Edut - Chapter 12

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 16:4; 12:2.

Note the distinctions between the two in Hilchot Sh’vuot, Chapter 1.

I.e., in a situation where we assume that he was unaware that he was transgressing as the Rambam continues to explain.

See Hilchot Shabbat 10:1.

Sanhedrin 26b and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 34:4) give another example: people who bury the dead on the first day of a festival. Although it is a transgression, they are under the impression that they are performing a mitzvah.

See Chapter 10, Halachah 4.

For the admission of the person himself is equivalent to the testimony of 100 witnesses (Bava Metzia 3a). The intent is not that his word is accepted as the testimony of witnesses, but that his admission of liability obligates him.

Just as a person’s testimony is not accepted with regard to his relatives, his testimony is not accepted with regard to himself. He is “his own relative” (Sanhedrin 9b). Nevertheless, such a person should not be appointed as a witness as an initial and preferred option [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 34:28)].

A transgression that would disqualify him as a witness, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 4.

And that is also a transgression which disqualifies a person as a witness (ibid.).

We follow the principle palginon diburo, “we divide his words.” We accept the portion of his statements which say that so-and-so lent money at interest; we do not accept the portion which states that the person testifying was the recipient of the loan.

In which instance, he would not be disqualified as a witness.

In which instance, were two witnesses to testify that this transpired, he would be disqualified as a witness.

A person’s testimony is ordinarily not accepted with regard to his wife, for she is considered as his own person (Chapter 13, Halachah 3).

Following the principle of palginin diburo.

In this instance, the ox is also executed, for the reason the Rambam continues to explain.

Hence we do not require the principle palginon diburo.
The Ra’avad interprets Sanhedrin 10a, the source for the Rambam’s ruling, as implying that since we do not employ the principle palginin diburo, the person’s testimony is not accepted at all. The rationale is that since the ox is his property, he is considered an involved party and his testimony is not accepted (see Chapter 15). Since we do not accept his testimony with regard to the ox, we also do not accept it with regard to the sodomizer.

As stated in the following halachah.

For the defendant can claim: “I will pay the money when you prove that he is an acceptable witness.” We do not say: “Let us follow the assumption that the witness, like all Jews, is acceptable unless it is proven otherwise,” for the defendant can say: “The money is presently in my possession. Let it remain there unless it is proven that I owe it to the other person.”

For a person disqualified as a witness is also disqualified as a judge (see Chapter 16, Halachah 4).

The Siftei Cohen 34:33 states that his word is accepted even with regard to matters which he observed before he repented.

Our translation follows the text suggested by the Kessef Mishneh. He interprets this as referring to a situation where the person does not receive lashes, because a warning was not given.
The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 34:72 and the Siftei Cohen 34:34 emphasize that the transgressor is not reinstated as a witness until testimony was given in court that he repented. Until that time, legal documents he signed are invalid. Although there are opinions which differ, this perspective is borne out by the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:26).

Hilchot Sanhedrin 17:7 states: “Whenever a person sins and is lashed, he returns to his [original state of] acceptability, as [implied by Deuteronomy 25:3]: ‘And your brother will be degraded before your eyes.’ Once he is lashed, he is ‘your brother.’”
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo notes that there are texts of the Mishneh Torah that read: “Whenever a person was obligated to receive lashes, he is considered as an acceptable witness, when he receives lashes in court.” Rav Yosef Karo states that he prefers the version used above because: a) it also deals with situations where the person does not actually receive lashes, and b) it implies that if a person receives lashes, but does not repent, he is not reinstated as a witness. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 34:29), however, he does not mention repentance in this clause.

I.e., perform actions which indicate that he sincerely regrets his previous conduct, as the Rambam illustrates in the following halachot.

See the notes to Chapter 10, Halachah 4.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 34:29) states that repentance is required only when a person frequently transgressed. If, however, he transgressed only once and returned the money on his own volition, that is sufficient.

And not because of the compulsion of the court. If the court compels them, we have no proof that they themselves regretted their actions (Kessef Mishneh).
The promissory notes must be torn up, because the obligation to pay interest is stated in the promissory note itself. In such an instance, the borrower is still required to return the principal. Nevertheless, the loan is given the status of a debt supported by a verbal commitment alone. As such, the creditor cannot expropriate property sold to others.

Although it is permitted - indeed, according to Scriptural Law, even a mitzvah – to lend to gentiles at interest, as stated in Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 5:1-2, an exception is made in this instance, because of the tendency that was already ingrained in the person’s character.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 34:29) adds that the lender must also return the money which he took at interest. If he does not know from whom he took the money, he should give it to the community to use for the public benefit.

This phrase is added on the basis of the authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah.

For we fear that this will lead to them playing for money again.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 34:31) quotes opinions that state that the gamblers must also return any money that they won before they are reinstated as acceptable witnesses.

Where there is no question of theft involved. In this instance, as well, the Ramah (ibid.) quotes opinions that require that any doves stolen be returned.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 34:33) emphasizes that the severe measures the Rambam requires are necessary before the person is reinstated only when the person derived financial benefit from committing a transgression. If, however, a person violates a transgression that does not bring him financial gain, it is sufficient for him to make a public admission of his guilt and promise never to transgress again.

Making such a statement in a court that is familiar with him is not possible, for they will never require him to take an oath.

I.e., check to make sure that there are no lesions in the lungs or other factors that render the animal as trefe; alternatively, check the knife which he uses to slaughter the animal.

If the butcher does not sell the meat, but merely slaughters an animal for another person and tells him that it is kosher when it in fact is non-kosher, he is also disqualified as a witness. Nevertheless, since he did not garner any financial gain from his transgression, he need not undertake all the measures the Rambam continues to describe. Instead, it is sufficient for him merely to repent (Kessef Mishneh).

Since he sells non-kosher meat to others, we can assume that he partakes of it himself. This is a prohibition punishable by lashes. Hence he is disqualified as a witness (Kessef Mishneh).
Selling the non-kosher meat itself - even though it involves the violation of the prohibition “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind” - does not disqualify the butcher as a witness. The rationale is that this prohibition is not punishable by lashes (ibid.).

It is necessary for him to clothe and robe himself in black to humble his heart and cause him to regret having caused others to sin (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 34:84).