Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The rationale is that the Torah prescribed an airech for a person in his or her totality, not for his individual limbs (Arachin 4a; 20a).

Since the person’s life is dependent on his heart or his liver, pledging the airech of these organs is like pledging his entire airech. See Arachin 20a.

The same law applies if he pledges the airech of half of his heart (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Arachin 5:3).

This reflects one of the differences between pledges of worth and arechim. He is liable thick for his pledge, because his words have significance. His hand has value that can be appraised.

Arachin 19b emphasizes that we do not evaluate his value as if his hand were amputated, for then his worth would depreciate greatly, because no one wants a person without a hand.

Again, since the person’s life is dependent on that organ, it is as if his entire worth was pledged.

The laws that apply if he did not specify in what his weight should be measured are stated in Halachah 7.

The Rambam’s opinion is shared by Tosafot 19a. Rashi and others, however, offer a different interpretation.

In a halachic context, by contrast, the term yad can refer to the hand. See Hilchot Berachot 6:4; Hilchot Mikveot 11 :4.

Adding the extra term "extension of" indicates that he is deviating from the ordinary manner in which the term would be explained (Arachin 19a).

Arachin, loc. cit., derives this from an instance which occurred in the Talmudic era. A very rich woman pledged her daughter’s weight to the Temple. Our Sages obligated her to give her weight in gold.

For example, if he pledged: “My standing,” we are unsure whether he meant a scepter that could stand on its own or one that would bend. If he pledged: “My sitting,” we are unsure of whether he meant a scepter as tall as he is when he sits or one of his full height that is bent according to his position when he sits. See Rashi and Tosafot, Arachin, loc. cit., where the possible interpretations of each of the above terms are explained.

I.e., we compel him to give generously, because if he gives less than the amount he promised, he will be transgressing the prohibition against desecrating his vow. If, however, he says: “This was not my origin intent,” we are certain that he fulfilled his vow (Lechem Mishneh).

And thus his estate is obligated to fulfill his vow (Chapter 1, Halachah 21).

There is no question of the heirs desecrating a vow, because they did not take the vow. The only question is the lien against the estate. Accordingly, we follow the principle that money is not expropriated from a person unless it is certain that he is liable (Lechem Mishneh).

We assume that this was the intent, for this is the most commonly used silver coin.

We assume that this was the intent, for anything less would not have significant value.

As related in Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 4:3, there was a blade of iron positioned on top of the Temple building to prevent ravens from resting there and dirtying it with droppings. We assume that this was the intent, for there would be no other purpose to give iron to the Temple treasury.

One hundred zuz.

Chapter 1, Halachah 10.

See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 10:8 which explains that giving charity in this manner - i.e., where neither the donor nor the recipient know of each other’s identity - is one of the highest forms of giving.

We are permitted to use funds designated for one charitable purpose for a charitable purpose that is higher. And the offering of the communal sacrifices is considered the highest possible purpose.

Because doing so would be considering lowering the level of holiness from that for which the funds were designated. The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling based on several sources. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam’s position.

Which is a lesser amount, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

Arachin 18a derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 27:17.

I.e., he has the means to pay the pledge that he made.

The laws that apply if he cannot pay even a sela are discussed in Halachah 4.

Thus the evaluation mentioned by the verse is twofold:
a) the age of the person whose airech is pledged is considered and on that basis, we determine the sum the one who made the pledge must pay;
b) if the one who made the pledge is poor, we evaluate his capacity to pay (Radbaz).
Once the poor person pays the lesser amount, he is not obligated to pay any more even if later he becomes wealthy (Halachah 7).

Implied is that an airech must be at least a shekel.

For this is the highest airech mentioned in the Torah.

I.e., acquires the amount he pledged.

He is not given the option of paying a lesser amount. Instead, the full airech remains a debt incumbent upon him.

For he was not pledging an airech, but instead, taking vow to pay the amount the wealthy person had pledged. The Ra'avad differs and maintains that the poor man is judged according to his own financial capacity.

We find a parallel concept with regard to sacrifices. There are certain offerings that are dependent on a person’s financial status. If he is wealthy, he must bring one type of sacrifice and if he is poor another. If a poor person brings the sacrifice required of him, he is not liable to bring a second sacrifice if he becomes wealthy (Arachin 17b; Radbaz).

I.e., even if he is poor, we do not evaluate his financial status as we ordinarily do if he pledged an airech. The rationale is that he mentioned a specific amount and hence, he is obligated for that amount (Radbaz).

I.e., and establish his liability only according to the possessions he owns.

The Ra’avad differs and offers a different explanation. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh favor the Rambam’s view.

100 zuz.

The smallest airech there is. I.e., he is liable to pay three shekalim if he possesses that sum (Chapter 1, Halachah 20). If, however, he does not possess that sum, we do not say that he has taken an explicit vow. Instead, his worth is evaluated, as above.

And thus he is obligated to pay two arachim. This halachah is speaking about an instance where the donor is poor and does not have the money to pay either - let alone both - of his pledges.

I.e., the priest began evaluating the second airech first. The donor could not give the entire amount for the second airech, since he was already liable for the first.

In Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 20:1, the Rambam writes that if a creditor whose lien begins later expropriates property from a debtor first, the court expropriates it from him and gives it to the creditor with the prior lien. This, however, applies only with regard to landed property and not to movable property (ibid. :2).

And thus he should have paid all ten selaim for that airech, if he did not do so and paid a lesser amount, he fulfills his obligation.

The Rambam’s ruling follows the logic of Rav Sherira Gaon, as quoted by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi (Ketubot 94a), although the wording of Arachin 7b, 8a, does not imply such a conclusion.
The difference between the two situations is that the two debts are owed to two different people. Hence giving one is taking from the other. Thus the chronological sequence when the liens were established is important. Arachim, however, are always given to the Temple treasury. Thus they are both being given to the same place. Hence there is no point in having the money expropriated.

For when giving the first airech, he should not consider the second airech at all.

In which case he is obligated to pay both of them, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 19.

According to this view, even if he becomes wealthy afterwards, he is not obligated to give anything more.

If he does not have enough for even one complete airech.

The Radbaz rules that, because of the doubt, all we obligate the person is to fulfill the first (more lenient) view. Nevertheless, if the Temple treasurer seizes the entire amount as payment for the first airech, the donor remains liable for the second.

Our translation is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard published text has a somewhat different version.

The verse implies that the obligation is incumbent upon you until the funds are actually given. This is in contrast to some other financial commitments vowed to the Temple treasury, as stated in Hilchot Nedarim 1:2; Hilchot Ma‘aseh HaKorbanot 14:4-6.

I.e., they are not consecrated and the prohibition against misusing property dedicated to the Temple treasury does not apply to them.

For the implication of the prooftext is that on the day you give the airech, it becomes consecrated.

In contrast to an ordinary lender who must wait for collateral to be given to him. The donor must be evaluated by the court, however, before his property may be taken.

I.e., in contrast to collateral taken from an ordinary lender which must be returned. See Deuteronomy 24:13.

Even if they have not worn it already.

For these articles are considered as owned by the person’s wife or children and their property may not be expropriated to pay for the donor’s debt. Compare to Hilchat Malveh V’Loveh 1 :5.

I.e., he is left the basic necessities for his spiritual and material sustenance. If he consecrates all of his property, he is not left even these articles (Chapter 6, Halachah 3).

Implied is that if he possesses an expensive mattress, we sell it and buy him an ordinary one.

If he does not possess the above, we leave him financial resources to purchase them (see Arachin 6:3 and commentaries).

These obligations are discussed in Hilchot Ishut 12, 2; 13:6.

Note the following halachah.

Note the following halachah.
40. I.e., if he possesses clothing that is appropriate for someone of a higher social standing, that clothing is sold, the funds are used to purchase clothing appropriate for his social standing, and the remainder is given to the Temple treasury. Compare to Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh l :7.

I.e., weekday gannents are less expensive than those worn on Sabbaths and festivals.

So that he will be able to continue to earn his livelihood.

For these are considered as property, not as tools.

The rationale is that although expected, these profits are not certain and a loss may occur (Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Arachin 6:5).

We fear that the movable property can be lost or stolen or damaged in another way and that the servants may flee. See Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 12:11.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 27, for details regarding these announcements.

For announcing the sale of the property will attract buyers and increase the price and land cannot be stolen or lost.

As a present or the like.

The Rambam begins describing the laws involving the consecration of ancestral fields. Those involving the consecration of purchased property are described from Halachah 26 onward.

Leviticus 27:16. Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 117) and Sefer HaChinuch {mitzvah 355) include the commandment to deal with the consecration of a field as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. These laws apply only in Eretz Yisrael (Hilchot Bikkurim 1 :6), but not in the Diaspora and only during the time the Jubilee year is observed (Chapter 5, Halachah 1; Hilchot Shemitah V’Yovel 10:9).

See Halachah 4 for a definition of this measure.

This is a larger area than that required to sow an equivalent amount of wheat (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Arachin 3:2).

Arachin 25a makes this distinction, differentiating between a field that is sown by hand or sown by leading an animal with an open bag of seed through the field.

As indicated by the following halachah, the airech is given for every year individually. We calculate the number of years left until the Jubilee and divide the sum of 50 shekalim accordingly.

Hilchat Shekalim 1:2-3; see Chapter 1, Halachah 4.

As mentioned above, a sela is equivalent to 384 barley corns of silver.

I.e., we divide the 50 selaim into 49 years.

And thus seemingly one is overpaying by a fractional amount.

That is the money-changer’s profit for the transaction.

A se'ah is 8.3 liter in modern measure according to Shiurei Torah and 16.2 liter according to Chazon Ish.

Hilchot Shabbat 16:3.

The measure mentioned by the Rambam produces a square with an area of 75076 sq. cubits.

See Halachah 2.

As stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 1, the owners are commanded to redeem it and they are given the option of doing so before another person.

As Leviticus 27:19 states: “If the person who consecrates it redeems it, he shall add a fifth in silver of its airech.’’

See also Hilchot Terumot 10:26; Hilchot Ma ‘aser Sheni 5:1.

The Mishneh LiMelech states that this refers to an heir redeeming the field after his testator’s death, but not during his lifetime. A person’s wife, however, must add a fifth even during her husband’s lifetime, for they are considered as a single entity.

I.e., five selaim and five pundiyonin. ·

One may, however, redeem half the field by paying half the required sum, as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 2.

We have taken some liberty in the translation. The Hebrew term used by the Rambam, girayon kessef, means “the subtraction of silver,” i.e., we subtract the sum due for the years of the Jubilee cycle that have already passed from the sum of fifty shekel. See Leviticus 26:18.
The Rambam uses this wording because, as stated in Halachah 9, if the person desires to pay the full 50 shekalim, he may redeem the field even if less than a year remains to the Jubilee.

The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling, noting that although this appears to be the meaning of Arachin 25a, it is illogical to say so. If the field is not redeemed by its owner before the Jubilee, he must pay 50 shekel a measure to redeem it in the Jubilee. If he does not redeem it, it is given to the priests who are required to pay its fair value (see Halachah 19). Thus the Temple treasury will almost certainly be losing by allowing the person to redeem it for the two year amount. Why then would the Temple treasurer be allowed to do so?
The Kessef Mishneh notes the Ra’avad’s logic, but states that this is the new concept taught: that even if it is not to the benefit of the Temple treasury, the treasurer may make such a decision. The Radbaz states that the law applies in an instance when there will be a benefit to the Temple treasury to enable the property to be redeemed in this manner.

See Halachah 19.

There is a difference of opinion concerning this issue in Arachin 25b. Shmuel interprets Leviticus 27:17 as excluding fields consecrated in the Jubilee itself. Rav differs. Significantly, although here the Rambam follows the opinion of Shmuel, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Arachin 7:1), he originally follows Rav’s view, as indicated by the standard published version. Rav Kapach maintains that the manuscript copies of the Commentary to the Mishnah reflect a change of view and as in the text here, he follows Shmuel’s view.

As stated in the following halachah and in Halachah 21, they are governed by different laws than ordinary Israelites in this regard. See also the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Shemitah ViYoval 13:7.

See Halachah 21.

As stated in Halachah 8.

To calculate its size so that the amount required to be paid can be determined, as explained in Halachah 2.

If they are not that high or that deep, they are not considered as significant entities (Arachin 25a).

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, noting that from Arachin 25a, it appears that such patches of land are measured together with the field. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh explain that the Talmud is stating that they are consecrated, but that they are considered as independent from the field. Hence, rather than be measured according to the standard value, they are measured according to their worth.

Halachah 5. The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that although the trees are consecrated, they are redeemed when the field as a whole is redeemed. The Radbaz justifies the Rambam’s view.

The Torah passage pertaining to consecrated fields mentions a field that is “sown.” Since such a field is not fit to be sown, the general principles that apply to arachim for fields at large do not apply to it. Instead, it is considered as an ordinary vow.

This reflects the Rambam’s version of Arachin 14a. The standard printed text of that source reads differently.

Fifty cubits by fifty cubits, as stated in Halachah 4.

In which instance, he adds the value of the trees to the standard airech of the field, as stated in Halachah 15. The rationale for this ruling is evident from Hilchot Shemitah V’Yoval 3:2; Hilchot Bikkurim 2:13: Once trees have grown, they need this much land to be maintained. Hence when one sells the trees, he is considered to have sold the land with them and when he consecrates the trees, he consecrates the land with them.

Because these are considered to be included in the land on which they are planted.

Since the trees are scattered, we do not consider the land as subservient to them. Hence, unless the land is consecrated explicitly, it is not considered as included in his statement.

Since the trees are all mentioned individually, each is considered as a discrete entity and we do not view him as having consecrated the property as a whole.

Since the land is not consecrated, the small trees are also not consecrated, because their consecration depends on that of the land.

The Radbaz states that seemingly this ruling is self-evident, for it is the same as that of Halachah 15 where the donor does not mention the trees explicitly. He explains that there is a new dimension in the Rambam’s ruling, for one might think tha. t since the donor mentioned the trees explicitly, the land associated with them should be considered as a distinct entity and evaluated according to its worth and not its measure. Hence, the Rambam feels it necessary to emphasize that this is not the case.

See Halachah 24 and notes.

The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam shares the understanding of Rashi (Arachin 25b) who maintains that the priests pay the standard amount for a beit kor.

I.e., it never returns to its original owner or his heirs.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 10; Chapter 5, Halachah 7.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 1 O; Chapter 5, Halachah 7.

The Rambam is referring to the law (Hilchot Shemitah ViYoval, ch. 11) that an ancestral field which is sold returns to its owner in the Jubilee year. The Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s wording, for since the donor redeemed the field, it need not return to him in the Jubilee; it is in his possession. The Radbaz explains that the intent is that even if the donor gave the money, but did not take possession before the beginning of the Jubilee, the field returns to him in the Jubilee. The fact that he consecrated it does not cause it to be removed from the category of an ancestral field. The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam is using wording that will enable the different clauses of the halachah to appear similar.

Leviticus 27:20 states that a person loses his right to have his ancestral field return in the Jubilee: “If he [the Temple treasurer] sold the field to another man.... “Nevertheless, since in many contexts, a son is considered an extension of his father, he is not considered as ‘’another man” and his purchase of the field does not cause his father to lose his claim to it (Arachin 25b).

As is the law with regard to an ancestral field. The fact that it was consecrated and redeemed by another person does not remove it from this category.
This ruling follows the Rambam’s version of Arachin 7:3 and his interpretation in his Commentary to the Mishnah. The standard printed text of Arachin 25a differs, however, and states that the field is given to the priests in such an instance. The Ra’avad notes the existence of the two versions of the source.

For they purchased the right to it only until the Jubilee year.

In contrast to the situation mentioned in the previous halachah. The rationale for the difference is that they are required to pay in the previous instance, because consecrated property never leaves the domain of the Temple treasury without being redeemed. In this instance, however, the field has already been redeemed as the Rambam continues to explain.

That a field which is not redeemed becomes the property of the priests.

This refers to a field that was given to a priest or a Levite as an ancestral heritage, not one that they purchased.

Because her husband’s redemption of it could be considered as if she redeemed it herself.

Because in actual fact, she did not redeem it.

We follow the principle: “When a person desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him.” The Ra’avad differs with this ruling, stating that since her husband is working the field, it is considered as having been acquired by him, for her. The Kessef Mishneh questions the Ra’avad’s ruling, stating that since the Talmud (Arachin 25b)’ left the matter unresolved, it is not appropriate for the Ra’avad to resolve it by logic. The Radbaz adds that the husband (as his wife’s agent) must intend to acquire the field and it is possible to work a field without having this intent.

It is sold and its value divided among all the priests of that watch, not only those serving in the Temple on Rosh HaShanah.

The priestly family is broken up into 24 watches who each serve for a week in the Temple (Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 4:3). Thus over the course of the years, there is a revolution of the times when each of the priestly watches serve.

See Hilchot Temidim UMusafim 4:9.

Because when Rosh HaShanah began, it was in their possession (Radbaz).

The Ra’avad states that this law applies when the person consecrates only one or two trees, but not when he consecrates three. For in that instance, they are consecrated together with the land on which they grow (see Halachah 17) and hence, the consecrated property could be referred to as a field.

Although certain aspects of the laws of ancestral fields do not apply to it (see Halachah 16), this dimension of them does.

This is in contrast to an ancestral field where a standard amount is given, as explained above. In his commentary to the Torah (Leviticus 27:22), Rashi writes that it is redeemed in the same manner as an ancestral field. Nevertheless, in his commentary to the Talmud (Arachin 26b), he states that it is redeemed according to its worth.

For in the Jubilee, it was to return to its ancestral owner. The donor’s ownership did not extend past that time. Hence he cannot consecrate it for longer, as the Rambam proceeds to explain.

And the person who consecrated the field never possessed permanent ownership of it, only the right to partake of its produce. Hence, he cannot consecrate it to the Temple treasury permanently (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Arachin 7:4).

As evaluated by the court.

I.e., the price for its redemption becomes fixed and if he does not redeem it, it becomes the property of the priests, as stated above.

See also Hilchot Shemitah V’Yoval, ch. 11, where more details concerning ancestral fields and purchased property are discussed.