Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

A small copper coin of little value.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 245) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 229) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 194) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 130) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

And thus, it could not be returned.

As explained in Halachah 5, the obligation is to return the stolen article itself. If, however, that is impossible, the obligation is satisfied by returning its worth.

See the commentaries on Hilchot Geneivah 1:2, which discuss the source for this prohibition. (See also Halachah 6.)

As reflected in Hilchot Geneivah 7:8 and the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 12:7), this prohibition is of Scriptural origin. Note, however, the Kessef Mishneh, who cites sources that indicate that the prohibition against withholding money from a gentile is Rabbinic in origin. (See also the Ma’aseh Rokeach, who states that the Rambam’s mention of “a colleague” in Halachah 1 is intended as an exclusion of a gentile, implying that the prohibition against robbing a gentile is of Rabbinic origin. See also Siftei Cohen 359:2 which interprets the Kessef Mishneh as considering robbing a gentile as Rabbinic in origin.)
The Shulchan Aruch HaRav explains that robbing a gentile is prohibited by Scriptural command, but withholding money due him violates merely a Rabbinic prohibition. This might also be the Kessef Mishneh’s intent. The Noda BiY’hudah (Yoreh De’ah, Volume I, Responsum 81), offers a different perspective, stating that it is forbidden to rob a gentile, because of a Scriptural command to respect his property. There is, however, no direct prohibition against such. Thus the prohibition has the strength of a positive commandment and not that of a negative commandment.

Note the Noda BiY’hudah (ibid.) who states that even though the prohibition against robbing a gentile is Scriptural in origin, the obligation to return the article that was obtained by robbery is of Rabbinic origin.

In this source and in Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 247), the Rambam distinguishes between gezel (robbery) and oshek (withholding a colleague’s due). The Maggid Mishneh, however, suggests that the Talmudic sources (Bava Metzia 61a and 111a) do not make such a definitive distinction.

Even if one never intended to take possession of the servants or the livestock, using them against his colleague’s will is considered robbery.

Delaying payment of a worker’s wages also involves the violation of a specific prohibition against that act. See Hilchot Sechirut 11:2.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 247) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 228) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. This prohibition is not punishable by lashes, because it can be corrected by the return of the withheld funds [Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Makkot 3:1).]

I.e., he does not have the prerogative of returning the value of the article that he obtained by robbery, but must return the article itself.

I.e., the article itself.

See Chapter 2, where the nature of the required change is discussed. (See also Hilchot Geneivah 1:12.)

Note, however, the concluding halachah of this chapter.

In contrast to a thief, who must pay twice the stolen amount if convicted on the testimony of witnesses.

For if the robber were required to tear down the entire building, it is likely that he would never repent, but instead maintain possession of the article that he obtained by robbery.

Although a sukkah is a temporary dwelling, the importance of the mitzvah causes it to be considered as if it were permanent (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 360:4).

The prevailing assumption is that the person who was robbed is not concerned with an article of such little worth and is willing to forgo its return.

Although the robber already fulfilled the mitzvah of returning the article that was obtained by robbery, and the article he retains is worth less than a p’rutah, he is obligated to return it (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 360:8).

For the article in his possession is not worth a p’rutah.

For what he returned was not worth a p’rutah, and the court is not obligated to compel him to return the remaining article that he obtained by robbery.
This reflects the interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh and Rav Moshe HaLevi. The Kessef Mishneh quotes the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 360) as understanding the Rambam to be stating “There is a robbery, and the article that has been robbed has not been returned.” (This does not, however, fit the version of the standard text of the Tur.)
The Kessef Mishneh also offers his own interpretation of the Rambam’s words: “The article that was obtained by robbery was not returned (for both items were not returned), nor is there an obligation to return the remaining article (because it is worth less than a p’rutah).”

For although it is possible for the article to be taken from the owner by forces beyond his control in a settled area as well; it is far more likely that this will take place in a desert.

Even if the robber forces the owner to accept the article in the desert, and the article is taken afterwards from the owner in the desert by forces beyond his control, the robber is held responsible.

The robber is not, however, obligated to return the article to its owner in the place where he originally took it from him. It is sufficient for him to give it back to him in any safe setting [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 366:4)].

I.e., he is embarrassed and unwilling to admit the robbery to the owner.

For the owner will count the change he received and realize how much money he has been given. If the owner subsequently loses the money or it is stolen from him, the robber who returned the money is not held responsible.

I.e., if it is stolen from the wallet, the robber remains responsible.

Since according to the owner’s knowledge, the wallet was empty, he would not be likely to check it and thus he would not discover the money that was returned.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 265) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 38) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot. Significantly, in the listing of the mitzvot at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah, the Rambam also mentions coveting a colleague’s wife, but in these halachot he mentions another man’s wife only with regard to the prohibition against desire.

Although the popular conception is that the transgression is violated only when the object is taken without payment (Bava Metzia 5b), this is not the case.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s statements and maintains that for the person to be liable, the original owner of the article must refuse to sell it, and the violator must take the article against his will. Even if he leaves payment for the article, he is still considered to have violated the said prohibition.
To what can this be compared? To a person who was compelled to make a sale against his will. In such an instance, the halachah (Bava Batra 48a; Hilchot Mechirah 10:1) rules that the sale is binding.
The Maggid Mishneh explains the Rambam’s position, stating that although after the fact such a sale is binding, at the outset it is forbidden to compel a person to part with his property. [See the commentaries, who cite a difference of opinion between Abbaye and Ravvah (Temurah 4b) whether a transaction that violates Torah law is binding or not. They note that in several rulings the Rambam appears to maintain that the transaction is binding, and in others he states that it is not binding. Kin’at Eliyahu states that according to the explanation given at the conclusion of the following note, the reference to Temurah is out of context.]
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 359:10) follows the Rambam’s perspective.

The Ra’avad disputes the rationale given by the Rambam. For indeed, as the Rambam himself continues to explain, the coveting spoken of in this verse involves a deed, taking the desired article. The Ra’avad explains that violation of the commandment is not punished by lashes because the article taken should be returned to its owner.
The Maggid Mishneh rationalizes the Rambam’s position, explaining that according to the Rambam the sale is binding, and there is no obligation to return the article. Indeed, the sale itself is not a prohibited act. What is prohibited is the pressure that the purchaser applied to the original owner to sell him the article, and that involved speech, not deed.

Note the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 359), whose version of the Mishneh Torah stated: “that he cannot acquire from him” - i.e., even the desire for articles that can never be purchased is included in the prohibition.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 266) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 416) include this as one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

For this reason, it is considered to be distinct from the prohibition against coveting mentioned in the previous halachah.

In this context, Rav Kapach cites the discussion of whether there are mitzvot in the Torah that were instituted merely as “a fence” for other mitzvot, or whether each of the mitzvot has a self-contained purpose.

As stated in I Kings, Chapter 21, Ach’av, King of Samaria, coveted a vineyard owned by Navot. When Navot refused to sell it to him, Ach’av had Navot executed and the property confiscated.

If the article taken by robbery exists, however, it must be returned, for one may not benefit from property obtained in such a manner, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 2. (See also the first halachah of the following chapter.)

If, however, the robber does not seek to repent, and the owner sues for the value of the goods stolen from him, the court expropriates it from the robber (Maggid Mishneh).

Nevertheless, the original owner has a legal right to the money, and if he desires that it be returned the court must facilitate this, even if the robber repented of his own volition (ibid.).

I.e., and not its worth.

For, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 2, it is forbidden to derive benefit from an article obtained through robbery.

This demonstrates that an inheritance is not considered a transfer of property, but rather a continuation of the testator’s domain. For, as stated in Halachah 3, if the owner despairs of an article’s return, and it is transferred to another person, the article itself need not be returned.

In Halachot 10-14 the Rambam defines what is meant by undergoing a change. See the parallels in Hilchot Geneivah 1:12-15.

See Halachah 6 for an illustration of this principle. (See also Hilchot Geneivah 1:11.)
The Ra’avad, Rabbenu Asher and the Tur differ and maintain that the increase in value belongs to the robber even if the owner did not despair of the article’s return. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 362:2), however, follows the Rambam’s ruling, while it appears that the Ramah (loc. cit.:8) follows that of the other authorities.

Our Sages feared that if the robber knew that he was required to pay the entire profit that he received from this article, he would never repent.

According to the Rambam, the increase in the value of the article itself (e.g., offspring born to a cow obtained by robbery) belongs to the original owner, and he must merely reimburse the robber for it. The Ra’avad and others differ and maintain that the increase in value itself belongs to the robber, and he need not return it. The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) adopts the Rambam’s view.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 362:3) differ and maintain that the owner must have despaired of the article’s return before it was sold or given away, in order for the transfer of property to be binding.

With his despair, the owner abrogates his ownership of the article. The robber himself cannot become the owner, because he is obligated to return the article he obtained by robbery. When, however, he gives the article to the purchaser, the purchaser becomes the legal owner.
Note the parallel to Hilchot Geneivah 5:3. On that halachah, the Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling when the thief sold the stolen article before the owner despaired of its return. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 356:3) follows the Rambam’s ruling, the Ramah maintains that the owner’s despair must precede transfer of the stolen article.

In this, the purchaser or the heir has a greater right than the robber himself.

And, as explained in Halachah 2, according to the Rambam the robber is not entitled to the increase in value before the owner despairs of the article’s return.

The Rambam does not mention whether or not the robber must reimburse the original owner for the money he paid. The Sefer Meirat Einayim 362:10 states that the owner should be reimbursed. Although some other authorities differ, this is the opinion of the later authorities.

For our Sages granted the consideration of acquiring the increase in value only to a Jewish purchaser and not to a gentile (Bava Kama 96a).

And must be reimbursed for it by the original owner.

This question is left unresolved by the Talmud (ibid.). Therefore, because of the doubt and because the increase in value is in the purchaser’s possession, he is granted this consideration. If, however, the original owner takes possession of the increase, the same logic is applied in the other direction, and he is not required to pay. See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 1:11.

See Halachah 2.

Needless to say, it applies when the increase in value is due to the robber’s work or investment of resources. See Halachah 9.

As reflected in the following halachah, the Rambam does not consider pregnancy or growing wool a change in the animal’s status. Thus one might think that the calf would have to be returned to the original owner. Nevertheless, our Sages held the robber liable only for the value of the cow at the time of the robbery.

I.e., the calf and the shearings are considered as new entities. Thus since the owner has despaired, they become the property of the robber.

As mentioned above, according to the Rambam becoming pregnant or growing wool is not considered a change in the status of the animal. Therefore, the animal remains in the possession of its original owner. Since he did not despair of its return, he is entitled to the increase in its value (i.e., the offspring or the wool).
The Ra’avad, Rabbenu Asher, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 362:8) differ and maintain that these are considered significant changes, and the thief acquires the right to the animal’s increase in value. The Shulchan Aruch follows the Rambam’s approach. (See also Hilchot Geneivah 1:11.)

For if the thief had consecrated the animal before the owner despaired of its return, the consecration would not be effective (Bava Kama 68b).

I.e., the animal is not considered as if it had been the thief’s property from the time of the theft, thus entitling him to the increase in value from the time of the theft until the consecration, as is the case regarding a thief or robber who did not consecrate the stolen article, as stated in Halachah 2.
The rationale for this distinction is that leniency was granted in Halachah 2 to encourage the thief to repent. No such leniency is granted if he consecrates or slaughters the stolen animal. The rationale for the distinction is that in the cases mentioned above, the thief or the robber did not utterly prevent the animal from being returned to its owner. Once he consecrates it or slaughters it, by contrast, through his actions, he causes it never to be returned to its owner again.

The Ma’aseh Rokeach and others cite the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 18:14 and explain that the sin referred to here is the sin of slaughtering a consecrated animal outside the Temple’s premises.

The principles stated in Halachot 6-8.

If, however, the animal became fat as a matter of course, without any expense on the part of the robber, the principles mentioned previously apply (Siftei Cohen 362:4).

For, as Bava Kama 65a states, the robber will complain: “Is it fair that I fattened it and you reap the profits.” See the parallel in Hilchot Geneivah 1:11.

In such an instance, the robber is not considered to have acquired the article he obtained by robbery and must return it to its original owner.

See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 360:10, which questions whether this applies only to bricks baked in the sun, or also to bricks fired in a furnace.

Therefore, he should return the brick and receive payment for the increase in its value.

See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 360:11, which cites conflicting opinions with regard to the ruling regarding a utensil fashioned from a strip of metal.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 360:14 and Siftei Cohen 360:2 emphasize that the dye used must be permanent. If it is temporary, different rules apply.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo objects to this example, explaining that the weave can be undone, and the garment can be turned back to threads. Therefore, when quoting these laws in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 360:6), he omits this example.

I.e., it is not as if the article has been returned to its initial state. Instead, a second major change was wrought. Therefore, the object may remain in the possession of the robber, and he is obligated to return only the value of the article he obtained by robbery at the time of the robbery.

For both before and after it was cut down, it is referred to as a date palm. This reflects a general principle: A change brought about by a deed is not significant unless it causes the article to be called by a different name [Tur and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 360:6)].

For once the leaves of a palm branch are separated from each other, it will never be called a lulav again.

For it is considered a new and distinct entity.

Since the animal is considered to be of a different type, it is considered to have undergone a change, even though that change is not a result of the actions of the robber. See the parallel in Hilchot Geneivah 1:13.

The Maggid Mishneh states that it appears that the owner is given this prerogative even if it conflicts with the robber’s wishes. The Maggid Mishneh questions this ruling, asking why the robber is not considered to have acquired the pieces by causing the article to undergo a change, for it is no longer in its original state.

E. g., a person obtained an animal by robbery. He is obligated to pay the animal’s value at the time of the robbery, and he is given the carcass. If, however, the owner desires the carcass, he may take it and also receive the difference between its value and the original value of the animal.

If the increase in value came from an external factor - e.g., the animal bore offspring - the robber would be entitled to the increase if the owner despaired of the return of the article.

The laws that apply when, however, the object is not returned intact are stated at the beginning of the following chapter.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 362:19 explains that since the article obtained by robbery is considered to belong to its original owner at all times, the financial ramifications of the robbery are considered to have taken effect at the time of the article’s destruction or its being transferred to another person.

We have altered the literal translation of the Rambam’s words, which is “when it departed from the world,” for they appear to refer only to an instance when the jug was broken or its contents drunk.
Bava Kama 65a uses the expression “its value at the time of judgment.” The Rambam changes the wording of his source to indicate that even if it increased in value more between the time it left the robber’s possession and the time the case was brought to court, the robber is not obligated to pay the latter increase.

And the original owner would have received the benefit of the increase, as stated in the final halachah of the previous chapter.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 362:20 states that this refers to loss due to other causes than from the robber’s negligence. If it is lost because of his negligence, he must pay its worth at the time of its loss.

For a robber is obligated to pay the value of the article at the time of the robbery (Bava Kama 93b).

In the previous halachah, when the robber destroyed the article himself, the price was calculated from the time the article was destroyed. That, however, represented a stringency for the robber. Making such a calculation in the situation described in this halachah would bring about a leniency, and our intent is not that the sinner should benefit (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 362:21).

Our translation is based on the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Keilim 16:5).

The commentaries cite Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 4:14 as a parallel.

For more stringent laws always apply with regard to consecrated property.

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 363:1) differ with the Rambam (and the Shulchan Aruch, which quotes his ruling) and maintain that even if a coin has been disqualified, a thief can fulfill his obligation by returning it intact to its owner, as in the following halachah.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 363:1 states that the intent is half or more.

The difference between servants and the animals mentioned in the first clause is that according to Scriptural Law, the laws governing servants are equated with those governing land. With regard to land, we follow the maxim: “Land can never be stolen.” For the land always remains the legal property of its rightful owner. Therefore, all that is necessary is to return it. These same principles are applied to servants (Bava Kama 96b).
The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 363) differs with the Rambam’s ruling and maintains that servants are considered to be movable property and are governed by the laws mentioned in the previous halachah. The Tur further states that, according to the version of the Mishneh Torah he possessed, the Rambam shares his view.

Less than half (Sefer Me’irat Einayim, loc. cit.).

Once terumah becomes impure, it is forbidden to be eaten. The only benefit that may be derived from it is to use it for kindling.

At which time it is necessary to destroy all leaven. Even after the festival, leaven that had existed on Passover must be destroyed.

E. g., it was sodomized and thus disqualified for use as an offering.

Because of a blemish.

For killing a man, or because a man was to be executed for sodomizing it.

In all these instances, the article itself appears unchanged. Therefore, although its value has depreciated, and in certain instances it has become totally worthless, that is not apparent in the physical form of the article obtained by robbery. Therefore, it is not of consequence in court.

For then, the original owner will have received his article intact. Despite its loss of value, the robber has kept to the letter of the law.

Leviticus 5:20-26 states that if a person takes a false oath to deny a robbery, he must pay the principal plus an additional fifth (actually one fifth of the new total - e.g., five shekels if he stole an article worth four), and bring a guilt offering in atonement.
In this instance, although the article obtained by robbery itself has already become valueless, since there are instances when the robber will be held liable for its original value, he is held liable if he denies the robbery under oath.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam on this point and maintains that as long as the robber possesses the article and can return it, he is not liable for any additional payment, even though he denied possession of the article under oath.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 363:7 states that this applies even though the owner of the animal needed his beast at that time and was prevented from working with it because it had been taken by the robber. See the following halachah and notes.

Fines - payments of more or less than the principal - are not imposed in the diaspora (Sanhedrin 31b). Thus, one might think that a penalty of this nature would also not be imposed. But there is a fundamental difference in this instance. This penalty is not an obligation of the law, but rather a pragmatic injunction applied by the Sages to prevent the perpetuation of injustice. Therefore, it is enforced even in the diaspora.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 363:9 states that the judges who impose such penalties must have been given authority by the leaders of the community or the Torah leaders of the generation.

For if they become used to remaining idle, it will be more difficult to have them work later. Therefore, it is considered as though the owner of the servants consented to their use (Bava Kama 97a).

The commentaries explain the difference between a servant and an animal (as in the previous halachah) as follows. An animal is considered to be movable property, and therefore the benefit gained from movable property can be taken by the robber. A servant is governed by the same laws that govern land (see Halachah 4 and notes) and thus is always considered to be in the possession of his master. Therefore, his master is entitled to the wages that he earns.
(This explanation does present a difficulty. For the Rambam maintains that until an owner despairs of the return of his article, he is entitled to the benefit derived from it. Why then in the previous halachah does the Rambam not differentiate between whether the owner despaired of the animal’s return or not? One can, however, distinguish between the increase in value of the article itself and the benefit resulting from its work. See the Ma’aseh Rokeach.)

The person who seizes the boat is considered to be a robber.

Regardless of whether this amount is greater or less than what one would receive for hiring out the boat. For a robber must return the article or its value at the time of the robbery.

I.e., the owner has the choice of collecting whichever amount is greater. Had he hired the boat out voluntarily, he would not have been able to collect more than the fee agreed upon. Since this is not the case, he has this option.

And the fee at which the boat is hired is of no concern.

I.e., situations in which a utensil that is often hired is taken without its owner’s consent.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 363:6) preface their treatment of this halachah with the following introduction: When do the laws the Rambam mentions apply? When the owner of the dwelling did not approach the dweller and order him to leave. If, however, he approached him and ordered him to leave, and the dweller refused, the dweller is obligated to pay him rent for the dwelling.

The Maggid Mishneh states that if the person who dwells within causes the value of the property to decline - e.g., he caused the walls to blacken - since he is required to pay for the damages, he is also required to pay for the entire rental. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 363:7) quotes this with the preface, “There are those who say,” a phrase that usually indicates that this ruling is based on only one source.

Our Sages refer to the approach of preventing a person from benefiting when one does not suffer a loss as “the attribute of Sodom.” In this instance, however, that term cannot be applied exactly, for in this instance the owner has the legitimate right to derive benefit from his home. Therefore, although we ordinarily follow the principle that “we force a person [not to practice] the attribute of Sodom,” no homeowner is forced to allow a homeless person to live in a vacant property belonging to the homeowner.

For as long as this person is dwelling there, the owner cannot rent it out to anyone else. The Ramah (loc. cit.) adds that in the present time, we assume that a vacant dwelling will be rented out, even though the owner had never rented it out previously.
Tosafot (Bava Kama 20a) differs and maintains that the dweller is not liable to pay in that instance. Since he did not derive any benefit - for he does not usually pay rent for a dwelling - and he did not damage the owner’s property - but merely prevented him from gaining a profit - he is not obligated. The Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 363) differs and explains that since the dweller received benefit (albeit not financial benefit), and the owner was prevented from deriving a profit, the dweller is held liable.

The Rambam maintains that the person who dyed the wool without the owner’s knowledge must pay the difference between the value of white wool, and that of the wool of the color that resulted. He need not reimburse the owner for the dye that the owner used, because that dye is on the wool - the fact that it has been covered up by the second dye is of no consequence.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam regarding the proper choice of wording, but not with regard to the content of his ruling.

This point is the subject of an unresolved difference of opinion among our Sages (Bava Kama 101a). Therefore, the sum is not awarded to the plaintiff. But if he seizes it from the defendant outside the court, it is not expropriated from him. See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 1:11.

This definition of the term sh’licht yad, literally “lay a hand on,” is evident from the examples given by the Rambam and is reflected in the wording of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 292:1).

He is considered a gazlan (robber) and not a ganav, for he is not acting in stealth.

We ordinarily follow the principle that “there is no concept of agency with regard to the commission of a sin.” Bava Metzia 44a explains by Biblical exegesis that this instance is an exception.

Exodus 22:7 states that an unpaid watchman who claims that an article entrusted to him for safekeeping was destroyed by forces beyond his control must take an oath that he did not “lay a hand on” the article. Implied is that if he did take the article for his private purposes, he is liable in such a situation.

All the rules stated in this and the previous chapter regarding to whom the increase in the article’s value belongs are applicable.

I.e., in the event that it is destroyed by forces beyond his control.

This ruling applies even when the watchman makes a statement to this effect in the presence of witnesses.

As clarified by Tosafot (Bava Metzia 41a) and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), sh’licht yad must ultimately involve taking something from the entrusted article. If the watchman takes an article for his personal use, but returns the article intact, he is not considered as having been shole’ach yad, but is instead considered to be a sho’el shelo mida’at, “a borrower without consent.” (See Halachah 15.)
The Rambam’s ruling here means that if the watchman ultimately intends to take the article - or a portion of it - as his own, he is liable immediately when he lifts the article up, even though as yet he has not taken any portion of it as his own.

A small serving of wine equivalent to 86.4 cubic centimeters according to Shiurei Torah and 150 cubic centimeters according to the Chazon Ish.

I.e., for the entire jug. Bava Metzia 44a explains that even when the watchman desires only to take such a small amount, he is held liable for the entire jug, because when the jug is full, the taste of the wine is preserved. Therefore, the entire jug is considered to be serving the small amount the watchman desires.

This illustrates the principle stated in the previous halachah.

Because if more money is kept in a wallet, it will be guarded with a greater degree of care than otherwise.

For in fact, this is all that he took.
Therefore, the watchman is held liable only for the dinar. If, however, the owner seizes the value of the entire amount, it is not expropriated from him.

For the watchman did nothing to acquire it as his own.

He is liable, not as a robber, but as one who has damaged his colleague’s property.

And thus did not acquire it as his own, in contrast to the instance mentioned in the previous halachah.

For we assume that his taking the revi’it from the jug caused air to enter it, and that caused all the wine to sour.

The denial itself - even before he takes an oath to free himself of responsibility - is sufficient to have him classified as a robber (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 294:2).

If, however, he made the denial outside the court, he is not considered to be a robber. We assume that he temporarily misplaced it and made the denial to forestall being asked to return it immediately.

Although the watchman did not pick up the article or perform any other kinyan, his denial is sufficient to have him considered to be a robber.
He also is disqualified as a witness, and his oath is not acceptable because of this denial [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 294:1)].

I.e., witnesses testify that they saw the article in his possession at the time he made his denial in court. If, however, the article was discovered in his possession afterwards, he is not held liable. We assume again that the article was in another place at the time he was called to court, and he was trying to forestall being pressed to pay for it.

I.e., he is liable for the article in the event it is destroyed by forces beyond his control. In this instance, the person does not intend to take the article as his own or even to diminish its value at all. He merely seeks to use it for his own purposes and then return it intact. Nevertheless, since he takes it without the owner’s consent, he is considered to be a robber.
In addition to the example offered by the Rambam, this law applies to a watchman who makes use of an entrusted article without causing its value to diminish, and then returns it to the place where it was kept [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 292:1)].

In contrast to an ordinary borrower, who is liable from the moment he borrows the object, a borrower who takes an object without the owner’s consent is not liable until he makes use of the article.

He returns it himself, as the Rambam continues to illustrate.

For this is not considered to be a halachically significant return of the article that was borrowed. See Hilchot Sh’luchin 2:2.

As the Rambam states (Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 3:4): A person may not forcibly take collateral from a debtor. This prerogative is, however, given to an agent appointed by the court.

This is forbidden even to an agent of the court (ibid.).

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that as long as the debt is legitimate, the person is not considered a robber for taking the collateral by force. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 359:6) follows the Rambam’s opinion.