Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

As the Rambam explains, he is speaking in this and the following halachah about a person who did not damage his colleague’s article at all, but reduced its value, by causing a halachic difficulty.

For the only laws of damages mentioned in the Torah involve actual damage done to the substance of the article or person involved.

This reduces its value, for people who are ritually pure will not desire to come in contact with it. This refers to ordinary food. If the food is terumah, the loss is far more substantial, for impure terumah is forbidden to be eaten at all and may be used only for kindling.

See Hilchot Terumot, Chapter 13. Produce that is deemed dimu’a may be eaten only by priests while in a state of ritual purity. Thus, instead of the produce being able to be sold at its ordinary price, a major reduction will have to be made, so that it will be purchased by the priests.

See Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot, Chapter 11, which explains that a Jew is forbidden to derive any benefit from wine used for idolatry.

I.e., because this law was instituted primarily as a deterrent.

E. g., a person touches food without knowing that he had contracted ritual impurity previously.

E. g., a person who is ritually impure is forced to touch food by powers beyond his control.

Generally, a person is liable for the damages he causes, even if he causes them untentionally or inadvertently (Chapter 6, Halachah l). Nevertheless, our Sages did not apply that principle in this instance, because the primary reason for this penalty was to serve as a deterrent, and this does not apply when damage is caused unintentionally or by forces beyond one’s control.

Piggul refers to the slaughter of a sacrifice or the receiving, carrying or sprinkling of its blood, with the intent that the sacrifice be eaten at a time when it is forbidden to be eaten. See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 13:1-3.

The Ra’avad and the Ramban differ with the Rambam regarding this point and maintain that a priest is not liable in such an instance. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling on the basis of his interpretation of Gittin 53a.

By performing work with either the heifer or the water, a person disqualifies them for this purpose. See Hilchot Parah 1:7, 7:1. Thus, he causes the owner financial loss.

I.e., he sends a red heifer to the place where its mother is working, with the intent that it will nurse, but implicit in his intent is that it will walk together with its mother and thresh while it is nursing. See Hilchot Parah, the conclusion of 1:7.

For when a person who is watching water intended for this purpose diverts his attention, the water is no longer acceptable.

Gittin 53a makes this distinction, for bringing the heifer into the threshing area to nurse is fundamentally a desirable act. It is only the intent of the person that causes the heifer to be disqualified.

When, by contrast, a gentile uses a Jew’s wine as a libation, it becomes forbidden.

Chulin 41a explains that we maintain that the Jew did not actually mean to offer the wine as a libation, but was merely intending to annoy his colleague.

Since his own share of the wine becomes forbidden, we assume that he actually intended to worship the false deity. Hence, his partner’s share is also forbidden.

In which instance, we can assume that he in fact intended to worship the false deity. Hence, the wine is forbidden.

For it is an accepted principle that a person never incurs both capital punishment and financial responsibility for the same act.

The principle absolving a person from financial responsibility when capital punishment is involved applies only when the responsibility for both penalties is incurred simultaneously.
Significantly, although the explanation given by the Rambam here is found in the Talmud (Gittin 53a), the Rambam omits this explanation in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Gittin 5:4) and offers two other resolutions to the question asked above.

The principle mentioned by the Rambam in this halachah, referred to as dina d’gramei, is the subject of much discussion by the commentaries. They note that in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:19 and 14:14, the Rambam frees a person who brings about damage from liability in an earthly court, because he did not cause the damage himself. They refer to such an instance as grama bin’zikin.
Dina d’gramei refers to actions that serve as more direct causes of damage, while with regard to grama bin’zikin, the damage is caused by another force. The person merely makes it possible for the damage to occur. See the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat, section 386) and the commentaries on those texts.

I.e., the Rambam considers this as a case of dina d’gramei. Tosafot (Bava Kama 26a) differs and considers this an instance of grama bin’zikin. For the person does not do anything that directly caused the utensil to break; he merely removed an object that would have prevented it from breaking. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 386:3) follows the Rambam’s perspective, while the Tur and the Ramah follow that of Tosafot.

For the person who owned the pillows and the utensil is not obligated to leave his pillows on the ground. The person who threw the utensil acted improperly, and he is the one responsible for the utensil to land without breaking.
The Ra’avad and the Tur differ with the Rambam with regard to this ruling, noting that Bava Kama 26a specifically states that when a person throws a utensil toward pillows, he is not liable, because “his arrows have ceased” - i.e., his actions will not cause damage. The Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam’s ruling, stating that this represents a preliminary understanding that ultimately is not accepted as the halachah.

And they divide the damages between them, for they both acted improperly. The person who threw the utensil had no right to throw it, nor did the person who removed the pillows have the right to remove them.

For since the promissory note is destroyed, its owner cannot collect the debt from the debtor.

Bava Kama 98b states that this law applies when there are no witnesses to testify that a promissory note that had been validated was destroyed. If there are witnesses to that effect, they can have a new promissory note written for the full amount of the one destroyed (Ramah, Choshen Mishpat 386:2).

If the promissory note was not validated, we cannot be certain that the owner of the note would be able to collect his debt.

And claims that he destroyed an ordinary piece of paper.

For there are no witnesses who can testify with regard to the value of the promissory note.

Hilchot Mechirah 6:12; Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 10:2. There it is explained that since according to Scriptural Law, the sale of the promissory note does not transfer the debt, the original creditor always has the potential of waiving the loan.

Which was certainly more than Levi paid him for it.

According to the Maggid Mishneh, the intent is that he tells his creditor that the debt will be paid by giving him a particular servant. The lien for the debt becomes centered on that servant alone. See Hilchot Milveh ViLoveh 18:3.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam regarding this point, but the Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s decision.

For once a creditor has accepted an entity as an apotiki, he can no longer expropriate any other property belonging to the debtor. See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 18:6.

This would create unfavorable gossip regarding the acceptability of the marriage prospects of the freed servant’s children (Bava Kama 41a.)

Our translation is not a literal rendition of the Rambam’s words, but is rather based on Rashi’s commentary on Bava Kama 98a. This interpretation appears necessary, because if the person had actually pushed the coin itself into the sea, there is no question that he would have been liable for its loss.

Tosafot (Bava Kama 98a) and the Tur differ with the Rambam on this point and on the final clause of the halachah and consider them to be instances of grama bin’zikin. According to their understanding, the person who caused the loss is not liable.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 386:1) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, while the Ramah (ibid.:3) follows the perspective of Tosafot.

In its present state, it is not fit to offer as a sacrifice on the altar.

For the coin is no longer as valuable as it was with the imprint.

He does not even bear partial responsibility. Instead, the person who threw the utensil is liable for the full amount (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 386:4).

As reflected by Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 5:1, this refers not only to an ox that gores others and kills or injures them, but also to one that destroys property.

I.e., a tree that hangs into the public domain and presents a danger. See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 13:25; Hilchot Sh’chenim 5:1. Today, parallels are very easy to conceive of: a leafy tree at the comer of a busy intersection that prevents drivers from seeing cars approaching from the intersecting street.

A penalty is not exacted for the worth of the tree or the animal, because they were condemned. Nevertheless, since the person was prevented from fulfilling this mitzvah himself, the judges may decide that he should be recompensed.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 382:1 states that the judges see whether this person is one who is fastidious in his observance of the mitzvot. If he is, we assume that he would have desired to fulfill this mitzvah himself, and a fine is meted out.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 382:1) states that only in this instance is such a claim accepted. See Chapter 5, Halachah 11.

Their blood must be covered, but not that of a domesticated animal. (See Hilchot Shechitah 14:1.)

When, however, the slaughterer gives permission, another person may cover the blood. For this reason, it is common to ask the slaughterer for permission to cover the blood of a chicken used for kapparot, so as to add another mitzvah to one’s merits before Yom Kippur.

Including those mentioned in the previous halachah.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 382:1) quotes these two halachot verbatim, without ruling in favor of either approach. It also states that such fines are not imposed by the judges of the present era. Nevertheless, if the person who was prevented from performing a mitzvah seizes money belonging to the person who prevented him, it should not be expropriated from him.

One of the examples given is a person who circumcises a person’s son without the permission of the father (Ramah, Choshen Mishpat 382:1).

When a person steals an article, he is required to return the equivalent of the article that he stole. In this instance, however, the person whose property was damaged cannot tell the person who caused the damage: “Take the carcass or the broken utensil and provide me with a healthy animal and a functional utensil” (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 387:1).
The Siftei Cohen 387:1, however, states that the law stated by Sefer Me’irat Einayim applies only when it is not possible to repair the utensil. If it can be repaired, the person who caused the damage is required to repair it.

See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 7:8.

To make wine.

If the grapes (or raisins) are more valuable than the wine. See Bava Batra 126a, which implies that wine is generally more valuable than these.

See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 5:10, which also states that movable property should be expropriated first. Bava Kama 7b explains that movable property is considered to be easier to sell than landed property. Therefore, it is considered to be “choicer” and should be given priority.
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 419:1 writes that the person who caused the damages has the prerogative of giving the person whose property he damaged movable property or landed property, whichever he desires. The Siftei Cohen 419:2 differs and states that according to the Rambam, the Beit Yosef and others, if the person who caused the damages possesses movable property, he must pay in movable property, regardless of whether or not he desires.

Exodus 22:4 specifically mentions that when a person’s ox (or other property) causes damage, he must pay “from the best of his field.” The same principle applies when he causes the damage himself.

See Hilchot Na’arah Betulah, Chapters 1 and 3, for a description of these penalties.

I.e., according to Scriptural Law, the person who caused the damage would not be liable unless there were witnesses who testified on the plaintiff’s behalf. Nevertheless, our Sages instituted this oath for the plaintiff’s benefit, to enable him to collect recompense for the damages that he suffered.

I.e., the claims he made were in keeping with an estimation we would make of his social standing.

See Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 4:1-3.

This is the subject of an unresolved difference of opinion in Bava Kama 62a. Because there is no definite ruling requiring a defendant to pay in such an instance, the Rambam rules that he is not liable.
According to the Rambam, the question debated by our Sages was: Should we say that since the person placed an object in a place where it is not normally kept, the person who caused the damages had no way of knowing that it was there, and therefore he is not liable? Or should we say that since he willfully destroyed property belonging to a colleague, he must bear the responsibility?

The Maggid Mishneh quotes Tosafot as stating that even if witnesses testify that there were pearls in the sack, the defendant is not liable, for it was negligent for him to leave them there. [The Maggid Mishneh himself differs and prefers the position taken by the Rashba, that if there are witnesses who substantiate the plaintiff’s claim, he must be reimbursed for the pearls. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 388:1) quotes Tosafot’s position.]

This follows the Rambam’s approach that whenever a plaintiff seizes property concerning which there is an unresolved halachic debate, it is allowed to remain in his possession. The Rambam’s approach is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 388:1). The Tur and the Ramah differ and require the property to be returned.

This phrase though missing from the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah, is found in manuscripts and in early printings and is logically consistent with the Rambam’s approach.

See Hilchot She’ilah UFikadon 5:6, which cites a similar instance. The defendant is a modeh b’miktzat - he admits a portion of the plaintiff’s claim. Therefore, he is required by Scriptural Law to take an oath denying the remainder of that claim. He cannot take this oath, because he admits that he does not know the number of gold pieces the wallet contained. Therefore, he is required to pay.
This is the Rambam’s position, and it is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 388:1). The Ra’avad, the Tur and the Ramah differ and require the plaintiff to take an oath to affirm his claim before collecting.

I.e., although he did not actually destroy the property, since he was the direct cause of its rightful owner’s being deprived of its use, it is considered as it he had destroyed it.
The fact that the owner has the right to collect his due from the moseir’s heirs indicates that he is considered to be liable according to Scriptural Law. Note the contrast to the Rabbinic obligations imposed in Chapter 7, Halachot 1-3 (Maggid Mishneh).
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 388:2) differs and obligates the moseir’s heirs only when the moseir was convicted by a court before his death. This indicates that he considers the moseir’s obligation Rabbinic in origin. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 388:15.

This term is the subject of the majority of this chapter. It refers to a person who endangers the life or property of a fellow Jew by giving information to lawless Jews or gentiles.

If, however, they compelled a person to show them resources that he himself owns, and instead he showed them resources belonging to a colleague, he is liable (Tur, Ramah, Choshen Mishpat 388:2).

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that as long as he does not violate the prohibitions against murder, adultery or incest and idol worship, a person may do anything to save his life. The commentaries justify the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that although a person is entitled to save his life by using property belonging to a colleague, he is obligated to reimburse him for it.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 388:4) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, but the Siftei Cohen 388:24 argues on behalf of the Ra’avad’s position.

The Siftei Cohen 388:20 states that this applies in an instance when the king makes an arbitrary demand, and not when he issues a tax that is incumbent on all inhabitants of the country.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 388:12 states that the expression “is not liable” indicates that at the outset, one should not sacrifice a colleague’s property under such circumstances. Kin’at Eliyahu maintains that the person must consider the amount of suffering and danger involved.

The person who showed the property to the lawless person is not liable, for the reasons mentioned in the previous halachah. The person who transported the property is not liable, for the reason the Rambam continues to explain.

And so, the fact that afterwards the moseir or another Jew brought the property to him is not significant. It is considered as if the lawless person had taken possession of it previously.

See the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 388:5) and the Siftei Cohen 388:26, who debate whether or not such a person is considered a moseir.

I.e., the lawless person, for we assume that he will not heed the instructions of a Jewish court.

I.e., a lawless gentile seized one Jew and exacted payment from him for money that he claimed was owed to him by another Jew.

Since the money was taken without legal process, the debtor can claim that he would have found a way to avoid paying the debt.

The commentaries explain that the same laws also apply with regard to standard property tax, income tax or sales tax.

This is a standard tax that every inhabitant of the country is required to pay. Therefore, if one Jew is imprisoned (because the king has charged him with responsibility for collection of all the taxes, or arbitrarily, in order to collect those taxes), he must be reimbursed for money taken from him on behalf of any delinquent taxpayer.
Note the Hagahot Maimoniot and Kessef Mishneh, who mention that the Rambam’s intent is with regard to the taxes immediately due. With regard to taxes due from previous years, different laws apply.

I.e., when a king or his soldiers visit an outlying city, the inhabitants of that city are required to pay for their hospitality.

This excludes a general fine exacted because of delinquent taxpayers as a whole, even when the person in question was himself delinquent.

If, however, there are no witnesses, the defendant can free himself from liability by taking a Rabbinic oath that he did not give his colleague’s property to the lawless person (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 388:20).

If, however, the defendant admits informing about property to a lawless person, but claims not to know the extent of the loss he caused, he is required to pay the plaintiff’s entire claim. The rationale is that he is required to take an oath but is unable to, as explained in Chapter 7, Halachah 19. (See Maggid Mishneh, Siftei Cohen 388:31.)
The above represents the Rambam’s position. The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 388:7) also mention that there are authorities who do not accept this ruling and maintain that even if the witnesses do not know the value of the property that was given to the gentiles, the person whose property was taken has the prerogative of taking an oath.

According to the Rambam, this law applies even when witnesses observe that the property was seized (Maharshal, Siftei Cohen 388:32).

This matter is the subject of an unresolved difference of opinion among our Sages (Bava Kama 62a). Therefore, as in all cases of this nature, the Rambam rules that whoever has the property in his possession at the time the matter is brought to court is entitled to maintain possession. Thus, if the plaintiff seizes the defendant’s property, he is allowed to keep it. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 388:7) do not accept this premise and require that the property that was seized be returned.

Circumstantial evidence and/or an oath taken by the plaintiff are not sufficient to create a Jegal obligation.

This term refers to an oath taken while holding a sacred object (a Torah scroll or tefillin), whether the oath is of Scriptural or Rabbinic origin.

This refers to a more lenient Rabbinic oath, which does not require holding a sacred article.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 388:8) quotes opinions that maintain that even when a person merely threatens to inform about a person’s property to a lawless man, he is disqualified as a witness. There are, however, dissenting views.

Causing him either to suffer corporal punishment or to be executed (Hilchot Teshuvah 3:12).

ln the present age, when Rabbinic courts do not have punitive powers, there are conditions that allow a person to seek redress from a colleague by employing a gentile or secular legal system. Before doing so, however, he must consult a Rabbinic court and obtain license from them. If he does obtain such license, he is not considered a moseir for appealing to the secular courts.

Bava Metzia 83b relates that Rabbi Eleazar ben Rabbi Shimon apprehended thieves and handed them over to the Roman authorities. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korchah rebuked him: “How can you hand over the nation of God to be killed?”
“I am only pruning the brambles [the wicked] from the vineyard [Israel],” Rabbi Eleazar protested.
“Let the owner of the vineyard [God] prune His own vineyard,” Rabbi Yehoshua replied.
Similarly, Gittin 7a relates that Mar Ukva complained to Rabbi Eliezer that certain men were disturbing him and asked him whether he should inform upon them to the gentile authorities.
Rabbi Eliezar answered, citing Psalms 39:2: “I will guard my mouth... even when a wicked man stands in front of me.” The verse implies, he told Mar Ukva, that even when a person’s adversary is wicked, he should guard his tongue.
Mar Ukva complained that it was difficult for him to endure their presence. Rabbi Eliezer instructed him to increase his own Divine service, and soon they were apprehended without his intervention.

I.e., even in the diaspora.

Although capital punishment as prescribed by the court was ended 40 years before the destruction of the Temple, this execution of a moseir in protection of one’s own interests is allowed in all ages. Thus, Bava Kama 117a relates that Rav Kahana killed a moseir in Babylonia. Similarly, in recent generations - e.g., to escape Nazi and Soviet persecution - such measures were occasionally advised by our people’s sages.

The Ramah quotes the Teshuvot Maimoniot as saying that if it is possible to prevent the moseir from informing without killing him, one is obligated to use that alternative.

In the instance mentioned above concerning Rav Kahana, he killed a moseir for informing about another Jew’s straw.
We fear that once a person becomes entangled with gentiles with regard to financial matters, he will never free himself, and ultimately they will seek to ruin his entire livelihood, and perhaps endanger his life (Bava Kama, loc. cit.).

The Maggid Mishneh (quoted by the Ramah, loc. cit.) cites an incident concerning Rav Shilah (Berachot 58a) from which it appears that if one does not have time to warn the moseir, one may kill him nevertheless. The moseir is considered as threatening the person’s life and the laws concerning a rodef apply.

Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 236) interprets this as indicating that the moseir must acknowledge the warning.

I.e., not only is killing him permissible; it is desirable.
The halachic basis for the permission to kill a moseir is the principle of rodef discussed in the following halachot and in Hilchot Rotzeach, Chapter 1 (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 388:29).

I.e., not only the person who is himself endangered, but any neutral party may kill him.

This expression indicates a ruling made by the Rambam on the basis of his own analysis, without an explicit Talmudic or Rabbinic source.
The Maggid Mishneh affirms the Rambam’s ruling, noting that none of the instances in the Talmud speak of killing a moseir after he performed his threat. He also cites the principle of rodef, in which the law is that once the rodef has killed or raped, it is forbidden to kill him arbitrarily. Instead, he must be brought to court.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 388:15) states that if a person informs on a colleague three times, he may be killed. The Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that one is allowed merely to be an indirect cause of the moseir’s death, but not actually to kill him. The Siftei Cohen 388:66 substantiates the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch.

Our translation follows the manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. This version is also reflected in the rulings of Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.: 11,15). The standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah reads “punished.”

I.e., Spain.

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 388:16), which states that the funds necessary for the community to deal with informers should be collected by taxation of all the members of the community.

This is also an emendation of the standard text, based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings.

The Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 388) quotes one of the Rashba’s responsa, which states that it is forbidden to have mercy on such individuals, and one must prosecute them severely. For “mercy to them is cruelty to all the people in the generation.”

This is also an emendation based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings. The standard text of the Mishneh Torah states “imprison him.”

This refers to pain and irritation, but not actual financial loss (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 388:30). Alternatively, it applies after the fact (Siftei Cohen 388:60). For, as mentioned in the previous halachah, one may even kill a person if he threatens to inform on an individual.

There is a difference of opinion concerning this question in Bava Kama 62a. The Rambam’s ruling is based on the principle that the moseir’s heirs have not done anything to warrant the destruction of their property. Indeed, it is possible that they will be righteous, and then, to paraphrase Job 27:17: “What is prepared by a wicked person will be eaten by a righteous man” (Bava Kama, op. cit.).
The Ramah (388:13) quotes opinions that state that although it is forbidden to destroy a moseir’s property, one may take it as one’s own. Apparently, those opinions maintain that this is forbidden because of the prohibition against bal tash’chit, destroying valuable entities. Therefore, if one takes it as one’s own, this does not apply.
Note also the Siftei Cohen 388:62, who states that if ruining a moseir’s financial resources will make it impossible - or more difficult - for him to inform on Jews, it is permitted to destroy them.

Rodef means “pursuer,” and as the Rambam states, refers to a person who is pursuing another Jew to kill or rape him or her. License is given to kill the rodef - as stated in Hilchot Rotzeach, Chapter 1 - before he carries out his desire.

This refers to an incestuous, adulterous or homosexual rape.

Therefore, we follow the principle stated above (Hilchot Geneivah 3:1), that whenever a transgression involves both a financial penalty and capital punishment, the person is not liable for the financial penalty.

Thus, just as he is allowed to kill the rodef, he may destroy his property as a deterrent.

Pausing to be sure that he does not break any utensils.

The Rambam explains that our Sages were concerned that a person would worry about the possibility of becoming financially indebted as a result of his efforts to save a colleague. This might cause him to desist entirely - or at least to proceed slower - in his efforts to save his fellow Jew.

Although he willfully destroyed property belonging to others, he is not liable, for the reasons the Rambam proceeds to explain. Instead, the loss is borne equally by all the people who own cargo on the ship, as reflected in the Rambam’s rulings, Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 12:14. If, however, if only one person’s cargo was jettisoned, he should be reimbursed by the others.
The above follows the interpretation by Sefer Me’irat Einayim 380:9. This explanation resolves the objections of the Ra’avad, who understands the Rambam as maintaining in this halachah that the person whose property was jettisoned must bear the loss alone.
The Maggid Mishneh and Kessef Mishneh resolved that objection by stating that in this instance, the Rambam is referring to a person who loaded his cargo on the ship last and overloaded the ship beyond its capacity. Since his cargo alone is the source of danger, it is correct - they maintain - that he suffer the loss alone.

Our translation follows the standard version of the Mishneh Torah, from which one might infer that it is forbidden to kill a gentile as well. Although killing him does not warrant capital punishment, it is forbidden by Scriptural Law. It must, however, be noted that authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah state “Whenever a person kills a Jewish man....”

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 289) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 34) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.

As explained in Hilchot Sanhedrin 15:4, this refers to decapitation as practiced by the gentile kings.

I.e., we do not say that since a person killed a colleague by fire, he should be executed by being burned to death.

This is speaking about an instance where the murderer acted intentionally. If a person kills unintentionally, the Rambam rules (Chapter 5, Halachah 10) that it is not a mitzvah for the blood redeemer to kill him.
Despite the statement in the text, the Rambam does not consider the redemption of the blood to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah, but rather apparently includes this in the mitzvah to execute by decapitation. Significantly, the Ramban (in his Hosafot to Sefer HaMitzvot) does include the blood redemption in his reckoning of the 613 mitzvot.

See the notes on Halachah 5 and Chapter 5. Halachah 7, from which it appears that the blood redeemer should not kill the murderer until he is convicted by the court.

I.e., his descendants or his paternal relatives.

E. g., a convert who did not father any Jewish children.

Although a grandson is obligated to show certain tokens of respect to his grandfather, this obligation is superseded by the commandment to redeem his father’s blood.

For the commandment to redeem the blood of one’s brother does not supersede the commandment to honor one’s father.

For this is a positive commandment not dependent on a specific time, and thus it is incumbent on both men and women (Merkevet HaMishneh).

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 296) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 412) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments. Significantly, in his Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam does not mention that this mitzvah is incumbent on the court, implying perhaps that it applies also to the blood redeemer.
The rationale for this mitzvah is obvious. If a person were able to pay ransom for murdering, the rich would act wantonly and redeem any foul play with money (Sefer HaChinuch, loc. cit.).

See the Guide for the Perplexed, Volume III, Chapter 41, which states that even if the victim did not die immediately and forgave the murderer, it is still a mitzvah to execute him.

See Sefer HaMitzvot, General Principle 5, which explains that this is not considered one of the 613 mitzvot, for it does not involve a specific deed.

On this verse, the Sifre comments that murder makes the land impure, drives the Divine Presence from the land and causes the destruction of the Temple.

Nor by the blood redeemer.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 292) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 409) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments. The rationale is to protect the rights of every criminal and give him the opportunity for due process of the law.
In Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam quotes the Sifre Zuta, which states that even if a person killed a colleague in the presence of a court of law, the court may not execute him until he is tried by another court.

Who is not liable for execution by the court.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 247) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 600) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.

As explained in the following halachah, it is, nevertheless, desirable not to kill the pursuer, if possible.

The person pursuing his colleague with the intent to murder.

Sanhedrin 72b states that it is not necessary to give a rodef a warning, as is required with regard to a person executed by the court. From the Rambam’s words, however, it appears that he considers it desirable to offer a warning, but that one should not hesitate and wait to see that it is accepted, because the intended victim’s life is at stake. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 425:3 states that, after the fact, even if no warning whatsoever is given, one may kill the rodef to save his intended victim.

Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit. considers this to be the proof-text that illustrates this commandment. I.e., the woman is considered a rodef because she is attacking her husband’s antagonist in a way that can kill him.

The rodef should be maimed in a way that prevents him from carrying out his intent.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 293) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 601) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.
The rationale is that taking pity on the rodef’s life will enable him to perform harm. This provides us with an important lesson: mercy and kindness are important emotions, but they must be controlled by the Torah’s guidelines. Otherwise, by showing mercy to the cruel, one will eventually be cruel to the merciful (see Kohelet Rabbah 7:37).

Oholot 7:6.

And remove it limb by limb (Ibid.).

Thus, since the fetus is endangering its mother’s life, it may be killed. The life of the mother is given priority over the life of the fetus.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger notes that the rationale for this priority is that the fetus is not considered to be “a soul,” a living being in the complete sense. He therefore asks why the principle of rodef applies? Even without that principle, it should be obvious that one may abort the fetus. Moreover, once the head emerges, the fetus is considered “a soul.” Nevertheless, even though it is still “pursuing” its mother, it is not touched.
(In this context, see also Hilchot Melachim 9:4, which states that a gentile who kills a fetus is liable for murder.)

But the body remains stuck in the birth canal.

See Pitchei Teshuvah 425:2, which mentions opinions that maintain that when it is certain that both the mother and the fetus will die if the fetus is not aborted, an abortion is permitted.

Raping a consecrated maiden is considered to be adultery and is punishable by death. Therefore, one is allowed to kill the pursuer. If, however, a person seeks to rape a maiden who has not been consecrated, efforts should be made to prevent this, but the would-be rapist may not be killed.

Although the verse mentions only a consecrated maiden, our Sages understood it as applying to all arayot - i.e., women with whom sexual relations are forbidden and punishable by execution or karet
The term arayot refers to adulterous or incestuous sexual relations. It also includes relations with a niddah, a woman who is ritually impure because of menstrual bleeding. Note, however, the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who maintains that the laws of rodef do not apply with regard to relations with a niddah..

Sexual relations with an animal are also considered one of the arayot and are punishable by execution. Nevertheless, since it does not bring shame to a human victim, it is considered to be a sin between man and God - like idol worship or the desecration of the Sabbath - and one may not kill the person seeking to commit the transgression.

Because the transgression does not involve another person.
Sanhedrin 73b mentions Sages who maintain that one may kill a person before he commits these transgressions, but the majority follow the ruling cited by the Rambam. The difference is that the minority opinion gives priority to the concept that killing the person seeking to perform the transgression is a spiritual benefit for him, for he will die without having committed the transgressions. The other view maintains that, since no other person is involved, we should allow the person to exercise free choice, however wrong his choice may be.
Note the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 8:7), which states that although one may not kill a person who seeks to perform these transgressions, one should try to prevent him by all other means.

Our translation is based on Sanhedrin 73b.
Once the head of the male organ has been inserted into the vaginal canal, the transgression has been committed. As such, Jewish law does not recognize an advantage to killing the rapist on the spot, and requires that he be tried in court.

Sanhedrin, ibid., defines the term “concluded sexual relations” as having inserting the entire organ, not as ejaculation.

Where he will be tried for his crime.
The license to kill a rodef is granted only to prevent a transgression. Since the transgression was already committed, no one has the right to take the law into his hands. The matter must be handled by the court (Kessef Mishneh).

The license to kill is not granted by her, but by the Torah. And it is the Torah’s laws that must be heeded. If, however, the woman’s life is actually in danger, the pursuers should allow the transgression to be committed rather than cause her death.
Note Sefer Me’irat Einayim 425:12, which discusses whether the rodef may be killed in a situation where the woman consents to the transgression.

Halachah 7.

I.e., he will suffer death at God’s hands (Kessef Mishneh).
The Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 425) explains that the person who killed the rodef may be slain by the redeemer of the rodef’s blood. Indeed, he cites Sanhedrin 49a, which explains that Yoav slew Avner (II Samuel 3:27) for this reason. Avner had slain Yoav’s brother Asah’el because he had pursued him (Ibid. 2:23). Nevertheless, Yoav still held Avner liable, because he could have saved himself by maiming Asah’el and not killing him.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 425) differs with the Rambam, asking why if the person who killed the rodef is liable to die, may he not be executed. The Kessef Mishneh defends the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that the killer cannot be executed by a court, since his intent is to save the intended victim, and it is not possible to give him a proper warning.

This commandment applies to the laws of a rodef mentioned in the previous halachot, but also to other situations, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 297) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 237) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.

The Kessef Mishneh cites the Jerusalem Talmud, which mentions that even when a person must endanger his own life to endeavor to save his colleague, he is obligated to do so. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 426:2.

Needless to say, the person whose life was saved must afterwards reimburse the person who saved it for the expenses he undertook (Kessef Mishneh).

This instance demonstrates that the mitzvah applies even when, as in the example the Rambam employs, the danger - though imminent - is not yet a factor of the immediate present.

See Halachah 7.

See Halachah 8.

See the previous halachah.

As stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2, lashes are given as punishment for the violation of a prohibition only when an actual deed is involved.