Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

Our translation of the term derech eretz, literally, “the way of the world,” is taken from the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Kiddushin 1:10).

Hence he is likely to accept a bribe to deliver false testimony.

I.e., to sign on a legal document or to observe a business transaction.

If he was designated as a witness (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 34:43).

Since he is unlearned, we assume that he lacks the other positive qualities mentioned in the previous halachah.

The Radbaz comments that this matter has been a source of error for many courts. Although our Sages state that every Jew can be assumed to be acceptable, the intent is that it can be assumed that he will not commit transgressions. It does not mean that he can be assumed to have all the positive qualities necessary for his testimony to be accepted.

The Kessef Mishneh interprets the Rambam’s words as referring to a person who goes through the marketplace eating casually, exposing himself to everyone’s view, as opposed to someone who eats in a private corner.

Yevamot 63b states: “There is no one more disgusting and more despicable... than someone who goes unclothed in the marketplace.”

As indicated by Chapter 17, Halachah 2, shame is one of the essential elements necessary to discourage a person from giving false testimony (Likkutei Sichos, Vol. XVII).

Rashi, Sanhedrin 26b states that a person who receives charity from gentiles in public “desecrates the name of God for the sake of money.” The intent is that by accepting the money from gentiles, the person indicates that the Jewish people are not willing to take care of him. This denigrates the honor of the Jewish people and thus of God.
As the commentaries mention, however, if a person benefits from the charity of gentiles privately or if he needs the money, and there is no other alternative but for him to take the charity in public, these words of censure do not apply. For since his livelihood is dependent on the matter, he has no option. See Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 8:9.

In this way, everyone will be advised not to rely on him.

For if his testimony serves as evidence concerning a loan or a sale, the lender or the purchaser will suffer financial loss if his testimony is disqualified.

Since his testimony is acceptable according to Scriptural Law, our Sages did not enforce their decrees in an instance which would cause people financial loss.

This is a general principle. Unlike financial matters, marriage and divorce, and cases involving capital punishment, the determination of whether an object is kosher may be made on the basis of the testimony of one witness [see Shulchan Aruch and Ramah (Yoreh Deah 127:3)]. The Rambam continues, explaining that even though the testimony of a particular witness would not be accepted with regard to other matters, it is accepted with regard to questions of this nature.

A prohibition other than the prohibition against eating meat that is not properly slaughtered. The testimony of such a person would not be accepted in court. Thus the fact that his word is accepted in this situation serves as proof of the principle stated by the Rambam at the outset.

Examples of - and the rationale for - this leniency is explained by the Rambam in the following halachah.

When stating this law in Hilchot Ma’aser 13:17, the Rambam adds one proviso, that it not appear that the person making the statement is trying to perpetrate deception. For example, two produce traders who are suspect to sell untithed produce enter a city. One says: “My produce has not been tithed, but my colleague’s has been tithed.”
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling and cites sources which appear to indicate that the suspect person’s word is not accepted at all, not with regard to his own matters, nor with regard to those involving another person. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh provide explanations that justify the Rambam’s ruling.

Whose word is not ordinarily accepted with regard to questions whether his own produce has been tithed.

The meat of a firstborn animal cannot be eaten unless it received a blemish on its own accord. This person is suspected of slaughtering such an animal and selling it even if it did not have a blemish. Our translation is based on the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh.

I.e., meat that is not from a firstborn.

I.e., even if they transgress themselves, they will hesitate before causing another person to transgress.

They will not, however, fear causing a person monetary loss.

This term refers to the kings of the Ten Tribes, and by extension to the Hasmonean and Herodian kings of the Second Temple era. Different laws apply to kings of the Davidic dynasty, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 3, Hilchot Melachim 3:7.

In Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:5, the Rambam quotes this law and gives a rationale: “because this may lead to a disaster.” See the notes to that halachah.

Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

People who collaborate with gentiles to cause Jews loss of life or property (see also Hilchot Teshuvah 3:6 and Hilchot Chovel UMazik 8:9-10).

As explained in Hilchot Teshuvah 3:8, this term refers to individuals who deny the Torah, deny prophecy, or maintain that God is not aware of man's actions.

Individuals who turn their back on Jewish observance (Hilchot Teshuvah 3:9).

I.e., to kill them. See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:1; Hilchot Rotzeach 4:12.

Those who observe the seven universal laws given to Noah and his descendants (see Hilchot Melachim 8:10-11).

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 16:4; 12:2.

Note the distinctions between the two in Hilchot Sh’vuot, Chapter 1.

I.e., in a situation where we assume that he was unaware that he was transgressing as the Rambam continues to explain.

See Hilchot Shabbat 10:1.

Sanhedrin 26b and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 34:4) give another example: people who bury the dead on the first day of a festival. Although it is a transgression, they are under the impression that they are performing a mitzvah.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 4.

For the admission of the person himself is equivalent to the testimony of 100 witnesses (Bava Metzia 3a). The intent is not that his word is accepted as the testimony of witnesses, but that his admission of liability obligates him.

Just as a person’s testimony is not accepted with regard to his relatives, his testimony is not accepted with regard to himself. He is “his own relative” (Sanhedrin 9b). Nevertheless, such a person should not be appointed as a witness as an initial and preferred option [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 34:28)].

A transgression that would disqualify him as a witness, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 4.

And that is also a transgression which disqualifies a person as a witness (ibid.).

We follow the principle palginon diburo, “we divide his words.” We accept the portion of his statements which say that so-and-so lent money at interest; we do not accept the portion which states that the person testifying was the recipient of the loan.

In which instance, he would not be disqualified as a witness.

In which instance, were two witnesses to testify that this transpired, he would be disqualified as a witness.

A person’s testimony is ordinarily not accepted with regard to his wife, for she is considered as his own person (Chapter 13, Halachah 3).

Following the principle of palginin diburo.

In this instance, the ox is also executed, for the reason the Rambam continues to explain.

Hence we do not require the principle palginon diburo.
The Ra’avad interprets Sanhedrin 10a, the source for the Rambam’s ruling, as implying that since we do not employ the principle palginin diburo, the person’s testimony is not accepted at all. The rationale is that since the ox is his property, he is considered an involved party and his testimony is not accepted (see Chapter 15). Since we do not accept his testimony with regard to the ox, we also do not accept it with regard to the sodomizer.

As stated in the following halachah.

For the defendant can claim: “I will pay the money when you prove that he is an acceptable witness.” We do not say: “Let us follow the assumption that the witness, like all Jews, is acceptable unless it is proven otherwise,” for the defendant can say: “The money is presently in my possession. Let it remain there unless it is proven that I owe it to the other person.”

For a person disqualified as a witness is also disqualified as a judge (see Chapter 16, Halachah 4).

The Siftei Cohen 34:33 states that his word is accepted even with regard to matters which he observed before he repented.

Our translation follows the text suggested by the Kessef Mishneh. He interprets this as referring to a situation where the person does not receive lashes, because a warning was not given.
The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 34:72 and the Siftei Cohen 34:34 emphasize that the transgressor is not reinstated as a witness until testimony was given in court that he repented. Until that time, legal documents he signed are invalid. Although there are opinions which differ, this perspective is borne out by the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:26).

Hilchot Sanhedrin 17:7 states: “Whenever a person sins and is lashed, he returns to his [original state of] acceptability, as [implied by Deuteronomy 25:3]: ‘And your brother will be degraded before your eyes.’ Once he is lashed, he is ‘your brother.’”
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo notes that there are texts of the Mishneh Torah that read: “Whenever a person was obligated to receive lashes, he is considered as an acceptable witness, when he receives lashes in court.” Rav Yosef Karo states that he prefers the version used above because: a) it also deals with situations where the person does not actually receive lashes, and b) it implies that if a person receives lashes, but does not repent, he is not reinstated as a witness. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 34:29), however, he does not mention repentance in this clause.

I.e., perform actions which indicate that he sincerely regrets his previous conduct, as the Rambam illustrates in the following halachot.

See the notes to Chapter 10, Halachah 4.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 34:29) states that repentance is required only when a person frequently transgressed. If, however, he transgressed only once and returned the money on his own volition, that is sufficient.

And not because of the compulsion of the court. If the court compels them, we have no proof that they themselves regretted their actions (Kessef Mishneh).
The promissory notes must be torn up, because the obligation to pay interest is stated in the promissory note itself. In such an instance, the borrower is still required to return the principal. Nevertheless, the loan is given the status of a debt supported by a verbal commitment alone. As such, the creditor cannot expropriate property sold to others.

Although it is permitted - indeed, according to Scriptural Law, even a mitzvah – to lend to gentiles at interest, as stated in Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 5:1-2, an exception is made in this instance, because of the tendency that was already ingrained in the person’s character.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 34:29) adds that the lender must also return the money which he took at interest. If he does not know from whom he took the money, he should give it to the community to use for the public benefit.

This phrase is added on the basis of the authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah.

For we fear that this will lead to them playing for money again.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 34:31) quotes opinions that state that the gamblers must also return any money that they won before they are reinstated as acceptable witnesses.

Where there is no question of theft involved. In this instance, as well, the Ramah (ibid.) quotes opinions that require that any doves stolen be returned.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 34:33) emphasizes that the severe measures the Rambam requires are necessary before the person is reinstated only when the person derived financial benefit from committing a transgression. If, however, a person violates a transgression that does not bring him financial gain, it is sufficient for him to make a public admission of his guilt and promise never to transgress again.

Making such a statement in a court that is familiar with him is not possible, for they will never require him to take an oath.

I.e., check to make sure that there are no lesions in the lungs or other factors that render the animal as trefe; alternatively, check the knife which he uses to slaughter the animal.

If the butcher does not sell the meat, but merely slaughters an animal for another person and tells him that it is kosher when it in fact is non-kosher, he is also disqualified as a witness. Nevertheless, since he did not garner any financial gain from his transgression, he need not undertake all the measures the Rambam continues to describe. Instead, it is sufficient for him merely to repent (Kessef Mishneh).

Since he sells non-kosher meat to others, we can assume that he partakes of it himself. This is a prohibition punishable by lashes. Hence he is disqualified as a witness (Kessef Mishneh).
Selling the non-kosher meat itself - even though it involves the violation of the prohibition “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind” - does not disqualify the butcher as a witness. The rationale is that this prohibition is not punishable by lashes (ibid.).

It is necessary for him to clothe and robe himself in black to humble his heart and cause him to regret having caused others to sin (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 34:84).

Sanhedrin 27b.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 287) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 589) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. As the Rambam states at the conclusion of the chapter, we do not disqualify relatives because we fear that they will lie on behalf of their relative. Instead, this is a Scriptural decree; Moses would not be able to testify on behalf of Jethro, his father-in-law (Bava Batra 159a).

Just as two relatives may not testify on behalf of each other; so, too, they may not testify together on behalf of someone else. Although the verse speaks about testimony in cases involving capital punishment, it applies with regard to all types of testimony.

As the Rambam proceeds to explain, if Jacob fathered Reuven and Shimon, Reuven fathered David, and Shimon fathered Pinchas, none of the individuals mentioned can testify on behalf of each other.

See Halachah 5.

I.e., Pinchas and David may not testify together.

I.e., Reuven may not testify with Pinchas. Diagram

The Rambam’s statements with regard to maternal relatives have attracted the attention the commentaries, for Sanhedrin 28a derives the disqualification of maternal relatives from the exegesis of a verse, implying that the prohibition is of Scriptural origin. This is in fact the position of many other Rishonim.
The Radbaz (- and this interpretation also appears to fit the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah -) explains that although this perspective is mentioned by the Talmud, it is not accepted as halachah. The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 33:7 states that the Rambam interprets that Talmudic passage as an asmachta, i.e., a support found by the Sages for a law that was part of the Oral Tradition.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam maintains - as he writes in his Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 2) - that laws derived through the principles of Biblical exegesis are midivrei sofrim, “from the words of the Sages.” Nevertheless, such laws have the same authority as if they were stated explicitly in the Torah. See the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 33:2) and commentaries where this issue is discussed.

Who came from the same drop of sperm (Yevamot 98a).

The Kessef Mishneh notes that the phrase “that they convert” implies that they converted themselves. If, however, a women converts while pregnant with twin sons, since they were born as Jews, they are disqualified from testifying on each other’s behalf by Rabbinic decree. The Siftei Cohen 33:7 cites the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 14:14 which states that, in such a situation, the brothers are forbidden to have relations with each other’s wife by Scriptural Law. Accordingly, he maintains that they are also disqualified as witnesses by Scriptural Law. The Be’er Heitev 33:7, however, explains that a distinction can be made between the two instances.

Without any connection at all to his past. Indeed, according to Scriptural Law, a convert can marry his mother or his sister (Hilchot lssurei Bi’ah 14:12).
Our Sages did not decree that converts may not testify on behalf of their relatives, lest one permit native-born Jewish relatives to testify on each other’s behalf, because the acceptance of witnesses is dependent on the court and a court would not make such an error (Yevamot 22a).

To refer back to the situations mentioned in Halachah 1. Jacob fathered Reuven and Shimon, Reuven fathered David, Shimon fathered Pinchas, David fathered Solomon, and Pinchas fathered Eli. Eli may testify on behalf of Reuven. Diagram

Eli may testify on behalf of Solomon.

David and Pinchas.

David and Shimon.

Sanhedrin 27b derives this concept from the exegesis of the verse: “Fathers shall not die because of sons.” Rashi explains that since the Torah uses the plural term for both father’s and sons, the implication is that several sets of relatives are involved.

For he is considered as being two degrees removed.

Rabbenu Tam states that a person may not testify together with his great-grandson. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 33:2) quotes both opinions and the Ramah states that Rabbenu Tam’s view should be followed.

And needless to say, the sons of their daughters and the daughters of their sons.

Sanhedrin 28b derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 18:14.

The opinions which disqualify a person from testifying on behalf of his great-grandson grant leniency and allow him to testify on behalf of his great-grandson’s wife, provided there is no direct monetary benefit to his great-grandson involved [Shulchan Aruch and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 33:3)].

To cite an example: Jacob gave birth to Dinah and Devorah, Dinah gave birth to Sarah, and Devorah, to Leah. Sarah married Abraham and Leah married Joel, Abraham and Joel may testify on behalf of each other. Diagram

When relatives are distantly removed, we do not employ the concept: "A husband is considered like his wife" twice in the same instance to disqualify a witness (Radbaz).
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 33:4) quotes the Terumat HaDeshen who rules that the initial and preferred option is for individuals who are related by marriage in this manner not to be appointed as witnesses together or to sign a legal document together as witnesses.

To continue using the above example: Dinah married Joseph. Joseph and Abraham may not testify on behalf of each other.

Since the two women are not distantly removed, we employ the concept: “A husband is considered like his wife” twice in the same instance to disqualify a witness.

To refer to the above example: Devorah married Baruch. Joseph and Baruch may not testify on each other’s behalf.

To refer to the above example, if Devorah had a son, Michael, Joseph could not testify on behalf of Michael. In this instance, after using the principle: “A husband is considered like his wife,” Joseph is considered as one degree removed and Michael, two degrees removed. Hence, they are disqualified to testify on behalf of each other.

To refer to the above example, if Devorah had a daughter, Judith who married Judah, Joseph could not testify on behalf of Judah. In this instance, after using the principle twice: “A husband is considered like his wife,” Joseph is considered as one degree removed and Judah, two degrees removed. Hence, they are disqualified to testify on behalf of each other.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 33:4) quotes the Rambam’s ruling on this point, but also quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who allows such testimony. The Ramah rules that Rabbenu Asher’s opinion should be followed.

To refer to the above example: Baruch had fathered Aaron in a previous marriage. Joseph may testify on Aaron’s behalf.

I.e., if Eliezer and Rebbeca are brother and sister and Rebbeca is married to Isaac, Eliezer may not testify on behalf of Isaac. He may, however, testify on behalf of all of Isaac’s relatives. For they share no family connection at all. See Halachah 12.

I.e., if Eliezer’s son, Dan, marries Osnat, Eliezer may testify on behalf of all of Osnat’s relatives.

For the two individuals themselves do not share any family connection. Sanhedrin 28b describes them as “lids to jugs.”
In their glosses to the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 33:6), Rabbi Akiva Eiger and the Chatam Sofer rule that this law applies even after nissuin (the consummation of the marriage bond). See also the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat, Ibid.) who states that as an initial and preferred option, these individuals should not serve as judges together.

This law, based on Sanhedrin 28b, is the source for the principle stated in Halachah 10 (Kessef Mishneh).

For all these principles are one degree removed from his wife and thus two degrees removed from him. And with regard to their husbands or wives, we apply the principle: “A husband is considered like his wife and a wife is considered like her husband.”
The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 33:15-16 emphasizes that with this halachah, the Rambam is clarifying that although we say “a husband is considered like his wife,” they are not considered as the same person. For were that to be true, a husband would also not be able to testify on behalf of her grandson or grandfather according to the Rambam’s perspective.

For we do not assume that he has already become close to them (Sanhedrin 28b). The Rambam’s wording implies that the initial and preferred option is not to have such a person serve as a witness. If he does, however, his testimony is not disqualified. Rabbeinu Asher is more lenient and allows the husband-to-be to serve as a witness for these people at the outset (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 33:17).
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 33:9) emphasizes that these laws apply with regard to a woman who was consecrated. If, however, a couple were merely engaged, the husband-to-be is not automatically disqualified. With regard to financial matters, however, it is likely that he would not be allowed to testify because he would be considered an involved party.

As stated above, Moses would not be able to testify on behalf of Jethro, his father-in-law.

For we do not suspect that they will violate the Torah’s prohibitions against testifying falsely because of their love or hatred for the other person.

As stated in the notes to Hilchot Sanhedrin 23:6, we fear that he will agree with the opinion of the person he loves and differ with that of the person he hates. Even though he will not consciously decide to deviate from the path of justice, his subconscious may motivate him to do so.