The Maggid was quite aware of this tension. His essential answer may be put as follows:

Kavanah, lishmah, hitlahavut, are the ideal state.

Nonetheless, the study of Torah and the practice of mitzvot have an objective validity of their own.

Thus they must be followed even if the ideal state has not been attained yet. One cannot possibly achieve yirah, the fear and awe of G‑d, without a prior absolute and objective fulfillment of Torah and mitzvot!

Hitlahavut is not realizable except by way of actions: by way of deeds to which it can attach itself and in which it becomes vested.

Indeed, hitlahavut in isolation harbors an element of danger.

For he who acts purely out of love, from a sense of immense ardor and ecstasy (hitlahavut), may get carried away and fail to be meticulous with his obligations. Hitlahavut thus need be tempered and restrained by a sense of fear, submission and discipline.

When the Maggid states that it is impossible to achieve devekut (attachment to G‑d) except by means of Torah and mitzvot, he is quite explicit in stating that he means the - act of Torah and mitzvot.

For mitzvot have three aspects: thought, speech, and deed.

When the Torah was given at Sinai, it was given by way of speech (G‑d's words in the proclamation of the commandments). Needless to say that this includes thought as well, because speech derives from thought. The Torah was thus given by way of thought and speech, and the deed was left to us. Hence, when we actually perform mitzvot, in actual deed, we effect the unity of the act of the mitzvah with its thought and speech.

Let us take, for example, the mitzvah of tefillin.

The section in the Torah which ordains the mitzvah of tefillin is the speech of the mitzvah.

The kavanah is the thought The commandment itself is the deed. That is why our sages said, "He who recites the Shema without tefillin bears false witness against himself." For how can the thought (the kavanah) vest itself in the speech? What will the thought and speech dwell upon if not on the actual deed? If, again, he recites the Shema with tefillin, the speech becomes a garment unto the thought, and the deed becomes a garment unto the speech.

Thus despite the inestimable importance of kavanah, the very act of the mitzvah has an objective, independent value and validity of its own. It may not be suspended, therefore, even when the proper kavanah is lacking.

The Maggid lays down what he calls "an important rule":

When a mitzvah comes to man's mind, he should not refrain from doing it because of his apprehensions that its performance may cause in him a feeling of pride or self-satisfaction, or whatever other ulterior motive. One must pursue the mitzvah anyway. No doubt but that from the present lack of lishmah he will eventually come to a state of lishmah. The good deed in and by itself effects a `good instrument' (the `body' of the deed), while the faculty of thought (kavanah) effects the pnimiyut (inwardness; the `soul') of that instrument.

For all of Torah and the mitzvot have an external aspect (chitzoniyut) which `guards the fruit,' i.e., the inner essence (pnimiyut).

This is analogous to the sac of the fetus and the placenta, the `external aspects' without which the fetus cannot develop.

For example, the mitzvah of teshuvah (repentance; return to G‑d) has an external aspect of being motivated by fear of negative consequences.

We see this in the case of "Pharaoh hikriv" (Exodus 14:10), which our sages read to mean not only that "Pharaoh came close" but also that "Pharaoh brought close": he brought Israel close to G‑d.

Pharaoh's pursuit caused Israel to do teshuvah. Now surely Pharaoh did not intend to bring them to teshuvah. They did so because they feared him. Their initial motivation, therefore, was one of fear. That fear was like a shell that protects the fruit. Thereafter, however, the Israelites found the `fruit' itself, `ate' it and did teshuvah in proper fashion. Thus from the initial shelo lishmah (lack of lishmah) will ultimately come about a state of lishmah.