Shabbat - Chapter Twenty One

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 1, this statement has raised the attention of the commentaries concerned with how the Rambam defines the scope of the positive commandment to cease activity on the Sabbath. Many authorities explain that this positive commandment is merely a restatement of the prohibition against performing forbidden labors. Others (see the commentary of the Ramban on Leviticus 23:24) understand the command as requiring a person to refrain from any and all activities that will disturb the Sabbath atmosphere of serene rest. The Rambam's wording in this halachah appears to support the latter view.

Support for this opinion can also be drawn from the phraseology chosen by the Rambam in Chapter 24, Halachah 12, the conclusion of the discussion of this issue in the Mishneh Torah:

Lest the day be like a weekday in the person's eyes, and he come to repair [articles,] lifting them up from corner to corner.... For he is sitting idle, and he will seek something to do. Thus, he will not have "ceased activity" and will have negated the motivating principle for the Torah's commandment [Deuteronomy 5:14], "Thus... will rest."

In this quote as well, the Rambam emphasizes that the commandment to rest in Exodus 23:12 encompasses holding back from performing any activity that will disturb the atmosphere of rest and peace that characterizes the Sabbath.

The Rambam uses the next four chapters to delineate various activities that were forbidden because of the two reasons he mentions above. In his discussion of this matter, he gives examples of activities that are related to each of the categories of forbidden labor.

This refers to a person who levels crevices in a field (Chapter 8, Halachah 1). If one performs such an activity in a home, one is liable for performing the forbidden labor of building (Chapter 10, Halachah 12).

See Chapter 26, Halachah 15.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 18:1), the Rambam elaborates on this concept, explaining that a person who removes the contents of a storeroom is likely to discover cracks and crevices in the ground. Our Sages, therefore, imposed this restriction lest he level the floor. Indeed, the only reason the person is allowed to empty the storeroom is that he intends to perform a mitzvah.

Or shoes (Ramah, Orach Chayim 302:6).

The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) also mentions an opinion that forbids wiping the mud on a stone wall, lest it appear that one is replastering the wall.

See the Mishnah Berurah 316:49, which questions whether this restriction applies to a paved or unpaved floor. (In this context, see also the Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 7:2.)

The Maggid Mishneh cites the use of a similar expression in Chapter 11, Halachah 4. In the notes on that halachah, it is explained that there are two interpretations of the phrase: a) that one may intentionally step on the substance in question and merely make it appear that one is doing so accidentally; b) that one may proceed without worrying whether one steps on the substance or not. (See also the restatement of this law in Chapter 26, Halachah 13.)

When mentioning this law, the Ramah (Orach Chayim 338:5) cites the Rambam's statements in Chapter 23, Halachah 17, which forbid gambling on the Sabbath. Thus, to avoid redundancy, we are forced to say that the play mentioned here is obviously mere sport. Nevertheless, it is forbidden for the reasons mentioned above.

The Rambam appears to forbid sweeping the floor, lest in the process of doing so, one decides to level the floor. Since both sweeping and leveling are intended to make one's floor look attractive, it is likely that while a person is involved in one activity, he will also perform the other (Rav Yitzchak ben Sheshet, Responsum 394).

Other commentaries explain that the reason is that it is inevitable that a person will level an earthen floor while sweeping it. Therefore, sweeping is forbidden even though the person does not intend to level the floor, based on the principle the Rambam states in Chapter 1, Halachah 6.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 337:2) follows the Rambam's ruling and allows one to sweep a paved floor. The Ramah, however, differs and maintains that it is forbidden. (See the Be'ur Halachah 337, which cites many opinions that encourage leniency.) Even those opinions that allow one to sweep emphasize that one must be careful regarding the type of broom used. A broom whose bristles are likely to break may not be used.

This refers to sprinkling water in a house to keep the dust from rising. Although there is a possibility that the water and the dust will collect and cause the floor to become level, there is no prohibition because this is not the person's intent. As the Rambam mentions in Chapter 1, Halachah 5, a person may perform an act that causes a forbidden labor to be accomplished if he does not intend for that labor to be accomplished, and there is not an absolute certainty that it will be accomplished.

In Talmudic times, oil was frequently applied to the floor of a bathhouse. (See Shabbat 40b.)

Sweeping a floor is considered a necessary act to maintain an atmosphere of cleanliness on the Sabbath. These other activities, however, are not as essential (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch HaRav 337:4; Mishnah Berurah 337:17).

Note, however, Hilchot Korban Pesach 1:16, which states that after the Paschal offerings had been sacrificed, the floor of the Temple courtyard was washed, even when the celebration of Pesach began on the Sabbath. All the prohibitions of the category of sh'vut were not enforced in the Temple.

Straw is acceptable for this purpose since it is fit to be eaten by an animal. Hence, it will not be considered as having been made a permanent part of the courtyard. If, by contrast, earth, pebbles, or sand are used, they would be considered as having been permanently incorporated into the floor of the courtyard. This is considered as building and is, hence, forbidden (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 313:24; Mishnah Berurah 313:55).

When quoting this halachah (which is based on Eruvin 104a), the Shulchan Aruch uses a different verb, זורה, which means "toss into." This difference also leads to a variation in the manner in which the concept mentioned in our halachah's final clause is interpreted there.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 2.

Eruvin 104a relates that water was drawn from a cistern by a pulley in the Temple, but that this is forbidden outside the Temple premises.

The location of the cistern clearly indicates that its water is intended to be used for household purposes. In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo explains that even if a cistern is not located in a courtyard, as long as it is distant from a place where the water might be used for commercial purposes, one may draw water with a pulley. In the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 338:6), he mentions further leniencies.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 3.

If, however, the honey has oozed or has been removed from the beehive before the commencement of the Sabbath, it may be used. (See the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch and the Ramah [Orach Chayim 321:13].)

Note the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 10:7).

This prohibition, as all the others mentioned in this halachah, was also instituted lest one detach fruit from a tree. (Note also the Shulchan Aruch [Orach Chayim 372:15], which mentions an exception to this principle.)

The commentaries question whether the Rambam's intent is that one is liable for detaching wood from a dried tree, or that this is merely a safeguard. (See Magen Avraham 336:1.)

See Halachah 9 regarding whether or not a person who climbs a tree is allowed to descend on the Sabbath.

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 312:6), which mentions an exception to this principle.

Rav Moshe Cohen differs with the rationale given by the Rambam and explains that the reason these fruits are forbidden is that they are considered muktzeh, i.e., since picking them would involve transgressing a prohibition, one does not consider using them on the Sabbath. Others explain that they are forbidden, because they are nolad, i.e., the potential to use them did not come about until after the commencement of the Sabbath. Accordingly, it is forbidden to move them on the Sabbath. From the location in the Shulchan Aruch in which this law appears, Orach Chayim 322:3, one might infer that Rav Yosef Karo follows Rav Moshe Cohen's opinion.

The Rambam accepts the principle of nolad only in regard to the festivals, and not in regard to the Sabbath (see Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 1:17) and does not consider the concept of muktzeh applicable here.

The Rambam follows Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's version of Sukkot 37b. Rabbenu Chanan'el and others reverse the laws and grant the leniency regarding smelling an etrog and the like, but not a myrtle. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 336:10) quotes the Rambam's view.

This is considered equivalent to climbing a tree (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Eruvin 10:8).

Based on the principle of l'vud.

I.e., the portion that is within three handbreadths of the ground.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 336:2) mentions that it is even forbidden for them to sit on the side of the roots that is level with the ground. The difference between this law and the previous one is that in the previous law, the roots themselves descended within three handbreadths of the ground. In this law, a portion of the ground is upraised and is level with the roots.

Although one is forbidden to cause an animal to carry a burden, riding an animal is not forbidden according to the Torah, because of the principle, "a living being carries itself." Nevertheless, there is a Rabbinic prohibition involved, as the Rambam explains.

Beitzah 36b mentions another reason: perhaps one will ride beyond the Sabbath limits. Apparently the Rambam does not see these two positions as mutually exclusive.

Note, however, the Chatam Sofer (Vol. VI, Responsum 96), who writes that our Sages were motivated by a desire to have animals rest on the Sabbath, and the rationales mentioned in the Talmud were of secondary importance. Sefer HaKovetz notes that, in fact, the Jerusalem Talmud mentions the desire that animals rest as the source for this law.

When our Sages forbade riding on an animal, they also forbade using an animal for any other purpose (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:23; Mishnah Berurah 305:62). These prohibitions apply in all places, even in a desert where there are no trees from which one might detach a branch.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this prohibition applies also regarding articles hanging from trees. Support for this position can be derived from the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Sukkah 4:6, which prohibit use of both a sukkah constructed in a tree as well as one on an animal's back on the first day of the holiday.

If, however, a utensil was placed in a tree on or before the Sabbath, it may not be removed (Maggid Mishneh; Ramah [Orach Chayim 336:1]).

If, however, he climbed the tree before the commencement of the Sabbath, he may descend on the Sabbath (Maggid Mishneh). Although the Rambam's view is accepted by most authorities, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) also mentions a more stringent opinion.

Although the person makes use of the tree in his process of descent, this is not forbidden. For the alternative available to him, staying in the tree for the entire Sabbath, also involves making use of the tree (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 336:2; Mishnah Berurah 336:6).

See Chapter 25, Halachah 26, for added leniencies granted in consideration of suffering endured by an animal. (See also the commentaries on Hilchot Rotzeach 13:9,13, which discuss the halachic ramifications of this principle. Note also The Guide to the Perplexed, Vol. III, chapter 17.)

The restrictive process of unloading an animal's burden described by the Rambam in this halachah is necessary only when the articles the animal is carrying are muktzeh (forbidden to be moved on the Sabbath day). If the articles are not muktzeh, they may be unloaded in an ordinary manner, provided one does not lean on the animal.

From this, the Mishnah Berurah 305:65 derives that the prohibition against causing an animal's suffering is not strong enough to supersede the prohibition against muktzeh.

Although the grain is muktzeh, as long as one does not move it with one's hands, one is not violating the prohibition (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 305:24). See also Chapter 24:14-15.

There are commentaries that emphasize that this is also a leniency. It is forbidden to nullify the possibility of using a utensil even temporarily. Hence, the only reason that putting the pillows under the sacks is permitted is that there is a substantial loss involved (Mishnah Berurah 266:27).

Note, however, the Maggid Mishneh, who mentions opinions that explain that since one can remove the pillows one by one at any time, one is never nullifying a utensil from being used.

Rashi (Shabbat 154b) offers a slightly different interpretation of the type of glass used and the purpose for which it was intended.

I.e., although the larger pieces will break when they fall, the broken pieces that will remain will also be able to be used for the original purpose. Only a small quantity of glass will be totally useless.

Although unloading the glass utensils slowly will inevitably involve lifting the forbidden articles slightly, the Sages permitted this because of the loss involved (Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch HaRav 266:24).

Note also Shulchan Aruch Harav 266:25, which grants a further leniency and allows pillows and covers to be placed under large utensils in the case of a substantial loss, if there is no other alternative. Even though there is no way to remove the pillows from under the utensils on the Sabbath, this leniency is permitted because of the potential loss. The Be'ur Halachah 266 explains that this is a matter of controversy among the halachic authorities.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 6.

The commentaries note that the Rambam's words seem to indicate that one is liable for collecting produce even when one does so far from the place where the produce originally grew. This issue is a point of disagreement among the commentaries. (See the notes on Chapter 8, Halachah 5.)

Significantly, Tosafot, Shabbat 143b, suggests omitting the phrase "and partake of them." (Note the Be'ur Halachah 335.)

Although the prohibition against gathering produce is explicitly stated in Shabbat 143b, the rationale for the prohibition is a matter of debate among the halachic authorities. The reason suggested by the Rambam is not accepted by most, and other reasons are offered:

a) it is possible that pebbles might be mixed in with the produce and thus one might come to perform the forbidden labor of separating (Rashba);

b) gathering produce is a weekday activity and its performance runs contrary to the atmosphere of peace and rest prevalent on the Sabbath (Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 335). These are the rationales reflected in the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 335:5).

According to the Torah, the forbidden labor of collecting food applies only with regard to the produce of the earth (Shabbat 73b; Chapter 8, Halachah 5). Nevertheless, the Rabbis extended the scope of the prohibition and forbade collecting other foods as well.

See Chapter 8, Halachot 7 and 10. Rashi, Shabbat 143b, explains that the reason is that the primary purpose that grapes and olives are grown is for these liquids. With regard to other fruits, by contrast, it is not as common to use them for juice. From his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:1), it appears that the Rambam also accepts this rationale.

(Rabbenu Nissim gives another reason: The juices of other fruits are not considered to be liquids, but rather food. See Hilchot Tum'at Ochalin 1:4. The Pri Megadim and others consider these to be two separate rationales.)

This prohibition includes all fruits that are frequently used for juice (Ramah, Orach Chayim 320:1). Significantly, however, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:6) states that one may squeeze lemons. The Mishnah Berurah 320:22, however, questions that decision, because it is customary in many places to use lemons for juice. A similar question applies regarding many other fruit juices that are now far more popular than they were in previous generations.

The basis for this opinion is that even if a person desires to squeeze the fruit juice for use as a beverage, since the popular practice is not to do so, his individual intent is of no consequence. There are, however, opinions that maintain that a person is forbidden to squeeze juice from fruit if he desires to use it as a beverage.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 320:1 states that, even though the halachic basis of the first view is sounder, in places where it is customary to follow the second view, the stringency should be maintained. (See also the Be'ur Halachah 320.)

Or to prepare them to be used as food in any other way. For example, to squeeze the oil from noodles (Mishnah Berurah 320:24,25).

As mentioned in Chapter 8, Halachah 10, even when one squeezes a food with the intent of removing its liquid, there is no prohibition involved if one squeezes the liquid directly into food. The rationale is that when a liquid is absorbed in food, its own identity is of no consequence. Hence, it is as if one is separating food from food. This concept is reflected in the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:7).

The prohibition is, however, only Rabbinic in origin. This follows Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Shabbat 145a. Rabbenu Chanan'el rules that a person who squeezes these foods for the sake of their liquids is liable for transgressing a Torah prohibition.

For this resembles crushing grapes or olives to produce wine or oil (Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Rashba). The Maggid Mishneh continues, explaining that other commentaries (see Rashi, Shabbat 51b, Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 320) maintain that the prohibition stems from the fact that one is bringing into existence a new entity (nolad) on the Sabbath. It appears that the Rambam and the Rashba do not accept that rationale.

Rashi, Rabbenu Nissim, and others state that this refers to a cup or a bowl filled with liquid. They explain that this is permitted because the water from the snow will flow directly into this other liquid and will never exist as a separate distinct entity. The Rambam does not make such a distinction, and appears to allow squeezing the snow into an empty cup. It is possible that, according to the Rambam, this leniency also applies to the pickled and cooked foods mentioned in the first clause of this halachah. See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 320:6.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 320:9) states this law slightly differently: "One may place [snow] into a cup of wine or water so that it melts." Here, also, the Rambam is being more lenient, allowing the person to crush the snow by hand. The later authorities follow the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch.

Note the Maggid Mishneh's treatment of this subject in his gloss on Chapter 3, Halachah 2. As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, the leniency of this halachah is that one may perform an act to continue grinding these substances.

In one of his responsa, the Rambam explains that this refers to mixing meat, grain, and soup into a single mixture.

It is, however, forbidden to perform this activity while the pot is on the fire. Inevitably, one will stir the pot's contents, and this is considered part of the cooking process (Chapter 9, Halachah 4).

See Chapter 8, Halachah 10.

We have quoted the view of Tosafot (Yevamot 113a). Sucking milk fresh from an animal is considered a cure for pain felt in one's heart. The Rabbis question if this leniency also extends to a person groaning from hunger.

An animal is generally milked into a container.

I.e., without any human activity being performed on the Sabbath day. As opposed to the following halachah, this applies to fruit that was not crushed before the Sabbath.

Since the primary purpose for which these fruits are used is to produce beverages, the Rabbis instituted the following prohibition even when the person purchased these fruits to eat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 320:1).

Which are often used to produce juice, as mentioned in Halachah 12. As mentioned in that halachah, the Rambam allows one to squeeze other fruits for juice. Surely there are no prohibitions against liquids that flow from them.

As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, the Ramah (loc. cit.) states that whenever it is customary to drink a fruit's juice, the situation is governed by the laws that apply to pomegranates and berries.

Since the person intended to eat the fruit, he does not appreciate the fact that liquid has flowed from them and is not likely to squeeze them to produce more (Mishnah Berurah 320:6).

If the person brought them home with no specific intention, any liquid that flows from them is prohibited (ibid.).

There is another opinion in the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:1), which forbids using liquid that flows from crushed honeycombs, lest one come to crush other ones on the Sabbath. Nevertheless, in practice, the more lenient view is accepted.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 11.

See Halachah 14.

By blowing the air over them, he causes the husks to fall. Alternatively, this prohibition can be interpreted to refer to fanning the grain with one's hand or sifting it in the air. This appears to be the conception of the Shulchan Aruch which employs the word מנפה, "sift," rather than מנפח, "blow."

Although blowing away the chaff is part of the forbidden labor of winnowing, it is permitted, because one's intent is to partake of the food directly afterwards. See a parallel in Chapter 8, Halachah 12, in regard to the forbidden labor of separating.

Implied is that using two hands is forbidden (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 319:7)

As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 8, Halachah 12, our translation of these terms is taken from the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Keilim 16:3. Most commentaries follow other interpretations. (See Ramah, loc. cit..)

See Chapter 8, Halachah 11, which states that three forbidden categories of labor - winnowing, selecting, and sifting - are very similar. Nevertheless, "every labor that was performed in the Sanctuary is counted as a separate category."

In Chapter 8, Halachah 14, the Rambam speaks of filtering wine and water, mentioning several of the points touched on in this halachah.

But not wine or water that is filled with dregs.

See, however, Chapter 22, Halachah 33, where the Rambam mentions how one must hold the Egyptian basket lest one violate a Rabbinic prohibition against erecting a tent.

Significantly, there are authorities who associate this prohibition with the prohibition against erecting a tent. (See also the Shulchan Aruch HaRav 315:14 and the Mishnah Berurah 319:49, which explain that the prohibition against hanging a filter was instituted to prevent involvement with "mundane activity.")

This refers to hanging the filter over a container in the manner in which one filters beverages. There is no prohibition, however, against hanging the filter in the open air (Mishnah Berurah 315:36).

See Chapter 8, Halachah 11.

Note the gloss of Rav Moshe Cohen of Lunil and the Magen Avraham 319:19, who question the connection between mixing nuts into honey and making cheese. The Tosefta, Shabbat 13:12, mentions mixing nuts and honey in connection with the forbidden labor of kneading. Kinat Eliyahu explains that the Rambam's intent might be that just as when curdling milk for cheese one makes a single block of food from liquid, so too, one accomplishes the same objective by making such a candy.

In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo notes that the Rambam's wording here (and in Chapter 7, Halachah 5) appears to indicate that one is liable for grinding only when cutting produce with the intention of cooking it. If, however, one intends to eat the produce raw - e.g., in a salad - one is not liable.

In the Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo concludes by stating that this interpretation is not absolutely imperative. In the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:12), however, he states that one who cuts produce is liable for grinding without any qualification. The Ramah, in his gloss, clarifies that one is liable only when one cuts the vegetables and then stores them for later use. If one partakes of them immediately, one is not liable.

The later authorities (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 321:10; Mishnah Berurah 321:45) mention opinions that question the leniency mentioned by the Ramah. They also emphasize that the Ramah granted permission to cut the vegetables only with a knife. Even he forbids using a grater or similar utensil.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 15.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 24:2), the Rambam explains that this refers to stalks of grain or beans that are harvested as animal fodder, before their produce matures.

The Mishnah Berurah 324:23 states that this refers to soft carobs that can be eaten without difficulty even when they are not cut. Carobs that have already hardened are forbidden to be cut. There is, however, room for questioning whether the Rambam would make such a distinction.

In the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 324:7), Rav Yosef Karo differs with the Rambam and states that the reason for these prohibitions is that it is forbidden to undertake any unnecessary effort to prepare food for animals. Since these foods could be eaten without being shredded, it is forbidden to shred them on the Sabbath.

This refers even to an animal that died on the Sabbath itself. It is not considered muktzeh and may be served to dogs. Note, however, the Mishnah Berurah 324:17, which questions whether this leniency applies if the animal was healthy before the commencement of the Sabbath. In this context, note Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 1:17, 2:16.

In this instance, we have translated the word פירות as "fruit," rather than "produce" in order to avoid a difficulty mentioned by the commentaries. The Maggid Mishneh states that he has seen texts of the Mishneh Torah that read "for grinding applies only regarding produce." Although he favors that version over the one found in the standard texts, he finds neither to be fully satisfying.

The Kessef Mishneh explains the Maggid Mishneh's equivocation as follows. The standard text is problematic, since straw and carobs are also produce, and if there were no prohibition against grinding produce, there would be no reason to forbid shredding them. The amended version, however, is also somewhat difficult, since gourds are also produce.

Rav Yosef Karo himself favors the standard text and states that the phrase "there is no concept of grinding regarding..." is the rationale for the prohibition against shredding carobs.

To explain: The word פירות in this instance has a more restricted meaning, meaning "fruit" rather than "produce." The concept of grinding applies only with regard to grains and vegetables, but not with regard to fruit. Therefore, the prohibition against shredding carobs is only Rabbinic in origin. Although the clause pertaining to gourds and animal carcasses interposes between the clause regarding carobs and the rationale explaining it, that is not an insurmountable difficulty.

With the palms of one's hands (Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Shabbat 24:2).

Note the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (loc. cit.), which interprets all the terms in the relevant clause as referring to sheaves of straw, in contrast to Rashi and others, who interpret one term as referring to cedar bows. (See also the Maggid Mishneh and the Kessef Mishneh, who struggle to explain how the Rambam's ruling is derived from Shabbat 155a, the source for this halachah.)

This refers to the principle stated in Shabbat (ibid.) and quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:4), which states that we are able to lay out food for an animal to eat. We may not, however, undertake any extra difficulty to make the food more attractive and more accessible for the animal.

From the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh'vi'it 8:1), it appears that all three of these terms refer to species of hyssop. Hyssop is often used as animal fodder, but is occasionally employed as food for humans, and at times is used as kindling wood.

If, however, they are stored for use as kindling wood, it is forbidden to take them, as stated in Chapter 26, Halachah 18.

Note the slight difference in the manner in which this law is quoted in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:1).

Compare to Hilchot Sh'vitat Yom Tov 3:12, which states that one may crush peppers with a mortar and pestle.

Thus, one must depart from one's ordinary process in two ways, using the handle of a knife instead of a mortar, and using a bowl instead of a pestle.

This refers to a person who feels discomfort, but whose life is not in danger, nor would he be classified as being חולה, "sick." Therefore, the various leniencies mentioned in Chapter 2 do not apply to him.

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:37) states that these restrictions apply only to a person who feels discomfort. A person who is totally healthy may partake of foods that are usually eaten only for medicinal purposes. Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:43 and the Mishnah Berurah 328:120, however, qualify this leniency and state that if the person's intent is to enhance his health, it is forbidden even when he has no signs of illness.

A plant with red roots, used for dyeing or for medical purposes.

Even one suffering from discomfort.

As reflected by a comparison to the previous halachah, there are several species of hyssop, some eaten by healthy people and some used primarily for medicinal purposes.

When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:37) mentions that even if it is obvious that the person is partaking of the food for medicinal purposes, since this food is also frequently eaten for other reasons, there is no prohibition.

A plant known as asafetida, possessing a resin that is bitter tasting, and which is used as a remedy for chest pains (Meiri).

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:3), the Rambam states that a beverage produced from this plant is often drunk by people in cold lands because of the warm sensation it produces.

As indicated by Chapter 22, Halachah 7, once a person has begun drinking chiltit, he should continue. Otherwise, he risks the possibility of falling sick. Therefore, even though most healthy people in a community do not partake of this beverage, a person who has become accustomed to it may continue.

This is the text recommended by the Maggid Mishneh according to the explanation given in the previous note. There are, however, versions of the Mishneh Torah that read, "A person who has drunk chiltit... may drink it in places where it is not customary for healthy people to drink chiltit." According to this version, chiltit is being given as an example of the concept stated in the first clause of this halachah.

In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Pesachim 3:1), the Rambam defines this as a beverage made from water, into which salt, barley flour, and wild saffron are mixed. Shabbat 101a explains that this beer helps people with stomach discomforts.

Note the Ramah (Orach Chayim 327:1), who writes that at present it is not common for healthy people to apply oil to themselves. Therefore, it is forbidden to apply oil to oneself with any oil on the Sabbath for therapeutic purposes.

These liquids are not usually applied to the body. Therefore, when one applies them, it is obvious that one's intent is for medicinal purposes. Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 327:1), which states "one may not apply a mixture of oil and vinegar" and does not mention the application of vinegar alone.

The Mishnah (Shabbat 14:4) records an opinion that states that only "the sons of kings" may apply rose oil. Rabbi Shimon, however, grants this license universally, for "all Jews are the sons of kings." Shabbat 111b, however, restricts this leniency to places where this oil is freely available.

Shabbat 66b mentions that soaking one's hands and feet in a mixture of oil and salt is a remedy for intoxication.

To stop the flow of blood. This refers to a wound that was not caused by an iron utensil, nor one that is located in a place where bleeding might be dangerous. In these instances, one may dress the wound in a normal manner even if it is necessary to violate the Sabbath laws (Shulchan Aruch Harav 328:34; Mishnah Berurah 328:91).

Nor in beverages with high alcoholic content (Mishnah Berurah 328:92).

The Mishnah (Shabbat 14:4) gives another alternative: Dipping one's food in vinegar.

Shulchan Aruch HaRav 328:39 mentions opinions that permit this only when the oil is mixed with vegetable juice, since otherwise it is not the usual practice to drink oil.

This refers to raw gum taken from trees, and not to commercially prepared chewing gum.

Some authorities forbid brushing one's teeth if one's gums are likely to bleed. Similarly, using toothpaste is forbidden.

The same principles apply to the use of mouthwash.

Based on Rashi, Shabbat 108b, the Shulchan Aruch 328:20 forbids opening and closing one's eye to let the wine in, even when the wine was applied to one's eyelids.

Note the apparent contradiction to Chapter 3, Halachah 2, which states that one may leave eye salve on one's eye on Friday, implying that the salve must be applied before the commencement of the Sabbath, and not afterwards.

From a comparison to the quotation of the laws in the Shulchan Aruch 252:5 and 328:21, the following resolution may be offered. When one applies an eye salve itself to one eye, it must be applied before the Sabbath. If, however, the salve is mixed with water and is no longer a distinct entity, one may rinse one's eyes with it on the Sabbath.

From the manner in which the Ramah (Orach Chayim 328:24) and others state this law, it would appear that the intent is not that the reed be used as a bandage, but that it has other therapeutic qualities as well.

Eruvin 10:14 mentions that this was permitted in the Temple, because it was not necessary to observe the prohibitions classified as sh'vut there. (See Hilchot Klei HaMikdash 10:9.) From this statement, the Rambam derived that this is forbidden outside the Temple's premises.

Although this appears to be the Rambam's intent, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:22) quotes this prohibition as referring to oil and hot water mixed together.

Here there is an added difficulty. One may squeeze the liquids from the wadding when applying them to the wound and it is forbidden to squeeze liquids from a cloth.

Note the differences between the manner in which this law is stated by the Rambam and by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:23).

As long as the bandage has not fallen on the ground, it is considered as if it merely slipped off the wound, and therefore it may be returned to its place.

It must be emphasized that the bandages referred to here are those to which salves or other liquids have been applied. Applying such a bandage resembles smearing substances. There is no restriction against placing a bandaid or other dry bandage on a wound on the Sabbath. See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:23-24).

Eruvin 102b and the commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:25) interpret this prohibition as a safeguard, lest one come to spread a salve. Since the bandage was applied on Friday, there is no reason for a safeguard lest one grind herbs.

Outside the Temple, there is a prohibition against placing a bandage on a wound for the first time on the Sabbath, lest one grind herbs, and lest one spread the salves. Nevertheless, since both these prohibitions are considered in the category of sh'vut, they are waived in the Temple.

This is the explanation according to the standard printed text of the Mishneh Torah, and this text is accepted by Rav Kapach and Rav Frankel in their texts of the Mishneh Torah. The Maggid Mishneh, however, questions this version of the text based on the Eruvin 10:13, which states, "We may return a bandage [to a wound] in the Temple, but not elsewhere." Indeed, his question is reinforced by the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, which states that outside of the Temple, one may not return a bandage to its place after it has fallen to the ground. In the Temple, however, this is permitted. Nevertheless, it is forbidden to place a bandage on a wound for the first time on the Sabbath even in the Temple.

Nevertheless, several of the later commentaries (Seder HaMishneh; Or Sameach) attempt to justify the standard text of the Mishneh Torah, basing their explanations on the Rambam's statements in Hilchot Korban Pesach 1:16, where the Rambam states that when Pesach was celebrated on the Sabbath, the priests would wash the floor of the Temple Courtyard on the Sabbath to clean away the blood and refuse from the Paschal sacrifices.

In the source for that halachah, Pesachim 65a, there is a difference of opinion on this matter among the Sages. Rabbi Natan maintains that the only time a prohibition that is in the category of sh'vut is suspended in the Temple is when transgressing it is necessary for the Temple service. Therefore, he rules that it is forbidden to wash the Temple floor on such an occasion, for doing so is an expression of respect for the Temple, but is not a necessity for its service to continue.

From the fact that the Rambam rejects Rabbi Natan's view, it is clear that he maintains that - as he says simply in this halachah - "The prohibitions classified as sh'vut do not apply in the Temple" - i.e., they do not apply at all. The Mishnah in Eruvin follows Rabbi Natan's opinion. Therefore, in his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam explains Rabbi Natan's position. This explanation does not reflect the Rambam's own view; that is expressed in our halachah.

For the priests were careful and would not come to violate a Torah prohibition (the gloss of Rabbenu Yehonatan, Eruvin 102b).

Significantly, when the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:26 cites this law, it changes the wording slightly and states, "for one is spreading [a salve]." Spreading a salve is a derivative of the forbidden labor of smoothing, as stated in Chapter 11, Halachah 6.

Our translation is based on the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:6).

The Tosefta (Shabbat 17:22) states, "One may not run for exercise on the Sabbath, but one may walk leisurely the entire day." Note also the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 301:2), which grants license for youths to perform calisthenics on the Sabbath if they enjoy doing so. Note, however, the Mishnah Berurah, which emphasizes that the license is granted only when one enjoys the physical activity, and not when one does so for health purposes.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that these two phrases refer to alternate explanations offered by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi of the expression, "We do not go down to Kordima (alt. Poltima)," in the Mishnah (Shabbat 22:6). Although in his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that Mishnah differently, both the interpretations given by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi represent valid halachic points.

One may, however, bathe in the pleasant waters of the Mediterranean, even though they are salty (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:44).

For it appears that one has entered these bodies of water to cool off (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

Rashi, Shabbat 147b, explains that this prohibition was instituted to prevent "ordinary activity." On this basis, the Magen Avraham 327:1 relates that if one has a utensil designated for use on the Sabbath, this would be permitted. It is questionable, however, whether the Rambam accepts that rationale and that leniency.

The bracketed additions are based on Rashi's commentary, Shabbat 53b. Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:28) which states that this leniency applies only in places where it is common for people to annoint themselves with oil.

I.e., even when the wound has begun to heal and the scabs have dried (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 328:22).

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 332:2) is slightly more specific regarding this law, explaining that one may not treat an animal's scabs when they have already dried out and have begun to heal. When, however, the scabs are fresh and the wound still smarts, the scabs may be treated.

Literally, "was taken by blood."

Although a person is forbidden to perform any activity that is solely therapeutic in nature for the sake of a human being who is in discomfort, this restriction is not imposed regarding an animal's discomfort. The rationale is that a person generally is not disturbed about his animal's discomfort to the extent that he might be motivated to grind herbs for medication on the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 332:3; Mishnah Berurah 332:5).

It must, however, be emphasized that when an animal is very seriously afflicted, greater leniency is allowed. For example, one may have a gentile perform forbidden labors to save the animal. This is allowed because our Sages feared that when an animal's life was in danger, its owner would not hesitate to perform the forbidden labors himself to save the animal if he were not given any other alternative (ibid.).

Note the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 328:39), which states that because this is a wasteful activity, it is forbidden during the week as well, unless one is suffering discomfort.

This is one of the instances where the commentaries have difficulty discovering the Rambam's source. There is no explicit statement to this effect in the Talmud, and the Rabbis have offered several possible references from which it is possible that this concept could have been derived.

Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.:40) permits placing hot cups to cure a stomach ailment.

The latter practice involves tying a newborn baby's limbs with cloth so that they grow straight. This practice is still followed in several Yemenite communities.

See Chapter 2, Halachah 10.

To relate the Rambam's decision to terms of our contemporary experience: Medication may not be given on the Sabbath. Physiotherapy, by contrast, is permitted.

See Chapter 8, Halachot 11 and 16.

I.e., exposing the straw to the wind so that the chaff will be blown away.

Rashi explains that this act is permitted, because although it is possible that a forbidden labor, sifting, might be performed, it is done unintentionally. Hence, there is no prohibition involved. Kinat Eliyahu adds that here we are speaking about an activity that resembles sifting and which is forbidden by the Rabbis for that reason, but not about the forbidden labor of sifting itself. Therefore, forbidding carrying the straw in a sieve because some might unintentionally be sifted would be "a safeguard for a Rabbinic decree." Hence, there is no prohibition.

See Chapter 8, Halachah 16.

According to the Rambam, mixing roasted flour with water is forbidden by the Rabbis, but does not violate the Torah's prohibition against making a mixture of solid particles and water. The Torah's prohibition involves adding water to a collection of granular substances - e.g., flour or cement - and mixing them until they cling together as a single mass.

Other authorities [Tosafot (Shabbat 18a), the Ra'avad (see Chapter 18, Halachah 15), the Ramban, and the Rashba] differ and maintain that according to the Torah, one is liable for mixing any substance with water, even if its particles do not stick together. (See Shulchan Aruch HaRav 321:16 and Be'ur Halachah 321.)

Mixing even small amounts of unroasted flour, by contrast, is forbidden (Mishnah Berurah 321:53).

Rashi (Shabbat 155b) does not differentiate between shatit and roasted flour.

I.e., free-flowing as opposed to viscous.

During the week, by contrast, the vinegar is usually put in first (Shabbat 156a).

When bran is mixed into water, the particles remain separate and do not stick together, as mentioned in the notes on the previous halachah.

I.e., substances whose particles do adhere to each other when mixed with water.

But not in circular movement, lest it appear that one is kneading (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 324:3).

This ruling relates to another difference of opinion among the Sages which was not resolved and was, therefore, perpetuated by the later Rabbis. Rabbi Yosse bar Yehudah (Shabbat 155b) mentions that kneading involves actually mixing the dough with one's hands. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi differs and maintains that one is liable for kneading as soon as one pours water into flour.

The Rambam follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosse bar Yehudah. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi's opinion is, however, accepted by some authorities (Sefer HaTerumot), is referred to in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 321:16), and is preferred by the Ramah. According to this view, we may not stir a mixture of bran and water on the Sabbath unless the water was added before the commencement of the Sabbath (Shulchan Aruch, loc. cit.).

I.e., one is allowed to mix as large a quantity as one needs for that Sabbath. One may not, however, mix bran that one does not need on that Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 324:9).

Note the Levush (Orach Chayim 324), which offers a different reason for this prohibition: It represents an expenditure of effort that is not necessary to provide the animal with food for the Sabbath.

Before a camel-driver set out on a journey with his beast, he would force-feed it enough food to last several days, to minimize the amount of fodder he would have to carry (Meiri).

This refers to calves that are force-fed to fatten them for slaughter.

See Chapter 15, Halachah 1.

The Mishnah Berurah 324:28 emphasizes that even if one is allowed to force feed-animals, one must do so without moving the animal, for an animal is muktzeh.

This issue has import within the context of the socio-economic history of the Jewish people. In Eastern Europe, one of the main sources of income for the Jewish people was raising fattened geese. These geese were force-fed during the week to the extent that they were unable to consume enough food to satiate themselves on the Sabbath unless they were force-fed. Some Rabbis allowed force-feeding them on the Sabbath, while others forbade it. (See Mishnah Berurah 324:27.) There are authorities who forbade the practice entirely, because of cruelty to animals, and because of the problems in kashrut that might arise.

Note the Be'ur Halachah 324, which draws attention to the following question: Is one Jew allowed to feed animals that another Jew is responsible to feed? Seemingly, since their owner is allowed to feed them, that same license is granted to other Jews. The Be'ur Halachah favors granting this leniency.

Even if the pigs belong to a Jew, he is forbidden to feed them on the Sabbath. This decree was imposed because the Rabbis prohibited raising pigs (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 409). Therefore, if one possesses pigs in a manner that does not violate this prohibition - e.g., a gentile pays one a debt with a pig - one may feed them on the Sabbath (Mishnah Berurah 324:30).

In this instance, even though a person owns these animals, since they usually are left to find their own food, providing them with food is considered to be an unnecessary expenditure of effort (Shulchan Aruch Harav 324:7; Mishnah Berurah 324:29).

Rav David Arameah explains that this is a decree imposed lest one pick up the food that has been set aside and feed it to the animal.