Edut - Chapter 20

Mishneh Torah (Moznaim)

Featuring a modern English translation and a commentary that presents a digest of the centuries of Torah scholarship which have been devoted to the study of the Mishneh Torah by Maimonides.

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Notes:

1. If one of them is unacceptable as a witness, their testimony is no loner effective. Hence they are not punished (Kessef Mishneh).

2. The second pair of witnesses states that one, but not the other of the first pair were with them in a different place at the time they claim that the event transpired.

3. For the punishment was prescribed only for a pair of witnesses (Rashi, Makkot 5b).

4. As described in Chapter 13.

5. As described in Chapters 10-12.

6. As stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 4. They are, however, acceptable in matters where leniency is granted with regard to the acceptance of testimony, e.g., testimony concerning the death of a woman's husband.

7. Our translation is based on the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh who states that the fundamental principle the Rambam is trying to convey with this phrase is that capital punishment is not given unless it is explicitly stated in the Torah. A logical proof is not sufficient.

What is the logic here? If a person who conspires to have a person executed should be executed, should not one who actually caused him to be executed.

8. From the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah and from the gloss of the Radbaz, it appears that although they are not executed, they should be punished by the court.

9. I.e., what they conspired.

10. I.e., the Torah prescribes punishment only in such a situation.

11. The Ra'avad and the Kessef Mishneh question the Rambam's source for this distinction. The Kessef Mishneh explains that it is possible to say that since judgment is ultimately in God's hands, had the executed party not been guilty, God would not have allowed him to be executed. Hence the lying witnesses need not be punished. Alternatively, he can be explained that the punishments inflicted by the courts are not goals in their own right, but means to bring a person to atonement. It is not fitting to give lying witnesses who had a person executed the opportunity to achieve such atonement. Since lashes is not as severe a punishment, neither of these explanations apply.

12. I.e., the plaintiff is required to return it.

13. For financial penalties are established based on Talmudic logic (Kessef Mishneh).

14. As the Rambam continues to explain, the Hebrew term translated as 'immediately after,' toch kidei dibur, has a specific meaning: The time it takes a student to greet a teacher, saying: Shalom alecha rabbi (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17).

15. The Ra'avad questions: Since these witnesses were not disqualified through hazamah, why would one think that they should be punished? The Radbaz answers that the very fact that they appeared together with lying witnesses implicates them.

The Lechem Mishneh explains that the Rambam's intent is that even if the second pair of witnesses were also disqualified through hazamah, they are not punished. The rationale is that since their testimony was separated from that of the first pair and by the time they testified the defendant could have been executed because of the testimony of the first pair, their testimony is of no consequence. Hence they are not punished.

16. Thus even if there is no difficulty at all with the testimony of the last pair of witnesses, the defendant is not punished. 17. Because they saw the event together and appeared together in court.

18. The rationale for this distinction can be explained as follows: With regard to the disqualification of witnesses, everything is dependent on the testimony of the witnesses in court. Hence if their testimony is separated, they are not considered as a single group. Their classification as a single group, by contrast, depends on their coming to court together. Since they came together with the intent to testify, they are considered as a single group (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).

The Ra'avad (and Rashi, in his commentary to Makkot 6a) do not accept the Rambam's approach and maintain that even though the first pair of witnesses should be executed, if the testimony of the second pair is validated, the defendant should also be executed.

19. I.e., he is cross-examined by the court, as explained in Chapter 2.

20. I.e., despite the fact that he did not actually testify, it is considered as if he did as the Rambam proceeds to explain. See also Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 2:8 which states that making such statements is equivalent to actually testifying in court.

21. I.e., they receive punishment even if they committed the transgression without knowing that it was forbidden.

22. The Radbaz explains that Numbers 15:29, the source for the laws of inadvertent transgression mentions 'one who acts inadvertently' (see Hilchot Shegagot 1:2). In this context (in contrast to blasphemy), speaking is not considered as an act. Hence they are not held liable.

Nevertheless, the Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh offer a different rationale why these witnesses are punished without a warning: They desired to have the defendant punished although he did not receive a warning. Therefore, they should be punished without a warning.

23. See Chapter 18, Halachah 4.

24. For the entire purpose of a warning is to distinguish between a transgression committed willfully and one committed inadvertently (Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:2).

25. See Chapter 18, Halachah 3.

26. We do not say that they are lying and have resolved to testify against anyone who delivers testimony in this matter (Rashi, Makkot 5a).

27. Because the testimony of the second group exonerates him from the onus of the testimony of the first group.

28. The second group should be executed as lying witnesses who sought to have the first group executed. Reuven should be executed, because once the testimony of the second group has been disqualified, the testimony of the first group is then reinstated.

29. Because the disqualification of the second group exonerates them.

30. I.e., he has a physical ailment that will cause him to die within 12 months.

31. Seemingly, through their testimony, they are trying to have the defendant executed. Nevertheless, despite the fact they testify that the person who is trefe committed a murder, he is not executed. The rationale is that testimony must be able to be disqualified through hazamah. Since it is impossible to punish the witnesses 'as they conspired to do to their brother,' for they conspired to have a sick person executed and they are healthy, the concept of hazamah is not relevant, as stated in Hilchot Rotzeach 2:9.

32. And a person who kills a colleague who is trefe is not liable for execution. For it is as if he killed a dead person (Sanhedrin 78a; Hilchot Rotzeach 2:8).

33. Here also, it would appear that the intent is that since they are seeking to have the person executed, one might think that they should be executed. In fact, however, their testimony is not effective in having the defendant sentenced to death. Since they are trefe, there is no possibility of requiting them 'as they conspired to do to their brother.' For they conspired to have a healthy person executed and they are sick.

Accordingly, the Kessef Mishneh explains that we are speaking about a situation where the court did not recognize that the witnesses were trefe when it accepted their testimony.

34. Thus the punishment is not 'as they conspired to do to their brother.'

35. For the reasons mentioned by the Rambam in the following halachah.

36. I.e., the descendant of a priest who is not considered as a member of the priesthood, because he was conceived in relations forbidden to his father. See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 19:5.

37. Thus making his mother forbidden to his father.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger raises a question, noting that a woman who underwent chalitzah is only forbidden to a priest by Rabbinic decree. Hence the Ramban and others rule that lashes should not be given. Rabbi Akiva Eiger himself states that since the defendant is being disqualified according to Rabbinic decree through the testimony of the witnesses, and by giving that false testimony, they violate a Scriptural commandment, it is appropriate that they be punished by lashing.

38. We do not say that the witnesses should be considered as challalim themselves. This applies even if the witnesses are priests. Makkot 2b explains this based on Deuteronomy 19:19: 'And you shall requite him as he conspired to do to his brother.' The obligation is to requite him, not to requite his descendants and having him declared a challal would be a punishment against his descendants as well as him.

39. The lying witnesses are not exiled "as they conspired to do to" the defendant. The rationale is that Deuteronomy 19:5 says with regard to a person convicted of inadvertent murder: 'He shall flee to one of these cities.' Makkot, loc. cit., states: ...He,' and not those who conspire against him.'

40. For an atonement fine is not a monetary assessment, but rather a fine designated to bring atonement for the death of the victim. These witnesses do not need that type of atonement, for their ox did not cause death (Rashi, Makkot, loc. cit.; see also Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 10:4-5).

See also the Ketzot HaChoshen 38:2 which explains that even though the witness also caused the ox to be sentenced to death and no benefit to be derived from it. Nevertheless, the witnesses are lashed and not subjected to these penalties. See also the Ramban who differs and maintains that the witnesses are required to make financial restitution and are not lashed.

41. The Nimukei Mahari (based on Makkot, loc. cit.), explains that the intent is that the witnesses testify that the person stole and did not have the money to make restitution for the theft.

42. Although Makkot, loc. cit., outlines how each of these concepts is derived from the exegesis of a verse, since the concepts are not derived through the Thirteen Principles of Biblical Exegesis, the exegesis is considered as only an asmachta. The binding obligation to fulfill these directives stems from the fact that they were transmitted through the Oral Tradition (Radbaz).

43. The Rambam is borrowing the wording of Deuteronomy 25:1-2: 'And they shall validate the righteous and condemn the wicked. If the wicked man is deserving of being beaten...' which continues to speak of the punishment of lashing.

'Condemning the righteous' refers to a situation where lying witnesses caused judgment to be rendered against a righteous person.

44. In this situation, we follow the instructions of the continuation of the verse and punish the person by lashes. Delivering false testimony violates the prohibition 'Do not deliver false testimony against your colleague.' Nevertheless, one might think that since that prohibition does not involve a deed, it is not punishable by lashes. Hence the exegesis of the above verse is necessary. See Makkot 4b (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).

45. As in the four cases mentioned in the previous halachah.

46. I.e., since the lying witnesses delivered testimony concerning a transgression punishable by lashes, there is no need for a special teaching to instruct us to give them that punishment. They are requited in this manner, because this is what they 'conspired to do to their brother' (Kessef Mishneh).

47. See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 3:3 which states that the two parties to this transgression are given different punishments.

48. Sanhedrin 90a derives this from Deuteronomy 19:19 which speaks of requiting a lying witness, 'as he conspired to do to his brother,' his brother and not his sister. This, however, is an asmachta.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger questions what the ruling would be in a situation where the witnesses claim to have given a warning to the woman, but not to the man. He supposes that even in such a situation, they should be executed by strangulation, not burning.