ibid.) base their ordinance on the phrase: “by number 40...” which they interpret to mean: “a number close to 40.” [Had the verse stated “40 by number,” the implication would have been exactly 40. The reverse order leaves the matter open to interpretation.] The implication is that the reduction is mandated by Scriptural decree.
The Radbaz explains that, according to the Rambam, the Sages are explaining the rationale for the Torah’s ruling. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the exegesis is merely an asmachta, i.e., an allusion created by the Sages, but the ordinance is their own. Alternatively, the intent is that the Rambam refers to any concept derived through the principles of exegesis as midivrei sofrim, “from the words of the Sages,” even though concepts derived in that manner have the strength of Scriptural decree, as explained with regard to the consecration of a woman through a gift of money (see Hilchot Ishut 1:1 and commentaries).

For this reason, if the person is given a fortieth blow and dies, the attendant is not exiled (see the conclusion of the previous chapter), for he did not give him more than he was originally ordained to receive by the Torah (Radbaz).

This is one of the reasons why, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1, it is desirable for the judges to have a certain amount of medical knowledge (Radbaz in his gloss to that halachah).

For lashes are administered in sets of three, one on his front and one on each of his shoulders, as stated in Chapter 16, Halachah 9.

For the extra lash might endanger his life.

In all cases, the number is rounded off to the lower figure, lest giving him the greater number of lashes endanger his life.

I.e., 39.

In this instance, as well, the additional lashes endanger his life. Moreover, we do not say that he should be given time for his wounds to heal and then be given the remainder of the lashes. Instead, he is released entirely.

Once he has already been humiliated by being lashed, his sin is atoned. There is no need for a second estimation and lashing (Makkot 22b).

Even if he was not lashed at all, since he was judged to be lashed on that day, that judgment is binding (Makkot, ibid.). This explanation follows the Kessef Mishneh’s understanding of the way the Rambam interprets that passage. Other commentaries differ with the Rambam and offer alternative explanations.

Hence it is implicit that if his physical state changes, the ruling should also be adjusted. Needless to say, this ruling also applies if he becomes weaker and fewer lashes must be administered.

E. g., he ate non-kosher meat and shaved his beard. Alternatively, he shaved his beard several times.

E. g., he plowed a field with a donkey and ox together in the Sabbatical year.

But instead, they considered each transgression individually.

The commentaries note that the Rambam changes the wording of his source, Makkot 22b which speaks of 42 lashes. Significantly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Makkot 3:12), the Rambam follows the wording of that source.
Among the explanations offered is that the Rambam does not accept that number, because he maintains that according to Scriptural Law, a person is obligated to receive 40 lashes for a transgression; it is only Rabbinic decree that caused the number to be reduced to 39 (see the notes to Halachah 1). Therefore when 40 is deducted from 42, only 2 are left. Now two lashes cannot be divided in groups of 3. Hence no additional lashes would be given him. Similarly, with regard to 43 and 44, since they cannot be divided into groups of three, they could not be the number of lashes the Sages intended. Instead, the lowest number which allows for a set of three above 40 and is itself divisible by three is 45 (Or Sameach).

I.e., not only two, but as many sets of lashes for which he is obligated.

I.e., the shame he feels at losing control of his excretory functions in public is sufficient for him to receive atonement.

I.e., we do not say that since he lost control of his faculties because of weakness, he will certainly not be able to bear the lashes. Instead, we give him the amount of lashes it was estimated that he could bear (Radbaz).

The verse cited states: “And he shall be beaten... and your brother shall be degraded....” Implied is that only when the degradation comes about because of the beating itself is he absolved (Makkot 23a). The Radbaz explains the rationale for this concept. There are certain people who cannot control themselves because of fright. That, however, is not proof that they are unable to bear the pain of lashes.

As explained in the previous halachah.

He is not given any further lashes. Even though one might think that he would be absolved for only one transgression, since the two were combined together, once he is discomfited, he is absolved for both.

For by being lashed, he has already been publicly disgraced. If Divine Providence saw to it that the lash became severed, we assume that he has already received sufficient punishment.

In this instance, we do not say that both sets of lashes are considered as a single unit.

See Chapter 16, Halachah 8.

For his fleeing in disgrace and fear is sufficient degradation to atone for his transgression. Even though the lashing had not started before he fled, he is absolved entirely. The fact that he fled is shameful enough to absolve him.

The commentaries question what is the “state of acceptability” to which the Rambam is referring. It would appear that the intent is that the person is now considered as acceptable as a witness or to take an oath. There is, however, a question if repentance is also required for him to become acceptable for these matters. See Hilchot Edut 12:4 and notes.

On the above verse, the Sifri comments: “Throughout the entire day, [the Torah] calls him ‘the wicked one.’ After he is lashed, he is called ‘your brother.’”

Premature death in this world and the soul being "cut off' in the world to come, as stated in Hilchot Teshuvah 8:2.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Makkot 3:16), the Rambam writes: “Lashes and repentance atone for [a sin punishable by] kerait.

We do not say that as a measure of respect for his position, he should be judged by a court of 23 judges. For if he is held liable, he will be lashed in their presence and this will be a public dishonor [Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin 2:1)].

The Jerusalem Talmud (loc. cit.) explains that this comes as a result of the holiness with which the High Priest is endowed. It is a microcosm of God’s holiness and hence, like His holiness cannot be nullified.

The nasi (see Chapter 1, Halachah 3).

The Jerusalem Talmud (loc. cit.) suggests that this is because he will take revenge and kill the judges who ordered his punishment. The Kessef Mishneh advances a different version of that text which states that they will be killing him, i.e., the shame of having to stand before the judges who humiliated him will be too great.
The Radbaz (Responsum 2001) cites one of the Rambam’s responsa which states that a judge from the Sanhedrin is never removed from his position unless he violates a prohibition in public. The Radbaz, however, explains that for a nasi, any transgression is equivalent to a transgression in public.

Hence he should not be given the lesser position. This principle applies, not only in this context, but in others. See Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 3:16, Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 4:21.

The person is not absolved from punishment by an earthly court because he will later receive kerait, because if he repents he will not suffer those punishments (Makkot a, b).

For if the transgression is punishable by execution, even if the person is not executed, he does not receive lashes for it. Indeed, even if he does not receive a warning that the prohibition is punishable by execution, but rather that it is punishable by lashes, he does not receive lashes (ibid.).

In contrast to Karait, the soul of a person who violates such a prohibition is not “cut off” in the afterlife [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 9:6)].

Produce from which terumah and the tithes were not separated.

The heap offering taken from crops which must be eaten when both the terumah and the person partaking of it are ritually pure.

A mixture of wool and linen in the same garment.

For, in this context, speech is not considered a deed.

See Chapter 21, Halachah 7.

Makkot 13b derives the above concepts from the fact that the punishment of lashing is followed directly by the prohibition (Deuteronomy 25:4): “Do not muzzle an ox while threshing.” Just as muzzling an ox is a prohibition that involves a deed, so, too, all other prohibitions punishable by lashes must involve a deed.

In this instance, a explicit prooftext teaches us to make the exception. Exodus 20:7 states: “God will not absolve anyone who swears by His Name in vain.” Sh’vuot 21a interprets the verse as implying that God will not absolve such a transgression on His own. Nevertheless, if an earthly court punishes a transgressor, this sin may be absolved.

In this instance, lashes are given because the person’s words have an effect comparable to deed. Through his statements, the sanctity of the offering is transferred from one animal to another (Temurah 3b).

Temurah, loc. cit., explains that the obligation for lashes is derived from Deuteronomy 28:58-59 which states: “If you will not be careful... to fear the glorious and awesome name God... God will render awesome blows upon you.” Through exegesis, the latter phrase is interpreted as referring to lashes. If a person does not fear God’s name - as evidenced by his using it to curse a colleague - he is punished by lashes.
The enumeration of the transgressions that do not involve deed and yet are punishable by lashes is quoted from Sh’vuot 21a. On that passage, Tosafot notes that lying witnesses and a person who spreads a malicious report about his virgin wife are also punished by lashes.

As mentioned above, this applies even if the transgressor received a warning that the transgression is punishable by lashes.

As mentioned by Makkot 4b and Ketubot 32b, whenever an act is punishable by both a financial obligation and lashes, the person is held obligated financially and is not lashed.

After stating that prohibition, Deuteronomy 22:6 continues: “You shall certainly send forth the mother.” This is interpreted, not only as advice to be applied before taking the chicks, but also a means to correct and atone for one’s conduct (Rashi, Makkot 17a).

After stating that prohibition, Leviticus 19:9 continues: “Leave them for the poor and the stranger.” This also is not merely advice to be fulfilled at the outset, but a means of compensating and atoning for transgression.

The wording is slightly misleading. The intent is that one is no longer able to fulfill the positive commandment, e.g., the mother bird died, or the grain from the corners was consumed. As long as it is possible to perform that commandment, the person is not lashed even if he shows no inclination of performing that commandment. For the possibility always exists that he will change his mind.

This term is defined in the following halachah.

Lashes are not administered, however, when a prohibition is understood from a positive commandment, but is not mentioned explicitly, e.g., marriage between a High Priest and a non-virgin. He is commanded to marry a virgin (Leviticus 21:13). Hence we assume he should not marry a non-virgin (see Hilchot Ishut 1:8). Since that prohibition is not mentioned by the Torah, its violation is not punishable by lashes. See Chapter 19, Halachah 3.

This prohibition forbids several unconnected matters, including: a) not to partake of the meat of an animal until it is dead; b) not to partake of the meat of a sacrifice before its blood was offered on the altar; c) not to bring the meal of consolation to the relatives of a person who was executed; d) that a court who condemned a person to die should not eat on the day of his execution; e) that a “wayward and rebellious son” should not partake of the food purchased from the money he stole from his parents (see Sanhedrin 63a).
Since it includes so many different matters, it does not resemble the prohibition against muzzling an ox, which as stated above is the archetype for prohibitions punishable by lashes. That prohibition is explicit and focused on one deed. Any prohibition that is not does not receive the same punishment (Pesachim 41b).

The Paschal sacrifice.

Thus there is no difference whether the person ate partially roasted meat, cooked meat, or both together. He receives only one set of lashes. The Ramban in his Hasagot to the Sefer HaMitzvot, General Principle 9, differs and maintains that the person is given two sets of lashes if he eats partially roasted meat and cooked meat together. He considers the two as separate prohibitions.
In contrast to the prohibition: “Do not eat upon the blood,” a person is liable for lashes for transgressing the prohibition against partaking of the Paschal sacrifice in this manner. It is not entirely a prohibition of a general nature, for both dimensions are explicitly mentioned in the Torah.

Fresh grain that may not be eaten before the offering of the Omer on the sixteenth of Nisan. See Hilchot Ma'acholot Assurot, Ch. 10.

The various different prohibitions against black magic and occult arts mentioned in the verse.

And hence, one might think that one would receive only one set of lashes even though one violated all the transgressions. This, however, is not so, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

Although there are not separate prohibitions for all the different occult arts mentioned in the verse in Deuteronomy, since there are separate prohibitions for these two - and they are mentioned in the midst of the verse, we assume that similar concepts apply with regard to the other prohibitions [Sefer Mitzvot (General Principle 9), based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Sanhedrin 7:5).]

E. g., the prohibition against a priest marrying woman unfit for him (Leviticus 21:7; Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 17:2).

The word kipah literally means “dome,” i.e., a small room with a dome.

Our translation follows the version found in authentic manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard published text has a different and more difficult to understand version.

Which will swell in his digestive tract.

And he dies.
Since he brazenly violated a prohibition punishable by kerait time after time, the court causes him to die. This applies only when he violates the same prohibition repeatedly, but not when he violates different prohibitions punishable by kerait.

In apparent acquiescence to the warning.

I.e., stating that he is committing the transgression in full awareness of the punishment involved.

See Chapter 12, Halachah 2; see also Chapter 16, Halachah 4 with regard to lashes.

And thus he is not considered as having accepted the warning.

In the manner described in the previous halachah.
As an allusion to this practice, Sanhedrin 81b cites Psalms 34:22 which Rashi interprets as meaning “the evil of the wicked will cause him to die.” Since the person is a repeated sinner, he is considered as worthy of death. See also Hilchot Rotzeach 4:8 which speaks about a killer being placed in a kipah.

See the notes to Chapter 16, Halachah 3, for a definition of this term.

And since they were given a warning, the transgression was at least partially intentional.

In this instance, a warning is not necessary. If the court is convinced that the violation was intentional, it may administer this punishment without a warning having been given.

As reflected by the discussion of this practice by the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 73:17 and the Siftei Cohen 73:16, this punishment may also be given in the present age, and in fact, was used as a deterrent in previous generations. Today, however, it is no longer employed by most courts.

Sanhedrin 81 b cites a non-literal interpretation of Numbers 4:20 as an allusion to this concept.

The prohibition against blaspheming God's name is described in Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, Chapter 2. In this instance, since the transgressor involves the name of a false divinity, he is not liable for the violation of that prohibition. Instead, he is punished in this manner.

If, however, the woman observes the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants, this punishment does not apply [Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 12:5; the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 9:6).]

The Rambam deals with the question of relations with an idolatrous gentile woman at length in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, Chapter 12. There he explains that if a Jew marries such a woman, their relations are punishable by lashes. If the relations are carried out in public (i.e., they seclude themselves in the presence of ten Jews), while the couple are in the midst of relations - but not afterwards - a zealous person may slay them. The classic example of such actions is the slaying of Zimri by Pinchas, as related in Numbers, Ch. 25.

Indeed, if the court is asked what to do, they should not respond. The action must be the result of the spontaneous feelings of the zealous person who cannot bear the knowledge that such an act is taking place (ibid.:5).

This transgression is punishable by death at the hand of heaven. Hence the violator would be given lashes by the court (see Chapter 19, Halachah 2).

So that there will be no impurity in that holy place.

This punishment is derived from an extension of the interpretation of Leviticus 22:9: “They will die... because they have defiled it.”

As indicated by Deuteronomy 19:15: “According to the testimony of two witnesses... will a matter be established.”

Instead, we follow the principle (Yevamot 25b) that a person is considered to be an involved party and his own testimony should not be used against him. Only with regard to financial matters, do we follow the principle (Bava Metzia 3b): “The admission of a witness is equivalent to the testimony of 100 witnesses.”
The Radbaz explains the difference between the two realms of judgment as follows: A person’s life - and even his physical body - are not his own possessions, but God’s. Hence he is not making an admission concerning what belongs to him. His financial resources, by contrast, are his own and he may do with them what he desires.

For benefiting from the spoil of Jericho (Joshua, Ch. 7).

For killing King Saul (II Samuel, Ch. 15).

I.e., he was instructed to do so by a Divine order which he received through the prophetic spirit (Bamidbar Rabbah 23:6). Thus this practice should not be emulated in the future.

Joshua is also considered as a king (see Hilchot Melachim 1:3).

As stated in Hilchot Melachim 3:8-10, a king has the right to execute people even when they are not liable for execution by the court. The commentaries have raised a question with this explanation, because as stated in that source, a king may only execute violators through decapitation, and Joshua had Achan stoned to death. The Minchat Chinuch states that when the king executes a person to strengthen Torah observance, his fiat is not limited and he may use any means of execution he desires.

I.e., although one might question the above explanation - for it does not necessarily apply with regard to lashes - one must realize that the ruling is not dependent on the explanation, but is instead a Divine decree, which we may or may not comprehend intellectually.