Kuntreis Acharon for Section 1

Kuntreis Acharon 1:1 (2)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe explains that his ruling in note 2 in the main text is based on the wording of Rav Yosef Caro in his Beis Yosef (Yoreh Deah 1). In that source, Rav Yosef Caro quotes Mordechai (Chulin, sec. 614) who states in the name of Rabbeinu Chananel that a shochet must have an established reputation for being an individual who is G‑d fearing and trustworthy in his Torah-observance, who would not be suspected of giving Jews non-kosher meat to eat. Mordechai questions Rabbeinu Chananel’s statement, asking why a prospective shochet is held to a higher standard than other Jews, who are assumed to be trustworthy in their observance even if their reputation has not yet been established?

Rama also addresses this issue (see Darchei Moshe, note 12), and differs with Rav Yosef Caro’s blanket statement that all shochtim must have a reputation for being G‑d fearing individuals. Instead, Rama distinguishes between one who slaughters his own animals, intending to sell their meat to others, and one who is hired to slaughter for others;

The Alter Rebbe reinforces Rama’s conception, noting that Rambam (Hilchos Maachalos Assuros 8:7) rules that a butcher who slaughters his own animals and sells their meat must be “an observant person whose reputation for adherence {to Torah law} has been established.” This refers to a person who sells meat to others.

Accordingly, Rama maintains that, in principle, a shochet who does not slaughter his own animals need not have previously established a reputation for Torah observance. Instead, he – like any other Jew – is presumed to be trustworthy. Nevertheless, Rama notes that in practice, since it is customary in the present age for a shochet to check the slaughtering knife himself, rather than show it to a scholar, it is necessary that he have an established reputation for careful observance, even if he slaughters only animals he does not own.

The Alter Rebbe seeks to clarify Rambam’s stance regarding whether a shochet must have an established reputation for observance before he is certified, or whether the assumption of observance that every Jew is granted is sufficient for a prospective shochet. The Alter Rebbe begins by examining Rambam’s ruling in Hilchos Maachalos Assuros 3:21:

One may not purchase cheese or a piece of fish that does not have a sign that it is kosher except from a Jew whose reputation for observance is established. However, in Eretz Yisrael, in the era when [its population consisted] primarily of [observant] Jews, [such items] may be purchased from any Jew.

Rambam also issues a similar ruling regarding wine (ibid.11:25). Maggid Mishneh explains that Rambam’s rulings are sourced in Avodah Zarah 39b, which states that meat, fish, wine, and the like may be purchased in Syria only from a person with an established reputation. Maggid Mishneh explains that Rambam understood the mention of Syria as meaning Syria and anywhere else in the Diaspora. The implication is that in the Diaspora, these food items may be purchased only from a Jew with an established reputation for being G‑d fearing.

On this basis, the Alter Rebbe explains Rambam’s approach regarding shochtim. If a butcher who does not slaughter himself sells meat that a specific shochet slaughters for him, the word of the butcher regarding whether the meat is kosher can be accepted based on the presumption that he – like all Jews – is Torah-observant. The fundamental basis for accepting the butcher’s word is the presumption that he is afraid to lie because someone might ask the shochet whether the animal that he slaughtered was kosher. However, different laws apply if a butcher himself slaughters. In such an instance, he must have an established reputation as a Torah-observant Jew. Similarly, a person who sells meat purchased from shochtim with whom he is not familiar must have an established reputation for Torah observance.

The Alter Rebbe notes that from Rav Yosef Caro’s Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 2:4), it can be inferred that a Jew who rebels against Torah-observance would usually not be afraid to lie and, therefore, his word is accepted only because there is a possibility that the validity of his statements will be checked. Nevertheless, the Alter Rebbe explains that this restriction does not apply regarding a person who does not have a flawed reputation. Since his reputation is not flawed, the possibility that his statements may be verified is considered sufficient for such a person’s word to be accepted even if the truth of his statements will not necessarily be verified.

In a somewhat similar vein, Rama (Darchei Moshe, Yoreh Deah 119:1) distinguishes between selling food products to others and serving food in one’s own home. As long as a person is not suspect regarding the violation of a prohibition, food that he serves in his own home may be relied upon, even if he has not established a reputation as a Torah-observant Jew. However, with the exception of a person who sells meat from a shochet whom he hires who has an established reputation, any seller of meat, fish, or other kosher food must have an established reputation as a Torah-observant Jew.

On this basis, the position of Beis Yosef mentioned at the beginning of this note can be explained. A local shochet who charges a fee for each animal he slaughters properly must have an established reputation of being Torah-observant. This is the same requirement that a person who slaughters his own animals, intending to sell the meat, is obligated to fulfill. Unless the shochet has established such a reputation, there is reason to suspect that he will, on occasion, sell meat that was improperly slaughtered. True, in the Kuntreis Acharon note 2 to Yoreh Deah sec. 2, the Alter Rebbe states that we do not suspect that a shochet slaughtered improperly. However, that ruling applies when the person slaughters only occasionally. In contrast to this, if a person is hired as the designated shochet of the city, due to the number of animals he is slaughtering, it is impossible that he would never err while slaughtering. Therefore, unless he has an established reputation as a Torah-observant Jew, we suspect that he may sell improperly slaughtered animals from time to time.

Similar concepts apply regarding the requirement to check the slaughtering knife. If a person slaughters only on occasion for his own personal use, we accept his word that his knife was acceptable. By contrast, as Rav Yosef Caro states in his Yoreh Deah 18:17 below, in the present age, since only trusted authorities appointed by the community may slaughter for the community, they are not required to show their knives to a Rabbinic authority.

Kuntreis Acharon 1:1 (3)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe focuses on the phrase he quotes from Tevuos Shor (sec. 18, note 7), in note 2 to the main text, “they are scholars and fit to [judge] this matter.” The Alter Rebbe explains that, as Tevuos Shor states, this phrase refers to people who are composed and calm. Scholars who are fit to check a slaughtering knife cannot be rash and easily harried individuals, because conducting such an examination requires much equanimity and intense concentration.

Having made that statement, the Alter Rebbe discusses a situation where a person calmly inspected a slaughtering knife with intense concentration, and yet failed to discover a blemish that another person later discovered when inspecting the same knife. The Alter Rebbe posits that in this instance, the blemish discovered by the second person is not one that would cause the slaughter to be disqualified (see sec. 18:6). The basis for that ruling is that if one would say that the person who first inspected the knife does not have adequate sensitivity or was not trained, it would be impossible for there to be a uniform standard for inspecting a knife. What one person would consider acceptable, another would deem invalid, and there would be no end to the seeking of another opinion regarding the knife. Moreover, a shochet would have to be examined regarding his ability to inspect a slaughtering knife whenever he slaughters, and this requirement is not stated in the Talmud or the Rishonim. Those sources mention only examining a prospective shochet’s knowledge, and ascertaining that he will not become faint while slaughtering.

Nevertheless, in the present era, the custom is to be more stringent because there is a fine line between a blemish that invalidates a knife and one that does not. Accordingly, the later halachic authorities ruled that, at present, people are not knowledgeable regarding such a matter and therefore, a slaughtering knife must be entirely smooth. Preparing a knife in this manner indeed requires much training and subtle sensitivity. Nevertheless, the obligation to slaughter with such a knife applies only as an initial preference. After the fact, if one slaughtered with a knife that has a subtle blemish, a Rabbinic authority may rule that the slaughter acceptable. (See sec. 18:6.)

Kuntreis Acharon 1:1 (4)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 4), the Alter Rebbe focuses on Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling in his Shulchan Aruch, that although we can assume that anyone who slaughters does so in accordance with halachah and, hence, we may eat the meat without determining the shochet’s proficiency in the necessary laws, this leniency applies only if the shochet is no longer present. However, if the shochet is present, we do not rely on this presumption, and before partaking of the meat, it is necessary to determine his proficiency in the relevant laws. However, when examining the shochet, he is not asked whether he felt faint when slaughtering.

The Alter Rebbe begins by quoting the opening mishnah of Tractate Chulin 2a, “Everyone may slaughter and their slaughter is valid, except for a deaf-mute, a mentally- or emotionally-challenged individual, and a minor, lest they ruin their slaughter. {Whenever} any of them slaughter {an animal} while others observe them, their slaughter is valid.”

The Talmud notes that the mishnah appears self-contradictory. The opening phrase, “Everyone may slaughter,” appears to indicate that anyone may slaughter as an initial and preferred option. However, the second clause, “and their slaughter is valid,” seems to imply that although anyone may slaughter, the slaughter is valid only after the fact, and not as an initial, preferred option.

After debating the matter, the Talmud (Chulin 3b) presents the resolution of this apparent contradiction in the mishnah proposed by Ravina:

Everyone may slaughter, {i.e.,} everyone who is an expert shochet. {All} experts may slaughter, even if they have not established themselves as having slaughtered without feeling faint.” This can be established by slaughtering in the presence of experts.

When does this apply? {i.e., When are they considered experts?} If it has been established that they know and are able to relate the laws of ritual slaughter. However, if it has not been established that they know and are able to relate the laws of ritual slaughter, they may not slaughter {as an initial preference}. If {such a person} did slaughter, he must be examined. If he knows {the laws} and is able to recite the laws of ritual slaughter, one may eat meat from {the animals} he slaughtered, and if not, one may not eat from {the animals} he slaughtered.

The Talmud then proceeds to discuss the second clause of the mishnah:

…except for a deaf-mute, a mentally- or emotionally-challenged individual, and a minor. {Slaughter performed by these individuals} is not valid even after the fact. {The Sages deemed the animals they slaughter invalid} lest they interrupt the slaughter, press the knife {against the animal’s organs} or conceal the knife.”

The Talmud then poses the following question, “{‘Whenever} any of them slaughter {an animal while others observe them, their slaughter is valid}’ to whom does {this clause} apply?” The Talmud answers that the words, “whenever any of them slaughter,” are referring back to the previous phrase, “To a deaf-mute, a mentally- or emotionally-challenged individual, and a minor.”

However, the Talmud rejects that answer, explaining that were that the case, the mishnah should have stated, “if they slaughtered.” Accordingly, the Talmud offers another resolution: that the words “any of them” refer to anyone who is not an expert shochet. The Talmud posits that if a layman slaughters an animal, it is not deemed halachically valid unless an expert observed him, as stated by the phrase, “while others observe them, their slaughter is valid.”

The Talmud does not accept that resolution either, explaining that, “it is sufficient to examine {the expertise of such a person after he slaughters}.” The Talmud then answers that the clause, “{Whenever} any of them slaughter {an animal}” refers to a person who is not an expert shochet, who slaughtered an animal, and “is no longer present to be examined.” Thus, Ravina is stating that if someone who is not an expert shochet slaughtered an animal, we are worried that the slaughter is invalid because the person may not be proficient in the relevant laws.

However, there is another version of Ravina’s explanation of this mishnah. According to that version, the words, “Everyone may slaughter,” refers to “everyone who has established a reputation {that he will slaughter without fainting}.”

According to this version, “{All those who} established such a reputation {may slaughter}, even if it is not known whether they are experts.”

The Talmud then clarifies:

When does the above apply? If such a person slaughtered before us two or three times and did not faint. But if he did not slaughter before us two or three times, {as an initial preference} he may not slaughter, lest he faint. {However,} if he slaughtered an animal and said: I am certain that I did not faint, his slaughter is valid.

The Talmud then explains the mishnah according to this interpretation: “Excluded are a deaf-mute, a mentally- or emotionally-challenged individual, and a minor. Even after the fact, {the slaughter of an animal by such individuals is invalid, for we fear that they} interrupted the slaughter, pressed the knife {against the animal’s organs} or concealed the knife {when feeling faint}.”

As with the first version, the Talmud then questions, “{‘Whenever} any of them slaughter’ to whom does {this clause} apply?” and answers, “To a deaf-mute, a mentally- or emotionally-challenged individual, and a minor mentioned immediately beforehand.” However, as with the first version of Ravina’s teaching, the Talmud rejects that answer, explaining that were that the case, the mishnah should have stated, “if they slaughtered.”

The Talmud then proposes that this clause is referring to, “those who have not established a reputation {that they will slaughter without fainting}.” However, it rejects that answer because it was explained that if such an individual says, “I am certain {that I did not faint, his slaughter is valid}.” The Talmud resolves this issue by explaining that the phrase, “{Whenever} any of them slaughter” is referring to a person who slaughtered, and, “is no longer present to be asked {if he felt faint}.”

The Talmud then wonders why the other Sages did not interpret the mishnah like Ravina did. It explains that the implication of the first version of Ravina’s teaching is that only established experts may slaughter as an initial and preferred option. This would mean that most people may not slaughter. The other Sages rejected this stance for the following reason: Since most of those who slaughter are experts, even if it is not known if a particular person who slaughters is an expert, it is assumed that he is, and his slaughter is valid.

The Talmud explains that the second version of Ravina’s teaching implies that the issue involved is whether or not the person is prone to faint. However, the other Sages maintain that we are not concerned about this possibility.

After quoting and explaining this Talmudic passage, the Alter Rebbe explains how the Rishonim understand it. Rabbeinu Asher explains that according to the first version of Ravina’s teaching, Ravina maintains that we do not assume that most of the people who slaughter are experts. Therefore, as an initial preference, a person should not be allowed to slaughter without first being tested regarding his knowledge and proficiency in the relevant laws. If a person did slaughter without first being tested, he should be tested afterwards. Furthermore, if he was not examined after slaughtering, the meat from the animal he slaughtered is forbidden. Accordingly, he should not be allowed to slaughter on the condition that he will be examined afterwards, because it is possible that the examination will not take place.

Rabbeinu Asher explains that the other Sages do not agree with Ravina’s fundamental assumption – that most people who slaughter are not experts in the relevant laws. Rather, they maintain that most people who slaughter are experts. Therefore, they permit a person to slaughter on the condition that he be examined afterwards, because even if he is not examined, we can rely on the presumption that he, like most people who slaughter, is an expert. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that even according to the other Sages, it is an initial preference that a person’s proficiency and knowledge in the relevant laws be examined. Moreover, if the person is present, it is forbidden to partake of meat from animals he slaughtered before he is examined.

Rashi interprets this Talmudic passage differently than Rabbeinu Asher does. He agrees that the fundamental difference between Ravina and the other Sages is that the other Sages operate under the presumption that most people who slaughter are experts. However, Rashi maintains that the other Sages also agree that initially one should not slaughter until his proficiency and knowledge in the relevant laws are examined. This opinion is mentioned by Rama in his note to Rav Yosef Caro’s Hilchos Shechitah.

At present, the practice is to accept the leniencies of both opinions. Thus, any shochet is allowed to slaughter, and his proficiency and knowledge of the relevant laws is not examined, neither beforehand nor afterwards. In his Darchei Moshe (Yoreh Deah 1:5, 19), Rama states that the rationale for this practice is that in the present age, the knowledge and proficiency of all shochtim in the relevant laws are certified by experts before they slaughter, and it is not at all common for someone to slaughter without being certified.

After clarifying the interpretation of the first version of Ravina’s teaching, the Alter Rebbe discusses the second version. He cites Rashba (Chulin 3b, 4b) and Rabbeinu Nissim (Chulin 3b), who maintain that we are not concerned that a shochet might feel faint while slaughtering, because that is a very rare occurrence.

The Alter Rebbe then proceeds to explain the rulings of Rav Yosef Caro in his Shulchan Aruch and of Rama: Any person who seeks to slaughter is allowed to do so, because we assume that the majority of those who slaughter are experts. It is not necessary to ask a prospective shochet whether he is prone to feel faint while slaughtering. The rationale for this lenient ruling is that we rely on the fact that the majority of shochtim have been certified by slaughtering in the presence of experts who examined their knowledge and proficiency in the relevant laws, and saw that they did not feel faint while slaughtering. However, a person should not slaughter until he is certified by an expert who observes him slaughter three times.

Kuntreis Acharon 1:1 (5)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), the Alter Rebbe cites the rationales given by several of the Rishonim as to why it is necessary to examine a shochet’s proficiency and expertise.

The Alter Rebbe begins by presenting Rabbeinu Nissim’s gloss to Chulin 3b. Rabbeinu Nissim maintains that although we follow the principle that most of those who practice ritual slaughter are experts, there is a significant minority who are not. Therefore, if the shochet is present, he should be examined, preferably before he slaughters. Rabbeinu Nissim explains that this is the same logic behind the requirement to inspect the lungs of a slaughtered animal: True, it can be assumed that most animals are not tereifah, and therefore it is not necessary to inspect all the organs of an animal that has been slaughtered. Nevertheless, adhesions are commonly found in the lungs of animals. True, they are not found in the lungs of the majority of animals. Nevertheless, the number is significant enough to require that the lungs of animals must be inspected. The same concept applies regarding a shochet.

Rashba (Chulin 3a) and Ramban (Chulin 3b) offer a different rationale for requiring shochtim to be examined before slaughtering, explaining that all animals are assumed to be forbidden unless they are known to have been slaughtered properly (see Chulin 9a; Rama 25:3). Hence, there are grounds for forbidding any slaughter unless the shochet’s expertise was established through a thorough examination. Nevertheless, if the shochet slaughtered without undergoing such an examination, and is not present after the fact, rather than forbid the meat in the absence of any factors that might lead to a ruling invalidating the slaughter, we rely on the assumption that most shochtim are experts. However, if the shochet is present, that assumption should not be relied upon, and his expertise must be examined before the meat is permitted.

Rabbeinu Asher (Chulin 1:15) takes a different approach, and relies entirely on the assumption that most people who slaughter are experts, maintaining that the number of those who are not is too few to be statistically significant. Accordingly, Rabbeinu Asher does not even consider the possibility that such a person slaughtered. This stance leads to Rabbeinu Asher’s ruling that if a shochet slaughtered an animal without having his expertise verified, the meat is permitted after the fact.

It appears that Rabbeinu Nissim does not accept Rabbeinu Asher’s basic assumption, and maintains that there are a significant number of shochtim who are not experts. Nevertheless, the Alter Rebbe explains that although Rabbeinu Nissim maintains that the number of shochtim who are not experts is significant, and also that the animal’s halachic status is that one may not partake of its meat until it is known that it was properly slaughtered, we do not postulate that if the shochet was not examined, the meat should be forbidden. The rationale for this lenient stance is that even those shochtim who are not experts will not necessarily slaughter in an invalid manner. Accordingly, even Rabbeinu Nissim would agree that the possibility that an animal will be slaughtered in an invalid manner is not statistically significant. Therefore, if the shochet is no longer present to be examined, the meat is considered kosher.

Although Rabbeinu Asher takes a lenient approach regarding the number of unqualified people who slaughter, in his gloss to Chulin 1:5, he maintains that if there is no one to determine a person’s proficiency in the relevant laws, the person should not be permitted to slaughter. True, a person is permitted to slaughter without his proficiency being examined on the condition that he undergo such an examination after he slaughters. However, if it is known beforehand that there will be no way to determine the person’s proficiency in these laws, he should not be allowed to slaughter as an initial preference.

Hence, Rabbeinu Nissim’s reasoning leads to a more lenient ruling than does Rabbeinu Asher’s. As mentioned, Rabbeinu Nissim draws a parallel between examining a shochet’s proficiency and examining the lungs of a slaughtered animal. Beitzah 25a maintains that if there is a possibility of a financial loss, it is permitted to partake of the meat of an animal without first examining the lungs (see the Alter Rebbe’s Orach Chayim 503:11, where this is discussed). On the basis of Rabbeinu Nissim’s reasoning, the Alter Rebbe explains that it is similarly permitted to allow a person to slaughter even if his proficiency in the relevant laws was not examined, since not permitting him to slaughter might lead to a financial loss. The rationale for this lenient ruling is that if we do not permit the animal to be slaughtered, the owner will lose the possibility of partaking of its meat.

However, it should be noted that the Alter Rebbe grants the above leniency only when it is impossible to wait until a halachic authority will come and examine the prospective shochet or it is not feasible to bring the animal to an expert shochet whose proficiency has been verified. Only in such a situation do we accept the opinion cited by Rama in his note to this subsection of Rav Yosef Caro’s Shulchan Aruch, that we may rely on the presumption that any shochet – even if he has not been certified – is proficient in the necessary laws after the fact (see note 7, where the Alter Rebbe discusses this issue).

The principle that we do not rely on the assumption that most shochtim are proficient in the relevant laws when it is possible to clarify the issue by testing the knowledge of the shochet in question applies even to a shochet who was certified as proficient and knowledgeable in these laws, but then abandoned his profession for a significant amount of time. As will be explained below (the Alter Rebbe’s note 22 in the main text), since it is common for people who stop slaughtering for a time to forget the pertinent laws and to lose the skill of slaughtering correctly, such a shochet must have his knowledge and proficiency certified again before he resumes slaughtering.

Kuntreis Acharon 1:1 (6)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 6), the Alter Rebbe focuses on Rama’s statement, “a shochet himself… should not slaughter until he slaughters three times in the presence of a scholar who is an expert in the laws of ritual slaughter.” The Alter Rebbe notes that Rambam and the Tur state that a shochet should slaughter three times in the presence of a scholar before he slaughters on his own. Thus, although Rama’s words are based on those of Rambam and the Tur, Rama altered their wording, stating that the scholar must be, “an expert in the laws of ritual slaughter,” rather than “a scholar.”

The Alter Rebbe focuses on why it was necessary for Rama to add the words, “who is an expert in the laws of ritual slaughter,” explaining that the term “scholar” implies that the person is a recognized Torah authority who issues halachic rulings. By contrast, “a scholar who is an expert in the laws of ritual slaughter,” implies that the person may not be on the level of issuing halachic rulings, but may merely be familiar with the laws of ritual slaughter. Thus, Rama is ruling that it is enough for a shochet to slaughter three times in front of such a person.

Nevertheless, Rama proceeds to state that the custom is not to rely on this leniency, but rather for a prospective shochet to be certified by a “scholar,” i.e., by a Torah authority who issues halachic rulings. The Alter Rebbe explains that the rationale for this practice is that, at present, it is customary to eat meat from an animal that a shochet slaughtered without having his proficiency and knowledge of the relevant laws verified beforehand or afterwards. Therefore, it is necessary that he be tested thoroughly by a halachic authority before he receives his certification.

After quoting several authorities who interpret Rama’s words in this manner, the Alter Rebbe offers an alternate interpretation – that it is sufficient for a shochet to be certified by a scholar who is an expert in the laws of ritual slaughter even if he is not a scholar capable of issuing halachic rulings. The Alter Rebbe then supports this interpretation by citing several authorities who interpret Rama’s statement in this manner.

In conclusion, the Alter Rebbe suggests that certification should be granted by a Torah scholar. However, it is not necessary that this scholar be one who is authorized to issue halachic rulings. Instead, it is sufficient that the scholar be an expert in the laws of ritual slaughter, be capable of arriving at a halachic ruling in any matter he studies, and that he test the prospective shochet several times and establish that he is a G‑d-fearing individual. Nevertheless, since it is not common for shochtim to be scholars, a halachic authority will often certify prospective shochtim who are not Torah scholars. However, a halachic authority who issues such certifications should be careful not to certify a prospective shochet until he is certain that the candidate is G‑d-fearing.

The Alter Rebbe then proceeds to discuss the law regarding a person who slaughters without being certified. The Alter Rebbe begins by quoting Tevuos Shor (section 1, note 40), which rules that an uncertified shochet who slaughters should be judged according to the principles stated by Rav Yosef Caro, subsection 11 below. The rationale for Rav Caro’s stringent ruling regarding a shochet who slaughters in a community that had passed an ordinance that only a designated shochet should slaughter, is that since he slaughtered in violation of the communal ordinance, the animals he slaughtered should be forbidden. Commenting on that decision, the Alter Rebbe (see note 53 there) rules that leniency can be granted in such a situation if forbidding the meat will cause a severe financial loss. Accordingly, that same ruling can be applied here. Indeed, the Alter Rebbe supports his lenient stance by explaining that if a person lacking certification slaughters animals for others who are not aware of his lack of certification, they should not be penalized at all provided the shochet is examined, either before or after slaughtering.

The Alter Rebbe then quotes Chavos Ya’ir (responsum 178), who mentions a further leniency, ruling that, in specific situations, a shochet who was not certified may slaughter when supervised by an expert shochet who is not physically able to slaughter the animal himself. The Alter Rebbe supports this lenient ruling, citing Rama’s comment that the prohibition against such an uncertified shochet slaughtering applies only when he does so without supervision.

Nevertheless, the Alter Rebbe objects to the practice whereby certified shochtim allow apprentices to slaughter for them, even though the apprentices have not been certified and are slaughtering without any supervision. However, the Alter Rebbe does find some justification for the practice, explaining that since the certified shochet under whom the apprentice is studying sent them to slaughter, the awe of his master will be upon him because the master may inspect the animals he slaughtered.

Kuntreis Acharon 1:1 (7)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 7), the Alter Rebbe clarifies his ruling in note 11 in the main text regarding charging a fee for certifying a person as a shochet. The Alter Rebbe explains that although a scholar is forbidden to charge a certification fee, there are grounds to say that in some instances, the certification of a person who paid such a fee is not disqualified.

The Alter Rebbe begins by clarifying this ruling based on our Sages’ statement in Bechoros 29a (cited by Rama, Choshen Mishpat 34:18 and by the Alter Rebbe in his Choshen Mishpat, Hilchos Eidus, subsection 8), that if a person accepts payment for delivering testimony, his testimony is invalid. However, if a witness is asked to travel to a different place to witness an event concerning which he will testify, he is permitted to charge a fee (see Rama, loc. cit.; see also the Alter Rebbe’s Choshen Mishpat, loc. cit.).

Tevuos Shor (section 1, note 13) compares the situation presented here to that of a person who charges a fee for traveling to witness an event concerning which he will testify. Thus, Tevuos Shor maintains that a scholar who certifies shochtim may charge for his services. However, the Alter Rebbe rejects that comparison, noting a significant difference between the two instances. In the instance of the witness presented in Choshen Mishpat, the person being asked to travel to witness an event involving a halachic matter is not obligated to do so. However, since shochtim are not permitted to slaughter in the present age without first being certified, the scholar’s certification of the shochet is considered to be a matter involving a Scriptural commandment. Hence, the scholar is required to examine the prospective shochet without charge, just as a Rabbinic authority is obligated to render judgments in disputes between individuals, examine animals that are slaughtered to see if they are tereifah, and examine firstborn animals to verify that they are not blemished, all without a charge.

Bechoros, loc. cit., derives this law from Devarim 4:5, where Moshe states, “Behold, I have taught you statutes and judgments as G‑d commanded me.” Our Sages interpret Moshe’s words as follows, “Just as I [studied] without charge, you [should study] without charge.” Since a shochet is not permitted to slaughter in the present age without being certified, the local Rabbinic authorities are obligated to supervise him and to grant such certification without charge.

The Alter Rebbe then compares this situation to one where a Rabbinic authority supervises the composition of a bill of divorce and witnesses must travel to observe the divorce proceedings. The witnesses may charge a fee if they have to travel to observe the bill of divorce being given. This is not comparable to the situation here, because unlike a scholar who is ruling on a matter of law, the witnesses are merely signing on the document. Hence, their involvement does not resemble teaching Torah Law at all. By contrast, the Rabbinic authority is obligated to perform his duties without charge because the divorce could not be granted without his involvement, and his involvement falls within the category of rendering a halachic decision. Similar concepts apply regarding certifying a shochet. Since a shochet could not slaughter without the Rabbinic authority’s certification, the Rabbinic authority is considered as though he were involved in a matter of Torah Law and is hence, obligated to do so without charge.

Accordingly, if a scholar charges a fee for certifying a shochet, the certification is invalid. This stance is supported by the law presented in Bechoros, loc. cit. See also the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, Choshen Mishpat 9:5, that if a judge charges a fee for delivering a judgment, his judgment is nullified even if it is aligned with halachah. Similarly, in the present instance, a prospective shochet who paid a scholar to certify him as an expert shochet must receive certification from another authority before he is permitted to slaughter, even if he is truly qualified to slaughter.

The Alter Rebbe then addresses a misconception that may arise, leading people to compare the practice of permitting a Rabbinic scholar to charge for certifying prospective shochtim to the practice of permitting a Rabbinic judge to charge for signing a halachic ruling. The Alter Rebbe explains that a Rabbinic judge may charge for his services only if he is asked to hold the record of the ruling for safekeeping because the plaintiff does not want to have the ruling carried out at the present time. If, by contrast, the plaintiff would like the ruling to be applied immediately, the judge may not charge for signing the ruling and seeing to its application. Doing so is part of his obligation to issue a halachic ruling. Hence, the judge is really charging for holding the documentation of his ruling for safekeeping, not for issuing the ruling per se. This is not relevant regarding the certification of a shochet.

Although as explained above, as a general rule, a scholar may not charge prospective shochtim a certification fee, the Alter Rebbe concludes by ruling that no Scriptural prohibition is involved if a Rabbinic authority charges a fee for certifying prospective shochtim provided the fee is clearly s’char beteilah, i.e., the Rabbinic authority has no other profession and, rather than take up another profession, he serves in this capacity [Kesubos 105a; see also the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 246:5; Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:2)]. In such a situation, the Alter Rebbe allows a shochet who received such certification to slaughter if there is no other Rabbinic authority who can examine his proficiency and expertise. However, even so, lest people suspect the scholar of certifying shochtim for monetary gain and not examining the shochtim thoroughly as an initial preference, shochtim who received such certification should refrain from slaughtering.

Kuntreis Acharon 1:2 (8)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 8), the Alter Rebbe discusses Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling that it is not necessary for a shochet to know all the details of all the laws pertaining to ritual slaughter. The Alter Rebbe cites many authorities whose statements imply that this ruling applies not only after the fact, but even as an initial preference.

The Alter Rebbe also discusses numerous peripheral issues in this note, including whether a shochet may decide how to proceed when a question arises regarding his slaughtering knife and slaughter, and how proficient a shochet must be in the laws pertaining to ritual slaughter:

a) The Alter Rebbe maintains that it is preferable that a shochet not make decisions regarding questions that arise based upon his own knowledge. Rather, he should consult a Rabbinic authority before proceeding. The Alter Rebbe bases this statement on his ruling in Hilchos Talmud Torah 2:1, that a person issuing halachic rulings must know the motivating rationales for the law. Since the motivating rationales regarding the laws of slaughter and tereifos are complex, it is preferable for a Rabbinic authority to issue these rulings.

b) In his discussion of how proficient a shochet must be in the laws pertaining to ritual slaughter, the Alter Rebbe presents the ruling of Pri Chadash, Yoreh Deah, in his Kuntreis Acharon, note 8. In that source, he explains that Pri Chadash maintains that a shochet is considered knowledgeable in the relevant laws if he knows the laws without knowing the Scriptural allusions from which those laws are derived. The Alter Rebbe notes that there are authorities (e.g., Tevuos Shor, sec. 1, note 11) who disqualify a shochet who lacks such knowledge, maintaining that his unfamiliarity with such matters is a sign that he does not apply himself to his studies. The Alter Rebbe concludes by ruling in accordance with Pri Chadash, that as long as the shochet knows the primary relevant laws concerning ritual slaughter, he is considered to be knowledgeable.

Kuntreis Acharon 1:2 (9)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 9), the Alter Rebbe focuses on Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling in his Shulchan Aruch, that a shochet is disqualified only if he states that a slaughtered animal that should be forbidden is permitted. The Alter Rebbe explains that this ruling applies only when a shochet makes such a statement permitting, as an initial preference, the slaughter of an animal that should have been forbidden. However, the Alter Rebbe maintains that if the shochet knows that a slaughtered animal is forbidden as an initial preference, and errs by permitting it after the fact, he is not disqualified. However, the slaughtered animal’s meat should be forbidden. The rationale behind the Alter Rebbe’s ruling is that since the potential shochet knows that it is improper to slaughter an animal in this manner as an initial preference, we are not concerned that there will be a mishap causing him to do so. Rather, we assume that he will endeavor to slaughter in a manner that is acceptable as an initial preference.

Kuntreis Acharon 1:4 (10)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 10), the Alter Rebbe clarifies the rulings of Rav Yosef Caro in his Shulchan Aruch and of Sifsei Kohen, which is presented in note 30 in the main text. Rav Yosef Caro’s words are general and a bit vague. As such, Rav Yosef Caro does not specify what he means by the phrase, “a place where the majority of the people located there are Jewish.” Sifsei Kohen narrows down the definition of that term, stating that Rav Yosef Caro’s intent was not the population of the entire city or of the marketplace, but rather the population of the specific place where the animal or chicken was found, as the Alter Rebbe states in note 30.

However, Pri Chadash (Yoreh Deah 63:3) disagrees with Sifsei Kohen, and offers a stricter interpretation of Rav Yosef Caro’s statement. Pri Chadash maintains that even if the majority of the people normally found in the marketplace are Jewish, if the majority of the city’s population is not Jewish, and a thoroughfare which is commonly used by most of the city’s residents passes through the marketplace, stringency is required. Thus, Pri Chadash interprets Rav Yosef Caro’s reference to, “a place in which the majority of the local populace are Jewish,” as referring to an area populated by Jews through which non-Jews rarely pass.

The Alter Rebbe then analyzes Rav Yosef Caro’s wording in the main text here and in his Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 259:3, where he discusses when it is permitted to keep an ownerless object that was discovered. The Alter Rebbe concludes by agreeing with Sifsei Kohen’s interpretation of Rav Yosef Caro’s statement, explaining that neither here, nor in Choshen Mishpat, does Rav Yosef Caro mention that the place where the object is found must not only be populated mainly by Jews, but must also be set off as a separate neighborhood where non-Jews rarely go.

The Alter Rebbe proceeds to cite another instance where the ruling depends on the makeup of the local population. When a corpse is discovered in a field, and it is not known who killed him (see Devarim 21:1ff.), the following rules apply regarding what action must be taken: If the closest city is located between mountains and, by and large, travelers do not pass through the area, the inhabitants of that city are required to bring a calf and have its neck broken, as required by that passage. However, if the city is located in a place frequented by travelers, it is assumed that one of those travelers murdered the person, and the local residents are not required to bring a calf (Bava Basra 23b). This applies even if the corpse was discovered close to the city, and the majority of the local residents are Jewish. This ruling seems to contradict Sifsei Kohen’s interpretation of Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling here, since although the population center closest to where the corpse was discovered is a city with a majority of Jewish residents, the assumption is that a non-Jewish traveler murdered the deceased. However, the Alter Rebbe explains that this ruling does not contradict the opinion of Sifsei Kohen mentioned above, because Rav Yosef Caro uses the following logic: Most Jews are not murderers, and therefore, it is more reasonable to assume that the deceased was murdered by a traveler who passed by – the majority of whom are non-Jews– and not by one of the Jewish inhabitants of the neighboring city. Accordingly, that law has no bearing on the ruling here. The rationale is that it is far more likely that meat found somewhere was accidentally dropped by one of the local people rather than by a traveler who was passing through the area.

The Alter Rebbe then discusses another law which shares some common factors with the case discussed here: an instance in which thieves opened a barrel of wine in a Jewish neighborhood. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 129:11), Rav Yosef Caro rules that if the majority of the city’s population are non-Jews, and a road traversed by non-Jews passes through this neighborhood, the wine is forbidden because it is assumed to have been touched by non-Jews. Although at first glance this ruling seems to contradict Sifsei Kohen’s interpretation of Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling here, a more careful analysis shows that this ruling is consistent with the logic of Sifsei Kohen. Since most Jews are not thieves, and since there is a road commonly used by non-Jews running through this Jewish neighborhood, we assume that the thieves came from a different part of the city, and not from this specific neighborhood. Thus, Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling takes into account the majority of the population in the city at large.

The Alter Rebbe then analyzes the concept that since most Jews are not thieves, we look at the makeup of the general population, and assume that the thief came from outside of the Jewish neighborhood. Building on that discussion, the Alter Rebbe questions the ruling that applies when a goat or chicken was lost and then later discovered. If it was stolen, the ruling depends on the identity of the majority of the thieves in the city and not that of the majority of the people in that locale, because most of the people are not thieves. However, if the meat was lost, the ruling depends on the identity of most of the butchers of the city. Even if most of the local populace are Jewish, if most of the butchers are non-Jews, the meat is forbidden. Thus, in the instance discussed here, regarding a slaughtered animal that was discovered in a place where the majority of the population was Jewish, if most of the butchers are not Jewish, the meat is permitted only if a Jew recognizes the animal or fowl as one that once belonged to him. In such an instance, the only concern is that the animal was found and slaughtered by a non-Jew. That concern is not taken into account since the majority of the people where the animal was found are Jewish, even though the majority of those living in the city as a whole are non-Jews. If, however, a Jew does not recognize the animal as having once belonged to him, we operate under the assumption that the meat came from the majority of the city’s residents, who are not Jewish, and the meat is forbidden.

Kuntreis Acharon 1:4 (11)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 11), the Alter Rebbe focuses on the ruling in Chulin 12a, (mentioned in note 33 in the main text) that a slaughtered animal that was found is assumed to have been slaughtered correctly unless it was found cast away in a dung heap. In that case, the fact that it was discarded is considered proof that it was disqualified while being slaughtered. The Alter Rebbe explains that greater stringencies are applied regarding ritual slaughter in the present age (see Rama, Yoreh Deah 23:2). Therefore, in the present era, even if one finds the carcass of a slaughtered animal that was not discarded, it is not assumed to have been slaughtered in an acceptable manner.

Moreover, the Alter Rebbe explains that for leniency to apply, the animal must be small enough for the slaughterer to be able to easily bring it to the dung heap himself and yet, it was discovered in a place where an unkosher animal would not usually be left. However, if the slaughterer slaughtered a large animal like an ox, which he could not easily bring to the dung heap alone, the fact that the slaughtered animal was in a place where people do not usually leave their unkosher animal carcasses is not considered an indication that it was slaughtered correctly.

Kuntreis Acharon 1:5 (12)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 12), the Alter Rebbe focuses on Rav Yosef Caro’s statement in his Shulchan Aruch that a minor who is proficient in the craft may perform ritual slaughter as an initial preference. The Alter Rebbe cites Tosafos (Sukkah 42b) and other authorities from whom Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling differs. They maintain that, as initial preference, a minor should not serve as a shochet, even if he is well versed in the pertinent laws, is proficient in the craft, and is being supervised by an adult. These authorities compare the prohibition against having a minor slaughter to the prohibition against having a deaf-mute or a mentally- or emotionally-challenged individual slaughter. In these instances, the person is not permitted to slaughter because he may make a mistake that the person supervising him would not notice.

Similarly, if a minor who is not proficient in the craft of ritual slaughter slaughters an animal, the animal is forbidden even after the fact. This ruling applies even if the minor is well-versed in the pertinent laws, and even if he was supervised by an expert shochet while slaughtering the animal. The rationale for this strict stance is that since the minor is not proficient in the craft of ritual slaughter, we are concerned that he may interrupt the process or press the knife against the animal’s organs without the knowledge of the supervisor.

This is not the case regarding a minor, a deaf-mute, or a mentally- or emotionally-challenged individual who is proficient in the craft of ritual slaughter. If an adult supervises such an individual, the animal he slaughters is acceptable after the fact.

The Alter Rebbe maintains that weight should be given to this view, and these stringencies should be followed because a Scriptural prohibition is involved. See Simlah Chadashah 1:30. See also Sifsei Kohen, Yoreh Deah 1:25.

In this note, the Alter Rebbe also clarifies that the adult who supervises the minor must be either the owner of the animal or the person charged with slaughtering it. However, if the adult does not have permission to slaughter the animal, his word regarding the validity of the process is not accepted if he is the only one observing.

Kuntreis Acharon 1:7 (13)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 13), the Alter Rebbe notes the difference between the rulings of Rav Yosef Caro in subsections 6 and 7 of his Shulchan Aruch. In subsection 6, Rav Yosef Caro rules, “A person who is deaf – he speaks but does not hear – should not perform ritual slaughter… [However,] if he does slaughter… [the animal or fowl] he slaughtered is permitted,” while in subsection 7, he rules, “A person who is mute, but is capable of hearing, may slaughter if he is proficient [in the necessary laws].” The Alter Rebbe questions why, Rav Yosef Caro mentions the schochet’s proficiency in subsection 7, when ruling regarding a mute shochet, but does not do so in subsection 6 when ruling regarding a deaf shochet. He explains that these rulings are based on the concept that as an initial preference, we do not rely on the assumption that most people who slaughter are proficient in the necessary laws (see Kuntreis Acharon, note 5). Therefore, Rav Yosef Caro mentions that it is necessary to ascertain the schochet’s proficiency. If his proficiency is established, a mute may slaughter as an initial preference, because he can fulfill his obligation to recite a blessing by listening to a blessing recited by another person. By contrast, a deaf person may not slaughter as an initial preference, even if his proficiency in the necessary laws was established, because he cannot hear the blessing he recites before slaughtering (see note 44 in the main text). However the inverse is also true – that after the fact his slaughter will be accepted even if his proficiency is not ascertained.

The following laws apply if slaughter was performed by either a mute or a deaf person who was not known to be proficient in the necessary laws. If the mute or deaf person is present, his knowledge of the necessary laws should be examined in writing (Sifsei Kohen, Yoreh Deah 1:30). This ruling parallels Rav Yosef Caro’s rulings regarding such people granting a bill of divorce (see the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, Even HaEzer 121:5) or engaging in commercial activity (ibid., Choshen Mishpat 235:18).

However, if a deaf or mute shochet who is not known to be proficient in the laws of ritual slaughter departs after slaughtering an animal (and thus, he cannot be examined), the slaughter is unacceptable unless it is known that his mental capacity was not diminished because of his disability.

If a certified shochet became deaf or mute, his mental capacity should be checked before he is permitted to slaughter. However, in both these instances, if the person demonstrates knowledge of the laws of ritual slaughter, that is sufficient proof of his mental capacity (Tevuos Shor, sec. 1, note 58).

Kuntreis Acharon 1:12 (14)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 14), the Alter Rebbe, focuses on the statement in the main text, that when the shochet stated that the animal was slaughtered improperly, he rendered the meat as forbidden for himself, noting that the source for this ruling is Rashba (Vol. 3, responsum 253). However, the Alter Rebbe notes that Terumas Hadeshen, P’sakim, responsum 226, states that this ruling applies only if the shochet’s statement was not contradicted by witnesses. However, if his statement is contradicted by witnesses, he may retract it.

The Alter Rebbe then notes that Mishneh L’Melech seems to be of two views as to whether or not Rashba would accept this ruling. In Hilchos Ishus 9:15, Mishneh L’Melech maintains that Rashba would accept Terumas Hadeshen’s ruling allowing the shochet to retract his statements. However, in Hilchos Yibbum 3:13, Mishneh L’Melech maintains that Rashba would not allow the shochet to retract his statement.

With regard to actual practice, since there is a difference of Rabbinic opinion, we follow the principle: If there is a question regarding Scriptural Law, we rule stringently. However, if there is a question regarding Rabbinic Law, we rule leniently.

A further point: If a person’s statements that render an object as forbidden for himself will cause a loss to others, all authorities agree that his word is not accepted if witnesses contradict it. As support for this lenient ruling, the Alter Rebbe cites the ruling of Rama (Even HaEzer 7:5), regarding the wife of a kohen who was captured by non-Jews. If the woman states that she was defiled, and there are witnesses who contradict her statement, then her statement is not accepted and she is not forbidden to her husband.

In this note, the Alter Rebbe also cites the explanation of K’nesses HaGedolah (Yoreh Deah, sec. 1, note 82 to Beis Yosef), regarding why a person may render an object as forbidden for himself. K’nesses HaGedolah explains that with regard to himself, every person is like a court. Just as a court can impose excessive punishments if it deems it necessary in a particular situation, so too, a person may accept a prohibition for himself even though he is not obligated to do so. Thus, when the shochet states that he did not slaughter the animal in question, despite the fact that witnesses contradict his statement, he is considered to have made the meat forbidden for himself and thus, can not retract his statement.

Kuntreis Acharon 1:14 (15)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 15), the Alter Rebbe focuses on Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling in the main text that the statement of the person who claims that the slaughter was invalid is not heeded because the disputed testimony of one witness is of no consequence. Therefore, the shochet is permitted to continue slaughtering and the meat from the animal in question may be eaten by all Jews. However, the Alter Rebbe rules that the witness himself may not partake of that meat from animals this shochet slaughters, as reflected by Rav Yosef Caro’s words, “from this time onward.”

The Alter Rebbe questions Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling based on the concept that the testimony of one witness is accepted if the status of the article in question vis-à-vis its permissibility has not been established (Rama, Yoreh Deah 127:3). This principle would seem to apply even more so in the present instance since we maintain that an animal is considered forbidden until it is established that it has been slaughtered properly (Chulin 9a). Nevertheless, Rav Yosef Caro maintains that since the shochet disputes the observer’s testimony, that testimony is not accepted. Hence, it is considered as if nothing was stated regarding the slaughter. In such an instance, we rely on the presumption that the majority of those who slaughter are experts (Chulin 3b). Moreover, the Torah trusts the shochet, and considers his statement that the animal was slaughtered correctly to have the same validity as it would had the statement been made by two witnesses. The rationale for this trust is that the shochet has the potential to slaughter correctly [see Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), above].

Maharshal (Yam shel Shlomoh, Chulin 1:9) and other authorities disagree with this premise, and maintain that the shochet’s word is not accepted as equall to the testimony of two witnesses. The rationale is that these authorities maintain that a statement made by a single witness is accepted regarding Scriptural prohibitions. Since the mitzvah to ritually slaughter animals to be used for human consumption is of Scriptural origin, the situation presented here is considered to be one in which there is conflicting testimony: the testimony of the shochet and that of observer. Accordingly, these authorities rule that all Jews are forbidden to partake of the meat because it is a matter of question whether the slaughter of the animal was acceptable.

With regard to actual practice, the Alter Rebbe concludes that since the matter is a question of Scriptural Law, the meat should be forbidden for all Jews, not just for the person claiming the animal was not slaughtered in the halachically correct manner. However, the shochet or the person who checks his slaughter is not disqualified from slaughtering or checking in the future.

Kuntreis Acharon 1:14 (16)

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 16), the Alter Rebbe focuses on the rulings of Pri Chadash and Mishneh L’Melech presented in note 57 in the main text, that the testimony of a witness who testifies that a shochet slaughtered improperly should have ramifications for him, namely, the meat from animals slaughtered by that shochet should be forbidden for the witness until the shochet repents. In support of this stance, the Alter Rebbe cites the comments of Rabbeinu Asher (Kesubos 4:5) and Rabbeinu Nissim in his commentary on Rif (Kesubos 15b), that if a person testified that witnesses once forged a signature on a legal document, their testimony may never be used on his behalf. The rationale for this stringency is as follows: Regarding himself, one’s testimony has the weight of the testimony of two witnesses. Therefore, once he has testified that these people forged a signature on a legal document, they are considered false witnesses in his eyes and their testimony may never be used on his behalf. This stance seems to run contrary to Maharik’s ruling that meat from animals the shochet slaughtered is not forbidden for the witness for all time.

However, Tevuos Shor sec. 2, note 38, interprets Maharik’s ruling slightly differently, maintaining that Maharik’s intent is that the witness may never partake of meat from an animal that this shochet slaughtered unless the shochet repents. However, Tevuos Shor maintains that Maharik’s position is that if people observed the witness partaking of such meat, they are not obligated to admonish him. True, generally, if a person is forbidden to partake of something because his statements caused that entity to become forbidden for him, the person must be admonished by those observing him partake of the forbidden entity. The rationale behind this interpretation of Maharik’s position is that if the shochet slaughtered the animal correctly, its meat would be kosher. Hence, the person who testified against him would not be transgressing by partaking of it.

Accordingly, the statements of Rabbeinu Asher and Rabbeinu Nissim do not represent a contradiction to this interpretation of Maharik’s ruling, because there is a fundamental difference between the two instances. Rabbeinu Asher and Rabbeinu Nissim are speaking about a financial matter. In that instance, we follow the principles that a) a litigant’s testimony is equal to that of 100 witnesses, and b) once a statement is made in court, it cannot be retracted. Therefore, by stating that the witnesses forged signatures on a document, the person disqualified their testimony for himself forever. By contrast, Maharik is discussing prohibitions, not a matter of financial law. In such instances, the concept that one witness is considered equal to two witnesses does not apply. The witness would be forbidden to eat the meat only because his statements caused meat slaughtered by this person to be deemed forbidden for him (see Kuntreis Acharon, note 14, above). Hence, the meat the shochet slaughtered is not necessarily unkosher since it is always within a shochet’s capacity to slaughter in a kosher manner. Therefore, it is possible that the witness never meant to consider this shochet’s slaughter to be forbidden for him and the leniency mentioned by Maharik can apply in this instance.