Avadim - Chapter 3

This includes a servant sold by the court, one who sells himself, and one who sells himself to a gentile, as the Rambam continues to explain.

According to Jewish law, marriage is a two-phased process including erusin, consecration, when the man sanctifies a woman as his wife, and nisuin, when the marriage is consummated and the couple begin their lives together. A woman who is merely arusah, consecrated, is excluded because the proof-text speaks of the wife being “together with him.” When a couple are me’urasin, they are not living together.

When a man’s brother dies childless, the man is a obligated to marry his widow. This rite is called yibbum, and the man obligated to marry the widow is called a yavam. Until the marriage takes place, the widow is described as a shomeret yavam, “awaiting her yavam.” Although the servant is obligated to marry her, since they are not “together,” the master is not obligated to provide for the woman’s sustenance.

The Hebrew term issurei Lavin also has the implication that the prohibition is not punishable by execution, karet, or death by the hand of heaven. In the latter instances, the marriage is not binding at all, and the woman is not considered the man’s wife (Hilchot Ishut 1:5). In the instance at hand, by contrast, the marriage is binding. Examples of such forbidden relationships are the marriage of a priest and a divorcee, and the marriage of a widow to a High Priest.

Marriages between relatives that are not forbidden by Scriptural Law, but that are prohibited by Rabbinic decree. See Hilchot Ishut 1:6, which mentions 20 such relationships.

The Kessef Mishneh asks: Since shniyot are not forbidden by Scriptural Law, how can they be included in the ruling mandated by this proof-text. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Scriptural ruling refers to a woman who is fit to live with her husband. Since Rabbinic Law forbids such a woman from living with her husband, she is not fit to live with him.

And since an association is made between a servant who sells himself and one sold by the court, we apply the concept stated with regard to one to the other.

To derive benefit from her work, from her property, from ownerless objects she finds and to inherit her; see Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 12.

He is not, however, obligated to do so (Mechilta).

Chapter 2, Halachah 12.

Against his will.

The children she bears are also considered Canaanite slaves and become the property of the master, as Exodus 21:4 states: “The woman and her children will be her master’s.”

See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 12:11.

Who is alive at present. If he had a wife, but she died, he may not be given a Canaanite maid-servant (Or Sameach).

The bracketed additions are made on the basis of the commentary of Kin’at Eliyahu, who explains that, as the Rambam states in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 12:11, the prohibition against relations with a Canaanite maid-servant is only Rabbinic in origin. Thus according to Scriptural Law (which includes the Oral Tradition), a Hebrew servant may marry a Canaanite maid-servant. The prohibition is that – according to Scriptural Law – a master may not compel a servant who does not have a wife to marry a Canaanite maid-servant. Accorcling to Rabbinic Law, any Jew – except a Jewish servant who has a wife and children – is forbidden to many a Canaanite maid-servant.
[Note, however Moreh Nevuchim, Vol. III, Chapter 49, which to imply appears that the Rambam considers the prohibition against relations with a Canaanite maid-servant Scriptural in origin.]

Although this law is part of the Oral Tradition and thus must be fulfilled whether or not we understand its motive, there is an easily understood logical basis for this law. When a servant has a Jewish wife and children, he will not feel such a powerful attraction to his Canaanite wife and children. Hence, he will not desire to remain in servitude. If, however, he does not have a Jewish wife, he will be very attached to his Canaanite wife and children and may desire to remain in servitude.

Who as a free man may not marry a convert or a Canaanite slave who was released and granted her freedom.

And the servant must fulfill all the obligations a husband has vis-a-vis his wife.

I.e., during his servitude she is together with him.

The license to treat Canaanite slaves in this manner is stated in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 14:19.

The servant’s relationship with the maid-servant must parallel the relationship between a man and his wife.

See the following halachot, which discuss this issue. As Exodus 21:5-6 states, if a Hebrew servant desires to remain with his Canaanite wife, he may perpetuate his servitude until the Jubilee year. But no longer.

And a person may strike a colleague to prevent him from violating a Torah prohibition (Bava Kama 28a).

Kiddushin 14b derives this from the exegesis of Exodus 21:6, which speaks about a servant sold by the court and states: “His master shall pierce his ear.” The Talmud interprets this as an exclusion: “‘His ear’ and not the ear of a servant who sells himself.”

The matter is left to his choice.

See the following halachah.

Although ordinarily a Hebrew servant serves the son as stated in Chapter 2 Halachah 12.

From the Rambam’s wording, we can conclude that once a servant’s ear is pierced, he cannot redeem himself with money, nor may he be freed with a deed of release (Mishneh LiMelech).

As the Rambam mentions in Halachah 9, the body of the ear is pierced. As the Rambam states (Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 3:7). such a blemish would disqualify a priest from serving in the Temple.

The Mishneh LiMelech questions why the Rambam cites this verse, which does not appear to speak about a servant whose ear was pierced, and not Leviticus 25:10: “Each person should return to his family,” which refer to such a servant.

Since Exodus 21:6 uses the term Elohim, one can infer that it refers to judges who possess semichah, the ordination granted teacher to student, in a chain extending back to Moses our teacher.
The Mechilta states that since it was the court that sold him, the court should be consulted before his servitude is prolonged.

“I love my master, my wife and my children; I shall not go free” (Ibid.:5).

If they are detached, the piercing is unacceptable.

And not in the soft flesh around it. This is reflected by the law mentioned in the previous halachah, that piercing a priest’s ear makes him unfit for service. For if the hole was made only in the soft flesh, it would not disqualify a priest from service.

Kiddushin 22b states that the awl need not touch the door itself.

In Exodus 21:6.

For otherwise it is not considered a doorpost.

It is not appropriate for this to be performed by an agent (Mechilta).

For that would indicate that the person is not paying attention to either of them, because of a lack of concern.

The Hebrew haamar yaamar where the root amar, “say,” is repeated, indicates that the servant must make his statements twice.

According to the Rambam, the servant’s statement must be made and repeated on the last day of his servitude. An accounting must be made of how much each moment of time is worth, and he should make his statements just before the last p’rutah’s worth of time.

At which time they would no longer be of substance.

The term “household” implies a wife and children.

Since the servant is sick, it is obviously not “good for him” together with his master.

There is an opinion in Kiddushin 22a that states that “with you” implies that they are both equal – in this instance, that they share a state of health. Although this opinion is not accepted by all authorities, and the Talmud does not reach a final decision with regard to the matter, the Rambam rules leniently, forbidding the servitude to be prolonged (Kessef Mishneh).

See Halachah 6.

See Halachah 3.

I.e., to a fellow Jew. See Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 3. The Mishneh LiMelech states that the Rambam’s wording implies that a person may not sell himself for less than six years. The Ritbah rules that one may.

Although Kiddushin 15a derives this concept through Biblical exegesis, the commentaries have explained the motivating rationale. When a person is sold for stealing, it is hoped that living in the purchaser’s home will influence him to improve his character and begin a new phase of life. In order to help him do this, his master gives him a severance gift so that he will have the financial means at his disposal to begin anew without feeling the need to steal to gain resources.

And this obviously cannot apply with regard to a Hebrew maid-servant. The Sifre derives the same concept using the words “If the servant will say,” commenting “the servant,” and not “the maid-servant.”

Seemingly, “this” refers to piercing the servant’s ear, the subject of the clause that immediately precedes these words.

As mentioned in the preceding verses (Deuteronomy 15:14-15).

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 233) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 481) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 196) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 482) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. I.e., even if the master did not fulfill the commandment at the outset and sent his servant away empty-handed, he can – and is required to – remedy that error by giving him a severance gift afterwards.

I.e., either animals or produce.

Even though money can lead to an increase if invested successfully, that increase will not come on its own accord.

If during the period of his servitude, his master’s household has been blessed abundantly, the severance gift given to the servant should be increased.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 4.

Since the servant fled, he is not being sent away by the master.

The Mishneh LiMelech interprets this to mean that even after the severance gift becomes the servant’s property, it cannot be expropriated from his possession.

I.e., while serving as a maid-servant.

Ketubot 46b-47a states that an ownerless object a girl finds is granted to her father because of eivah, “lest strife arise” - i.e., our Sages feared that if her father were not given these objects, he would be upset and would withhold his daughter’s sustenance. Some maintain that the same rationale applies with regard to her severance gift. Others maintain that the father is granted her severance gift as he is granted all other income she generates.

Or reaches the girl’s possession, for she does not possess an independent financial capacity (Kessef Mishneh).

Through Biblical exegesis, Ketubot 43a derives the concept that the rights that the Torah granted a father to his daughter’s earnings and other moneys paid on her behalf are his alone and are not transferred to his sons. See also Hilchot Ishut 19:10.