The Laws Governing Borrowing, Hiring, and Muzzling Animals

Bava Metzia 29b. See the parallels in Hilchos Metziah U’Fikadon, subsection 30 above, and Hilchos Halvaah, subsection 22 above.

Ibid., 36a.

We have translated the term sefer as “holy text” because that meaning fits the context here, as the Alter Rebbe continues: “Although lending them is a mitzvah….” Originally, the term meant “scroll,” and that was the intent of the Talmud when using this term. Nevertheless, even after the invention of the printing press, when the same term began being used for printed books as well, the Alter Rebbe (and previous and subsequent authorities) quotes the original rulings.

Although we have translated the term as “holy texts,” the same laws apply to secular works, or as the Alter Rebbe mentioned, any borrowed or hired article. Holy texts are mentioned because one might think that lending them out is permitted because doing so enables a mitzvah, Torah study, to be performed. Hence, it is necessary to emphasize that leniency is not granted even in such a situation.

Bava Metzia 29b.

See Hilchos Metziah U’Fikadon, subsection 27 above, which states:

[True,] when there is a mitzvah involved, we assume that the person will derive satisfaction [when the mitzvah is performed with his property] if he knows that the article with which the mitzvah will be fulfilled will not be damaged, as stated in Orach Chayim 14[:9]. When, however, [the owner] is concerned about [possible] loss, he would object to his property [being used even for a mitzvah].

See subsection 4, which grants permission for a borrower to allow others to use a lender’s books provided they are not removed from the domain of the original borrower. In that instance, the chances of damage are greatly minimized.

Bava Metzia 36b. This restriction applies even if the original borrower was willing to accept responsibility for any loss that might subsequently occur.

I.e., and not merely on occasion.

Ibid., 93a.

For they are entities that can be lost, hidden, or stolen.

See Imrei Yaakov, note 14, which states that this entire subsection refers to an unfurnished apartment or house. If the dwelling is furnished, the laws described in the previous subsection similarly apply to the furnishings.

If he sublets it for a higher price than he rented it, he may keep the difference(Rama, Choshen Mishpat 363:10). Since the owner entrusted the house to him, he is entitled to do with it as he sees fit.

For in this instance, there is greater likelihood of the property being damaged. The same law would seemingly apply to pets that can do damage; even if the second renter has fewer household members but has a pet that can do damage, he would not be permitted to sublet it to him. See note 15 below.

He need not give the owner any of the rent from the sublet. Here, also, since the owner entrusted the house to him, he is entitled to do as he sees fit.

Regardless of who is in physical possession of the land at any given moment, legally, land always remains in the possession of its rightful owner regardless of where the owner is located (Sukkah 30b; Bava Kama 95a; see also Hilchos Gezeilah U’Geneivah, subsection 11 above).

In Hilchos Sechirus 5:5, Rambam writes that there is no prohibition against subletting a dwelling. Raavad takes issue with Rambam on this point, claiming that sub-leasers may damage the dwelling.

Their difference of opinion revolves upon the following issue: As the Alter Rebbe writes here, in contrast to movable property, there is no possibility for landed property to be hidden from its owner. For this reason, Rambam maintains that a dwelling may be sublet, for the owner will always receive his property back. Raavad, by contrast, maintains that although the property will be returned to its owner, it may be damaged and the owner may have to sue to have the damages repaired. In his gloss to that halachah, the Maggid Mishneh supports Rambam’s ruling, explaining that the possibility of damage to a dwelling is minimal.

To apply the above to contemporary situations: Certainly with regard to furnished homes and apartments, there is ample reason to forbid subletting without the owner’s consent, for the furnishings are movable property, as stated above. Even with regard to unfurnished dwellings, when there is a higher probability that damage will occur — e.g., there are more family members living within the dwelling — subletting is forbidden. Moreover, when the dwelling involves intricate equipment, e.g., lighting, safety features, and the like, although they are permanent fixtures in the dwelling and are thus not considered independent, movable property, there is reason to say that since there is a possibility they will be damaged, a renter is forbidden to sublet the dwelling because of them. Needless to say, if a tenant signed an agreement stipulating that he is forbidden to sublet a dwelling, he is bound by that agreement.

With the stipulation that the owner of the article or the animal continue performing the task for which he or it was hired, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to state.

I.e., the purchaser of the merchandise or anyone else with a similar-sized burden. See Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 311:8. Implied is that if the merchandise was of significantly larger size or weight, the owner could protest because his animal or ship was not fit to carry such cargo, as stated below.

Bava Metzia 79b. The rationale is that in this instance as well, there is no chance of the hired property being secreted away without the owner’s knowledge, since he is together with his property at all times.

From the Alter Rebbe’s wording it appears that he maintains that if the person who originally hired the article cannot find another person to hire it, he is responsible for paying the fee he originally promised to pay, as stated in Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit. The owner of the ship or animal is not required to seek out a new client.

Since the person to whom the article was originally entrusted accompanies it, the owner cannot claim that he does not desire to have a new person accept responsibility for his article.

See Bava Metzia 80a. If the weight or the bulk of the new merchandise is greater, the original renter is overstepping his bounds because the animal or the ship was not hired to carry such a burden.

As stated in that source, this refers to sons over the age of majority who are living in their father’s home. Thus it can be assumed that, at times, they will take responsibility for articles entrusted to their father.

In the previous clause, the owner was the one accompanying the article. He has grounds for grievance, because he is forced to deal with a different person than the one with whom he originally established the contract. In this instance, since the owner does not accompany the article, he is not required to deal with the second renter at all.

Imrei Yaakov (note 23) maintains that this law applies to any entrusted article. A holy text is mentioned because it can easily become torn or damaged in other ways (Rashi, Bava Metzia 29b), and thus one might think that the owner would not consent to its use by another.

See subsection 1.

Needless to say, if the owner specifically stated that he does not grant the borrower license to allow others to use his text, the borrower is not permitted to lend it out to others even while in his own property.

See Bava Metzia 29b; Hilchos Metziah U’Fikadon, subsection 25 above. When two people study from one text, it is possible that each of them will simultaneously pull it towards himself and a page will rip. Therefore, unless the owner gave explicit permission for his text to be used in such a manner, it cannot be assumed that he would grant license for this.

See Bava Metzia 35b. See also Hilchos Metziah U’Fikadon, subsection 26 above.

As reflected in the continuation of the Alter Rebbe’s statements, he speaks about “texts,” because there is reason to assume that the owner will object to their use, for fear of their becoming damaged.

The phrase “on occasion” is added to emphasize that leniency is not granted even in such circumstances — despite the fact that they will be used for a mitzvah — because of the possibility that they may be damaged. When there is no concern that an article used for a mitzvah will be damaged, e.g., a tallis or tefillin, it may be used on occasion without the owner’s permission. Nevertheless, it is forbidden to borrow such articles on an ongoing basis without permission. See parallels in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec.. 14:10.

I.e., one might think that leniency applies with regard to holy texts, because studying from them is a mitzvah and a person is pleased when a mitzvah is performed with his property if it does not involve a loss. See parallels in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 14:9, 12; sec. 437:7; sec. 585:5; sec. 637:9; and sec. 649:3. Since leniency is not granted with regard to holy texts, we can assume that neither would it be granted with regard to other objects. See also Hilchos Metziah U’Fikadon, subsection 27 above.

See Hilchos Metziah U’Fikadon, subsection 28 above. See also the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 14:9, 12, which allows a person to borrow another person’s tallis and/or tefillin on occasion for this reason, provided that they not be removed from the location where the owner placed them. Borrowing an object without permission and removing it from the other person’s house is forbidden even when there is absolutely no concern that the object will be damaged (see the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 14:10).

Bava Metzia 41a; Bava Basra 88a.

Subsections 26-28.

Bava Kama 114a. There the Mishnah states that Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka, rules that if a swarm of bees leave the hive that is on a person’s property and builds a hive on the branch of a tree in a field belonging to a colleague, the owner of the bees may cut off that branch (thus causing the owner of the tree a loss) and retake possession of his bees, provided he reimburses the owner of the tree for his loss.

See ibid., 114b. The Alter Rebbe is citing the opinion of Rabbeinu Asher (Bava Kama 10:16) and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 274), who derive this ruling from coupling the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka (mentioned in the previous note) with a second ruling of his quoted by the Gemara: that if a person possesses wine and he sees that honey belonging to another person is being lost, he may pour out his wine to save the other person’s honey and demand payment for his wine.

I.e., Rabbeinu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rambam (Hilchos Gezeilah VeAveidah 6:14). In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), the Alter Rebbe explains that the Mishnah (Bava Kama 114a) also mentions an opinion — and does not cite the name of its author — that one may not cut off the branch of a tree to retrieve his bees. The general principle is that when two Sages hold differing views and the Mishnah cites the opinion of one of the Sages without mentioning his name, the halachah follows his view. For this reason, Rabbeinu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rambam differ with the law stated previously. The Kuntreis Acharon states that they would apply that ruling even when the owner of the tree (or the barrel) is not present. This runs contrary to the opinion of Sefer Meiras Einayim 308:14 who states that if the owner of the tree (or the barrel) is not present and did not explicitly refuse to give up his property, it is possible that Rabbei­nu Yitzchak Alfasi and Rambam would agree that it is permitted to ruin it with the intent of reimbursing him, even without his consent.

And pour out his wine.

I.e., he is certain that the owner of the honey will reimburse him.

The term the Alter Rebbe uses is baal nefesh, literally, “a master of his soul.” See Mishlei 23:2. The title baal nefesh connotes a more encompassing degree of piety beyond that demanded of one who is “G‑d-fearing.” A G‑d-fearing person is instructed to pour out his wine to help a friend provided he himself would not suffer a loss. A baal nefesh is told not to pour out someone else’s wine to save himself from suffering a loss even though he would reimburse that person.

I.e., in contrast to a specialized tool or piece of equiptment that is commonly hired out together with its owner to operate it.

Compare to the law stated at the end of Hilchos Gezeilah U’Geneivah, subsection 2 above.

It is possible to say that this law would not apply in the present age. In the socio-economic climate of Eastern Europe, where most of the people in a community knew each other, it is plausible that an owner would not object to his article being taken and hired in such a manner. By contrast, in contemporary settings, it seems unlikely that most people would be happy with such an arrangement.

Bava Metzia 101b. There the Talmud relates that a wine merchant sought a place to store his wine. He sought to rent a storeroom from a certain woman, who refused to rent it out to him. He changed his tone and offered to consecrate her as his wife. She agreed, and the relationship was formalized. (In that era, marriage was a two-staged process. Hence, they did not yet live together as man and wife.) She then allowed the wine to be stored on her property. When the man returned home, he sent the woman a bill of divorce. She then had the wine removed from her property in the manner stated above.

As the Talmud, loc. cit., states, a property owner has the right to refrain from renting out his property to anyone to whom he does not desire to rent.

This is an obligation incumbent on the property owner, and not merely an act of pious conduct (Sefer Meiras Einayim 319:2). Sefer Meiras Einayim continues, stating that if the property owner does not notify the owner of the produce that his goods were removed, he is liable for damages.

Which includes taking steps to prevent a person’s property from being damaged, as stated in Hilchos Metziah U’Fikadon, subsection 33 above.

He need not, however, notify the owner of the produce (Sefer Meiras Einayim, loc. cit.).

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe explains that he based his decision on the rulings of Rabbeinu Yerucham and Beis Yosef (Tur, Choshen Mishpat 319). He states that this decision is also reflected by the conclusion reached in Bava Metzia 101b after discussion of the instance of the wine merchant mentioned above (footnote42). There the Talmud implies that when a courtyard is not up for rental, the owner may remove any objects another person places there. When, by contrast, a courtyard is up for rental, the owner of the courtyard may remove property there before notifying its owner only under special circumstances.

Even though it is likely that it will be taken or destroyed there.

As in the previous subsection, the Alter Rebbe rules that the owner of the courtyard is obligated to notify the owner of the produce. Imrei Yaakov (note 51) rules that if the owner of the courtyard fails to notify the owner of the produce after depositing it in the public domain, he is not liable for any damages caused it.

Bava Kama 25a.

If, however, he gave the owner of the jugs permission to store them in his courtyard, he is liable for damages he causes, even if he damages them unintentionally.

Bava Metzia 83a. Similarly, all other terms of his employment are dependent on local custom unless explicit stipulations to the contrary are made.

He must, however, interrupt work for prayer (Berachos 16a; the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 90:3).

Bava Metzia 83b.

Tehillim 104:22-23.

Bava Metzia 111a. Sefer HaMitzvos (positive commandment 200) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 588) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments. Significantly, in his Sefer HaMitzvos (negative commandment 238), Rambam writes that this positive commandment (although not the negative commandment that follows) applies even with regard to a non-Jewish worker. See Bava Metzia 111b, which emphasizes that this mitzvah applies whether the worker is rich or poor.

Sefer HaMitzvos (negative commandment 238) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 230) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments. Bava Metzia 112a highlights the severity of the prohibition, stating that whenever a person withholds payment of a worker’s wage, it is as if he takes his very soul from him.

Devarim 24:15.

Bava Metzia 111b. Sefer HaMitzvos (negative commandment 247) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 228) regard this as one of the Torah’s 613 commandments.

Devarim 24:14-15.

Seemingly, in order to restrict the application of the mitzvah only to within Eretz Yisrael. This is not so, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain.

I.e., animals, utensils, and other movable property.

The implication being that the prohibition applies to objects in your land but not to the land itself.

According to this opinion, a person who delays payment of his rent does not violate this prohibition. See, however, Imrei Yaakov, note 61.

Bava Metzia 110b.

Vayikra 19:13.

It must be noted that in our contemporary experience, the use of electric lighting and the change in socio-economic patterns have affected the length of a worker’s day.

Bava Metzia 111a.

I.e., instead of the craftsman being paid an hourly or daily wage, he was contracted by the job and promised a fixed price for a specific task.

Otherwise, he violates the transgressions mentioned in the previous subsection. See Bava Metzia 112a.

Imrei Yaakov (note 68) explains that this principle applies with regard to the contractual obligations that existed in the Talmudic era when the employer would provide the contractor with the raw materials with which to work. By contrast, a contractor who provides his own materials is considered a merchant who sells goods. In such an instance, delaying payment, although undesirable, is not included in this Scriptural prohibition.

Bava Metzia, op. cit.

See ibid., 81a.

Even though the contractor is not entitled to sell the item without the owner’s permission, the fact that he has been given an article of at least equivalent value to his wage serves as assurance that he will ultimately receive his due. This leads to the conclusion that the scope of the Scriptural prohibitions involves not necessarily failing to provide a worker with the money he immediately needs, but putting him in a situation where he is unsure whether he will ever be paid.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe cites the ruling of Beis Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 339) who maintains — based on the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 111a) as interpreted by the Tur — that if instead of paying a worker, an employer tells him that he may collect his due in the form of food from a particular storekeeper, the employer does not violate the prohibition of failing to pay his workers on time. The Beis Yosef infers that this ruling applies even if the worker objects to such an arrangement.

The Alter Rebbe states that although one could take issue with the conclusion of the Beis Yosef, it would only be in a situation such as that of the storekeeper, in which the employer did not give the worker anything. In the instance involving the tailor, however, the employer gave him his garment. Hence, it would appear that since the worker knows that he will ultimately receive recompense for his work, and since he has that assurance in hand, the employer is not considered to have violated the prohibition against failing to pay his worker on time.

I.e., conduct beyond the measure of the law.

Subsection 18.

I.e., according to the literal wording of the Scriptural prohibition, the prohibition is not ongoing.

Bava Metzia 110b.

Lit. “words of Kabbalah.” This term is used in reference to sources stemming from the books of the prophets or the other Holy Scriptures and not to the Five Books of Moses.

Mishlei 3:28, as quoted and interpreted by Bava Metzia 110b-111a. See also Hilchos Halvaah, subsection 4 above.

This leniency applies only with regard to the prohibition: “Do not tell…,” which stems from the received tradition. With regard to the Scriptural commandment and prohibition: “Pay him his wage…. Do not let the sun set…,” the employer cannot excuse himself by claiming that he is busy. See subsection 18; Ahavas Chesed, ch. 10, note 6.

Bava Metzia 111a. The collection of responsa Halachos Ketanos (Vol. II, responsum 31) maintains that an employer does not violate this prohibition if the worker demands payment via proxy. R. Akiva Eiger (gloss to Choshen Mishpat 339:10) differs and maintains that there is no difference whether the demand for payment was made by the worker or via his agent. Ahavas Chesed, ch. 9, note 32, explains that the rationale why an employer is not held liable for delaying payment if a worker does not demand his wage is that it appears that the worker is agreeable to the delay of payment. As such, it makes no difference whether his demand for payment is made personally or via proxy. Developing this concept further, where the employer pays by making deposits directly into the worker’s bank account, it would appear sufficient for the worker to notify the employer of his demand for payment by phone, e-mail, or other commonly accepted means.

Ibid., 112a. Ahavas Chesed 9:10 adds that when an employer possesses only part of the money he owes the worker, he is obligated to give him that portion. Ahavas Chesed, loc. cit., note 7, further clarifies that if there is money that the employer gave to another person for safekeeping, or that is on loan to another person and that loan is now payable, he is obligated to collect those funds and pay his workers on time.

See also subsection 18 of this text, which deals with the question of whether an employer is obligated to borrow money in order to pay his workers on time.

Which could be sold to procure the funds necessary to pay the worker, or given to the worker as payment.

As mentioned in footnote 74, in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe mentions — although he does not state that he accepts — the opinion of Beis Yosef that one may make such an arrangement even against the worker’s will. Rashi, Bava Metzia 112b; Sefer HaChinuch; Shaar HaMishpat; Ahavas Chesed; and others rule differently, maintaining that the worker must consent to the arrangement.

Bava Metzia 112a.

Halachically, a check is not considered money. Nevertheless, in this instance it is comparable, for it can be cashed easily. Moreover, since the Alter Rebbe rules (subsection 13) that it is acceptable to give a worker collateral, surely a check would be considered acceptable (Imrei Yaakov, Shaarei HaTziyun 126).

Hilchos Halvaah, subsection 20 above. There the Alter Rebbe writes that the employer himself is obligated to sell the movable property in order to pay the worker. He cannot force the worker to accept the movable property in order to sell it and receive his wages from the proceeds.

See Bava Metzia 110b.

Ibid., 111a.

See subsection 14 above.

Imrei Yaakov (note 83) provides a contemporary example of this principle: An employer customarily pays his workers their monthly wage on the seventh of the following month rather than on the first. Since this is his usual practice, it can be assumed that the workers accepted the fact that they would be paid in this fashion. Hence, the employer is not considered to have violated the prohibition of delaying payment of their wages.

In that vein, Kin’as Eliyahu mentions the instance of an employer who is known to have difficulties meeting his payroll and often delays payment. Since the employees are aware of this situation and nevertheless begin (or continue) working for this employer, it can be said that the employer does not violate the above prohibitions by delaying payment of their wages. See Sefer Meiras Einayim339:17.

Pischei Choshen, ch. 9, note 66, emphasizes that this ruling does not apply to the manager of a company. Even though he is not the owner, since the actual responsibility for paying the workers is his, he also bears the halachic responsibility.

The rationale for this ruling is a matter of debate, for one of the fundamental principles of Torah Law is that a person’s agent is considered as the person himself (Kiddushin 41b, et al.). Why, then, is the principal not liable when he hires workers via an agent? Among the resolutions offered (Tosefos Rid to Bava Metzia 111a) is that, as mentioned above, the owner’s liability to pay his workers on time is contingent upon their expectation to in fact be paid in a timely manner. Since the employer did not hire them face to face but via proxy, they do not have the firm conviction that he will indeed pay them on time. See also Pischei Choshen, ch. 9, note 64.

Bava Metzia 110b.

For he was the one who hired them.

Ibid., 111a.

The employer is not considered to have made a stipulation that runs contrary to Torah Law (see commentaries to Sefer Chassidim, sec. 1066, the source of this law, and Sifsei Kohen 339:2), because any stipulation made regarding financial matters is binding, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to state.

In which instance he is not considered to have violated the prohibitions against delaying payment, as stated in subsection 15.

From the Alter Rebbe’s wording here, it is apparent that an employer is not obligated to borrow money to pay his workers if he does not have the funds himself. Nevertheless, as an expression of piety, it is desirable for him to go beyond the measure of the law and do so.

See Bava Metzia 94a.

Devarim 24:15. Our translation follows Rashi’s commentary.

Zohar, Vol. III, p. 85a.

If, however, he was not negligent but nevertheless, caused the barrel to break, he is absolved from liability according to law. This is true even if he is a paid watchman.

Bava Metzia 83a.

Mishlei 2:20, as cited by Bava Metzia 83a.

I.e., those who conduct themselves beyond the letter of the law. See Hilchos Metziah U’Fikadon, subsection 20 above, which quotes (Bava Metzia 30b): “Jerusalem was destroyed solely because they establish their rulings exclusively on Torah Law,” without extending themselves and showing kindness beyond the measure of the law.

See also Tosafos (Bava Metzia 24b), who explain that there are situations in which Torah Law actually mandates a person to show consideration beyond the measure of the law. In this instance, however, when the porter caused the employer a loss through his negligence, Torah Law does not obligate such consideration. Nevertheless, the employer is counseled to “proceed in the path of those who are good.”

I.e., to pay him what he would have earned had he performed his task properly.

Mishlei 2:20.

Bereishis 18:19.

See subsection 11ff.

See Berachos 16a. The first three blessings of the Grace after Meals are Scriptural obligations. The fourth blessing was ordained by our Sages in the later era of the Mishnaic period [after permission was granted to bury the dead of Beitar following the Bar Kochva revolt (Berachos 46b)]. When the Sages enacted their ordinance, they freed laborers from the obligation to recite it, because in that era, employers were extremely strict and demanded that their workers be very precise in fulfilling the quota of hours they must work. Nowadays, since employers are more lenient in this regard, workers are required to recite this blessing as well (the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 191:1).

The Alter Rebbe — and Rambam (the conclusion of Hilchos Sechirus), his source — describe Yaakov as a tzadik, one who is righteous and just. As reflected in Rambam’s Hilchos Deos, ch. 1, a righteous and just person is one who fulfills the obligations incumbent upon him (in contrast to a chassid, a pious person, who goes beyond the measure of the law). Rambam and the Alter Rebbe are citing Yaakov’s conduct as exemplifying what is required of all workers (Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 25, p. 141; consult that source for several distinctions between Rambam’s exposition of these laws and the Alter Rebbe’s).

Bereishis 31:7.

Ibid., 30:43.

I.e., according to the Alter Rebbe, the laws that follow are a direct consequence of a worker’s obligation to work for his employer with all his strength. In that, he differs from his source (Rambam, loc. cit.), for Rambam also mentions these laws but before stating — and without any connection to — the worker’s obligation to work for his employer with all his strength (Likkutei Sichos, op. cit.).

Thus he will not be working for his employer “with all his might” as required (Likkutei Sichos, op. cit.).

Talmud Yerushalmi, Demai 7:3. See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:12, where this and the following laws are cited. The Talmud Yerushalmi emphasizes that the censure given a teacher for being lax in these matters is more severe than that given other workers: “They are working for flesh and blood, but you are working for Heaven’s sake.”

Yoma 18a.

This applies even when there are no customers in the store. If the employee were to be allowed to perform other work when there are no customers in the store, he would be drawn to it even when there are customers (Aruch HaShulchan, Yoreh Deah 245).

Bava Metzia 77a.

Ibid., 77b. If stopping his work will cause the employer a loss — even merely the loss of potential profit — the worker is not permitted to stop (Imrei Yaakov, note 108). If the worker leaves in the midst of his work, and, by doing so causes the employer a loss, he is held responsible. Details of a worker’s liability in such an instance are discussed in Choshen Mishpat, sec. 333.

Needless to say, in all circumstances he is obligated to return the portion of his wage that he did not earn. Nevertheless, even if there is no foreseeable way that he can return that money, he is entitled to cease working (Sifsei Kohen 333:15).

Vayikra 25:55, as cited by Bava Metzia 10a.

Based on the gloss of Sifsei Kohen 333:17, it appears that this law applies only when the worker lives and works in the home of the employer and thus resembles a bondsman. If he lives in his own home, the resemblance is not complete and the law does not apply.

Yeshayahu 16:14.

Devarim 15:18.

Since at the time a worker is hired, “his body is acquired by his master” (Ritva, Bava Metzia 10a), if he were to work for longer than the ordinary period, the comparison to a bondsman would be appropriate (Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 25, pp. 145-146).

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 4), the Alter Rebbe cites the opinion of Rambam (Hilchos Avadim 1:1), who maintains that a person is permitted to sell himself as a bondsman only when his needs are such that he has nothing to eat. If he has food but not clothing, he may not sell himself.

But not in the present era, for the mitzvah of a Hebrew bondsman applies only in the era when the laws of the Jubilee year are in practice (Rambam, Hilchos She ­mitah VeYovel 10:9).

Vayikra 25:39; see the Sifra to the verse.

See Bava Metzia 12b. Even before that age, a woman may not sell herself as a bondswoman. Instead, until she attains majority — which involves manifesting signs of physical maturity after the age of twelve — her father may sell her as a bondswoman if he is destitute. If she has already been sold, once she manifests signs of physical maturity she is granted her freedom (Rambam, Hilchos Avadim, ch. 4).

Imrei Yaakov (note 112; based on Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 9:9; Rashi, Bava Metzia 57a) states that this applies to a non-Jewish worker as well.

Bava Metzia 87a-b, with regard to a person; ibid., 88b, with regard to an animal. See the contrast with foods other than produce in subsection 26.

In this subsection, the Alter Rebbe speaks of two of the Torah’s mitzvos: the mitzvah that deals with permitting human workers to partake of the produce with which they are working (Sefer HaMitzvos, positive commandment 201; Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 576), and the prohibition against preventing animals from partaking of produce with which they are working (Sefer HaMitzvos, negative commandment 219; Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 596). In Rambam’s Mishneh Torah, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch, these two mitzvos and the relevant laws are each discussed in different sections. The Alter Rebbe, by contrast, groups them together here because of the derivations made from one set of laws to the other.

Bava Metzia 87b. This applies to a worker hired on an hourly or daily basis as well as to one contracted for a given task (Imrei Yaakov, note 114).

Ibid., 91b, with regard to a person; ibid., 92a, with regard to an animal.

See also subsection 24.

Bava Metzia 90a. See also subsection 29.

Ibid., 90b.

With the exception of taking a false oath, transferring the holiness of a consecrated animal, and cursing another person with G‑d’s name, lashes are never administered for prohibitions violated through speech alone (Makkos 16b). In this instance, however, since the person’s speech brings about a deed — the prevention of the animal from eating — the person is held liable for lashes. Alternatively, since generally the violation of this prohibition involves a deed, one is liable for lashes even in this instance when it does not involve a deed (Maggid Mishneh to Hilchos Sechirus 13:2). See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 10, pp. 83-84.

I.e., in the era when there were judges who possessed the unique semichah (ordination) that extended back to Moshe our teacher, a person who violated this prohibition was liable for lashes. Indeed, since the Scriptural commandment to administer lashes is mentioned directly before the prohibition against muzzling an animal (Devarim 25:2-3), that prohibition is considered the paradigm for all prohibitions punishable by lashes (Makkos 23a).

Devarim 25:4.

Bava Kama 54b.

A kal vachomer, to use the Hebrew term; a conclusion drawn from the comparison of a more lenient ruling to a more stringent one. Bava Metzia 88b explains: There is no explicit statement in the Torah that an animal is allowed to partake of produce with which it is working that is still attached to the ground. In contrast, the Torah explicitly states that a human is granted license to partake of produce that is attached to the ground while he is working with it. Now, if license is granted for an animal to partake of harvested produce with which it is working, similar license should certainly be given to human beings.

Bava Metzia 88a.

Devarim 23:25, as cited by Bava Metzia 87b.

See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 34, p. 130ff, which focuses on the difference of opinion (Bava Metzia 92a) whether a worker is considered to be partaking of produce that is his by right or whether he is partaking of what has been granted him from Above. The Rebbe explains that there are three ways of looking at the right granted a worker to partake of the produce with which he is working:

a) that it is a direct derivative of the work that he is performing; just as he earns his wage, he also earns abonus — the right to partake of the produce with which he works (i.e., it is his by right);

b) it is not at all connected to his work; instead, it is a G‑d-given entitlement given him because he is a worker (comparable to the various harvest gifts the Torah designates for the poor);

c) an intermediate perspective: the right to partake of produce is granted a person because of his work — but not because he has earned it, but rather in consideration of his efforts.

As stated in Bava Metzia 87b, the verse does not grant the right to an utter stranger who enters a person’s vineyard to partake of his produce.

Ibid., 88b.

Devarim 23:26.

Bava Metzia 87a.

Ibid., 87b.

Ibid., 89b.

Ibid., 89a.

Ibid., 92a.

According to Scriptural Law, the obligation to separate tithes applied only while the Jewish people as a collective lived in Eretz Yisrael, i.e., until the exile of the tribes of Reuven and Gad, approximately 150 years before the destruction of the First Beis HaMikdash (Rambam, Hilchos Terumah 1:26, Hilchos Shemitah VeYovel 10:8-9). According to Rabbinic Law, one is obligated to separate tithes from the produce of Eretz Yisrael even nowadays. See Rambam, Hilchos Maaser, ch. 3, with regard to when the obligation to tithe produce other than grain takes effect. See also subsection 27 with regard to grapes and olives.

The Alter Rebbe is speaking about employees working with produce in the Diaspora where there is no — and with the exception of certain places close to Eretz Yisrael, never was an — obligation to tithe, even according to Rabbinic Law. Nevertheless, the intent is that the license for a worker to partake of produce in all locales is contingent on the obligations that would have been incumbent on the produce had it been in this state in Eretz Yisrael at the time when the obligation to tithe applied.

The Alter Rebbe is describing the obligations established by Jewish Law. Needless to say, an employer may — and many do — grant his employees the right to partake of food, even when Jewish Law does not obligate them.

Sefer Meiras Einayim 337:13 maintains that this applies only to wheat and not to other grains. Although there are times when one makes bread from other grains, other grains are used primarily for other purposes and not for making bread. The Turei Zahav 337:3 differs and maintains that everything depends on the individual person. If he generally makes bread from other grains, the laws that apply to wheat apply to those grains as well.

E.g., one who grinds kernels of wheat into flour.

There is a practical application to this law. Employees in a bakery or a factory that produces food products may not partake of the baked goods or other products unless the employer grants them permission to do so.

Bava Metzia 91a.

A worker who partakes of produce when he is not granted license is considered to be stealing the produce from the employer (see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 337:19, and subsection 26 below). Our Sages did, however, grant a worker the right to partake of fruit after he finished picking fruit in one row and before he begins picking in another row, so that he not waste time eating while picking the fruit (ibid., 337:11).

Bava Metzia 92a; i.e., just as a person may partake of produce only while working, so too, with regard to an animal. Therefore, when an animal stops working — carrying the produce — it may no longer partake of it.

Ibid.

The translation is taken from Rashi, Bava Metzia 90b.

Ibid., 90b. This and the following laws all revolve around the same concepts. A worker may desire that either he — or his animal — eat while working so that he or it will not be hungry later and eat at the worker’s own expense. Conversely, the owner may desire that the worker or his animal partake of a lesser quality food or drink so that they not eat a large amount of the produce with which they are working.

In this context, “be able” and “not be able” mean “feel an appetite for” or “will not feel an appetite for.”

Bava Metzia 89a.

The intent is that eating other foods will make the worker desire to wash them down with juicy grapes.

Until the wine is removed from the vat, there is no obligation to tithe it (Sefer Meiras Einayim 337:15).

Bava Metzia 93a.

A worker is allowed to partake of produce only when performing activity with it, as stated in subsections 23-24. A watchman is not actively involved with the produce; he merely guards it.

Thus excluding dairy (and meat), i.e., foods that are not direct products of the earth.

See the commentary above to Hilchos Gezeilah U’Geneivah, note 1 above, for the distinction between the two prohibitions.

E.g., he gives it to his wife or his children, even when they are with him in the field (see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 337:17).

Sefer HaMitzvos (negative commandment 268) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 577) consider this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvos of the Torah.

Bava Metzia 91b. As stated in subsection 22, it is only “when you are placing produce into the vessels of the employer you may partake of it.” Since the worker was working with the one type of produce, he is not permitted to eat from the other.

Bava Metzia, ibid., questions what the ruling would be in such an instance and leaves the matter unresolved. Therefore, stringency is required.

I.e., the juice will not have flowed from the grapes to the extent that it is clearly visible.

I.e., working with the grapes and partaking of the grape juice.

He is permitted to partake of the grape juice because the obligation to tithe it does not begin until it is placed into barrels or jugs. See Rambam, Hilchos Maaser 3:14.

Bava Metzia 90a.

As stated in subsection 22, the prohibition applies to threshing and to all other tasks performed with produce that has been harvested.

Even when the non-Jew threshes his own grain and thus the Jew does not at all benefit from the muzzling of his ox, the act is forbidden. There is a difference of opinion regarding this matter among the later authorities. Rama, Yoreh Deah 297:4, maintains that if the non-Jew is acting for his own benefit, there is no prohibition in making such a statement to him. Sifsei Kohen 297:4 differs and maintains that it is forbidden. The Alter Rebbe follows the position of Sifsei Kohen, as he proceeds to explain.

If the non-Jew would muzzle the cow without the Jew’s knowledge or consent at the outset, no prohibition would be involved because the non-Jew is acting on his own volition and is therefore not bound by this commandment.

See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, sec. 307:35, which states: “Since [a Jew] tells [the non-Jew] to perform work with [the Jew’s] property, [the non-Jew] appears as [the Jew’s] agent, even if [the non-Jew’s] intent in performing the work is for his own sake.”

See ibid., 243:1, where the Alter Rebbe writes that this prohibition is Rabbinic in origin, instituted by the Sages so that people not regard the Torah’s prohibitions lightly and violate them by their own deeds.

Since the cow does not belong to the Jew, the non-Jew does not appear as his agent.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), the Alter Rebbe writes: See Bava Metzia 90b, which interprets the Torah’s prohibition as meaning “Do not thresh while the animal is muzzled,” i.e., the prohibition applies not to the act of muzzling, but to threshing with a muzzled animal.

The previous law states that a Jew working for a non-Jew is forbidden by Jewish law to muzzle an animal. This law emphasizes that although that prohibition applies, the benefit that a worker is entitled to when working for a Jewish employer is not given him when he works for a non-Jew.

The Alter Rebbe places the words “whether with produce that has already been reaped or with produce that is still attached” in parentheses. As stated by Shaar HaKollel, many of the rulings set off by parentheses in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch were matters that the Alter Rebbe had not fully resolved in his mind and felt the need to reconsider.

It is possible to hypothesize about the reason for his equivocation here as follows: As mentioned in the following note, there are some authorities who permit a Jew working with produce belonging to a non-Jew to partake of that produce. As indicated by the prooftext cited, this refers to produce growing in a field. The permission to partake of food that has already been reaped, by contrast, has its source in the prohibition to muzzle an ox. Permission to partake of such produce belonging to a non-Jewish employer cannot be derived from that source. Therefore the equation between produce that is attached and produce that has been reaped is questionable. Simplyput: The prohibition against partaking of a non-Jew’s attached produce is the subject of a difference of opinion, while the prohibition against partaking of his produce that has been harvested is unanimously accepted.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 6), the Alter Rebbe states that his ruling is based on the understanding of the Nimukei Yosef (gloss to Bava Metzia 52a in the Halachos of Rabbeinu Yitzchak Alfasi) and Sifsei Kohen 337:1, who maintain that partaking of the non-Jew’s produce would be considered stealing. The Alter Rebbe questions this position, noting that there are other authorities — including Rashi — who offer interpretations of Bava Metzia 87b that would permit a Jew to partake of produce belonging to a non-Jew with which he is working. Indeed, the standard published text of the Gemara supports such an interpretation.

Bava Metzia 89b.

This represents the Alter Rebbe’s addition to the wording of his source, which is Rambam, Hilchos Sechirus 13:4. For Rambam’s words could be interpreted as meaning that leniency is granted only when the cows do not thresh as they pass over the grain (Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 4, p. 1124ff).

I.e., it is considered as if he acted unintentionally, and a person is not held liable for prohibitions violated unintentionally. This explanation is somewhat problematic, because when one intentionally performs an act that will inevitably (p’sik reishah) cause a prohibition to be transgressed, he is held liable even if he had no intent to violate the prohibition. In this instance, although the person who causes the cows to pass over the field did not intend for them to thresh the grain, it is inevitable that the grain be threshed. Should he therefore not be held liable for muzzling his cows?

The resolution depends on a deeper understanding of the issues involved: When is a person who does something that inevitably leads to a violation of the law liable? When the activity he himself performs causes the violation. In this instance, the act that will inevitably result in the transgression of a prohibition does not involve muzzling (which constitutes the prohibition), but rather threshing. Threshing itself is permitted; the Torah merely tells us not to muzzle an animal while it is threshing. Since threshing itself is not prohibited, the concept of an inevitable activity does not apply, and the threshing is considered unintentional. Therefore the prohibition against muzzling is not violated (Likkutei Sichos, op. cit.).

In that source, the Rebbe notes that this is the concluding law in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, and — as was his practice when making a hadran (a discourse on the conclusion of a text of Torah Law) — shows a connection between this law and the laws cited at the beginning of that text.