Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 253:18) states that this law applies whether the dying man specifies “this maneh,” pointing to the money in question, or “a maneh” without being specific in this manner.

If the maneh in question does not constitute the totality of the estate of the sh’chiv me’ra, the sh’chiv me’ra must Clearly state that he is giving the maneh because of his impending death. Otherwise, he would have to confirm his gift with a kinyan. (See Chapter 8, Halachah 17.) Moreover, a kinyan chalifin would not be effective in this instance, because money cannot be transferred via a kinyan chalifin [Shulchan Aruch (op. cit.)].

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as stating that this ruling applies only when a maneh is found among the dying man ‘s property. Otherwise, property should not be sold to meet this obligation. The Mag g id Mishneh debates whether or not the Rambam and the Rashba share the same position.

I.e., the heirs may claim that the intent was not that the person be given a maneh from the estate, but that the dying man had admitted that he had once been given a maneh by the recipient and had buried it in some unknown place. We do not accept this claim and we give the recipient a maneh from the estate.

As above, the laws mentioned in this halachah apply only when the sh’chiv me’ra specifically states that he is giving the gift because of his impending death, or when the articles given comprise the totality of the estate of the sh’chiv me’ra.

Hilchot Mechirah 6:8 explains that when a healthy person wants to transfer money that was given as a loan or an entrusted article to another person, the three people - the lender, the borrower and the intended recipient - must stand together, and the lender must tell the borrower, “Give the maneh that you owe me to so and so [the intended recipient].” Our Sages did not require this practice to be followed when a dying person was apportioning his property. Instead, they allowed the dying man to make the transfer with merely a verbal statement.

The Maggid Mishneh states that the sh’chiv me’ra need not mention the debt that the promissory note records. It is obvious that by transferring ownership of the note, he is transferring ownership of the debt.

The Hagahot Maimoniot and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 253:20) state that this applies with regard to a promissory note only when the debtor is a Jew, but not when the debtor is a gentile.

See Hilchot Mechirah 6:10-11, which outline this process with regard to a transfer made by a healthy person. These procedures are not required, however, when a dying man apportions his property.

The sh’chiv me’ra himself can, however, still waive payment of the note if he desires.

See Hilchot Mechirah 6:12.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 2.

Giving this instruction is sufficient to allay the suspicions that the Rambam mentions in the following clause.

See Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 6:7.

See Hilchot To’en V’nit’an 7:1. Note Sefer Me’irat Einayim 255:3, which states that it is not necessary for the sh’chiv me’ra to charge the observers explicitly to serve as witnesses.

E. g., the person to whom he stated that he owed money was present or the dying man had no children (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., money that had been used for the redemption of produce from the second tithe. This money must be taken to Jerusalem and used to purchase food there.

The bracketed additions are based on the Shulchan Aruch (Ciioshen Mishpat 255:7).

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 255:24 states that this law applies even if such statements were made by a healthy person, but it appears that he desired to clarify the status of the money that he put away lest he die suddenly.

Different laws apply if the two people make such statements.

The first tithe, which must be given to the Levites. Some authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah state ma’aser sheni in this halachah as well.

And thus cannot be taken by the witness.

The motivating factor is the principle of migo - i.e., had the person desired to perpetrate a falsehood, he could have done so otherwise. In this instance, since the money was accessible to him, if he had desired to give the money to the other person or for tithes even though there was no obligation to do so, he could have taken it and given it himself. Since he did not do so, but rather brought the matter to the attention of the heir, we assume that his words are true.

See Sanhedrin 30a.

I.e., the instructions that the person heard in the dream are of no halachic consequence, and he is not at all bound to adhere to them.

From the statements of the Maggid Mishneh, it appears that the sh’chiv me’ra made this statement on his own volition, as mentioned in Halachah 4. The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 255), by contrast, explains that this refers to an instance where the creditor came and asked for payment of the debt and the dying man acknowledged hi obligation.

The Tur (loc. cit.) mentions a difference of opinion among the Rabbis with regard to the definition of the heirs’ claim. Some of the Rabbis explain that the heirs are claiming that their father erred when he made his original admission and that he later retracted that statement. If such an admission had been made by a healthy man, it could not be retracted.
Other Rabbis explain that the heirs claimed that their father had paid the debt after he made the admission, but before he died. (See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 255:20, but note also Siftei Cohen 255:14.)
It must be noted that this law applies whether or not the statement of the sh’chiv me’ra was observed by witnesses.

As is required whenever a person denies entirely a claim made by others. Here too, the heirs are denying the claim of the person acknowledged by the sll’chiv me’ra.

Note the parallel in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 7:6.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s ruling is based on the interpretation of Bava Batra 175a by the Ri Migash. That interpretation describes the circumstance referred to in this halachah as follows: A dying man admitted owing a debt to a colleague while speaking in a sincere fashion, that left no doubt that he was not merely making the statements so that his sons would not appear wealthy. (See Halachot 3 and 4.) His sons, however, were not present at that time. They were not told about their father’s statements in detail, only that he had made such an admission, but had not stated that the debt should be paid.
On that basis, it is highly unlikely that they would have paid the debt. For they had no way of knowing that the estate in fact owed the money. They had not been informed of the fact that their father had spoken in a sincere tone, and in their minds it would have been possible to think that he made the statement so that his sons did not appear wealthy. For this reason, their claim is not accepted.
[The Hagahot Maimoniot give another explanation for the heirs’ hesitation. As long as the sh’chiv me’ra did not definitely charge them with paying the debt, the possibility exists that they felt that his thoughts had become confused, as sometimes happens before death, and that the debt was not necessarily owed.]
The Ra’avad, the Tur and the Rashba challenge this ruling, explaining that we should assume that the sons knew that their father spoke sincerely. Hence, if they say that they paid the debt, their word should be accepted, as it is in the instance mentioned in the following halachah.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 255:4) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, while the Ramah cites that of the dissenting authorities.

Since they were explicitly told to pay the debt, it can be assumed that they would. Thus, the situation resembles that of a debt supported by a verbal commitment alone. In such an instance, if the debtor claims to have paid the debt, his word is accepted. According to Rabbinic law, however, he must support his claim with a sh’vuat hesset.

I.e., the money is considered as if it had already been given to the intended recipient, when it was given to the third party. And then, upon the recipient’s death, it becomes the property of the recipient’s heirs.
Had the gift been given by a healthy person, it would not have been binding, because telling a person to bring a gift to someone is not tantamount to asking the person to acquire property on his behalf (see Chapter 4, Halachot 4 and 5). Nevertheless, our Sages reinforced the power of the statement of a sh’chiv me’ra and considered it as if the property had already been transferred.
There is a slight problem in the above logic. Generally, the gifts given by a sh’chiv me’ra do not take effect until after the sh’chiv me’ra dies. In this instance, we say that it takes effect as soon as it was transferred. It is possible to explain that since the sh’chiv me’ra appointed an agent, he thus made it clear that he desired that the gift take effect immediately (Siftei Cohen 125:36).
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 125:9) adds several particulars that are corollaries of the above points.
a) The gift applies even if the recipient dies before the giver dies;
b) The gift applies even if the heirs of the recipient were born after the giver dies;
c) The giver cannot retract until he recovers;
d) If the giver recovers, he can retract.

Since the person died before the money was given, the gift is null and void. It is not considered to be part of his estate.

We do not assume that the order in which the recipients are mentioned reflects the giver’s choice of priority. Instead, we assume that he desired to give them all equal priority, and it is just that it is physically impossible to mention the name of more than one person at one time.

I.e., if the estate contains 900 zuz, and all the allocations can be made, there is no difficulty. The only time questions arise is when it is less than that sum.
Compare to the division of an estate among different wives, Hilchot Ishut 17:8 and the payment of debts, Malveh V’Loveh 20:4.

The Maggid Mishneh (in his gloss on the following halachah) states in the name of the Rashba that this applies when there is not a sufficient amount left in the estate for the heirs to pay the creditor. If. however, there is money in the estate that was not apportioned in gifts, the debt should be paid from those fund • and not from the gifts given. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpar 253:10) quotes this ruling.

I.e., only a defined object may be transferred not a privilege (Hilchot Mechirah 22:13- 14).

See Hilchot Mechirah 23:1, which explains that giving such a gift “is not considered to be transferring ownership of an entity that has not come into existence. For the article itself exists, and [the person) is transferring ownership over its produce. To what can the matter be compared? To a per on who rents a house or a field to a colleague, in which instance he did not transfer ownership over [the property in its entirety], but rather merely the right to derive benefit from it”

The term banai can be interpreted as meaning “sons” or “children.” Although according to the latter meaning the man’s daughters would also be included, we assume that the dying man meant to transfer his property to his sons alone.
As reflected by the contrast to Chapter 6, Halachah 14, this concept applies only with regard to a dying man and not. to a gift given by a healthy person. Our Sages explain the di tinction between the two as follows: According to Scriptural Law, an inheritance is given only to the sons. Therefore, we assume that the dying man desired to uphold this canon, even though doing so would exclude his daughters.
One might therefore ask: Since the estate will be given to the dying man’s sons anyway, because of the laws of inheritance, why was it necessary for him to make this statement? It is possible to explain that this refers to a situation in which the dying ma n had already apportioned his property to others, o it was necessary for him to say that he was giving it to his sons to retract his previous gift (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 247:6).
Rabbi Akiva Eiger emphasizes that the daughters are not excluded from the division of the estate entirely. Instead, they are each given the traditional gift of a tenth of the estate at the time they marry. (See Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 20.)

We do not say that the use of the plural term indicates that he intended to include his daughter or his grandson among the recipients.

With regard to the daughter, the rationale mentioned in note 1 applies. With regard to the grandson, it is explained that it is not common for a person to refer to his grandson as his son.
See also the Hagahot Maimoniot, which cite Numbers 26:8 and I Chronicles 2:8 as Scriptural precedents for referring to one son as “sons.”

This applies even if there is another person in the locale named Tovia and who we might think was the intended recipient. As long as that person does not claim the estate, we assume that the person who does claim it is in fact the intended recipient.
Moreover, we do not delay settling the claim [Tur; Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 253:29)]. Should another claimant come, he can expropriate the property through legal process (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 253:63).

I.e., he serves as a halachic authority who renders decisions and is referred to by others in a manner that reflects their appreciation of his position.

For we can assume that the dying man would also have referred to him by his title.

Although the sh’chiv me’ra was making a formal legal statement, we assume that he referred to his friend in his usual manner, and not as he would be called by others.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 253:29) state that these laws apply when the sh’chiv me’ra states that his estate should be given to a person whose identity is a matter of question. If, however, the dying man says that he owes a person an amount of money, and two people claim to be the person intended, the debt should be divided between them. The Siftei Cohen 253:39 does not accept that ruling.

And the estate should be given to him. The rationale is that we assume that the dying man desired the merit of providing assistance to a Torah scholar (Rashi, Ketubot 34b).
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 253:29) state that if it is known that the dying man had a closer relationship with the other claimant, he is awarded the estate despite the scholar’s virtue.

The Tur and the Ramah (Ibid.) explain that the term shachen refers to a business associate, and not a person with whom one lives in geographic proximity.

For we assume that he is being granted the property because of the closeness they shared.

To this situation our Sages applied the verse (Proverbs 27:10): “A close neighbor is preferable to a distant relative.”
The Tur and the Siftei Cohen 253:38 state that if the relative would be the heir of the estate, he is given precedence.

This is the Rambam’s interpretation of the Halachic concept shuda d’dayanei. See the notes on Hilchot Mechirah 21:15 for a discussion of this concept.

The fact that one person is mentioned first is not significant.

I.e., he does not mention his sons by name. If he did so, each would receive an individual share (Maggid Mishneh).

Bava Batra 143a derives this from the description of the division of the showbread (Leviticus 34:9): “It will be for Aaron and his sons,” which is interpreted to mean “half for Aaron, and half for his sons.”

The Rambam maintains that when a collective entity (“the sons of so and so”) are mentioned, they always receive half the estate. Although there are other authorities (the Ramban and the Ra’avad) who differ and maintain that the collective entity should be considered no greater than any of the individuals mentioned, the Rambam’s opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 253:24).

This is the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who maintains that “a portion” must refer to a significant entity – at least one fourth. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 253:24) mention a third opinion: that the person named receives a share of the estate equal to that given to one of the deceased’s sons.

Our translation is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 17:6, 24:5).

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 253:25) maintain that the designated person should be given only an extremely small portion of the wine in all the above instances.

For we are not certain why our Sages made these distinctions (Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi).

This applies even if the sons are born after the sh’chiv me’ra dies.

The converse is also true. If one the sons of the sh’chiv me’ra dies, and thus each of the remaining sons receives a greater portion, the widow also receives a greater portion (Rashbam, as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., we do not say that she should be given a fourth (as would have been given her at the time the will was made). Instead, the size of her portion is dependent on the size of the portion of the deceased’s sons.

See Hilchot Mechirah 22:5, which explains this principle.
Since the property that the deceased acquired afterwards was not in his possession at the time he made his will, he cannot transfer ownership of it to his wife.

For although produce is technically considered to be movable property, when most people use that term they do not have produce in mind.

For by adding the word “all,” the sh’chiv me’ra obviously desired to include something additional.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this halachah is based on the final clause of the previous halachah and applies only when a person states “All of my movable property.”
See Hilchot Mechirah 5:5 and notes, which explains that although in certain contexts servants are governed by the laws that apply to landed property, when categorizing them, they are defined as movable property.

Thus, it is not common to transport it. Eve n when it is cleaned, it is not usually moved from its place. Hence it would not be referred to as “movable property.” An upper millstone, by contrast, is moved more often and hence would be considered in that category (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 248:38).

For the dying man obviously intended to broaden the scope of his gift by using this expression.

The Lechem Mishneh and others ask: Why does the Rambam not mention money and promissory notes? These are also specifically mentioned in his source, Bava Batra 150b, 151a. And seemingly, the status of these matters requires at least the same degree of clarification as the others that he does mention explicitly.

Since a Torah scroll should never be sold or given away, it is questionable if it is placed in the same category as other property.

Since the heirs cannot prove that the Torah scroll is rightfully theirs, they cannot expropriate it from the claimant.

Since the words “as appropriate for him” are extra, we assume that they were spoken to give the firstborn the money in addition to his share (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 253:14).

I.e., the double portion that he receives.

The father cannot detract from the firstborn’s portion. Therefore, if his portion is more than 200 zuz, he may claim it. If his portion is less than 200 zuz, he may claim the gift his father gave him.

I.e., she may claim the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, or she may claim the 200 zuz.

I.e., if the debt is less than 200 zuz, he should not be given the additional sum. The rationale is that it appears as if the sh’chiv me’ra were paying the creditor interest (Maggid Mishneh). If, however, he says “as is fitting for him,” his expression indicates that he is giving the creditor a gift for the favor he performed for him (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 253:16).

The daughter and the money.

Because one was not made conditional on the other.

Had such statements been made by a healthy person, the condition would not be binding, for it does not conform to the laws of conditional agreements, as specified in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 6. Nevertheless, leniency was granted to a dying man, and his statements are binding even if he did not follow all the legal technicalities (Ramban, Siftei Cohen 253:16).

I.e., the appraisal is doubled as a token of respect for the bride (see Hilchot Ishut 23:11).

I.e., the daughter must be given the garments and the articles her father specified. Nevertheless, rather than buy her the amount that she could purchase with the money that would have been required to purchase these articles at the time her father made his statement, she is given only the amount of garments and articles he mentioned.
Conversely, if the price of garments and articles increases, the heirs must buy her what her father specified, even though it costs more (Maggid Mishneh).

This reflects the version of Ketubot 54a, the source for this halachah, possessed by the Rambam. The standard text of that Talmudic passage differs, and hence there are different interpretations offered by other authorities.

See the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 253:13), which explains what should be done if the wine spoils.

To his execution.

Had the dying man not said that, the heirs could claim that the intent was that the recipient should be given from wine that is buried somewhere. Although the court would not accept this claim, by specifying the place of the wine, the dying man insured that his heirs would not even contemplate issuing such a claim.

I.e., he was a partner in the ownership of two date palms. According to the Rambam’s interpretation of this passage (Ketubot 109b), if Lhe sh’chiv me’ra possessed another whole date palm, this should be given to his daughter rather than the two halves. Rashi and others interpret the passage differently. Their opinion is reflected in the rulings of the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 253:22).

Note the statements of the Bayit Chadash, who explains that if the building is larger and can contain more than 120 korim, it is not given to the intended recipient. For we say that a person will not make such a large error. This view is not accepted by all authorities. See Siftei Cohen 253:18.

And he did not have a smaller building.

Therefore, he is given the entire building. We do not say that he intended to give the recipient only an area for 100 korim, and the remainder of the building should be given to the heirs.

Double the value of a shekel.

Compare to Chapter 12, Halachah 6.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 253:69 states that in such an instance we are forbidden to eulogize him, because “It is a mitzvah to carry out a dying man’s words.”

There is a debate among the Sages whether a eulogy is an expression of honor for the deceased (in which case he is able to forgo it) or an expression of honor for his heirs (in which instance his statement would have no consequence). Sanhedrin 47a rules that it is an expression of honor for the deceased. Hence, the Rambam’s ruling.

Who would have to pay for his burial.

It is a mitzvah to bury a Jewish corpse, and the failure to do so violates a negative commandment (Hilchot Eivel 12:1). If there is no money in the estate, however, communal funds should be used to bury the corpse.

This applies when the sh’chiv me’ra made a verbal statement alone. If, however, he had his statements written down, we assume that his intent was to make that son an executor, as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 2 and Hilchot Nachalot 6:2.
The Ramah, Rabbenu Asher and the Tur make a different distinction, explaining that when the sh’chiv me’ra uses the expression “give,” he is making his son an executor, but when he uses the expression “inherit,” that son is entitled to the entire estate. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 281:3.

This statement applies only with regard to a legitimate heir. If a person is not an heir, he cannot be granted a portion of an estate using such an expression (Hilchot Nachalot 6:1).

Bava Batra 130a derives this concept from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 21:16: “On the day that he leaves his property to his sons.” Our Sages interpret this to mean that the dying man has the authority to “leave his property to his sons” – i.e., divide it at will.
Based on this principle, a sh’chiv me’ra may also divide his estate among several of his heirs, giving one more than the other [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 281:1)].
This law applies only when there is no son who is a firstborn. If there is a firstborn son, the father does not have the option of denying him his birthright, as Deuteronomy, ibid., states. This applies if the sh’chiv me’ra uses the expression “inherit.” If he gives the estate as a gift to another son, the firstborn’s share can be denied [Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 281:4)].

Bava Batra 131a leaves undecided the question whether a healthy person can give gifts using the expression “inherit,” for the time for the inheritance has not arrived yet. Since the question is left undecided, the property cannot be expropriated from the heirs.

I.e., anyone who is not an heir.

The property that the first person inherits from the dying man’s estate, and that the first person did not wear out, sell, give away (see Halachah 9) or destroy before his death is given to the second person. This gift is never considered part of the first recipient’s estate, and he can never transfer ownership of it to his own heirs (Halachah 10).

Or any person who would be one of the heirs scheduled to receive a portion of the inheritance.

This applies even when the second person the sh’chiv me’ra named is also a legitimate heir [Maggid Mishneh; Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 248:1)].

Provided it was clear that he was not merely named as the executor, as stated in ch. 6.

Note, however, Halachah 6, which states that the giver can place certain restrictions on the inheritance by making an explicit statement to that effect.

He must use the expression “give.” If, however, a healthy person uses the expression “inherit,” his gift is not binding, as indicated in Halachah 2 (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 248:6).

The rationale is that a healthy person can give gifts. He does not have the legal authority to transfer an inheritance. Therefore, the exception mentioned in Halachah 4 does not apply, because it is unique to an inheritance.

As if it were a gift given by a healthy man.
The Rambam’s ruling represents his interpretation of Bava Batra 129a, b. Although the Ra’avad and others interpret that passage differently, the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 248:2) accept the Rambam’s ruling.

I.e., since the giver has the potential to give gifts to his heirs without having the gifts considered an inheritance.

The commentaries explain that this applies even if he entrusted the money to a third party without making an explicit statement, as explained above. Since the third party received specific instructions from the sh’chiv me’ra, he must follow them (Beit Yosef, Choshen Mishpat 248).

In contrast to the law stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 23, in this instance we do not say that he was merely encouraging his sons to live frugally. For in this instance, he already gave the money to another person.

Whether before or after the death of the sh’chiv me’ra. Even if the first person mentioned never took possession of the property, it is given to the second after the death of the sh’chiv me’ra.

For this was the giver’s will.

For no stipulation was made with regard to his acquisition of the property. Thus, it is transferred to his heirs.

For the stipulation made by the original giver can never be fulfilled.

The Rashba (Volume III, Responsum 122) states the prohibition is not a point of law per se, but rather an ethical measure that the recipient should uphold in order to carry out the will of the departed.

The Rashbam (Bava Batra 137a) states that although the person who gives the advice is considered “wicked,” the recipient who sells or gives away the property is not considered to be “wicked.” The rationale is that he acted for his own benefit, while the person who gave him advice did not derive any personal benefit from his conduct. The Ir Shushan, by contrast, considers the seller “wicked” as well.

Even though freeing servants involves a transgression, the actions of the recipient are still binding (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 248:12).

The commentaries explain that this refers to wasting a valuable garment by using it is as a shroud (Ibid.:13).

Despite the fact that the recipient’s conduct was undesirable and ran contrary to the will of the giver, the recipient’s deeds are binding (Ibid.).

The Maggid Mishneh explains the Rambam’s ruling as follows: From the fact that the original giver stipulated that after the first recipient’s death, the property should be given to someone else, we understand that it was not his intent that he give it to his sons. For we assume that a person would give his property to his sons, and for that reason, he stipulated that the property must be given to another person. Thus, if the recipient sells or gives it to his own sons, he violates the conditions of the original gift, and his actions are therefore not binding.
We do not, however, say that all sales or gifts are not valid, because the giver would not think that he would sell or give away the property to an outside party. Hence, doing so is not a violation of his stipulation (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 248:15).
The Rambam’s ruling is based on his interpretation of Bava Batra 137b. Although the Ra’avad and the Rashbam interpret that passage differently, the Rambam’s interpretation is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 248:4).

I.e., before the first recipient died, he wished to apportion his estate and give this property to another person.

I.e., before the first recipient died, he divorced his wife and became liable for the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

Even though the first recipient could use the property to pay his debts, and it is considered as being on lien to the debt since the payment has not been made, it is still considered to be belonging to the first recipient. And the court would not violate the will of the original giver by yielding it to someone else.

The court may – and should – indenture the proceeds, for these are the sole property of the first recipient.

Who seeks to collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

I.e., designated them as the source from which a debt will be repaid.

For his claim to it has precedence over that of the creditor or the wife.

This is one of the laws ordained by our Rabbis at Usha to stabilize the social conditions of the Jewish people (Ketubot 50a). When a man marries a woman, he is considered to have purchased her property. If she sells any property, he has the right to expropriate the property from the purchaser.

It is as if the woman sold the property to him, and thus the law stated in Halachah 9 applies.

Since this was the explicit condition of the gift, the husband has no right to the property.

When a woman sells property, her husband ordinarily has the right to nullify the sale and take the property, as stated above and explained in Hilchot Mechirah 30:3.

And he has the right to nullify the sale.

For, as mentioned above, the giver explicitly stated that the property should be given to him, rather than to the woman’s husband.

If she sells it, the sale is binding, as stated in Halachah 9.

There are, indeed, other instances where the cycle is allowed to continue endlessly until the parties reach a compromise. That ruling is not applied in this instance because of the rationale mentioned by the Rambam.

She was his only daughter, and thus his heir.

And thus he is entitled to inherit her property.

And a husband inherits only property that is in his wife’s possession at the time of her death, not property that is fit to come into her possession at a later time (ra’ui).

For the daughter (wife) has no right to the estate until after her grandmother’s death.

Even if the daughter had left an heir.

Since the estate would be considered as actually having been owned by the daughter before her death, her husband would have the right to inherit it.

I.e., the ownership of the property is transferred at the time of the giver’s death, but it takes effect retroactive to the date of the legal document.

This is one of the common legal processes through which a will was made in Talmudic times. Nevertheless, as reflected in the laws mentioned in this halachah, it has certain drawbacks, for the owner’s rights to his property are restricted.

I.e., the son who was given the property, and it is not considered to be part of the estate as a whole. Although legally it is part of the estate – as reflected by the continuation of the halachah – an exception is made for the reason the Rambam states.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 5 and notes.

For once produce is ready to be detached, it is considered as if it were already detached (Hilchot Mechirah 1:17).

For the produce is considered to be part of his estate as a whole.

If the son dies before his father, the property belongs to the son’s heirs, and they may expropriate it from the purchaser (Maggid Mishneh).

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 257:3) differ and maintain that the produce belongs to the son, as if his father had not sold the property.

For until the father dies, the son has no right to the use of the property.

We do not say that the property reverts to the father’s ownership and is acquired by his heirs.

This addition is based on the explanation of Sefer Me’irat Einayim 257:10.

And which was confirmed by a kinyan (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 257:11).

There is a difference of opinion among the commentaries with regard to the extent of the comparison to a gift given by a sh’chiv me’ra. The Rashbam and the Ramban say that the comparison is only that the full transfer of property takes effect later. Unlike a gift given by a sh’chiv me’ra, however, in this instance the giver cannot retract his gift. This appears to be the Rambam’s view.
The Maggid Mishneh, however, mentions others who differ and maintain that the comparison to a gift given by the sh’chiv me’ra includes this facet as well, and the giver has the right to retract. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 257:6) cites the first view.

From the fact that it is possible that the document may speak of a kinyan, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 258:1 states that this law speaks of a gift given by a healthy person. For if it were speaking of a gift given by a sh’chiv me’ra, a kinyan would not be necessary. Indeed, it would detract from the gift’s legal power.

For the transfer of the legal document itself serves as a kinyan (Hilchot Mechirah 1:7).

In which case the transfer would be invalid, for a person cannot transfer property after his death.

It is as if the document explicitly stated that it takes effect: “from today and after [the person’s] death” [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 258:1)].

With this clause, the Rambam answers a question that is likely to arise: If all that is necessary is to date a document, why is it common to require that the document state that the transaction takes effect “from the present time”?
The Rambam explains that in fact this is not necessary. The phrase is included merely as a precaution to clarify matters and prevent legal problems from arising.

I.e., the person acquires the property - and the benefits from it - from the time he is given the document. The giver no longer has any connection to it. Instead, the recipient may use it as he desires and do with it as he sees fit.

Compare to Chapter 8, Halachah 19. The difference between the two is that in this instance, since the giver is healthy, it is not logical to say that he is mentioning “his lifetime” only to avoid confronting death (Maggid Mishneh).

Cf. Jeremiah 17:7; Psalms 118:8-9, 146:3.

The Maggid Mishneh and other commentaries cite the conclusion of Hilchot Matnot Aniyim, Chapter 10, and Hilchot Talmud Torah 3:11, where the Rambam speaks of the virtues of refraining from taking from others and instead earning one’s livelihood through one’s own labor. Though these are prevalent themes in the Rambam’s writing, his words here focus on a more fundamental belief – that no man, neither oneself nor another, can be relied upon as a source for wellbeing. Instead, our faith and trust must be placed in God.