Kedoshim: Genuine and True Love

Vayikra 19:18.

Toras Kohanim to Vayikra 19:18; Talmud Yerushalmi, Nedarim 9:4; Bereishis Rabbah 24:7. Note the teaching of ben Azzai (Toras Kohanim; Talmud Yerushalmi, loc. cit.; Bereishis Rabbah, loc. cit., with a slight change in wording), “ ‘This is the book of the generations of man’ (Bereishis 5:1) – this is an even more encompassing principle than the other.”

See the commentaries on the above sources and the explanation of their teachings according to Chassidus in Or HaTorah, Bereishis, Vol. 3, pp. 591-592. In that source, the Tzemach Tzedek explains that these commentaries interpret ben Azzai as emphasizing that all souls derive from one source. This brings about a more encompassing conception of unity – that there is a fundamental oneness joining all Jews together.

See Rivo; Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi; Sefer HaZikaron; Sifsei Chachamim, and other supercommentaries to Rashi, loc. cit.

Shabbos 31a. See Maharsha’s Chiddushei Aggados to that passage.

Bereishis 3:8, 24, et al.

Shelah, his Tractate Shavuos, p. 181a.

Hayom Yom, p. 24, entry 29 Shvat. See Imrei Binah, Shaar HaKerias Shema, sec. 53ff., et al., which identifies the term “the wine of the Torah” with the Torah’s mystical secrets.

The commentary of Maskil LeDavid to Rashi, which attempts to explain why Rashi cites Rabbi Akiva’s name requires much clarification. See footnote 54, below.

The Tzemach Tzedek’s notes to Likkutei Torah, Devarim, p. 53c. The Tzemach Tzedek said that shortly before his passing, regarding a question in Chassidus, the Alter Rebbe told him, “The resolution is straightforward, and the question is good.”

True, “Many of the Torah’s commandments are stated and repeated, many of them three or four times so that the transgressor incurs liability and is punished according to the number of the negative commandments applicable for that mitzvah” (Rashi, Shmos 34:23). Rashi also makes similar statements in his commentary on Vayikra 6:6, 11:3, 44, 23:31, et al. Nevertheless, there is a general principle, “Wherever it is possible to expound [upon a verse so that it teaches a new law,] we do so, and do not say that [the purpose of the verse is] to compound the number of prohibitions” (Pesachim 24b). Obviously, this principle applies with regard to the straightforward understanding of the Torah as well. See Rashi’s commentary on Shmos 23:19, 34:26, et al.

See a statement of this concept in halachic terms in Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah 243; Rambam, Hilchos Eivel 14:1, Sefer HaMitzvos, General Principle 2. Note the discussion in the notes of Rabbi Yehudah Yerucham Fishel Perlow to Sefer Ha­Mitzvos of Rav Saadia Gaon, positive commandment 119 (p. 142c ff.).

This pattern applies regarding the Torah’s commands, not only its description of events, for example, the Sanctuary and its sacred utensils and the order in which they were to be brought. See Rashi’s commentary on Vayikra 25:1, which emphasizes that all the mitzvos contain both general principles and particular elements.

This pattern has already been featured in the Torah, for example, Shmos 22:8 first mentions a general category – “any charge of misappropriation” – and then lists several particulars; a bull, a donkey, a lamb, and a garment.

The concept that the particular elements of a general principle are mentioned in close proximity to it is also evident in halachah; see Pesachim 6b and the sources mentioned there. Note Rashi’s commentary on Bereishis 2:8, which mentions that one of the 32 principles of Biblical exposition is, “[When] a general statement [is] followed by a specific act, the latter constitutes a specific [clarification] of the first [general statement].” (However, in that source, were Rashi not to explain the verse in that manner, the relevance of this general principle to the particulars mentioned later would not have been evident at all. Accordingly, this verse cannot serve as proof that a specific point should be in close proximity to the general statement.)

See Sefer Ha’Arachim-Chabad, Vol. 1, the beginning of erech ahavas HaShem, and the sources cited there, regarding the question: How is it possible to command the love of G‑d?*

The verse itself gives the reason and the path to fulfill the mitzvah (Devarim 6:5), “You shall love G‑d Your L‑rd” – by meditating on the fact that “G‑d is your L‑rd” and that He took us out of the land of Egypt. Note Rashi’s commentary on Shmos 20:2, that explains G‑d’s taking the Jews out of Egypt is reason for them to be eternally indebted to Him.

By contrast, in the present instance, the verse merely commands “Love your neighbor as yourself” without giving a reason or explanation.

There is a difference between this commandment and the prohibition (Vayikra 19:17), “Do not hate your brother in your heart,” or other similar ones, for they involve not having an emotion, hate, in one’s heart. Preventing negative feelings from arising is not as great a challenge as engendering positive ones. Note the statement (Sefer HaMaamarim 5699, p. 9) that it is relevant to speak of commanding one to feel the emotion of fear.

* Note HaTomim, edition 4, p. 45 (p. 188a in the collected printing), that states:

With regard to the love of G‑d, the Alter Rebbe** explains that the commandment is to meditate on concepts that motivate such love; then the love will come as a direct consequence and a product of the meditation. Logic leads to the conclusion that the same motif applies regarding the love of one’s fellow Jew. Such love will come about as a result of meditating carefully on the positive qualities possessed by the other Jew.

** See also the maamar entitled Lehavin Mitzvas HaAhavah, printed in the additions to Derech Mitzvosecha, and in the notes to that maamar, p. 408.

According to a straightforward understanding of the Torah, the question is not that problematic, for a fundamental element of the education of a child beginning his study of the Torah – and even prior to that age – is to love his parents and people as a whole, to love G‑d, and to love the Torah and its mitzvos.

On this verse, Rashi – in contrast to others (Rashbam, the sources cited immediately below and in footnote 41) – does not interpret “your neighbor “ as “your fellow in [the observance of] the Torah and its mitzvos,” thus excluding those who do not observe. Similarly, Rashi does not interpret the prohibition, “Do not hate your brother,” as referring to “your brother in [the observance of] the Torah and its mitzvos.” (See Yereim, sec. 39 – sec. 195 in Yereim HaShaleim; Tana D’bei Eliyahu Rabbah, the end of ch. 18, cited by Yalkut Shimoni and Or HaChayim to the verse, et al.) This is also evident from Rashi’s commentary on Devarim 13:9, taken from the Sifri to that verse, which implies that only one who entices a fellow Jew to worship false deities is excluded from those to whom the mitzvah “Love your neighbor as yourself” applies. See the notes of the Tzemach Tzedek to Tanya, ch. 32.

True, according to halachah,* in certain contexts, the interpretation of “Love your neighbor as yourself” is that the command applies only to “your fellow in [the observance of] the Torah and its mitzvos” (Sefer Mitzvos Gadol, positive commandments 9; Hagahos Maimonios, Hilchos Deos 6:3; see Rambam, Hilchos Eivel 14:1;** Yerei’im sec. 38 – sec. 224 in Yerei’im HaShaleim, et al.).” By contrast, it is permitted – or it is even a mitzvah – to hate a wicked person (Pesachim 113b).

However, later authorities (Maharam Shik, Taryag Mitzvos, mitzvah 244; the notes of Rabbi Yehudah Yerucham Fishel Perlow, loc. cit., p. 143d ff.) cite Sanhedrin 45a (note the sources cited there) that derive the obligation to execute a person in the most painless manner possible from the verse “Love your neighbor as yourself,” interpreting it to mean “Select an appealing [i.e., compassionate] means of execution for him.” This indicates that the obligation to love one’s fellow Jew includes even a wicked person, even one liable for execution. This is explicitly stated by Remoh (gloss to Sanhedrin 52b), “Whenever Scripture uses the term, rei’acha, the intent is a Jew, [any Jew,] even a wicked person.”*** As stated above, only one who entices a fellow Jew to worship false deities is explicitly excluded from those to whom the mitzvah “Love your neighbor as yourself” applies.

From the above, it is clear that the mitzvah to hate a wicked person is not because he was excluded from the scope of the mitzvah “Love your neighbor as yourself.” Instead, it is an independent commandment, derived by Pesachim, loc. cit., from the verse (Mishlei 8:13), “To fear G‑d is to hate evil.” This is also evident from Tanya, ch. 32, which states, “Even those whom it is a mitzvah to hate, it is also a mitzvah to love.”****

As a consequence of the teaching from Pesachim, loc. cit., the scope of the application of the mitzvah “Love your neighbor as yourself” is somewhat restricted. It applies in all its particulars only to “your fellow in [the observance of] the Torah and its mitzvos.” Perhaps the halachic authorities (Sefer Mitzvos Gadol, Yerei’im) who restricted the application of the mitzvah of loving one’s fellow Jew relied primarily on this verse – cited in Pesachim – to arrive at their decision. See footnote 41 below. This is not the place for further discussion of the matter.

* As explained on other occasions (see Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 9, p. 34, et al.), the interpretation of the verse according to its straightforward meaning and its application in Torah Law may differ.

** Note, however, that in the source where Rambam focuses directly on the mitzvah of loving one’s fellow Jew, Hilchos Deos 6:3, he writes that the mitzvah is “to love every member of the Jewish people as his own person” without making any distinctions. Similarly, when listing the mitzvos at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah, he states that the mitzvah applies to “all people who are members of the covenant,” without differentiation. Furthermore, Rambam does not state that it is a mitzvah to hate a wicked person in Hilchos Deos, the place where he discusses the commandment of loving one’s fellow Jew, but rather at the end of Hilchos Rotzeach. There is a well-known general principle that Rambam relies only on statements that he made beforehand in his text, but not on those he will make later in the text (Yad Malachi, Klallei Rambam, sec. 6). Hence, in the instance at hand, it cannot be said that in Hilchos Deos, Rambam is relying on his statements in Hilchos Rotzeach.

Similarly, in his Shulchan Aruch, the Alter Rebbe (Orach Chayim 156:5) states only, “It is a mitzvah incumbent on everyone to love every other individual as his own person.” He omits the exclusion (stated by Magen Avraham 156:2) that this applies specifically to “your fellow in [the observance of] the Torah and its mitzvos” and not to a wicked person. It is only in his Choshen Mishpat, Hilchos Ovrei Derachim, subsection 9, that the Alter Rebbe mentions that it is a mitzvah to hate a wicked person.

*** Note the second interpretation given by Remoh, loc. cit., “It is possible to interpret the term rei’acha as ra’im shebicha, ‘the wicked among you.’ ”

**** Note the commentary of Meiri (Yoma 75a) that states, “The hatred of another person should never prevent one from affording him all possible benefits, [as implied] by the verse, ‘Do not hate your brother in your heart.’ ” See also the notes of Rabbi Yehudah Yerucham Fishel Perlow, loc. cit., p. 142b.

Note that regarding the commandment (Shmos 20:14), “Do not desire,” Rashi refrained from commenting, implying that the command should be understood straightforwardly – that a person should control and restrict his natural desires. See the commentaries of Ibn Ezra and Rabbeinu Bachya to that verse that explain the command in this vein. See a footnote to the Rebbe’s communal letter of 1 Nissan, 5736 (included in the expanded printing of his Haggadah), which focuses on the meaning of this prohibition according to halachah.

Ramban, Vayikra 19:17; Paneiach Raza; Chizkuni; Maharik, Chidushim, and supercommentary on Rashi 19:18, et al.

These commentaries do not interpret the command, “Love your neighbor as yourself” straightforwardly. Instead, they understand its intent as applying only to performing actions, showing kindness to others and the like. See also Ibn Ezra, Rabboseinu Baalei HaTosafos (Hadar Zakeinim), Malbim, et al. to the verse in Vayikra. Maharsha’s Chiddushei Aggados, et al., to Shabbos, loc. cit.

However, the fact that Rashi does not comment on this matter indicates that he interprets the command, “Love your neighbor as yourself” straightforwardly, i.e., that it involves experiencing feelings of love. See, however, the main text below, which discusses the matter. That the commandment should be understood in a simple sense is also evident from a straightforward reading of Rambam’s wording in Sefer HaMitzvos (positive commandment 206) and Hilchos Deos, loc. cit., and the Alter Rebbe’s wording in his Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit., et al.

Ramban, Vayikra, loc. cit.

Vayikra 19:14.

Rashi, Vayikra 19:32, 25:17, 36, 43.

Note, however, that the sources where Rashi makes this comment speak about actions, where it is not clear that the person performing the act had good intentions. He does not make such a comment about verses commanding merely feeling. Indeed, the warning, “You shall fear your G‑d,” is not issued regarding the command that does not involve action, “Do not hate your brother in your heart.” See footnote 29 below.

Note the comments of Midrash Lekach Tov on Vayikra 19:18, “ ‘I am G‑d’ – With regard to every matter dependent on a person’s heart [the Torah] states, ‘I am G‑d.’ ” Rashi, however, does not make such a statement. (See also Rashi’s commentary on the words “I am G‑d” in Shmos 6:2, et al., where he interprets that phrase differently.) Note also Rashi’s commentary on Vayikra 19:36, s.v. asher hotzeisi, where, as in his commentary on Shmos 6:2, he interprets the phrase “I am G‑d” differently than Lekach Tov.

See Rashi’s commentary on the nearby verse, Vayikra 19:19, “Observe My statutes – and they are the following….” See also the first interpretation of Chizkuni of the command, “Love your neighbor as yourself”: “If you act in this manner, you will love him.” Both instances reflect how a general command introduces particular elements.

Vayikra 19:16-18.

Ibid. 19:11.

Rashi, Vayikra 19:14. See also the sources cited in footnote 22.

When the violation of a prohibition involves actions that include deceiving another person, an additional explicit warning, “You shall fear your G‑d” is therefore understandable. When, however, a commandment exclusively involves the feelings in one’s heart, the need for vigilance is obvious. Why must it be stated?

Bava Metzia 62a.

See also Ramban, loc. cit., and Maharsha, loc. cit.; Tosafos, s.v. beror, Sanhedrin 45a; Beer Mayim Chayim to Rashi, Vayikra 19:18.

See the commentaries of Ibn Ezra and Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi, Bereishis 44:18.

See Rashi’s commentary on Bereishis 1:26, s.v. kidmuseinu; loc. cit. 13:10; et al., where he interprets the function of the chof in this manner.

It must, however, be noted that Rabbi Akiva’s approach in this regard has a specific connection to the case at hand, as will be explained in the main text.

Bereishis 44:18.

Ibid. 41:44.

Ibid. 41:40.

See the marginal note in Shelah, p. 61b, which draws an equivalence between the love of one’s fellow Jew and love of G‑d but explains the difference between them: The ultimate expression of the love of G‑d is to sacrifice one’s life for the sanctification of His name. By contrast, one is not obligated to sacrifice one’s life for the love of one’s neighbor. On the contrary, “Your life takes precedence….” Rather, the litmus test of loving one’s neighbor is whether one can overcome feelings of jealousy and petty hatred.

Avos 3:14.

Tanya, ch. 32.

Note that Rabbi Akiva (as quoted in Avos D’Rabbi Nassan, the end of ch. 16, according to the version cited in Machzor Vitri - composed by a student of Rashi - in his commentary on Avos 2:11) follows the approach that “Love your neighbor as yourself” applies only to one “whose conduct conforms to the desired conduct of ‘your people.’ ” However, first, that interpretation follows the understanding of the command only according to halachah, and, as mentioned, the approach according to a straightforward reading of Scripture can differ. Furthermore, in the above source, that directive follows the charge, “Hate the heretics and those who seek to sway people from their faith,” indicating that the intent is not to exclude ordinary sinners but rather those specific individuals. A similar understanding is reflected in the commentary of Or HaChayim on this verse.

Note Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 238), which, regarding the mitzvah to hate the wicked, cites the verse (Tehillim 139:21), “Those who hate You, I will hate,” referring to heretics and nonbelievers, as stated in Minchas Chinuch to that source. See footnote 17 above and footnotes 75 and 76 below.

Bava Basra 10a.

The Roman provincial governor of Eretz Yisrael in Rabbi Akiva’s era.

See Maharsha’s Chiddushei Aggados to that passage. Note also Rashba (Vol. 1, responsum 194), who, in response to a question regarding the halachic status of an apostate, cites the passage (Kiddushin 36a):

“ ‘You are the children to the L‑rd your G‑d’: when you conduct yourselves like children, you are called children [but when] you do not act like children you are not called children.” These are the words of Rabbi Yehudah.

Rabbi Meir said, “Regardless, you are [still] called children.”

Rashba rules according to Rabbi Meir – that regardless of their conduct, G‑d considers the Jews as His children. Furthermore, from Sifri (Devarim 32:5), it appears that Rabbi Yehudah conceded and accepted Rabbi Meir’s view. Note also the statements of Rabbi Akiva, Shabbos 128a (and the sources cited there) and Bava Kama 90b regarding the esteem with which every Jew should be regarded. See also Sanhedrin 110b, which mentions Rabbi Akiva’s piety in that generally, he would point out the virtues of the Jewish people.

Chagigah 6b; see the sources mentioned there.

Note Rashi’s commentary on Vayikra 25:1 and the supercommentaries there. Note, however, the exposition in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 17, p. 280ff., which states that Rashi’s intent is to explain that the verse in that source applies also – or perhaps only according to Rabbi Yishmael, who differs with Rabbi Akiva. See the lengthy explanation in that sichah.

Subsection 1.

Shabbos 31a.

Indeed, according to Ben Azzai (see the sources mentioned in footnote 2), there is another general principle of greater import.

Moreover, the Hebrew expression uses two terms, kol and kulah, to emphasize that ahavas Yisrael encompasses the entire Torah. Note Turei Zahav (Orach Chayim 582:3) which focuses on the expression in our Rosh HaShanah prayers, “Rule over the entire world”– where two terms, kol and kulo and, are also used in the Hebrew wording of the phrase. The Turei Zahav explains that sometimes we speak of a whole, although we mean only the majority. Repeating the expressions emphasizes that His sovereignty encompasses the world in its totality. Similarly, the emphasis here is that ahavas Yisrael encompasses the Torah in its totality.

I.e., according to the straightforward meaning of the Torah and the Talmud, it is only according to the inner, mystic dimension of the Torah that it can be said that ahavas Yisrael is the entire Torah, as explained by the Alter Rebbe in Tanya, ch. 32, and by the Tzemach Tzedek in Derech Mitzvosecha, Mitzvas Ahavas Yisrael and Or HaTorah, Shoftim, p. 838ff., et al. (See also Sefer Ha’Arachim Chabad, Vol. 1, Erech Ahavas Yisrael, sec. 8, and the sources mentioned there.) These sources are quoted in Kuntres Ahavas Yisrael. See also the Maharal’s text Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Ahavas Reya, ch. 1, et al.

See the commentaries of the Raavad and the Korban Aharon to Toras Kohanim on this verse, et al.

The Talmud, by definition, is less directly concerned with the straightforward meaning of the Biblical text and also focuses on other modes of exposition and interpretation.

There are glosses to Rashi (Nachlas Yaakov, quoted by the Sifsei Chachamim, Maskil LeDavid) which maintain that this is also the intent in Rashi’s commentary on the Torah. That, however, is highly questionable.

This clarifies why Rashi brings this only as a second interpretation. Hillel was speaking to a potential convert. Since a convert must accept the observance of all 613 mitzvos, it was necessary to say that Hillel was referring to the entire Torah, not only to the majority of mitzvos, those that are “between man and man.”

Nevertheless, the first interpretation is also not sufficient, because it is also problematic. (First, the interpretation of “your friend” is not literal. According to that interpretation, Hillel should have said “the Holy One, blessed be He” or the like. Why did he have to speak in allegory?) Moreover, according to this interpretation, it is not understood why Hillel uses negative terminology, “What is hateful... do not do to your friend,” instead of using a positive expression, e.g., “What is desirable to you, do unto your friend.” According to the interpretation that “your friend” refers to another person, by contrast, this can be understood, as per the Chiddushei Aggados of the Maharsha to Shabbos, loc. cit, who explains that this only refers to refraining from improper or hurtful actions.

I.e., it relates to those mitzvos that concern our relationship with our fellowman. These are the majority of – but not all – the mitzvos.

Eruvin 13b. See the sources cited there.

Avos 1:12.

Indeed, we see that the Baal Shem Tov would seek to help others with regard to their material situation without making these favors conditional on any spiritual improvement on the part of the recipient. See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 1, p. 261.

See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 2, p. 316; Vol. 15, p. 198.

This explanation also clarifies the Alter Rebbe’s choice of wording, “He does not forfeit....” Seemingly, he should have stated: “He still receives the reward....” Since, however, the intent of “loving the created beings” is “drawing them close to the Torah,” one might think that if one is not successful in that purpose, one in fact forfeits the reward for the mitzvah. See footnote 78.

See also Derech Mitzvosecha, loc. cit.; Sefer HaErachim, loc. cit., Kuntres Ahavas Yisrael, loc. cit.]

Tanya, ch. 32.

Quoted in Sefer Hasichos 5700, p. 117. See Kuntres Ahavas Yisrael, the notes to p. 7. See footnote 17 above, and footnotes 75 and 76 below.

Bereishis Rabbah 1:4; Tanna D’Bei Eliyahu Rabbah, towards the end of ch. 14.

The quote to follow is how the passage is cited in Chassidus (Likkutei Torah, Devarim, pp. 46a, 59a; Shir HaShirim, p. 16d, et al.). See Zohar, Vol. III, p. 73a.

I.e., from the Zohar, it would appear that the Jews need the Torah to connect to G‑d.

Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim, loc. cit; the series of maamarim entitled BeShaah SheHikdimu 5672, Vol. I, ch. 76; Vol. III, p. 1403ff; the maamar entitled Az Yashir, 5700, ch. 3ff., et al.

Sanhedrin 44a.

See the elaboration regarding this in the series of maamarim entitled BeShaah SheHikdimu 5672, Vol. 3, p. 1252, et al.

Tanya, the end of ch. 39; the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Hilchos Talmud Torah 4:3.

I.e., the fact that a person who transgressed returns to Torah observance reveals that he possesses an inner connection to G‑d that indeed transcends the Torah. The revelation of this inner connection motivates his return to observance because that connection can find expression solely through the Torah.

Therefore, even the potential for teshuvah (which transcends the Torah, as is evident from the fact that it can compensate for a deficiency in the observance of the Torah) is revealed through the Torah. (See the series of maamarim entitled BeShaah SheHikdimu 5672, Vol. 3, p. 1408; the series of maamarim entitled Yom Tov Shel Rosh HaShanah 5666, p. 235, et al.)

With the exception of the “heretics and apostates” (Tanya, loc. cit.). (See also footnote 76.) See also Sefer HaArachim Chabad, loc. cit., sec. 5 and the sources mentioned there, which describes how one’s love can embrace even such individuals.

Note Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 2, p. 300, which explains that the Maggid’s statement cited above (see footnote 64) that one must love an “absolutely wicked man in the same way as [one loves] an absolutely righteous man” is not a complete expression of ahavas Yisrael. The statement implies that one differentiates between a righteous man and a wicked man, and with regard to love stemming from one’s essence, such distinctions do not exist.

Tehillim 139:22, as interpreted by Shabbos 116a; see Tanya, loc. cit.

The explanation in sec. 11 clarifies why the Alter Rebbe quotes this concept in Tanya, loc. cit. (although even from a straightforward perspective, this idea is necessary to complete the explanation of the concept). True, it appears to contradict the concepts stated previously: a) that ahavas Yisrael stems from the fundamental connection every Jew’s soul shares with G‑d - and therefore, with all other Jews - and b) that a Jew, even though he sins, remains a Jew.

This apparent contradiction can be resolved as follows: Tanya, loc. cit., highlights the importance of loving people who are so “distant from G‑d’s Torah” that they are described as “created beings,” i.e., that is their sole redeeming characteristic. Regardless of their spiritual level, it is necessary to “draw them close to the Torah.” As will be explained, by loving them, it possible to “draw them close to the Torah.”

After stating these concepts, the Alter Rebbe mentions that this motif will not be effective when relating to those who created barriers separating themselves from the Torah, because the revelation of the soul’s qualities comes about through the Torah (as will be explained in sec. 11). Now, the heretics and apostates have completely severed their connection to the Torah, to the extent that “they have no portion in the G‑d of Israel” (Tanya, loc. cit.). In their present situation, it is impossible for the qualities of their soul to be expressed – in contrast to people who are merely “distant from G‑d’s Torah and His service.” Hence, it is impossible to express ahavas Yisrael that stems from the soul to heretics and apostates in a revealed manner.

On this basis, we can appreciate why in Tanya, loc. cit., the Alter Rebbe also quotes the words (of Hillel’s statement), “loving peace.” For “draw[ing] them close to the Torah” establishes peace between him and the people to whom he is reaching out. His efforts endow these people with the potential to enable “the soul to attain primacy over the body.” As explained in Tanya, loc. cit., such an approach is fundamental to experiencing genuine love for another person. It is only when one focuses on the soul – and, therefore, realizes that he and the other share the same spiritual essence – that one can love [him] as oneself.

Nevertheless, even if one is not successful in “draw[ing] them close to the Torah,” the others still possess (in a hidden manner, at least) the essential quality of the Jewish people, hence, “he does not forfeit the reward for the mitzvah of loving one’s fellow [Jew].”

Based on Sichas Shabbos Parshas Chayei Sarah, 5737, it can be explained that after the Alter Rebbe revealed this concept (i.e., “he does not forfeit...”), the consequence of expressing ahavas Yisrael is greater than merely not forfeiting reward. For indeed, such a person receives a great reward; by fulfilling the Alter Rebbe’s command, he binds himself with the Alter Rebbe whose command he is following.

Saying “he does not forfeit” (– as opposed to saying “he is granted a reward” –) is relevant only when it is taken for granted, as it were, that one already was worthy of a reward (see Berachos 10b; Nazir 15a).

Yoma 82a; Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, ch. 5:2.

See Sichas Shabbos Parshas Yisro, 5740, which explains that the connection between being “of the students of Aharon” and “draw[ing] them close to the Torah” resembles the convergence between “kindness and truth” (Tehillim 85:11) which our Sages (Shmos Rabbah 5:10) associate with the meeting of Aharon (kindness) and Moshe (Torah and truth). It is implied that even the kindness personified by Aharon (the level of “abundant kindness”) – which transcends the Spiritual Cosmos and motivates an unbounded measure of love to be extended to people at large – must correlate with the truth of the Torah (personified by Moshe).

On this basis, we can also explain the connection between the statements of Hillel and Rabbi Akiva to their authors. Hillel was characterized by the attribute of kindness [Zohar, Vol. III (Raya Mehemna), p. 245a; the introduction to Tanya, et al]. Therefore, he emphasized the importance of ahavas Yisrael as it transcends (the limitations of) the Torah.

Rabbi Akiva, by contrast, was identified with the Torah (see Menachos 29b; Sanhedrin 86a) and was one of the disciples of the House of Shammai (Rashi, Bava Metzia 37b; S’dei Chemed, Klallim, Maareches Ayin, Klal 87, and the sources mentioned there) who were characterized by the attribute of truth (see Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim, p. 48c). Hence, he emphasized ahavas Yisrael as being “one of the great general principles in the Torah.”