Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The mitzvah described in this chapter is not directly connected to the subject of Hilchot Sechirut, “The Laws of Rentals and Employer-Employee Relations.” Nevertheless, since it relates to the mitzvot discussed in the previous chapter - and indeed, certain laws are derived from the interrelation of these mitzvot - the Rambam mentions it in this place.

Once it has been unloaded, however, it may not partake of the produce, because it is no longer performing labor.

This ruling can be explained as follows: As the Rambam explains in the following halachah, permission for the animal to partake of food is derived from the verse: “Do not muzzle an ox while threshing.” “Do not muzzle” implies that a person may not prevent the animal from eating what it desires. There is, however, no license to feed it when it does not take the produce on its own (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 338:3).

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 219) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 596) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
Lashes are given because muzzling the ox involves the performance of a deed that violates a Scriptural prohibition for which another punishment is not stated. Indeed, since this prohibition is mentioned directly after the Torah relates how the punishment of lashing is administered, it is considered the paradigm from which we derive which prohibitions are punishable by lashes and which are not.

I.e., he prevents the animal from eating by shouting at it.
Bava Metzia 90b explains that he is liable for lashes for performing such an act. Although one receives lashes only when violating a transgression by performing a deed, shouting at the animal is also considered a deed.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that in Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2, the Rambam describes taking a false oath, transferring the sanctity of an animal and cursing a colleague as transgressions that do not involve a deed, seemingly implying that transgressing a prohibition with speech is not considered to be performing a forbidden deed. The Maggid Mishneh, however, distinguishes between the two instances. For in our halachah, by shouting, the person brings about a deed. Cursing, transferring the sanctity of an animal and taking a false oath, by contrast, will never lead to deed. See Hilchot Temurah 1:1 where the Rambam states: “These three prohibitions will never involve a deed.”
Alternatively, the Maggid Mishneh explains that since transgression of the prohibition against muzzling an ox generally does involve a deed, a person is liable even when he violates through speech that is not considered a deed.

I.e., he must reimburse the owners for the amount the animal would normally eat during the day. If he rents the ox for a lesser time, he may reduce his payment proportionately (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 338:9).

Performing the kinyan of meshichah and thus formalizing the rental transaction.

Since the transgressor does not become liable for both obligations - lashes and the financial penalty - at the same time, he must suffer both punishments. It is only when he becomes liable for the two simultaneously that he is excused from lashes. See Hilchot Geneivah 3:1.

Since the Torah states the prohibition without any details, we assume that it applies in all instances when a Jew is involved. Thus, it applies even when the produce also belongs to the gentile (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 338:11).

For a gentile is not required to observe this mitzvah. This applies even if the gentile threshes the Jew’s grain.

Since the Jew does not perform the prohibition himself, he is not liable. The Maggid Mishneh notes that on the basis of Bava Metzia 90a, some authorities maintain that there is no prohibition involved in telling a gentile to muzzle one’s animal. As reflected by Hilchot lssurei Bi’ah 16:13; the Rambam, however, considers telling a gentile to violate a prohibition as forbidden by the Torah.

Bava Metzia, ibid. explains that this law is speaking about an instance where a thorn became stuck in the ox’s throat accidentally and the worker did not remove it. If, however, the worker places the thorn there, he is considered to have muzzled the ox.

In which instance, the animal will not eat because of its fear of the lion. In this instance as well, Bava Metzia, ibid., states that if the worker places the lion there himself, he is considered to have muzzled the ox. Instead, the law is speaking about a situation where the lion came on its own accord.
Significantly, with regard to the case of the thorn, the Rambam uses wording that alludes to the Talmud’s explanation. With regard to the case of the lion, by contrast, the Rambam uses the phrase that the Talmud rejects, as explained above. Although the Kessef Mishneh maintains that there is a printing error in the Mishneh Torah, most printings and manuscripts contain the problematic text.

In which instance, the animal will not eat because of its desire to be with its son.

Since the animal is thirsty, it will eat less.

In this way, the animal will not see the grain. Therefore, it will not have any desire to partake of it.

In the latter instances, although the person performs a deed that prevents the animal from eating, he is not liable. The rationale is that the animal will not be prevented entirely from eating. Instead, it will eat less than usual.

Although the animal itself might desire to partake of the grain, since it is ultimately not to its benefit, it should be prevented from eating.

The heap offering of grain - one fortieth to one sixtieth of the crop - which must be given to the priests and may not be used by an Israelite. In the instance described above, since the animal that is threshing is not the property of a priest, he may not feed it terumah (Hilchot Terumot 9:8).
There is no requirement to separate terumah from grain until it is separated from its husks, and brought into a silo for storage. Nevertheless, if one designates terumah earlier, that designation is binding. As Rashi (Bava Metzia 90a) explains, in this situation, the owner of the grain designated a portion as terumah before it was threshed.

As opposed to grain about which there is a doubt whether it is terumat ma’aser, as mentioned in the following halachah.

Terumat ma’aser refers to the tenth portion of the tithe that the Levites must separate from the tithe and give to the priests. All the restrictions that apply to ordinary terumah apply to it as well.

Since the animal is forbidden to partake of this grain, the prohibition against muzzling it does not apply.

Ma’aser sheni means the second tithe. In four years of the seven year Shemitah cycle, after the first tithe is given to the Levites, a second tithe must be separated and taken to Jerusalem and eaten there. This grain is not considered to be a person’s private property, but as belonging to God. (See Hilchot Ma’aser Sheni 3:17.) Therefore, the animal is not allowed to partake of it. Hence, there is no prohibition against muzzling the animal.

Even though they do thresh grain when passing through, since this is not intentional, they may be muzzled.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam, offering an alternate interpretation of Bava Metzia 90a, the source for the Rambam’s ruling. The Rambam’s interpretation is, however, accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 338:8) and other authorities. The Tur and the Ramah do not state that they differ with the Rambam, but do quote the Ra’avad’s view.

An onlooker might not be aware that the crops are terumah or ma’aser sheni and would think that the prohibition is being violated. It is not necessary to take such a safeguard when the cows veered off their path, because then it is obvious that they were not intended to thresh grain (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 338:15).

Demai is a term that refers to produce grown by common people who we fear were not careful with regard to the separation of the tithes (Hilchot Ma'aser 9:1-2). The word demai is a composite of two Aramaic word da mai, meaning "This. What is it?"- i.e., has the produce been tithed or not?" (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Berachot 7:1). Nevertheless, we are not certain that the produce has not been tithed. Indeed, according to Scriptural Law, there are no restrictions against partaking of it.

This refers to an instance where a person sowed grain that was terumah. According to Scriptural Law, such produce is not considered terumah and may be used like ordinary produce. Nevertheless, our Sages restricted the use of this produce, requiring it to be treated as if it were terumah.

In Hilchot Terumah 11:28, the Rambam explains how one should thresh such grain: “He should tie a food sack around the neck of the animal and place that type of grain within. Thus, he is not muzzling the animal, nor is he feeding it terumah.”

Which is being hired to thresh.

Which will create thirst.

I.e., while on their lunch break, they may dip their bread in brine. While they are working, they may not partake of bread or salt with their grapes, as stated in Chapter 12, Halachah 10.

I.e., the worker. The prohibition applies whether the worker is poor or not. The Rambam, however, is referring to the source (Deuteronomy 24:14) that states: “Do not withhold the wage of a poor person.”

See Chapter 11.

The fourth blessing in grace was ordained by our Sages. At the time they ordained its recitation, they did not require a worker to recite it lest it take him away from his work (Hilchot Berachot 2:2). At present, since employers are more generous with their workers and are not as stringent in their demands on their time, workers are obligated to recite the fourth blessing in grace.

The term tzaddik as employed by the Rambam in the Mishneh Torah refers to a person who upholds Torah law, fulfilling his obligations. By describing Jacob with this term, the Rambam indicates that the requirement to work with “all one’s strength” is not an extra dimension of piety, but a requirement of the law itself (Likkutei Sichot, Volume XXV).

Note the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Pe’ah 1:1), which states that through observing the mitzvot between man and man, a person receives a reward not only in the world to come, but also in this material world.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 244) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 60) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

As quoted by the Maggid Mishneh, the Ramban, the Rashba and other commentaries have taken issue with this ruling of the Rambam. Bava Metzia 96b states that a borrower is not liable when the borrowed object is destroyed “because of the work.” These commentaries explain that an object can be destroyed because of the work even if the destruction takes place afterwards. For example, an animal may die “because of the work,” after it has ceased working. Conversely, the fact that an animal dies or an object is destroyed while working does not necessarily mean that it was necessarily destroyed “because of the work.”
The Rivash (Responsum 503) justifies the Rambam’s wording, explaining that the Rambam was not stating a different criterion from that mentioned by the Talmud, but rather defining the Talmud’s ruling. According to the Rambam, it is only when the animal dies or the article is destroyed while the task is being performed that we can certainly know that it died or was destroyed “because of the task.”
The Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Chashen Mishpat 340:1) follow the dissenting views quoted by the Maggid Mishneh.

The Rivash (loc. cit.) explains the rationale for this ruling. Since the lender was informed about the task the borrower desired to perform and still lent out his article or animal, he is responsible for the loss. For he should have realized that this task is beyond the animal’s or article’s capacity. Failing to do so is negligence on his part.

I.e., performed a task other than the one for which he borrowed the animal. Even though the other task is easier, since the lender did not grant permission for his article to be used for that purpose, the borrower is liable [Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.)]. Note, however, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 340:4, which offers a slightly different interpretation.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Rambam’s wording implies that even though the borrower deviated from his initial request, for him to be liable, the animal must die in the midst of that deviation. The Kessef Mishneh questions this ruling.

According to the Rambam, the intent of this phrase is literal: “under him” means while he was riding it. This follows the Rambam’s approach that, for the borrower to be absolved, the animal must die when performing the task for which it was borrowed. Thus, if the animal dies when he is not riding it, the borrower is liable.

Also implied is that he did not deviate from the ordinary pattern of working with that animal [Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.)].

See Hilchat Sechirut 3:1, where the conceptual basis for this ruling is explained.

I.e., witnesses who substantiate his claim.

A Scriptural oath, which must be taken while holding a sacred article.

See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 7:8.

I.e., instead of requiring the borrower to keep the broken utensil or the injured animal and buy a replacement for the owner; all that is required is that he compensate for the difference.

I.e., he pulls the animal after him. This is the kinyan that formalizes his borrowing of the animal (Hilchot Sechirut 2:8). Even if he does not use the animal until later, from the time of meshichah, he accepts responsibility (Siftei Cohen 340:8).
The Tur and the Ramah differ and state that even if the borrower does not perform meshichah, from the time the owner leaves the animal in the borrower’s responsibility, the borrower is required to provide it with food.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 340:4) clarifies that we are speaking about a depreciation in value that is irreversible.

And not because he did not feed it properly.

We do not say that there is a set time for which it is assumed that he lent him the article. With regard to lending money, Makkot 3b states that unless it is stated otherwise, we assume that a loan was given for 30 days, and the lender may not demand payment beforehand. A loan of an article is not governed by those rules, and the lender may ask that the article be returned at any time (Maggid Mishneh).

As the Rambam continues to explain, after the article is lent to the borrower, it is considered as his for the duration of the loan.

See Hilchot Sechirut 11:1.

For they did not personally accept any responsibility for damages that occur to the cow by forces beyond their control. The Maggid Mishneh states that they are responsible in the event of the animal's loss or theft. Since they have the license to use it, they must bear this measure of responsibility. See Chapter 7, Halachah 6, which offers a parallel situation. This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 341:3).

As reflected in the continuation of the Halachah, this leniency applies only when the deceased did not leave an estate to his children. Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), which quotes an opinion that states that if the owner of the article told the heirs: “Either accept responsibility for the article in the event of its destruction by factors beyond your control, or return it,” they must heed his words.

One third Jess than the ordinary price (Bava Batra 147b). See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 6:23, where the Rambam has a similar percentage deducted from the price of food (Maggid Mishneh).

As implied by the Rambam’s wording, this law applies whether they are left landed property or movable property. Although Bava Batra, loc. cit., the source for the Rambam’s ruling, mentions only landed property, as the Rambam mentions in several sources (e.g., Hilchot Malveh V’ Loveh 11:11), the Geonim ordained that the obligations incumbent on an estate be assessed against its movable property as well as against its landed property [Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 341:4)].

I.e., the full value of its worth.

For their father had accepted responsibility for the cow, and that responsibility is borne by his estate.
The Ramban, the Rashba, Rabbenu Asher and many other authorities contest the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that the obligation applies only when the heirs slaughtered the cow. If it dies because of forces beyond the sons’ control, the estate is not liable. The difference between the two instances is that when they slaughtered the cow, it could be considered negligence on their father’s part, for he should have informed them that the cow had been borrowed. Therefore, the estate is liable.
The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling, noting that Bava Metzia 97b, the source for this law, quotes two different rulings of the Sages regarding this issue. These rulings revolve around a larger question: When does the obligation of the watchman begin? At the time the article is destroyed, in which instance the estate would not be liable, because at the time the obligation began, the borrower had already died. Or does it begin at the time the article was borrowed? If that was the case, the estate would be liable, because the obligation had begun in the deceased’s lifetime.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that in this instance the Rambam’s ruling appears to imply that the obligation begins at the time the article was borrowed, while in Hilchot Geneivah 3:4, the Rambam’s ruling implies that the obligation begins when the article is destroyed.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo seeks to resolve the seeming inconsistency in the Rambam’s rulings, stating that the lien on the watchman’s property is established at the time of meshichah. The actual obligation does not begin, however, until the time the article is destroyed. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 341:4), he quotes the view of the Ramban and the Rashba.

And performs meshichah to take responsibility for the article.

This reflects the rationale that governs the previous Halachah. Once a person borrows an article, it is his for the duration of the period stipulated. In the previous Halachah, the duration of the period was defined in time. In this Halachah, it is defined by the task.
Even if the borrower takes a longer time to perform the task than the lender had originally conceived, he may maintain possession until he completes the task (Seifer Me’irat Einayim 341:14).

Our translation follows the version found in the manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah that reads pardes echad, literally, “one orchard.” The standard published texts state pardes acher, meaning “another orchard.”
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 341:7) state that he can use the spade to hoe any orchard, even one that he does not own.

I.e., he specified “my orchards.” If, however, he asked for the spade just to “hoe orchards,” he may hoe only two orchards.

He does not have to make restitution for the damages.

Rabbenu Asher questions the Rambam’s wording, for the generosity described by the Rambam is certainly an unordinary matter. For that reason, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 341:6) offer a different interpretation of Bava Metzia 103a, the source for this ruling. Instead of b’tovatcha, “according to your generosity,” they state b’tovo, “while it is in good condition.”
Seifer Me’irat Einayim 341:15 states that in a situation where the person’s generosity is such that he would accept such a condition, even Rabbenu Asher and those who follow his position would accept the Rambam’s ruling. The difference between them involves only ordinary people.

Once the utensil has been destroyed, the terms of the original agreement have been fulfilled and the remnants belong to the owner. The borrower has no right to make use of them without his permission.

To the point at which it is no longer fit to contain water.

For the original agreement has been concluded.

If, however, the owner did not confirm the agreement with a kinyan, he may retract his commitment.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 341:8) add that the borrower may build the tub on any place within the owner’s property. Seifer Me’irat Einayim, however, explains that he does not have unlimited permission to use his colleague’s property, and the intent is that he may look anywhere until he finds an appropriate place to dig a well that serves his purpose.

Note the parallel in Hilchot Sechirut 6:6.

For it is not customary for a person to spend a lengthy period of time at a house of mourning. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 341:2 quote the opinion of Rabbenu Asher that a person who borrows a garment to visit a house of mourning may keep that garment until the end of the seven-day shiv’ah period. Seifer Me’irat Einayim notes that in the laws of mourning (Yoreh De’ah 340:35), the Shulchan Aruch quotes Rabbenu Asher’s opinion without mentioning that of the Rambam.

Even though the Rambam maintains (Hilchot Sechirut 2:3) that being negligent in the care of an article is equivalent to destroying it willfully, special leniency is granted in this instance. It must be emphasized that the question of whether leniency is granted when the owner is working with the borrower in an instance where the article is destroyed because of negligence is the subject of an unresolved debate in Bava Metzia 95a. Therefore, on the basis of the principle: “When a person desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him,” the Rambam rules in favor of the defendant (the borrower).

See Hilchot Sec hi rut 1:3, where the Rambam explains that the expression “with him” mentioned by the verse does not mean in his physical proximity when the article is destroyed, but rather employed by him at the time the article is rented.

The performance of this kinyan establishes him as a watchman, making him responsible for the article.

For the owner must be working for the borrower at the time the article is borrowed.

By helping the borrower, he is working for him. Hence, the borrower is absolved of responsibility. When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 346:4) emphasizes that this applies even if the lender does so on his own initiative. The Ramah mentions that there are views which differ.

For he has not performed any task on behalf of the borrower. His intent is only to ensure that his animal is not being mistreated.

According to the Talmudic practice of medicine, bloodletting had healing properties.

The person who composes legal documents.

Note the Tur, who interprets Bava Metzia 97b, the source for the Rambam’s ruling slightly differently, maintaining that even if these individuals are not actually performing work for the inhabitants of the city, as long as they are hired for that purpose, it is considered as if the owner of the article is “with the borrower.” For at any time, any one of the city’s inhabitants may approach them with work that they are required to perform. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 346:12) quotes both of these views without stating which one is favored.

I.e., any member of the city.

I.e., the employee.

Since the owner of the article is a municipal employee, it is considered as if he were working for every member of the city. Therefore, no member of the city is liable for the damage caused to the owner’s articles while they are in his care.

The bracketed additions are made on the basis of the statement of this law in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 346:13).

Seifer Me’irat Einayim 346:20 notes that from the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), it appears that this applies only when he borrows an article from them during the time of study, and not on other occasions throughout the day.

Therefore, if he borrows an article from them, it is considered as if the owners were “with him,” while if they borrow from him, that is not considered to be so.

It was customary that in the days preceding the festivals of Pesach and Sukkot, the people would gather together in the Talmudic academies, and the Rabbis would lecture on the subjects pertaining to the festival. On such occasions, the Rabbi was required to confine his remarks to subjects pertaining to that festival and did not have license to speak about other issues.

Therefore, the laws are the reverse of those described in the previous situation.

A question concerning this matter is asked, but not resolved by Bava Metzia 96a. Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi explains, however, that the question can be resolved by comparison to the situation mentioned in the next clause of this Halachah. The rationale why a servant’s activity is considered equivalent to that of his owner is that he is considered an extension of his physical person. Although an agent is identified with the principal, to the extent that our Sages say, “A person’s agent is considered as the principal himself,” that identification is not as encompassing as a slave’s identification with his master. Hence, although the agent works with the borrower, it is not considered as if the owner were working with him.
Rabbenu Asher differs with Rabbenu Yitzchok Alfasi and maintains that the principle, “A person’s agent is considered as the principal himself’ applies in this instance as well. Hence, if the agent works with the borrower, it is considered as if the owner were working with him. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 346:6) follows the opinion of Rabbenu Yitzchok Alfasi and the Rambam, while the Tur and the Ramah follow that of Rabbenu Asher.

Hence, it is considered as if the master himself is working with the borrower.

For a servant is not entitled to work for another person without the consent of his master. When he acts on his own initiative, the identification with his master mentioned above is not complete.

For as the Rambam continues to explain, the husband is not the owner of the property.

This refers to the nichsei m’log, property that the woman brings to the marriage. This property remains in the possession of the woman, but is given to her husband to use. Different laws apply to nichsei tzon barzel. (See Hilchot Ishut 16:1.)

Which is not owned by the partnership and for a purpose not associated with the interests of the partnership (Seifer Me’irat Einayim 346:12).

For both the wife and the partner are busy caring for property belonging to the husband and the other partner [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 346:16)].

Even though the other partner has committed himself to do a favor for the borrower on the following day, at the time the article is lent out, he is not working for him. (See Hilchot Sechirut 10:2.)
The Rambam’s ruling has aroused the attention of the commentaries, for it appears to be in direct contradiction to the previous clause. Seemingly, since the partners are working for each other’s interests, the owner is working for the borrower. Indeed, on the strength of this question, the Maggid Mishneh interprets this clause as meaning: “If one partner says to a colleague, ‘Lend me [property] today, and I will lend you tomorrow,’ it is not considered as if the owner [were working with the borrower].”
The Maharam of Padua does not accept that interpretation, and instead explains that by making the statements quoted by the Rambam, the partner indicates that on the day he is borrowing the article, he is not intending to perform any work on behalf of the partnership. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo quotes the interpretation of the Maharam of Padua, but in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 346:8), he cites the ruling of the Maggid Mishneh.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1675) explains that the Rambam is speaking of an instance that involves two partners, but their partnership does not require them to perform work for the partnership immediately. Hence, there is no difference between them and people at large.

Bava Metzia 96b discusses the question whether working for one partner - or having one partner work - is considered as involving the partnership as a unit, or the partner as an individual. The question is left unresolved, resulting in the laws mentioned by the Rambam.

For since the matter is unresolved, he cannot be obligated to pay.

For, after the seizure, the article is in the possession of the owner, and the borrower cannot prove that it justly belongs to him. For there is an equal possibility that the law would be decided in favor of the owner.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 346:11) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. Generally, the Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that when there is an unresolved point of law, a litigant is not allowed to seize property once the dispute is raised. Nevertheless, in this instance, the Ramah does not mention this point.

As mentioned in Halachah 1 and notes, generally, with regard to the question of negligence when the owner is working with the borrower, although the matter is left unresolved by the Talmud, the Rambam rules in favor of the borrower. In this instance, however, there is also an unresolved doubt whether the work of one partner is sufficient to obligate the entire partnership. Hence, because of the cumulative effect of these two issues, and especially in light of the Rambam’s perception (Hilchot Sechirut 2:3) that being negligent in the care of an article is equivalent to willfully destroying it, the Rambam rules in favor of the plaintiff.
The Tur and the Ramah differ with the Rambam regarding the perception of negligence and maintain that it should be judged more leniently. Hence, they do not require the borrower to make restitution. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 346:11) quotes both views without stating which one he favors.

To be conspicuous and appear as wealthy and/or prestigious.

Anything less than a p’rutah is not considered a significant monetary amount. Hence, the question is whether the borrowing of the animal is at all of consequence.

Bava Metzia 96a explains that our Sages’ question is whether we consider the interests of the borrower - in which instance, he received monetary benefit from borrowing the animal - or whether we look at each animal individually - in which instance, neither animal will have worked for a p’rutah’s worth.

From interpretation of Bava Metzia, loc. cit. offered by Rashi and the Tur, it would appear that the question that our Sages left unresolved was whether taking an animal for these purposes is governed by the ordinary laws that apply to borrowing it. The Rambam, however, appears to understand that the question involves the issue of whether the owner is working for the borrower.
The Machaneh Efraim focuses on this issue and maintains that the Rambam considers borrowing an animal for these purposes to be borrowing, and obligates the borrower in an instance when the animal is destroyed beyond the borrower’s control. Therefore, the Talmud’s question is whether or not the leniency of freeing the borrower because the owner is working with him applies in such an instance. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 346:10) quotes this law in a manner that allows for either interpretation to be read into the words.

This ruling applies whether the animal was destroyed by forces beyond the renter’s control, lost, stolen or destroyed due to negligence.

Bava Metzia 98b questions whether the person who borrowed and then rented the animal is liable or not, and then uses this as the basis for the further queries mentioned by the Rambam (im timtzeh lomar). In all situations of this nature, the Rambam maintains that the further queries indicate that the original question has been resolved.

Since borrowing the article places new obligations on the renter - making him liable in a situation where the article is destroyed by forces beyond his control - there is room to consider it a new relationship and not an extension of the previous one. On the other hand, since the other obligations continue, there is room to consider it an extension of the previous relationship. Hence, the unresolved doubt.
It must be noted that the standard printed text of Bava Metzia, loc. cit. states im timtzeh lomar between this situation and the questions mentioned in the clauses that follow, indicating that this situation serves as a basis for the questions that follow. Based on the principle mentioned above, it would appear that the Rambam should free the borrower of liability in this instance, as well. Nevertheless, as reflected in the commentaries of Rashi and Tosafot, it is not clear that this is the correct version. Hence, the Rambam maintains that the doubt is still unresolved. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 346:14) follows the Rambam’s interpretation. The Tur and the Ramah, by contrast, follow the understanding of Rabbenu Asher, who frees the borrower/lender of liability.

In this and the following clause, some of the texts of the Mishneh Torah read “was working for him.” Most commentaries, however, favor the version cited in our translation.

In this and the following clause, the unresolved question is whether or not the borrowing or renting in the middle is considered an interruption and prevents the two periods of borrowing or lending from being considered as a single unit.

And thus, responsibilities that she undertook are not transferred to him.

See a parallel in Chapter 1, Halachah 5, which speaks about a borrowed article being transferred to the heirs of a deceased person. They are given the right to benefit from the article, but are not held responsible for its loss.

Over which her husband has no authority. Generally, this would apply when she is widowed or divorced. Alternatively, she can be compelled to sell the rights to her property to a person on the condition that it become his in the event she becomes widowed or divorced (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 341:30).

By continuing to use the property after he discovers that it is borrowed, he accepts responsibility for it. If, however, he does not use the article afterwards, he is not held responsible [Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 341:17)].
The Ra’avad states that the husband must make an explicit statement that he accepts responsibility for the article. The Maggid Mishneh states that although there is no explicit source in the Talmud for the Rambam’s ruling, there is a logical basis for it. Since he is considered as if he purchased the article from his wife, his rights and responsibilities are the same as hers. A distinction can be made between this situation and that described in Chapter 1, Halachah 5, because in that instance the estate is transferred automatically, while in this instance, the husband willfully makes use of his wife’s property.