Avadim - Chapter 6

From that point onward, he attains his own financial capacity and is no longer considered his master’s property. If his master desires to retract, he no longer has the capacity.

I.e., even without his knowledge. As stated above, it is taken for granted that a servant will desire his freedom.

The Lechem Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s ruling (which echoes that of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi) is based on the concept that the word “Give” indicates that the master does not desire the release to take effect until the deed is given.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that Rashi and Tosafot in their commentaries on Gittin 13a offer a slightly different interpretation, explaining that the intent is that the master did not give the agent a bill of release. Instead, he instructed the agent to compose a bill and give it to the slave. According to these views [as stated by the Tur and the Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 267:76)], if the master gave the agent a bill of release, the slave is released even if he told him to give it to him.

Since the master died before the bill of release reached the slave’s hands, it is no longer effective. For the slave has already become the property of the master’s heirs.

See the commentary of the Bayit Chadash (Yoreh De’ah 267) which states that there is a doubt whether or not these expressions are effective. Therefore, although the master may not compel the slave to perform work, the slave is not considered a free man and may not marry into the Jewish community.

Gittin 40b explains that in contrast to the expressions mentioned in the first clause, this expression indicates merely a promise to free the slave. It does not bring about the slave’s release.

We do not accept the slave’s statements as proof that he has not been released, because it is possible that, without the slave’s knowing, the master had another person acquire the bill of release for him as stated in Halachah 1. Therefore, the slave is considered a free man. Rabbenu Asher maintains that not only is he forbidden to enter into relations with a Canaanite maid-servant, he is even granted the right to marry into the Jewish people. Rabbenu Nissim does not accept the latter point and requires him to produce a bill of release before he marries a Jewish woman. See Siftei Cohen, Yoreh De’ah 267:96.

This is a principle applied in many areas of Jewish business law. Although the owner also has made a statement – that the slave is no longer his property – priority is given to the statement made by the slave. Perhaps the owner considered the option of freeing the slave, and although he did not actually do so, thought that he did. Alternatively, the slave was previously the property of the owner, and thus he is considered his property until it is proven otherwise (Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:12).
The Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 267:75) states that if the master does not admit having erred, he is compelled to free him.

She is not freed, and any children she bears are considered slaves.

I.e., they cannot compel her to perform labor.

See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:5.

See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 9:12, which with regard to a similar situation states: “She should be given only the type of work she desires from all the types of work that are known [to be performed] by servants in that locale.”
The Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 267:77) states that this maid-servant may not be sold to another person. The Siftei Cohen 267:98 states that there are authorities who maintain that if the maid-servant will not be satisfied unless she is freed, she must be freed.

Each of the six matters are discussed at length in the following halachot. See Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 579), which adds another point, stating that a slave’s bill of release should be written on twelve lines like a woman’s bill of divorce.

The term kuti refers to the Samaritans, gentiles who were brought by the King of Assyria to live in Eretz Yisrael after the Ten Tribes were exiled (See II Kings 17:24.) Afterwards, they converted to Judaism. They were not, however, precise in their observance and hence were always considered different from the Jewish people as a whole (see Bava Kama 38b). See the following halachah, which states that in the present era, they are placed in an entirely different category.

According to some authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah, this clause is included in the previous halachah.

Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 27:1.

Jewish witnesses are required for these documents since the transfer of these documents brings about a transition in ritual status. In contrast to other legal documents that record transactions concluded by other kinyanim, these documents are not merely records of a transactions; they are the means that bring about the transition.
Similarly, as the Rambam writes in Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh, loc. cit., acknowledgments of debts, presents, compromises, waivers and other financial matters that are concluded by the transfer of the legal document are also unacceptable unless they are signed by Jewish witnesses.

This law is dependent on the principle stated later on, that witnesses to a bill of divorce and a bill of release must sign in each other’s presence. With regard to other matters, we do not accept the signature of the kuti, because we fear that he might not be an acceptable witness. With regard to these documents, by contrast, since the kuti signs in the presence of the Jew, we do not suspect that the Jew would have signed unless he knew that the kuti was an acceptable witness (Turei Zahav 267:19).

Chulin 6a relates that an image of a dove that they worshipped was found in their sanctuary, and from that time onward they were considered outright gentiles.

The students of Tzadok and Boethus who broke away from Jewish observance and denied the validity of the Oral Law.
In a related issue, the Siftei Cohen 267:59 states that the Karaites in the present age are not acceptable as witnesses in any context. Contemporary authorities place the same restrictions on Conservative and Reform Jews today.

I.e., with her in mind. See Hilchot Gerushin 1:3 and 3:1-4.

The Tosefta, Gittin 2:9 explains that the use of the term law, “to her,” in both verses, established an equation (gezerah shavah) between the two instances. The Turei Zahav 267:20 explains that even without establishing an equation between the two, the same exegesis can be applied in both instances.

I.e., the substance on which the bill of divorce is written must be able to be given directly to the woman to be divorced. There may not be a need to detach the substance from the ground or from any other substance to which it is connected. See Hilchot Gerushin 1:6.

In this instance, the Turei Zahav 267:21 states that a gezerah shavah is necessary to teach the concept.

See Hilchot Gerushin 9:29, which states that this law was instituted as a precaution lest a person instruct a group of many people to sign a bill of divorce and the bill be given to the woman after it was signed by only two witnesses. We fear that she will not know about the stipulation and think that the bill of divorce is acceptable.

See Hilchot Gerushin, Chapter 7, which explains that when a person brings a bill of divorce from one place to another in the diaspora, or from the diaspora to Eretz Yisrael, he must state that the bill of divorce was written and signed in his presence. Gittin 2a explains that although we assume that a legal document is acceptable, after it is presented, one of the principals may protest and claim that the document is a forgery. In that instance, the authenticity of the signatures of the witnesses must be verified. Since the bill of divorce was brought from the diaspora, we fear that witnesses to verify the signatures will not be found. Therefore, our Sages ordained that if the agent bringing the bill of divorce states that it was written and signed in his presence, it is considered as if the signatures were verified.

See Hilchot Gerushin 7:6, which states that once the agent makes these statements, the husband’s protests alone are not sufficient to cast aspersions on the authenticity of the legal document. To disqualify it, he must prove that the witnesses’ signatures are forgeries.

I.e., she does not have to say that the bill of divorce was written and signed in her presence, as stated in Hilchot Gerushin 7:24.

We accept the woman’s statements because of the principle of migo – i.e., had she desired to lie, she could have told a more encompassing falsehood. Instead of saying that the bill of divorce was written and signed in her presence, she could have claimed that the all divorce proceedings had been completed. Had she made such statements, her word would have been accepted, because she had the bill of divorce in her possession.

Hilchot Gerushin 7:23 states that this law applies when the husband gives the bill of divorce to the woman on the condition that she act as an agent and take it to another locale, where the divorce would be completed. Once she makes such statements her word is accepted. The Ra’avad protests the Rambam’s statements here and in Hilchot Gerushin. In his gloss on Hilchot Gerushin 7:24, the Maggid Mishneh resolves the Rambam’s ruling.

As Hilchot Gerushin 6:6 states, this excludes a gentile, a slave, a deaf-mute, a mentally or emotionally incapable person and a minor.

For the slave does not possess an independent financial capacity. When he accepts something, he is accepting it on behalf of his master. And so, when the slave receiving the bill of release belongs to another person, it is as if the bill were given to his master for the sake of the slave being freed. This is acceptable, as stated in Halachah 1. But when the slave receiving the bill of release belongs to the same master as the slave being freed, the bill of release has never left the master’s domain, and therefore the slave is not freed.

I.e., because she is not freed, she is not consecrated, since a person may not consecrate a Canaanite maid-servant. If, however, he tells her only: “Be consecrated,” we assume that he freed her previously, and his consecration is binding (Kessef Mishneh).