To’en veNit’an - Chapter 3

Unless he admits owing a p’rutah, he has not admitted owing a significant amount of money, as reflected in Halachah 3.

Based on Kiddushin 11 b, the rationale for this requirement can be explained as follows: Exodus 22:6, which serves as the source for the obligation to take an oath, states: “When a man will give a colleague money or utensils....” The term kessef, “money,” or more precisely “silver,” refers to a me’ah, as the Rambam explains in the following halachah. And since the verse mentions “utensils,” using the plural - i.e., at least two - we can assume that it also refers to at least two measures of money.
There is a difference of opinion among the Sages (Sh’vu’ot 39b) whether the entire claim must be at least two me’in, or that the amount that the defendant denies owing must be that value. The Rambam - and the other authorities - follow the opinion of Rav. See Halachah 3.

See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Bechorot 8:7). The Rambam maintains that he received the tradition from his father, who in turn received it from his father and grandfather, in a train of tradition extending back to the early scholars that weights of silver are measured in barley corns.
Shiurei Torah defines a p’rutah as being equivalent to 1140 of a gram of pure silver.

I.e., without being mixed together with other metals. Kin’at Eliyahu questions why the Rambam use the word naki for “pure” in the first clause and mezukak in the second.

The term “holy shekel” is found in Exodus 30:13 and other verses. It refers to the measure designated by God to be used for ritual purposes.

See Hilchot Ishut 10:8; Hilchot Chovel UMazik 3:10. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), the Rambam states that this also is a tradition that he received from his father, who in turn received it from his teachers.

Although as explained above, the concept is derived from the exegesis of a verse, the Rambam maintains that all concepts derived through the techniques of Biblical exegesis are midivrei sofrim, “from the words of the Sages.” (See Yad Malachi, K’lalei HaRambam, sec. 7.)

This interpretation is found in the Commentary on Sh’vu’ot, loc. cit. authored by Rav Yosef MiGash, the Rambam’s teacher.

The Kessef Mishneh explains the reasoning of the Rambam’s teachers as follows: They maintain that the defendant must deny two dinarim from the dinarim used in Jerusalem in that era. Two dinarim are equivalent to ten me’in, which in turn are equivalent to 160 barley corns. That figure must then be divided by eight, for the coins were only one eighth silver, yielding a sum of 20. From that, a half a barley corn, the equivalent of a p’rutah, is deducted, yielding a sum of 19 and 112.

For anything less than a p’rutah is not financially significant.

This halachah introduces the distinction to be clarified in the following halachah. Utensils are placed in a different category than money. Produce, by contrast, is considered in terms of its monetary worth.

Because the sum that he denied is worth less than the minimum amount stated in Halachah 1.

This is the version of the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah. Other versions state 65 nuts; and still others, 100. The need for emendation is obvious, because if there is a question whether one nut is worth a p’rutah, four or five will not be worth two me’in.
Based on the Mishneh LaMelech, the Rambam La’Am explains the preciseness of the version that states 65 nuts. A me’ah is equivalent to 32 p’rutot. Thus, if there are 65 nuts and each nut is worth a p’rutah, the defendant will be acknowledging a debt of a p’rutah and denying a claim of 64 p’rutot - i.e., 2 me’in.

Because the admission he makes is not significant enough.

That the debt the defendant admits must be worth a p’rutah; and the amount he denies, two me’in.

I.e., acknowledging or denying any utensil is equivalent to acknowledging or denying the “money” mentioned in the verse cited above. See Sh’vu’ot 40b.
The Rambam’s statements are rooted in the rulings of Rav Hai Gaon. It must be emphasized that there are many Rishonim (e.g., the Ramban and Rabbenu Asher) who differ with the Rambam and maintain that although a utensil does not have to be worth two me’in, it must be worth at least a p’rutah. For anything less than a p’rutah is not financially significant. Although the Tur mentions the other view, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 88:3) mentions only the Rambam’s position, and the Ramah does not differ. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 88:5 and the Siftei Cohen 88:2, however, mention the other views.
The Rambam’s position itself, however, warrants some explanation. In Hilchot Ishut 4:19, he states that if a person consecrates a woman with a utensil, for the consecration to be binding the utensil must be worth at least a p’rutah. In Hilchot Me’ilah, however, he speaks of transferring the holiness associated with money to a utensil “of any value,” which could be interpreted as meaning “worth even less than a p’rutah.” It appears that the Rambam did not have a universal principle to be applied concerning the matter, and judged each issue within its own context.

For then his denial is significant. His admission is considered significant, because the admission of any utensil is significant.

Because the sum that he denied was not of significance.

For then his admission is significant. His denial is considered significant, because the denial of any utensil is significant.

As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 1.

The Maggid Mishneh raises a question with regard to the law when one witness testifies that a person accepted an entrusted object, noting that some Rishonim hold him liable for an oath and others do not. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo cites Hilchot Gezeilah 4:13 as an indication that the Rambam would hold the person liable for an oath in such a situation. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 75:23) he rules accordingly.

See also Hilchot Sechirut 2:8.

This refers to an unpaid watchman. Similar principles apply with regard to a paid watchman who claims that an article was destroyed by forces beyond his control.

Here too, the Rambam’s ruling is the subject of a difference of opinion among the Rabbis. The Rambam’s ruling reflects the position of his teacher, the Ri MiGash. Other authorities, the Ramban, the Rashba, and Rabbenu Asher differ. The rationale for their difference of opinion can be explained as follows: The obligation to take an oath when one admits a portion of a claim (modeh b’miktzat) is derived based on the principle of eiruv parshiyot - i.e., that the passages in the Torah referring to a defendant’s obligations and a watchman’s obligations are interwoven. The Rambam maintains that the interconnection teaches us only that a modeh b’miktzat is required to take an oath. It does not teach us anything about the nature of the oath. The other authorities, by contrast, understand the interrelation to be more encompassing. Therefore, they maintain that all the factors pertaining to modeh b’miktzat should also be applied to watchmen.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 88:5 quotes the Rambam’s view. The Tur and the Ramah, by contrast, favor the other perspective. Significantly, in a later chapter, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 295:3) quotes the Rambam’s opinion, but states that “a majority of authorities differ with him,” which is interpreted as implying that the other view should be followed.

I.e., they cannot expropriate money that is worth less than a p’rutah. As explained in the notes on the following halachah, the Rambam’s statement is somewhat problematic.

This term refers to Rav Yosef MiGash and his teacher, Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi.

In his Commentary on Sh’vu’ot 40b, Rav Yosef MiGash explains his position. As mentioned above, he maintains that the concept of eiruv parshiyot teaches us only that a person who is modeh b’miktzat is required to take an oath. Therefore, the particulars defining the oath such a person must take are not relevant to other oaths.

It appears that the intent is guardians, sharecroppers and the like, who are obligated to take an oath according to Rabbinic law to clear themselves of all suspicion. It does not apply to watchmen, for as stated in the previous halachah, the Rambam does not require a claim to be equivalent to two me’in in such a situation.

The Rambam’s statements have aroused the attention of the commentaries, because:
a) they appear to contradict his statements at the conclusion of the previous halachah;
b) since the Rambam accepts his teachers’ basic premise - that the interrelation established by eruv parshiyot is not all-encompassing - why does he differentiate between one instance and another?
c) with regard to an employee who claims that he was not paid, in Hilchot Sechirut 11:9, the Rambam writes:
Even when his wage is only a p’rutah, if the owner claims to have paid him already, he should collect it only after taking an oath. Similarly, whenever a person takes an oath and collects his due, even if the claim is only one p’rutah, he may not collect it unless he takes an oath resembling one required by Scriptural Law.
This appears to be a direct contradiction to the Rambam’s statements here.
In their glosses on Hilchot Sechirot, the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh attempt to resolve the contradiction. The Maggid Mishneh explains that in Hilchot Sechirut, the Rambam made an exception, distinguishing between a worker and other claimants, because the worker is dependent on his wage.
The Kessef Mishneh states that although the Rambam differed with his masters, that difference was theoretical. He was not actually willing to rule against their opinion in an actual court decision.
The Siftei Cohen 89:2 explains the apparent contradiction between this and the previous halachah as follows. At the outset, for the plaintiff to be given the opportunity to take an oath, there must be a difference of two me’in between the two claims. Nevertheless, if when the time comes for him to actually take the oath, the plaintiff reduces his claim and takes an oath claiming only a p’rutah, his oath is accepted.
The Ra’avad argues in favor of the position of the Rambam’s teachers, explaining that the comparison the Rambam makes is faulty. A person taking an oath when a claim is lodged against him is taking the oath to defend his property. Hence, if the claim is not for a significant amount, he is not required to take the oath. A person taking an oath to collect his claim is, by contrast, trying to collect money that is due him. For him, the amount is significant, even if it is merely a p’rutah. With regard to a hired worker, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 89:2) rules according to the perspective of the Rambam’s teachers.

I.e., he is not obligated to take a Scriptural oath. He is obligated to take a sh’vu’at hesset, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 3.

The Rabbis explain the derivation of this concept as follows: The source for the obligation to take an oath is Exodus 22:8: “which he said: ‘This is it.’” Such wording implies that the defendant is acknowledging the same article that the plaintiff is claiming.

A measure equal to half a kor.

As stated in Halachah 10, the defendant is not even liable to pay for the barley he admits to owe. See the notes on that halachah for an explanation of the rationale.

The fact that he gave the coins for safe-keeping - and not as a loan - is significant. When a loan is given, the emphasis is on the value of the coins, not on the coins themselves. When, however, an object is given for safe-keeping, it is possible to explain that the person is concerned with the coins themselves, not merely their value.
See the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 88:9-10), which makes this distinction, but which also quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Nissim, who does not.

A p’rutah is made from copper. Hence, it is not considered to be of the same kind as a silver me’ah.

Even when these coins are made with the same metals, since the plaintiff made it clear that he was demanding payment of the currency of one country, the fact that the defendant admitted owing the currency of another country is not significant.

Because a large lamp and a small lamp are considered two different types of articles.

This does not necessarily mean changing the shape of the lamp. Its weight can be reduced by making the metal thinner.

The commentaries on Sh’vu’ot 43a, the source for this halachah, explain that this is speaking about an instance where the ends of the belt have distinct features. Thus, cutting the belt means altering it, so that it is a different article. If, however, cutting the belt means merely shortening it, then an oath is required.

For a curtain is usually a uniform entity with no distinction between its parts.

He is, however, required to take a sh’vu’at hesset, because he is denying the claim of the wheat.

This admission negates the admission made by the defendant.
After quoting the Rambam’s explanation, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 88:12) states: Therefore, even if witnesses testify that the defendant owes him the barley, the defendant is not required to pay. For by denying the existence of the obligation, the plaintiff nullified all claims to that money. (The Siftei Cohen 88:16, however, does not accept this conclusion.)
There are, however, other authorities (Rabbenu Asher as quoted by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch), who maintain that the defendant is freed from liability only when the plaintiff claims: “I lent you wheat on this date, at this hour,” and the defendant says: “It was barley.” Otherwise, the fact that a person demands payment for only one obligation is not proof that he nullifies others.

The rationale for this decision is that since the produce is in the plaintiff’s possession, if he says: “I did not nullify my claim to the barley,” there is no way to disprove this assertion (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 88:25).
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 88:12) state that a distinction should be made whether the plaintiff seized possession of the barley before the case was heard in court (in which instance the Rambam’s ruling is accepted) or afterwards (in which instance the plaintiff is required to return the barley). They maintain that once the plaintiff has nullified his claim to the barley, he should not be allowed to maintain possession.

For he is admitting a portion of a claim. Thus, the oath is Scriptural in origin (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 88:21).

I.e., if the judges think that he answered early so that his response would not be of the same type as the claim, and he would thus not be required to take an oath.

For the wheat, as if he were denying a portion of the claim.

Since the plaintiff did not have the chance to complete his claim, the defendant is not considered to be a person who admitted a portion of the claim. This applies even if immediately afterwards, the plaintiff stated: “I was also planning to lodge a claim for barley.”
From the Rambam’s wording, it would appear that he is freed from the obligation to take the oath. Nothing is mentioned with regard to whether or not he is liable to make restitution for the barley. The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 88) states that the defendant is not liable for the barley. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 88:14) appears to quote that opinion, but there is some debate, because the wording of his text is not clear. See the Siftei Cohen 88:28. The Shulchan Aruch continues, stating that if, however, the plaintiff says: “Certainly, you owe me barley, but now, I am not concerned with them. I am asking for my wheat,” the plaintiff is liable to make restitution for the barley.

The Maggid Mishneh, the Tur and the Ramah quote the Remo, who maintains that in this instance as well, if the judges feel that the defendant rushed to answer to prevent the plaintiff from completing his claim, they can require him to take the oath.

Hence, he must pay for the wheat he admits and take a sh’vu’at hesset with regard to the barley [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 88:15)].

From the plaintiff’s wording, it appears that he is concerned only with the oil and not with the jugs.

Thus, it is as if the plaintiff is claiming wheat and the defendant is admitting barley.

Thus, it is as if the plaintiff is claiming wheat and barley, and the defendant is admitting barley.

100 dinarim.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this law does not have a direct Talmudic source. Hence, there is room for differences of opinion among the Rabbis. The Ra’avad and the Rashba differ with the Rambam, citing several sources (e.g., Bava Metzia 97b) in support for their perspective. Other authorities (e.g., Rav Zerachiyah HaLevi, Sefer HaTerumot) argue in support of the Rambam’s approach. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 88:19) accepts the Rambam’s ruling, and the later authorities follow suit.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s wording implies that the defendant is bringing the utensil that is claimed with him to the court. Only then does the principle of Heilech (see the following note) apply. The Ramban and the Rashba maintain that as long as the entrusted article is in the watchman’s domain, the principle of Heilech applies. For wherever the article is, it belongs to its owner. The Kessef Mishneh clarifies that there is not necessarily a difference of opinion in theory between the Rambam and those authorities. See also the notes on Chapter 4, Halachah 3.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachah 3, when a person admits a claim, but says: Heilech, “Here it is,” he is not liable at all. Since the defendant is denying the financial claim entirely and there is no other claim against him, he is not considered to be denying a portion of the claim.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 87:4) clarify that this applies even when the utensil he is offering is equivalent to the utensil that was lost.

He must make this inclusion because of the principle of gilgul sh’vu’ah, as explained in Chapter 1, Halachah 12.

I.e., he is obligated to take the Scriptural oath required of a person admitting a portion of a claim with regard to the maneh. The rationale is that since he admits that the utensil he is returning is not the plaintiff's, he is admitting that he owes him a utensil. Since the plaintiff is claiming that he owes him money and a utensil, and he is admitting only the utensil, he is liable to take an oath. This resembles a situation where the plaintiff demands wheat and barley, and the defendant acknowledges only a debt of wheat.