Issurei Biah - Chapter 18

The term literally means “a promiscuous woman.” Halachically, however, it has a specific meaning as the Rambam continues to explain. This concept is relevant because a priest is forbidden to marry a zonah as mentioned at the beginning of the previous chapter.

Even if she is a virgin, and even if she converts (Halachah 3).

Even against her will. It is the fact of the relations, not her intent, that causes her to be placed in this category. See Halachot 5-6.

This applies even with regard to a prohibition that stems from a positive commandment, as mentioned in Halachah 3.

A child born from a relationship forbidden to a priest, as mentioned in Chapter 19, Halachot 5-6.

There is no prohibition against a challal marrying any Jewish woman, even the daughter of a priest (see Chapter 19, Halachah 11).

She may even marry a High Priest (if she engaged in anal intercourse with an animal), as stated in Chapter 17, Halachah 14.

As stated in Hilchot Ishut 1 :4.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, offering a more lenient view, explaining that although a woman who enters into relations with any of the above individuals is forbidden to marry into the priesthood, these relations do not cause her to be considered as a zonah and she and a priest are not punished by lashes if they engage in relations. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 6:8) quotes the Rambam’s view.

At that age, even if she had engaged in relations, her hymen would regenerate and she would be considered as a virgin (Ketubot 11 b). Nevertheless, she is not considered as a native-born Jewess. The Ra’avad rules that such a woman is not considered as a zonah. Nevertheless, she is forbidden to marry into the priesthood, based on the interpretation of Ezekiel 44:22 advanced by Kiddushin 78a which states that a priest must marry only from “the seed of the House of Israel.” Note the discussion of this difference of opinion by the Maggid Mishneh. See also Chapter 19, Halachah 12, which states that as long as converts marry among each other, their descendants are forbidden to marry into the priesthood.

See Chapter 12, Halachot 22-23, which defines this term and the prohibition against such a man marrying a native-born Jewess.

See Chapter 15 which describes the prohibition of such a man marrying a native-born Jewess.

See Chapter 12, Halachot 18-21, which describes the prohibition of such converts marrying a native-born Jewess.

See Chapter 16 which describes the prohibition of such a man marrying a native-born Jewess.

Leviticus 22:12 states “When the daughter of a priest is [possessed] by a foreigner, she may not partake of the terumah of holiness.” Yevamot 68a states: “Since she engaged in relations with someone who is forbidden to her, she is disqualified.”

Since she is forbidden to marry anyone other than her yevam relations with any other man cause her to be considered as a zonah.

The term aylonit refers to a woman who does not have female physical characteristics. Her breasts do not protrude, she stiffens during sexual relations, and her lower abdomen does not resemble that of a woman. She is considered incapable of giving birth (Hilchot Ishut 2:4-6).

These refer to distant relatives whom the Rabbis forbade as safeguards to Scriptural prohibitions. See Hilchot Ishut 1:6 for a list of these prohibitions.

See Hilchot Yibbum 1:12-13 which explains that once a woman is obligated to undergo chalitzah, there is no Scriptural prohibition against engaging in relations with her or her relatives. Nevertheless, our Sages instituted these prohibitions as safeguards.

Chapter 19, Halachah 16.

We are translating the term heara; see Chapter 1, Halachah 10.

For below these ages, any sexual contact in which these individuals engage is not significant, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachot 13-14.

I.e., if the woman’s husband dies after the adulterous relations without divorcing her, she may not marry a priest. Alternatively, as the Rambam continues to explain in the subsequent halachot, if she is the wife of the priest, she may not remain married to him.

As the Rambam implies, the prohibition indicated by this verse is not explicitly referring to a woman married to a priest. Instead, halachically (see Hilchot Gerushin 11:14), it is interpreted as referring to all married women who are defiled by adultery. The wife of an Israelite who was raped is an exception, but not the wife of a priest.
The commentaries question the exactness of the Rambam’s statements here, because in · this instance two separate prohibitions - the prohibition against relations with one’s defiled wife and the prohibition against a priest engaging in relations with a zonah - are involved. See the Maggid Mishneh for a discussion of the issue. See also Chapter 1, Halachah 22.

See Hilchot Ishut 24:19.

I.e., despite the fact that she is not held responsible for the adulterous relations, they create a spiritual blemish that prevents her from marrying a priest.

For the adulterous relations were carried out against her will.

After her husband dies.

Testimony is not considered binding unless it is made by two witnesses. Thus the testimony of one witness is not of consequence. Similarly, a person’s testimony cannot be used against himself. Hence, the woman’s own testimony is not of consequence.
There is one instance where the testimony of one witness is significant. When the husband issued a sotah warning to his wife. See Hilchot Ishut 24:18).

And seeks to be released from her husband so that she may engage in relations with him.

And thus he believes that his wife committed adultery.

For since he believes either his wife or the witness, he will be consenting to a transgression each time he enters into relations with her. Accordingly, he has a moral and spiritual obligation to divorce her (Maggid Mishneh to Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.)

The Heit Shmuel 6:25 states that the Rambam’s ruling applies only as an initial and preferred option. After the fact, if she marries a priest, they may remain husband and wife unless he believes her statements.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam, explaining that since the woman’s statements were rejected, they are considered of no consequence afterwards. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling and it is accepted as law by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 6:13).
The Ra’avad’s rationale is that if the woman is able to provide an satisfactory explanation why she originally stated that she was forbidden, her word is accepted, as is the case with regard to other similar situations. The Maggid Mishneh does not accept this logic. See Chelkat Mechokek 6:12 and Beit Shmuel 6:26 which discuss this issue.

In contrast to an Israelite, as the Rambam continues to explain.

The husband’s word is accepted as stated in Hilchot Ishut 11 :8-15. The rationale is that we operate on the presumption that a man will not take on the expense and trouble of making a wedding and then forfeit it because of a spurious claim.

Since the doubt involves a Scriptural prohibition, we rule stringently.

For if the relations took place afterwards, even if she was raped, she is forbidden to her husband as a zonah.

And when there are two doubts involved, even when a Scriptural prohibition is concerned, we rule leniently.

See Halachah 7.

Although a minor who willfully commits adultery is not punished, she is forbidden to her husband (Chapter 3, Halachah 2).

Since she was consecrated before the age of three, even if she had engaged in relations beforehand, her hymen would have regenerated. Thus there is only one doubt involved.

A formal warning delivered in the presence of witnesses not to enter into privacy with a specific man (Hilchot Sotah 1:1).

I.e., if her first husband dies without divorcing her.

Drinking the waters would have tested her virtue. Since she did not undergo this test, the matter is unresolved and hence she is forbidden to a priest.

See Hilchot Sotah 2:1, 3:2 which imply that the refusal to drink the waters is tantamount to an admission of guilt.

In such an instance, the woman is forbidden to her original husband, but he must pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Hilchot Sotah 2:1).

Hilchot Sotah 1:14 states that if even one witness testifies that he saw the woman commit adultery after receiving the sotah warning, she becomes forbidden to her husband.

Hilchot Sotah 1:10 states that, when a husband is unable to supervise his wife’s moral behavior, the court may issue such a warning on his behalf. In such an instance, however,. the woman is not compelled to drink the sotah waters.

Hilchot Sotah 2:2 lists fifteen women who are not given the option of drinking the sotah waters.

I.e., neither a mamzer, nor a gentile, nor another individual who would disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood.

This represents the legal abstract. Our Sages, however, applied stringencies as indicated by the following halachah.

This factor is necessary to allow for us to apply the principle: "Whenever an entity is separated, it is considered as having been separated from the majority." When, as stated in Halachah 15, the relations occur in a place where an entity is kevua, in its fixed place, we do not follow the majority.

Compare to Chapter 15, Halachah 11, which states that when the lineage of the child is involved, the woman’s word is accepted even when the majority of the men are not acceptable. The rationale for the difference is that with regard to the child, there is no alternative. If the child is not deemed acceptable, he or she will not be able to marry within the Jewish people. If, however, the woman’s word is not accepted, she will still be able to marry anyone other than a priest (Maggid Mishneh).

I.e., instead of requiring a simple majority as is the usual standard.

This ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 6:17). That source, however, also cites the view of the Tur and other Rishonim which maintains that if she states that the person with whom she engaged in relations are acceptable and the majority of the people are acceptable, she may marry into the priesthood as an initial option. The Beit Shmuel 6:31 also cites a third, more lenient view.

After the fact, we rely on the halachic abstract stated in the previous halachah. This applies even if most of the people are unacceptable (Beit Shmuel 6:32).

I.e., persons who would disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood.

The Kessef Mishneh explains the Rambam’s ruling as follows: When the woman goes to the unacceptable man for relations, he is considered as in his established place and hence, the doubt is considered equally balanced. Even when the unacceptable man comes to the woman for relations - in which instance, he has been separated from his natural place, and hence the principles of probability should apply - we rule stringently. This is a safeguard, lest one rule leniently when the woman goes to the man.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 6) rules more leniently, maintaining that if the man comes to the woman, we follow the principles of probability. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 6:18) mentions both views without stating which one should be followed.

And after the fact, we rely on her word.

In these two instances, we assume that she lacks the intellectual sophistication to know the status of the man with whom she engaged in relations.

In all instances, the initial and preferred option is for her not to marry into the priesthood (Maggid Mishneh). A child born from these relations is considered a mamzer of questionable status, as stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 12.

Since a question of Scriptural Law which cannot be clarified is involved, we rule stringently.

In such an instance, we are not concerned with the doubt because of the high probability that the man was acceptable.

The minimum age from which time onward sexual relations are significant.

As the Rambam proceeds to explain, since the prohibition is of Rabbinic origin, we do not follow the Scriptural requirements applying to witnesses. Therefore although ordinarily the testimony of two acceptable witnesses is required, in this instance, we accept the testimony of only one witness and moreover, accept testimony from witnesses - women, servants, and relatives - who would ordinarily be disqualified.

There is a difference of opinion among the commentaries whether the testimony of a woman’s son or daughter is acceptable. If they mention the matter in the course of conversation, their word is accepted, as evident from the following Halachah. If, however, a son or a daughter deliver testimony on their mother’s behalf, most authorities maintain that the testimony is not accepted (see Chelkat Mechokek 7: I; Beit Shmuel 7:3).

Even though one could argue that each one is lying on the other’s behalf.

Whenever there is a question whether or not a Scriptural prohibition applies, we rule stringently. This principle, however, is a point of Rabbinic Law. According to Scriptural Law, since the prohibition is not definitely established, one need not observe it.

A minor is not acceptable as a witness. Nevertheless, if he makes statements in the course of his conversation which indicate that a woman - his mother or any other woman - was not molested by her captors, those statements can serve as evidence to grant the woman license to marry a priest. The rationale is that these statements are considered to reflect the truth. We suspect that the child is telling us a representative account of what happened. Hence, since the prohibition was instituted only because of doubt, such statements are sufficient to allay our suspicions. With regard to the principle of accepting statements made in the course of conversation, see Hilchot Gerushin, Chapter 13, and commentaries.

Because the implication is that his mother was not molested.

Or if he makes the statements in the course of conversation (Maggid Mishneh; Beit Shmuel 7:4). The Rama (Even HaEzer 7:2), however, mentions opinions that grant leniency when he makes such statements in the course of conversation.

The rationale is based on the principle: “A person may not give testimony on his own behalf’ [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 7:2)].

For we fear that the maid-servant may lie to cover up for her mistress.

For we do not assume that she will know that these statements may be used to advance the cause of her mistress.

We suspect that he desired to marry her and therefore testified that she was not defiled even though he did not have definite information to that effect. Although we enforce this stringency with regard to the priest himself, we accept his testimony with regard to others and allow her to marry another priest (Chelkat Mechokek 7:6, Beit Shmuel 7:7).

For other persons might come and testify that she was defiled in which instance, he would be forced to divorce her. Hence were he not sure that the matter was true, he would not risk forfeiting his money (Ketubot 36b).

We would forbid her from marrying a priest only because of her own statements and in those very statements, she maintains that she is pure.

For the testimony of one witness is not halachically significant. Based on Rashi (Ketubot 23b), the Beit Shmuel 7:8 states that this applies even if the witness testifies that the woman was defiled.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this applies even if the witness who testified that she was defiled testified first. Although one might think that once the first witness testifies, her status would be established as forbidden, our Sages ruled leniently with regard to a woman taken captive.

Had the witnesses made their statements first, the woman would not have been granted this license. Nevertheless, once she is given permission to marry into the priesthood, that permission is not rescinded unless there are witnesses that she was defiled.

I.e., watchmen who will observe her and prevent her from being raped by her captors. Although she did not enjoy this protection beforehand, we grant it to her at present.

For testimony delivered by two witnesses establishes a halachic reality which must be reckoned with.

The Chelkat Mechokek 7:9 and the Beit Shmuel 7:12 state that even if the witness came after she was given license to marry into the priesthood, but before she actually married, his testimony is of no consequence and the license is not rescinded. This applies even if witnesses had also come and testified that she had been held captive.

The Chelkat Mechokek 7:11 quotes the Ritbah who maintains that this ruling applies even if the rumor was substantiated in court. As long as there is not actually testimony, her status remains unchanged.

As is his right until she reaches maturity [Hilchot Ishut 3:11 (see also 9:10)].

And she is forbidden to marry into the priesthood.

For his word is accepted only as long as the matter is in his hands (see Kiddushin 64a).

Since he has the right to consecrate her and effect her divorce, his word is accepted with regard to her status.

The Beit Shmuel 7:15 explains that we do not accept his word based on the principle of miggo. To explain: one might think that since the father’s word would be accepted were he to claim that he consecrated her and had her divorced, we accept his word if he claims that she was taken captive, for had he desired to lie, he could have claimed that she was divorced. We do not follow that argument, because the statement that she was taken captive involves a more encompassing prohibition, causing her to be forbidden to partake of terumah as well as being forbidden to marry a priest.

I.e., the prohibition was instituted because we suspect that she was defiled. The Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 7) states that, based on the Rambam’s statements, if there are witnesses that the woman was defiled, this leniency is not granted.

And see that the couple do not engage in intimacy.

This ruling (as continued in the following three halachot) reflects the Rambam’s interpretation of Ketubot 27b. There are several other interpretations of that passage. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 7:10) quotes the Rambam’s view, but also that of dissenting authorities. See also Hilchot Ma‘achalot Assurot 12:24 which states a ruling dependent on the same passage.

See Halachah 17.

Even if the woman admits that she did not escape or hide, her word is accepted, based on the principle of miggo. As stated in the following halachah, had she desired to lie, instead of saying merely that she was not molested, she could have claimed to have escaped or have hidden.

See the Chelkat Mechokek 7:15 which states that the Rambam’s words imply that the woman must come to court and make these statements to be granted license to marry into the priesthood. He also mentions Rabbenu Nissim’s view that does not require this measure, but instead permits all women in these situations to marry into the priesthood automatically.

As mentioned above, there are opinions that differ and maintain that even when the battalion is from another country, the women are forbidden.

The Kessef Mishneh maintains that even when the conquering army is from another country, if they remain in the city for a longer period, the women are forbidden to marry into the priesthood. We suspect that since there was no immediate pressure to flee, the soldiers may have raped the local women.

As are any women taken captive by gentiles as stated above.

Since our Sages forbade women taken captive, that prohibition is universally enforced, regardless of the length of time the women were in captivity (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., we do not suspect that she was raped, because the gentiles will fear to rape her lest they be forced to forfeit the money owed them [Ramah (Even HaEzer 7:11)]. These laws apply not only to jails, but instances when women are held captive by men for other reasons.

I.e., we fear that she was raped by her jailers.

If, however, the husband is an Israelite, there is no prohibition. We do not fear that the woman would try to save her life by seducing her jailers or accepting their advances. Were that to be the case, the relations would be considered voluntary and thus she would be prohibited to her husband.
The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 7:11). The Rama quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher and other Ashkenazic authorities who maintain that a woman would be forbidden to even an Israelite husband for the reasons stated above. He does, however, mention more lenient views.

The commentaries question if these laws apply with regard to contemporary prison conditions when it is less likely for the prison staff to ravage women held under their jurisdiction.

Halachah 17.