Eruvin - Chapter Six

Note Chapter 7, Halachah 1, which states that one may establish an eruv t'chumin by actually going on Friday afternoon to the location one desires to establish as one's place for the Sabbath. The possibility of depositing food was instituted by our Sages to expedite the process of establishing an eruv t'chumin, by allowing a person to have an agent deposit food for him.

See Halachah 5 regarding both these factors.

In his introduction to these halachot, the Maggid Mishneh questions why two seemingly separate concepts, eruv chatzerot and eruv t'chumin, are considered to be part of the same mitzvah and are described together. He explains that since both are Rabbinic ordinances that involve placing food in a specific place so that the place will be considered to be one's base for the Sabbath, they can be considered to be a single mitzvah.

A cubit is 48 centimeters according to Shiurei Torah and 57.6 centimeters according to the Chazon Ish.

A person is always allowed to proceed 2000 cubits in all directions from the place where he spends the Sabbath. (See Hilchot Shabbat 27:1.) Since the place where the person's eruv is located is considered his base for the Sabbath, his 2000 cubits are calculated from this place.

The Rambam's statements here parallel his statements in Hilchot Shabbat 27:5, which explain that if a person's Sabbath limits end within a private domain, he is not entitled to proceed to the end of the domain. If, however, that domain is included within his 2000 cubits, it is considered to be only four cubits.

The Ramah (Orach Chayim 408:1) quotes the view of the Tur, the Hagahot Maimoniot, and other Ashkenazic authorities, who differ and maintain that one is allowed to proceed to the end of the private domain, even if it is further than 2000 cubits from one's eruv t'chumin. The Mishnah Berurah 408:12 mentions that many authorities support this ruling. See note 8.

The Maggid Mishneh (in his gloss on this halachah and on Hilchot Shabbat 27:5) mentions the fact that when one establishes the Sabbath limits of a city, an imaginary square is constructed around the furthermost points in the city's area, and the Sabbath limits are calculated from that square. Thus, it is possible that land that is outside the city's urban limits may still be within the square from which its Sabbath limits are calculated.

Although a leniency is used in the calculation of the city's Sabbath limits, and these outlying areas are considered to be part of the city proper, this leniency is not turned into a stringency. If a person's 2000 cubits end beyond the city's urban area, but not beyond these outlying areas, the city is considered to be included within his Sabbath limits, and thus only four cubits in length. This concept is quoted by the Ramah (Orach Chayim 408:1).

As mentioned above, the Tur and the Ramah (Orach Chayim 408:1) differ with the Rambam on this point and allow a person to walk throughout the entire city where his house is located, provided he sleeps in his home (Mishnah Berurah 408:11).

The rationale for this decision can be explained as follows: As explained in Hilchot Shabbat 27:1, the prohibition against proceeding more than 2000 cubits from one's place of residence on the Sabbath is derived from the verse (Exodus 16:29): "No man should leave his place on the seventh day." The term "his place" refers to the private domain in which he is located, regardless if it be a house, a city, or any other location.

By making an eruv t'chumin, a person redefines the location of "his place" on the Sabbath. Even if he is not located at that place at the commencement of the Sabbath or shortly thereafter, the location where he deposits his eruv is considered to be "his place" for this Sabbath. Therefore, if that location is a private domain, that entire domain is considered to be "his place," and the calculation of his Sabbath limits begins from its boundaries.

If his acts had been considered significant, he would have decreased his Sabbath limits, and not increased them. For without the eruv, he would be allowed to proceed two thousand cubits from the city limits. This follows the Rambam's conception, in contrast to that of the Tur mentioned above.

In Hilchot Shabbat 27:5 (see also note 6), it is explained that the Sabbath limits of a city are calculated from an imaginary square that may include several uninhabited areas in the city's periphery. If the eruv is placed in these outlying areas, it is as if it were placed in the city proper.

Since the eruv is beyond his Sabbath limits, i.e., over 2000 cubits from the city's periphery, he may not reach it during beyn hash'mashot, the time when the acquisition of the eruv takes effect (Mishnah Berurah 408:30). Therefore, the eruv is not valid. Instead, his Sabbath limits are defined from his home (Ramah, Orach Chayim 408:4).

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as saying that this applies only when one establishes one's eruv by using food. If, however, one actually walks to a place beyond a city's boundaries beyn hash'mashot, and in this manner establishes this location as one's place for the Sabbath, it is acceptable even if one's intent is not associated with a mitzvah. Although this view is not accepted by all authorities, the Mishnah Berurah 415:1 rules that in a pressing situation, one may rely on the more lenient view.

The expression "a purpose associated with a mitzvah" is used in a very extended sense in this context. As an example, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 415:1) mentions a desire to take a stroll in a pleasant orchard.

E.g., to proceed toward the end of one's Sabbath limits, so that one will be closer to a destination to which one desires to travel for business purposes after the Sabbath.

Although this is a matter of disagreement among the Rabbis, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 415:1) follows the Rambam's view.

It must be emphasized that the "fear" mentioned by the Rambam refers to a situation when there is not an obvious danger to the person's life. Were that to be the case, he would be allowed to proceed beyond the 2000 cubits even if he had not established an eruv, for a threat to life takes precedence over the observance of all the Torah's laws with the exception of idol worship, sexual immorality, and murder.

In contrast to an eruv chatzerot, for which bread alone may be used, all foods may used for an eruv t'chumin and a shituf, with the exception of water, salt, and mushrooms (Chapter 1, Halachah 8).

See Chapter 1, Halachah 9. There is, however, a distinction. Regarding a shituf, even when there are thousands of inhabitants involved, it is necessary to provide two meals only for eighteen people. In contrast, regarding an eruv t'chumin, food must be set aside for every person who desires to use the eruv.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 10.

This does not mean the person's home, or the place where he is standing beyn hash'mashot, but rather the place where he would partake of his eruv. There are times when it is impossible for him to partake of the eruv in the domain in which it is located - to cite the example given by the Mishnah, Eruvin 3:3: the eruv was placed in a tree more than ten handbreadths above the ground. In such instances, since it is not permissible to carry the eruv from the place where it was deposited to the place where the person would partake of it, the eruv is not valid.

This is the time when the Sabbath commences, and it is at this hour that the eruv must be established.

See Hilchot Shabbat 24:10.

And, as mentioned in Halachah 6, it is only in situations such as these that it is permissible to establish an eruv t'chumin.

If, however, he must perform a labor forbidden by the Torah to obtain the eruv, it is not valid. (See Chapter 1, Halachah 22.)

Although Rabbinic prohibitions are not normally enforced beyn hash'mashot when a mitzvah is involved, our Sages maintained their decree in this instance. For one might think that the reed has already been detached, and it is likely that one might break it (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 3:3).

Provided that they are not implanted in the public domain and there is not a basket, four handbreadths by four handbreadths, at their top (Mishnah Berurah 409:14).

The Ra'avad objects to the Rambam's ruling, noting that the matter is the subject of a difference of opinion between our Sages (Eruvin 45a): Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a person is considered to be located in the midst of the four cubits he is granted. Therefore, as the Rambam states here, he is granted only two cubits in either direction. Rabbi Yehudah differs and maintains that he is granted four cubits in either direction. It is Rabbi Yehudah's view that is accepted as halachah.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that in Hilchot Shabbat 12:15 and 27:11, the Rambam follows Rabbi Yehudah's view. There is, the Maggid Mishneh maintains, a difference between the ruling regarding the laws of carrying and the ruling regarding the Sabbath limits. His distinction is explained by the Radbaz (Vol. VI, Responsum 2237), who states that for an eruv t'chumin to be effective a person must be able to reach it while standing within the Sabbath limits. If the eruv is within two cubits of the Sabbath limits, the person can bend over and reach it. If it is further away, he would have to leave his Sabbath limits to reach it. Hence, it is not valid.

The Ra'avad's decision is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 409:5).

Halachah 5.

As explained in the previous halachah.

Impure terumah may not be eaten.

If it is valid at this time, what happens to it afterwards is of no consequence (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 3:4).

Since the eruv was acceptable when deposited, it is granted a chezkat kiyyum - i.e., we assume that the status quo remained the same and that it remained acceptable until immediately before the difficulty was discovered (ibid.).

(Although the Rambam mentions this concept in his Commentary on the Mishnah, his ruling in the following halachah implies that he does not accept this as a hard and fast rule.)

They both empowered him to act as a shaliach (agent) and establish an eruv for them.

This situation represents a paradox: If beyn hash'mashot is considered to be before the commencement of the Sabbath, the eruv that was eaten beyn hash'mashot is not valid. If beyn hash'mashot is considered to be after the commencement of the Sabbath, the eruv that was established beyn hash'mashot is not valid.

If, however, the eruv that was established beyn hash'mashot was eaten beyn hash'mashot, it is not valid. (See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 393:3.)

Beyn hash'mashot is the period between sunset and the appearance of three stars. There is a question if this period is considered to be part of the day or part of the night. See Hilchot Shabbat 5:4.

This ruling (based on Shabbat 34a) reflects a difference of opinion among the Rabbis. As mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah, most authorities maintain that an eruv t'chumin (in contrast to an eruv chatzerot) is acceptable when there is a doubt involved, only because it possesses a chezkat kiyyum - i.e., we knew that it was acceptable beforehand, and we presume that its status remained the same until we know otherwise. (See also Halachah 15.)

Therefore, other authorities (Rabbenu Chanan'el, Rabbenu Tam, Rashba) interpret this law as referring to an eruv chatzerot. There a chezkat kiyyum is not necessary, for an eruv chatzerot is only a Rabbinic institution (in contrast to an eruv t'chumin, which involves a prohibition that has its source in the Torah itself).

Nevertheless, it is possible to justify the Rambam's decision, for the prohibition against going beyond two thousand cubits is Rabbinic in origin (Hilchot Shabbat 27:1). Accordingly, since we are sure that the food set aside for the eruv can be eaten before the commencement of the Sabbath, and the doubt is merely whether the eruv was made at the proper time, the question concerns a matter of Rabbinic law. Therefore, we follow the principle, "Whenever there is a doubt concerning a point of Rabbinic law, the more lenient opinion is followed."

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 415:3) quotes both views (although the Rambam's appears to be favored). The Mishnah Berurah 415:11 favors the other view.

Although at the outset, an eruv chatzerot may be established beyn hash'mashot (see Chapter 1, Halachah 21), the laws regarding an eruv t'chumin are more severe (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 2:6).

Although the stones are muktzeh and removing them on the Sabbath would be forbidden, since a mitzvah is involved there is no prohibition against removing them beyn hash'mashot.

For at the time the eruv was established it was valid, and what happens afterwards is of no consequence. (See also Chapter 1, Halachah 21.)

As mentioned above, it is forbidden to partake of terumah if it is ritually impure. In this instance, however, there is a doubt and we do not know if, in fact, the terumah has contracted ritual impurity or not.

With this phrase, the Rambam clarifies his position with regard to a question asked by many authorities based on the situation described in Halachah 13. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, many authorities maintain that an eruv is considered acceptable when there is a doubt regarding its validity only when it possesses a chezkat kiyyum. As proof, they point to this law, which appears to indicate that the eruv is not considered acceptable because it was never known to be valid.

The Rambam explains that the reason why the eruv is not acceptable in this instance is not that it lacks a chezkat kiyyum, but because it may never be eaten. Because of the doubt involved, it is forbidden to partake of this loaf.

To summarize, in the instances mentioned in the previous halachot, the doubt revolves around the acceptability of the eruv. Therefore, we follow the principle, "when there is a doubt [with regard to the validity of] an eruv, it is considered acceptable." In this halachah, the doubt is whether the terumah may be eaten. This is a question of Torah law, and we are required to rule stringently (Noda BiY'hudah, Yoreh De'ah, Vol. I, Responsum 65).

Although there is a pure loaf there, since we do not know which loaf it is, the meal is not fit to be eaten.

We are not certain that the sanctity with which it had been endowed has departed until nightfall. At that time, it is too late to establish an eruv.

Food from which terumah and/or the other agricultural requirements were not separated. It is forbidden to be eaten until these separations are made.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 22.

This ruling is the subject of a debate among our Sages (Eruvin 26b). The Rambam follows the more stringent view. Although other authorities accept the more lenient ruling, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 409:1) cites the Rambam's decision. (See Be'ur Halachah.)

The difficulty is not in the actual placement of the eruv beyn hash'mashot, for the placement of an eruv is a mitzvah and the mitzvot were not given for our personal benefit. The difficulty arises afterwards. Since the person desires that the eruv be maintained in the cemetery, he is deriving benefit from it. Hence, it is forbidden to establish an eruv in this manner (Eruvin 31a; Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 3:1).

(See the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who asks why the eruv is unacceptable. Although it is forbidden to derive benefit from the cemetery in this manner, the fact that a person violates this prohibition should not invalidate his eruv.)

A field or yard that was plowed despite the fact that a grave was located there. Our Sages feared that some of the bones of the corpse became strewn throughout the field. Hence, they considered it to be impure ground (Hilchot Tum'at Meit 10:1).

A compartment carried by other people or animals. Since there is a board below him, he does not contract ritual impurity when he passes above a grave or a corpse (tum'at ohel). (See the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, ibid..)

Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (ibid.). Others explain that this refers to blowing away any chips of bone.

In contrast to an eruv chatzerot, the equivalent of two meals is required for every participant in the eruv, regardless of the number of the participants. The rationale is that through depositing the eruv, the person establishes the place in which he has deposited it as his "place" for the Sabbath. This must be done for every person participating in the eruv (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 8:1).

Note the parallel to Chapter 1, Halachah 17.

As in Chapter 1, Halachah 20.

In contrast to an eruv chatzerot, which, in most circumstances, is considered to be a benefit to a person unless he explicitly objects, an eruv t'chumin is dependent on the person's consent. For by extending his Sabbath boundaries in one direction, it reduces them in the other direction.

The Mishnah Berurah 413:6 cites opinions that state that it is acceptable if one received notification beyn hash'mashot.

Eruvin 82a, explains that this is dependent on the principle of b'reirah - i.e., when a person decides to rely on the eruv retroactively, it becomes clarified that this was his original intent.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 20.

In contrast to a storekeeper or a baker, we assume a private person will fulfill the request made of him.

Generally, our Sages ordained that even when a purchaser has already paid for the item he purchased, the transaction is not finalized until he draws the item he purchased after him [(meshichah), Hilchot Mechirah 3:1]. In this instance, they allowed leniency, accepting the Torah's ruling that a sale is finalized by the purchaser's payment of money.

For it is possible that the storekeeper will forget and not have another person acquire a share in the eruv (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah). Note the Maggid Mishneh, who offers a different explanation.

See also the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 369:1), who interpret these laws as referring to an eruv chatzerot and do not mention them within the context of an eruv t'chumin.

Since the person makes an explicit statement, we assume that the storekeeper will remember to do so.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that, in contrast to a transaction made with money, a transaction made by exchanging articles is completed at the moment of the exchange. (See Hilchot Mechirah 5:1.) Therefore, the bread belongs to the person and can be used for the eruv.

Based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah cited previously, Rav Kapach offers a different interpretation: that since he will have to appraise the utensil or sell it, the storekeeper will remember to establish the eruv.

Children below the age of majority do not have an independent halachic status.

Canaanite servants are obligated to fulfill all the negative commandments of the Torah (including the obligation to keep the Sabbath limits). They are not, however, granted any independent decision-making capacity, and instead are considered as their owner's property.

The Shulchan Aruch 414:1 states that this ruling applies even if they do not depend on their father or master for their sustenance.

All these individuals possess the halachic right to make their own decisions, and their relationship with their father, master, or husband is no different from that between two other individuals.

Since there is a high probability that these individuals will desire to rely on this eruv, there is no need for them to express their consent. The failure to object is sufficient. The Mishnah Berurah 414:4 adds a further leniency. Even if they were not notified about the eruv until after nightfall, since it can be assumed that they will desire to rely on the eruv, it is acceptable.

In other halachic contexts as well (see Hilchot Sukkah 6:1), a child is considered to be dependent on his mother until the age of six. (See the Mishnah Berurah 414:7, which cites other opinions that require a separate eruv to be established for a child below the age of six.)

And having charged the agent with this mission, he can rely on the agent to have deposited the eruv. He need not check to see if he has, in fact, done so (Eruvin 32b).

These individuals are not considered to be responsible for their actions and may not serve as agents. There is, however, a difference regarding an eruv chatzerot, for in that context, all that is necessary is that they collect the food.

I.e., a Sadducee or a Samaritan (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 3:2). Needless to say, a gentile may not serve in this capacity, for he can never serve as an agent.

The only reason it is necessary for him to watch is so that he knows that the eruv has in fact reached his agent (Eruvin, ibid.).

The Maggid Mishneh explains that since this is a question of Rabbinic law, the principle of b'reirah is employed. This means that retroactively, it is considered that the decision made by the agent expressed the intent of the person who charged him with establishing the eruv.

Even if they did not know the direction in which the eruv was established until after nightfall (Maggid Mishneh, Mishnah Berurah 409:52).

Because the agent did not carry out the instructions given to him. These rulings apply regardless of whether the agent establishes the eruv with food belonging to him or with food belonging to the person who sent him (Mishnah Berurah 409:53).

Chapter 1, Halachah 16. The very same blessing is recited for an eruv t'chumin. See also the notes on that halachah, which explain why a blessing is recited before the performance of a Rabbinic commandment.

Note the Ra'avad, who objects to the recitation of a blessing for this mitzvah, for in contrast to other Rabbinic mitzvot, the institution of an eruv t'chumin does not introduce any new practice. Even an eruv chatzerot makes one conscious of the prohibition against carrying in a public domain. An eruv t'chumin, by contrast, merely grants a person a leniency.

The Maggid Mishneh explains the rationale for the Rambam's ruling. In practice, as stated in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 415:4), the custom is to recite a blessing.

Note the Mishnah Berurah 415:15, which states that if a person fails to make a statement of this nature, the eruv is not acceptable. As mentioned in the notes on the following chapter, this applies, however, only when one has deposited food for the eruv, and not when one has actually walked there oneself.

See also the Mishnah Berurah 415:16, which mentions that in his statement the person should specify that he is establishing the eruv for the following day, or for all the Sabbaths of the coming year.