Shofar, Sukkah, vLulav - Chapter Eight

The etrog is described as ירפ ץע רדח (the fruit of the beautiful tree). Sukkah 31a explains that an analogy is established among the various species, and all of them must be “beautiful.” Fruit or branches that are dried out do not fit the latter description.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 645:5, 646:7) defines “drying out” as losing all its green and fading to a whitish color. The Ramah mentions an even more lenient opinion.

לזג—armed robbery or the like

הכננ—petty theft and the like. Though in other areas there are differences between these two categories of theft, in this context the same laws apply.
In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sukkah 3: 1 ), the Rambam explains that any of the species which are stolen may not be used for the mitzvah, because a sin may not serve as the medium with which a mitzvah will be performed )הרצמ האבה(. הריבעב (See also Hilchot Chametz U’matzah 6:7; Hilchot Issurei Mizbe’ach 5:7, 5:9.)
Sukkah 29b-30a mentions this reason, but also a second explanation: because, as stated in Halachah 10, on the first day of the festival a person must own the four species he uses for the mitzvah. (See the commentary on Halachah 9 for a further discussion of this matter.)

According to the first reason, the owner’s despair over the recovery of his article has no effect on the thiefs potential to use it for a mitzvah. Even according to the second opinion, the despair over recovering the article is not sufficient to allow the thief to use it, as is obvious from Hilchot Gezeilah 2:1, where the Rambam writes:
A stolen article whose form has not changed ... even though its owner has despaired of its recovery ... must be returned to its owner.
Thus, the article is not considered to belong to the thief, and he may not use it to fulfill the mitzvah. However, if the thief performed a deed which changed the appearance of the lulav or any of the other species, he is considered to have acquired it and may fulfill the mitzvah with it. Nevertheless, he should not recite a blessing before performing the mitzvah with such a lulav (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 649:1).

a tree which is worshiped as a deity. lt is also forbidden to be used for the mitzvah, on the basis of the principle that a sin may not serve as the medium with which a mitzvah will be performed הדצמ( האכה )הריכעכ (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, ibid.).

The commentaries on Sukkah 31b explain that this refers to an ashera that entered a Jew›s possession before it was nullified, or an ashera that was worshiped by a Jew. In these instances, the nullification of the ashera will not cause it to be pe ו:mitted for use; rather, it must be totally destroyed. Hence, it is considered to have no size at all, and, therefore, may not be used for the mitzvah (Maggid Mishneh). (See also the Commentary on Chapter 1, Halachah 3.)
Alternatively, since the ashera itself was worshiped, it may no longer be used for a mitzvah. A parallel can be found in Hilchot Tzitzit 1: 11, which relates that the wool of a sheep that was worshiped may not be used for tzitzit, although that wool does not become prohibited.

All the property of an apostate city must be destroyed. Therefore, any of the four species that come from such a city is considered to have no size at all, and, thus, is unacceptable for use in the mitzvah. (See also the commentary on Chapter 1, Halachah 3.)

but was not worshiped itself (Rabbenu Manoach); i.e., it grew in a garden of the temple of an idol. However, the Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 649:3) explains that it applies even when the tree itself was worshiped.

Because of its connection with idol worship, such an article is considered to be disgusting, and it is improper to fulfill the mitzvah with it (Rabbenu Manoach). However ...

provided the tree had belonged to a gentile and the latter had nullified its connection with idol worship before it came into the Jew’s possession. Alternatively, on any day ofthe festival but the first, one may take it even before its connection with idol worship was nullified. Since the possibility exists that it can be nullified, it is not ו:;onsidered to be a nonexistent entity. (See also the commentary on Chapter 1, Halachah 3.)

Sukkah 31a explains that as long as the species have some moisture left to them, they are not disqualified for use.

Sukkah 32b relates that the inhabitants of the large cities would bequeath their lulavim to their descendants as part of their estate. Obviously, the lulavim would have dried out during this time.

for only the lulav was mentioned in that passage.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that even a dried out lulav is not acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 645:5) follows the Ra’avad’s view.

These laws apply only to an etrog, because the agricultural prohibitions mentioned in this halachah apply only to fruit and not to mere branches (Rabbenu Manoach).

For the first three years of a tree’s growth, one is forbidden to benefit from its produce.

Terumah refers to the portion of produce which must be separated and given to a priest (Numbers 18:12). If the terumah becomes ritually impure, it is no longer permitted to be eaten and must be destroyed.

Produce from Eretz Yisrael from which the agricultural requirements—Terumah, Ma’aser Rishon (the first tithe), and Ma’aser Sheni (the second tithe)—have not been separated. Tevel is also unfit to be eaten, and thus, it may not be used for the mitzvah.

Produce concerning which there is doubt whether or not the tithes have been separated.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam states «he can consecrate all his property to the Temple.» In practice, there is no difference between the two.

See Hilchot Ma’aser 10:11. Since there is a possibility of his being allowed to eat the etrog, he may use it for the mitzvah (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, ibid.).

In the first, second, fourth, and fifth years of the seven-year agricultural cycle, the second tithe had to be taken to Jerusalem and eaten there in a state of ritual purity (Deuteronomy 14:22-27).
The Rambam maintains that one can use an etrog of ma’ aser sheni for the mitzvah only while in Jerusalem, since that is the only place that it is permitted to be eaten (Commentary on the Mishnah, ibid.). However, Rabbenu Nissim and others differ and allow such an etrog to be used for the mitzvah in other places as well. They maintain that though we are not allowed to benefit from ma’aser sheni outside Jerusalem, the fulfillment of mitzvot is not an act of personal benefit.

which was undesirable. From Leviticus 11:34, our Sages learned that produce does not become subject to contracting ritual impurity until it comes into contact with water. Since the lulav was generally placed in water (see Chapter 7, Halachah 25), when it was taken together with the etrog it would probably make the etrog wet, and thus cause it to become subject to contracting ritual impurity.

for there is no inherent difficulty with such an etrog.

According to the Maggid Mishneh and Rabbenu Manoach, this
refers to the center leaf that extends outward from the shidrah, and not the shidrah itself.
Rabbenu Asher and the Ra’avad explain that this refers to the majority of the lulav’s
leaves, and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 645:6) quotes their opinion. However,
the Ramah quotes the Maggid Mishneh’s statements.

because such a lulav is not “beautiful” (:רדה Jerusalem Talmud, Sukkah 3:1). All the other factors mentioned in this halachah disqualify a lulav for the same reason.

Sukkah 31b, 32a states: A lulav which is split is kosher; [but] if it is like a fork, it is not. The commentaries explain that the Talmud refers to a shape like a tuning fork, where the two ends are distant from each other. The commentaries explain that such a separation can disqualify a lulav even if the majority of leaves are not split in this manner, and hence, the principles mentioned in the following halachah would not apply.

i.e., the shidrah would be bent toward a person facing it

Sukkah (ibid.) states: If it is bent like a scythe, it is unacceptable. The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that the bend must be severe (as described by the examples given by the Talmud and the Rambam). However, a slight curve will not disqualify a lulav.

the shidrah bending away from a person facing it

and this can be considered as a ‘’beautiful” lulav (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 645:19). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 645:9) differentiates between when the shidrah bends gradually and when it is bent over to the extent that its tip points downward. In the latter case, even if it is bent backwards, the lulav is unacceptable.

Sukkah (ibid.) questions whether such a lulav is kosher or not and leaves the matter unresolved. Hence, we follow the more stringent view (Rav Yitzchak Alfasi).

i.e., the. leaves are still firm and pointed upward (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, Sukkah 3:1).

However, the most proper way ot performing the mitzvah is to use a lulav whose leaves are not separated at all (Maggid Mishneh).

even if they are bound together against the lulav. This applies only if the majority of the lulav’s leaves have opened up in this fashion (Ramah, Orach Chayim 645:2).

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam maintains that the lulav is not acceptable only if the majority of the leaves are split. However, others (Rashi, Tosafot) explain that this law refers to the middle leaf alone. If the majority of that leaf is split, the lulav is unacceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 645:3) quotes the Rambam’s opinion, while the Ramah favors that of Rashi and Tosafot.

i.e., there is no difference if the lulav’s lack of a tiyomet is a natural phenomenon or is brought about through human activity; in all cases it is unacceptable.

This is the tzinei har habarzel mentioned in the Mishnah (Sukkah 3:1). Sukkah 32b relates that such lulavim grow at the entrance to Gehinnom.

Since the shidrah is not covered, this is not considered to be “beautiful” (Mishnah Berurah 645:20).

Since the myrtle branch is covered by its leaves, the fact that its top is cut off is not noticeable (Rabbenu Manoach).
Though the Mishnah (Sukkah 3:2) states that such a myrtle is unacceptable, the Talmud (Sukkah 34b) states that the halachah follows Rabbi Tarfon, whose opinion is quoted by the Rambam in this halachah.
ln his commentary on this halachah, the Ra’avad states:
For a number of years, the spirit of prophecy has been present in our chamber of study, and we have determined that [such a myrtle] is not acceptable.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 646:10) quotes the Rambam’s opinion. However, the Ramah writes that it is proper to adhere to the Ra’avad’s view if possible. However, he quotes Rabbenu Nissim, who maintains that the top of a myrtle is only considered to be “cut off’ when the top of the branch is broken. The leaves’ falling off is not considered of significance.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that this refers to an Egyptian myrtle, which has seven leaves in each row. Rabbenu Manoach explains that this clause refers to the entire myrtle branch, stating that even though ‘most of its leaves have fallen off, as long as it has one full row of leaves covering the branch (at its top, as in Chapter 7, Halachah 8), it is kosher.
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 646:4) quotes the Maggid Mishneh’s statements as halachah. In contrast, Rabbenu Manoach’s interpretation is not accepted. Halachah 5 (ibid.) states that the majority of the length of the myrtle branch must be covered with leaves. However, if that condition is met, the myrtle is kosher even if the leaves at its top have fallen off.

for their color is the same as the leaves of the myrtle.

since the berries are a different color from that of the leaves ...

since this is not considered to be “beautiful” (Rashi, Sukkah 33b ).

so that there would be more leaves than berries,

- i.e., the number of black or red berries

i.e., on the first day of the festival, when the restrictions against work apply

And this may not be done on a holiday. (See Hilchot Sh’vitat Yom Tov 4:8.)

which is permitted. Sukkah 33b states that permission is granted, provided only that one has another myrtle to use for the mitzvah. Otherwise, it is forbidden to eat the berries, because through one’s activity one will definitely make the myrtle fit for use. Hence, even though one’s act was motivated by another intention as well, it is forbidden. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 646:13.)
The Maggid Mishneh quotes a slightly different version of the text, substituting “or if they were removed by another person” for the phrase “removed them one by one.” Authentic Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah follow the Maggid Mishneh’s text.

despite the fact that it was made fit for use on the holiday.

The Rambam maintains that the laws pertaining to the willow parallel those governing a myrtle. However, even many of the Sages who accept the Rambam’s opinion regarding the myrtle disagree with regard to the willow. They explain that such a myrtle is acceptable because its leaves cover the branch’s severed top. This concept does not apply with regard to a willow. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 647:2) also states that such a willow is unacceptable.

i.e., they are hanging down limply from the branch (Maggid Mishneh)

for this is not beautiful. Rabbenu Aharon Halevi interprets the Hebrew וצרפנ as “split.” The Shulchan Aruch HaRav 647:6 quotes both of these opinions as halachah.

even though none of the etrog’s substance is missing

This is the literal translation of the term . שלופמ Nevertheless, Rabbenu Asher interprets that term differently, explaining that the etrog is unacceptable if the hole reaches the etrog’s seed chamber. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 648:3) quotes both opinions. Regarding halachah l’ma’aseh, the authorities recommend heeding Rabbenu Asher’s opinion. However, they state that when it is difficult to find a kosher etrog, the Rambam’s opinion may be relied upon.

i.e., even if it was perforated with a thin needle

This and the other factors mentioned in this halachah disqualify an etrog for use because it is not “beautiful.”
The Ra’avad objects to this statement and maintains that some of the etrog’s substance must also be lacking for it to be deemed unacceptable. The difference between these two opinions depends on a difference in the text of the Mishnah (Sukkah 3:6). The Rambam’s,text reads:
If [ an etrog] was perforated, peeled, cracked, or lacking even the slightest amount of its substance, it is
unacceptable.
ln contrast, the Ra’avad’s text read:
If [an etrog] was perforated, peeled, cracked: when it lacks even the slightest amount of its substance, it is
unacceptable.
The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 2) follow’s the Rambam’s view. The Ramah writes that when it is difficult to find another kosher etrog, one may rely on the Ra’avad’s view.

A silver coin from the Talmudic period, four barley corns in size.

e.g., the hole was made by plunging an awl into the etrog (Rashi, Sukkah 36a).

Here, too, the Ra’avad differs and maintains that as long as none of the etrog’s substance is lacking, it is kosher.

The Ra’avad differs arid maintains that an isar of the etrog’s substance must be missing. In this and in the previous case, the same decisions of the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah mentioned above apply.

The Maggid Mishneh differentiates between the stem of the pitam and its tip from which its flower grew, maintaining that only the removal of the former disqualifies the etrog for use. The Ramah (ibid. 7) quotes this opinion as halachah. However, he suggests trying to use an etrog whose pitam is entirely complete.

However, there is no difficulty in using an etrog whose pitam falls off naturally, at an early stage of its development, as is true with regard to many etrogim (Rabbenu Mano’ach; Ramah, ibid.).

However, if only part of the stem is cut off and the portion attached to the etrog remains, it is kosher (Ramah, ibid. 8).

The term תיזזח is generally used to refer to human skin ailments—e.g., boils or warts. In this context, it refers to bumps which protrude above the etrog›s surface. However, the commentaries disqualify an etrog only if the bumps grow naturally from the etrog itself. However, if they are caused by external factors—e.g., thorns—the etrog is not disqualified.

The Ra’avad asks why both the numbers two and three are mentioned. In response, the Mishneh Lamelech quotes many examples of the use of similar terminology throughout the Talmud. lt must be noted that the Rambam, in his commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.), and the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (648:19) mention only two places.

because it looks spotty (Sukkah 35b ).

i.e., as long as there is no place for an additional bump between the two, it is considered to be one place (Shulchan Arucli HaRav, ibid.).

The Magen Avraham 648:13 also disqualifies an etrog if there is a line of bumps that covers the majority of the etrog’s circumference from any point on its surface.

See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, ibid.

because a blemish on the pitam is very obvious and unattractive. Sukkah (ibid.) states: “if a bump grows on the etrog›s nose, it is not acceptable.” The Rambam interprets “nose” as referring to the pitam. However, Rabbenu Asher and others explain that it refers to the portion of the etrog which begins to narrow as it approaches the pitam. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 9) accepts the latter view.

i.e, only the outer coating of the peel was removed and the thick, white inner peel is not yet revealed. Should this peel be revealed, the etrog is considered as though it has lost some of its substance (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, ibid.).

fqr the attractiveness of the etrog will begin to decrease without any possibility of its returning to its original state (Levush 586:6)

the peel could have regenerated itself if it had remained connected to the tree (Levush, ibid.). Therefore, ...

Tosafot, Sukkah 36a maintains that at least a portion of the original peel equivalent to a sela (a large silver coin) must remain. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 6) follows the Rambam’s opinion.

i.e., water fell on it after being detached from the tree and it became inflated (Rabbenu Manoach, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 648:15).

i.e., it produces a foul odor because it is infested with worms (Rabbenu Manoach).
Based on Sukkah 36b, the Ba’al Halachot Gedolot writes that “inflated” and “decaying” etrogim are disqualified only when the blemish is externally visible. However, if the blemish is only internal, they are kosher. (See Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 4) and commentaries.)

The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 15) defines “pickled” as “placed in vinegar.” However, the Magen Avraham (648:22) maintains that “pickled” should be interpreted according to its definition in the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah (105:1-2). Thus, if an etrog has been soaked in water or in any other liquid for more than 24 hours straight, it is considered to be “pickled” and disqualified for use. One should take care regarding this matter when soaking etrogim to preserve their freshness.

thoroughly on a fire or in boiling water (Rabbenu Manoach).

i.e., a mixture of any two or more colors. When the different color is concentrated in only one place, the etrog is not disqualified unless that color covers more than half the etrog›s surface area. However, if there is more than one spot of different colors, it is disqualified regardless of their size (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 16).

The Hebrew word קרוי refers to two different colors: dark green and yellow. lnitially, the etrog, like most citrus fruit, is dark green. As it matures, it turns yellowish.

It is not considered “beautiful” because its natural form was changed (Rabbenu Manoach).

This is kosher because the etrogim grew naturally in this way. ln this instance, when performing the mitzvah, a person should hold both etrogim in his hands. Though the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 20) accepts this decision, there are other authorities who differ. Hence, it is preferable to use another etrog (Mishnah Berurah 648:63).

Sukkah 3lb mentions etrogim which are small and green as being not fully ripe. However, since the Rambam mentioned those factors previously, it appears that here the intent is different and refers to a fruit that is not yet ready to be eaten, even though it is as large as an egg and has begun to turn yellow. (See also Sukkah 36a.)

Rashi (Sukkah 36a) states that if such an etrog is brought to a place where etrogim of a normal color grow, it may not be used.

even in Africa, where etrogim of this color grow 11aturally (Rashi, Sukkah 34b ).
There are two different explanations for the leniencies mentioned in the following halachah:
a) The mitzvah of the four species is derived from Leviticus 23:40: “On the first day, take for yourself the fruit of a beautiful tree ... “ From the phrase “for yourself,” we learn that a person must own the species he uses for the mitzvah. From the word “beautiful,” we learn that the species must fit that description.
Rav Yosef Karo (Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 649) explains that these requirements apply only “on the first day.” According to this explanation, these leniencies would also apply on the later days even in Jerusalem, where it is a Torah commandment to take the lulav on the later days (Chapter 7, Halachah 13).
Others. explain that, as mentioned in Chapter 7, Halachot 13 and 15, at preseilt, taking the lulav is a commandment from the Torah only on the first day of the Sukkot. On the subsequent days, the commandment is Rabbinic in origin, instituted to recall the Temple practice. Hence, greater leniency can be taken, because only a Rabbinic ordinance is involved.

Sukkah 36b relates that Rabbi Chanina would eat from an etrog and then use it for the mitzvah. Though an etrog which is lacking even the slightest amount of its substance may not be used (Halachah 7), he still fulfilled his obligation with it. From this incident, our Sages concluded that, on the later days, even such an etrog is kosher.
According to the Rambam’s opinion, the same applies to all other physical blemishes on the species. Since there is no greater blemish than an etrog which is bitten into, none of the requirements for “beauty” must be observed on the later days.
Nevertheless, Tosafot, Sukkah 29b and Rabbenu Asher maintain that this leniency applies only to etrogim which are lacking in substance. All the species which were disqualified because they are not “beautiful” may not be used on the later days as well. Though the Shulchan Aruch 649:5 quotes the Rambam, the Magen Avraham (649:17) and the Taz (649:9) quote the other view.

The Pri Megadim explains that even according to the Rambam, a blessing should not be recited when performing the mitzvah in this fashion.

As mentioned in the commentary on Halachah l, there are two explanations why a stolen lulav may not be used on the first day:
a) a sin may not serve as the medium with which a mitzvah will be performed )הוצם האבה(; הריבעב
b) as stated in Haiachah 10, on the first day of the festival a person must own the four species he uses for the mitzvah.
The commentaries explain that the Rambam follows the Iatter rationale. However, those who follow the first opinion (the Ra’avad, the Ramban, Rabbenu Asher) forbid the use of stolen species on the later days as well. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) quotes the Rambam, while the Ramah follows the other view.
[Though the above explanation is frequently used, it is difficult to accept. First, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sukkah 3:1), the Rambqm mentions the reason of הרצמ. האבה הריבעב Also, in Hilchot Chametz U’matzah 6:1 and in Hilchot lssurei Mizbe’ach 5:1 and 5:9, he forbids the use of stolen articles for the performance of a commandment. In addition, he has not yet mentioned the halachah requiring one to own the lulav used on the first day.
The Taz (649:15) clarifies the matter slightly further by explaining that since taking the lulav on the second day is only a Rabbinic commandment, using a stolen lulav is allowed even though it is a הוצם.[ האבה הריבעב

The literal translation of the Rambam’s words are “from the second holiday,” implying that these leniencies are granted even in the Diaspora, where the second day is celebrated as a holiday. Though all the laws of the holiday apply on the second day as well as the first, this applies only to the laws of the holiday itself. In contrast, in other contexts, since we follow a fixed calendar and know that the holidays fall on their appropriate dates, the restrictions applying to the first day do not apply on the subsequent days (Maggid Mishneh).
Rabbenu Asher differs and-maintains that all the restrictions that apply to the lulav on the first day must also be observed on the ‘second day as well. The Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 649:5) writes that all the species disqualified on the first day may be taken on the second day, but a blessing should not be recited.

Chol Hamo’ed, when all opinions agree that ...

mentioned in Halachah 1

as mentioned in Halachah 2

The Maggid Mishneh mentions that all the species disqualified for use because they were not of the required size or because they were of a similar, bui different, species may not be used on the later days of the festival.

lt appears from the Rambam’s statements that even in Jerusalem, where Torah law requires that the mitzvah be fulfilled for all seven days of the festival, the obligation to own the lulav applies only on the first day.

As explained in the commentary on the previous halachah, the Biblical source for the mitzvah of taking the four species, Leviticus 23:40, states: “On the first day, take for yourself the fruit of a beautiful tree ... “ The phrase “for yourself’ implies that a person must own the species he uses for the mitzvah (Sukkah 41b).
As mentioned in Chapter 5, Halachah 25, a borrowed sukkah may be used on the holiday. Though Deuteronomy 16:13 states “Celebrate the Sukkot holiday for yourself for seven days.” In this context, only a stolen sukkah is disqualified and a borrowed sukkah is permitted (Sukkah 27b).
Since in both cases, the source for the exclusion is the same phrase, one might ask why the laws pertaining to each are different. Many explain that since, as explained in the commentary to that halachah, the Torah includes a special verse to teach us that a borrowed sukkah is permitted, the scope of the exclusion implied by “for yourself’ is limited.
The Shulchan Aruch HaRav 637:3 explains that since the person owning the sukkah grants his colleague the use of it, the borrowed sukkah can be considered “as his own.” Since a person has to treat a sukkah as his permanent dwelling for the seven days of the holiday, it follows that the sukkah was lent for that purpose. Thus, while a person is using it, he may consider it “as his own,” i.e., just like his own dwelling. See Likkutei Sichot, Vol. 19.

Though there are certain restrictions against the transfer of property on a holiday, it is permitted to give a colleague a present (Rambam, Commentary on the Mishnah, Sukkah 3: 11 ).

The use of the Hebrew term לע תנמ frees one from certain obligations in phrasing the terms of the conditional agreement. (See Hilchot Zechiyah Umatanah 3:8.)

There are authorities who require that the owner specifically state that he is giving the lulav to his colleague on the condition that the latter return it. However, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 658:5) states that even if the owner gives a colleague a lulav without making such a statement, it is assumed that the lulav was given subject to this condition.

See Hilchot Zechiyah Umatanah 3:9.

i.e., by failing to fulfill the condition under which the present was given, the recipient nullifies the legal transfer of ownership. Thus, although he was in physical possession of the article, it did not belong to him. Hence, it is considered to be stolen and, thus, not eligible to be used for the mitzvah (Sukkah, ibid.).

before all the adults who desire to use it have fulfilled the mitzvah (Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 6)

The definition of the term “minor” in this context has been the subject of debate among the Rabbis. From the Rambam’s phraseology, it appears that he includes all minors in this category. However, Rabbenu Nissim writes that a child of six or seven. can transfer property and, hence, his return of the lulav is valid.
Support for Rabbenu Nissim’s position is brought from the Jerusalem Talmud (Sukkah 3:10), which relates that Rav Nachman bar Ya’akov gave his etrog as a present to his son and told him: “When you take possession of it and fulfill the mitzvah, return it to me.” Nevertheless, the passage does not serve as conclusive proof, because the possibility exists that his son had already reached majority. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 6) follows the Rambam’s view.

which are given to him by others who consciously desire that the minor acquire the property, in contrast to ownerless articles, which he cannot acquire accord,ing to Torah law (Maggid Mishneh, Hilchot Zechiyah Umatanah 4:7).

The transfer of the ownership of an article requires a conscious decision. Torah law maintains that a child lacks intellectual maturity ,) תעד ( and thus is incapable of making such a decision.

i.e., although he has physically returned the article, the child still remains the legal owner.
The Machaneh Ephraim (Hilchot Meshichah) notes that according to Rabbinic law, a child can transfer property that he owns to another. Thus, the Rambam’s statements seem to imply that any of the four species that are acquired only according to Rabbinic law may not be used for this mitzvah.

The verse quoted above includes all the four species, and not only the lulav. Therefore ...

considered to be the owner of the species in its entirety. Therefore, neither is ...

Bava Batra 137b relates that the requirement of owning a lulav includes not only having a share in it but rather owning it entirely.

The principles mentioned in the previous halachah regarding giving a lulav as a present also apply to giving a share of it as a present.
The Maggid Mishneh mentions a very frequent application of this concept: a lulav and etrog purchased by a synagogue for the use of all of its members. He quotes the Rashba, who explains that since the etrog was purchased with the intent that it be used by each member of that community, implicit in their agreement is that, on the first day, it will belong to each individual entirely at the time he uses it to fulfill the mitzvah.
The Ramah (Orach Chayim 648:7) quotes-this statement as halachah. However, the Magen Avraham 648:10 raises questions concerning it and suggests that each member of the community should grant his colleague his share as a present.

This is the case mentioned in Bava Batra (ibid.), from which the above principle is derived. In such an instance, the estate is considered to be the mutual property of all the brothers concerned.

it is considered to be his own. Hence, ...

and require that an equal division of the property be made before it was used, he cannot be considered to be the full owner of the etrog. Hence, ...

The above principles apply only when the funds of the estate were used to purchase a number of etrogim. Since many fruits of the same species were purchased with the money from the estate, it is possible that the other brothers will not object to one brother’s taking an etrog for his own use. However, if the money of the estate was used to buy a number of different species of fruit—e.g., ...

we assume that the brothers would desire to have the property formally divided before using it. Hence, they are all considered to be mutual owners of the fruit. Thus, ...

as Deuteronomy 16:14 teaches: “And you shall rejoice on your festivals.” Though that verse is mentioned with regard to Sukkot, Deuteronomy 16:11 states with regard to Shavuot: “and you shall rejoice before God,” and Rosh Hashanah 4b explains that an analogy is established to include Pesach as well.

The Rambam’s words present a question: The Mishnah (Sukkah 5: 1) refers to this celebration as Simchat Beit Hasho’evah, connecting it with the drawing of water for the water libation. (See Hilchot Tmidim Umusajim 10:6-10.) Indeed, the Talmud (Sukkah 50b; see also the Rambam’s commentary on the above-mentioned Mishnah) emphasizes that connection, quoting Isaiah 12:3: “And you shall draw water with happiness.” However, here, the Rambam makes no mention of that water at all!
We are forced to say that the Rambam views the verse from Isaiah as a mere asmachtah (an allusion from the Bible with which our Sages connected a verse to an independent concept) and that the celebration came about because of the unique nature of the Sukkot festival. Though this celebration was associated with the water libation, the latter is not the source for the practice. Indeed, the choice of the name Simchat Beit HaSho’evah (the celebration of the house of drawing the water) and not Simchat Hasho’evah (the celebration of the drawing of the water) allows for such an interpretation. (Likkutei Sichot, Vol. XVII).

i.e., in the Temple

Although this verse is used to derive the requirement of taking the lulav in Jerusalem for each of the seven days of the festival (Chapter 7, Halachal 13), its simple meaning remains.
Nevertheless, this charge is not considered to be an independent commandment, but rather an extension (and an intensification) of the mitzvah of celebrating on the festivals. Thus, in Sefer Hamitzvot (Positive Commandment 54), the Rambam describes that mitzvah and explains that it includes “to celebrate with musical instruments and to dance in the Temple .... This is Simchat Beit Hasho’evah.”
This explanation resolves another question: Mo’ed Kattan 8b teaches that one celebration spould not be interposed upon another. For this reason, weddings are not held during the festivals so that the wedding celebrations should not clash with those of the festival.
Thus, were one to consider the celebration of Simchat Beit Hasho’evah as associated with the water offering, one might ask why the Sages instituted such a celebration which might appear to overshadow the celebration of the festival itself. However, the above explanation resolves this difficulty as well, for as stated above, the Simchat Beit Hasho’evah celebration is an extension of the festival celebrations and not an independent matter. (See Likkutei Sichot, ibid.)

Two reasons are given why the courtyard was not set up during the festival itself:
a) It involved construction, which is forbidden on Chol Hamo’ed (Knesset Hagedolah)
b) Preparing the courtyard before the festival would allow the celebrations to begin immediately after the departure of the festival (Kinat Eliyahu).

in the open courtyard before the entrance to the Temple courtyard proper. This was called Ezrat Nashim—the women’s courtyard—because in contrast to the Temple courtyard, women were allowed to enter the Ezrat Nashim even when they were not offering sacrifices. The Rambam describes the Ezrat Nashim in Hilchot Beit Habechirah 5:1.

Originally, the men and the women would stand in separate sections on the same level. However, the Sages feared that, particularly during a time of celebration, such closeness might lead to frivolous interaction between the sexes, and decided to have a balcony constructed for the women (Sukkah 51b).

Since, as explained in the following halachah, the celebration was not held on the first night of the festival.

Sukkah 53a quotes Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananyah as saying: “While we were celebrating at Simchat Beit Hasho’evah, our eyes saw no sleep.”

The Mishnah (Sukkah 5:1-2) states: Whoever has not seen Simchat Beit Hasho’evah has never seen rejoicing in his life! ...
There were golden candelabras .... There was not a courtyard in Jerusalem that was not illuminated with the light of Beit Hasho’evah.
The pious and men of stature would dance before them with torches of fire in their hands and recite songs of praise. The Levites would play the harps, lutes, cymbals, and all other types of instruments on the steps ... leading down from the Israelites’ courtyard.

Indeed, from the Mishnah (Sukkah 5:1), which states: “The flute for five or six days; this was the flute of Beit Hasho’evah,” it appears that this was the major element of the celebration.

See the quote from the Mishnah above.

Note the following halachah and commentary.

Since, as explained above, the celebration involved musical instruments, it would not be held on the first night of the festival (or on the Sabbath), when playing such instruments is forbidden (Hilchot Shabbat 23:4).
The celebration is an extension of a Torah commandment, while the above prohibition is only Rabbinic in nature. Furthermore, it was held in the Temple, where Rabbinic prohibitions of this nature were usually suspended ןיא, תובש )שדקמב Pesachim 65a). Nevertheless, since there is no specific Torah obligation to celebrate in this manner, the celebrations were suspended because of the Rabbinic prohibition (Likkutei Sichot, ibid.).

for the experience of genuine Torah happiness is a fundamental and necessary element of our service of God, as explained in the following halachah.

Though they would attend, as mentioned in the final clause of the halachah

for it was only their celebration that could inspire the people with spiritual feeling.

Sukkah 53a relates how Hillel the Elder would rejoice at Simchat Beit Hasho’evah. Other Sages would also participate. For example, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would juggle eight torches of fire and bow down so low he could kiss the ground. The Jerusalem Talmud (Sukkah 5:3) relates how Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzedek would perform unique feats of jumping.

deriving joy from this passive participation.

By mentioning this concept at the conclusion—but as part—of the these halachot, the Rambam emphasizes how the celebration of the festivals is not just an isolated experience, but rather is intended to influence the totality of our service of God. The rejoicing of the festival of Sukkot enables us to appreciate true happiness in all aspects of our Torah service.

This verse comes after the full description of the curses and retribution which God will visit upon the Jewish people for their sins. From the Rambam’s statements, it appears that it is the lack of happiness in the service of God, and not the sins themselves, which brought about this punishment.
The Ari, Rabbi Yitzchak Luria, explains that even though the punishment comes for the sins, had the Jewish people served God with true joy and happiness, that happiness would have caused Him to overlook those transgressions, regardless of how serious they were. In contrast, a lack of happiness in the performance of the mitzvot demonstrates a deficiency in the person’s awareness of the connection to God established thereby.

for he is concerned with himself, rather than with God.

i.e., God, in whose presence we are at every moment.

Transcending his self-consciousness and committing himself to God totally, without any restrictions.

his ability to open himself up to God allows him to serve as a medium for the expression of His greatness, and thus, his own personal prestige rises, because, as our Sages commented: “A king’s servant is like a king.”

See Hilchot Teshuvah, Chapter 10.

The mention of David’s position further emphasizes the concept explained. Alternatively, a king has a connection to each of his subjects. Thus, mentioning the example of the king of Israel emphasizes how each Jew has a potential to achieve this rung of service.

When Michal, Saul’s daughter, witnessed David’s recklessness and total lack of inhibitions, she reproved him for conduct unbefitting a king. David answered her sharply, explaining that it is precisely this ability to give oneself totally over to Godliness which characterizes a Jewish monarch and makes him fit to lead the people in the service of God.