Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day
Temurah - Chapter 1, Temurah - Chapter 2, Temurah - Chapter 3
Temurah - Chapter 1
Temurah - Chapter 2
Temurah - Chapter 3
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We are using the term “transfer holiness” to refer to the convention of temurah. When this convention is employed even though the holiness of the animal is transferred the original animal remains consecrated.
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 106) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 351) consider the prohibition against transferring the holiness of an animal as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
Even if he transferred the holiness of several animals to others at one time, he is liable for lashes for each animal, as stated in Halachah 14.
See Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2.
For the transgression involves speech and ordinarily speech is not considered as a deed. There are times when it is considered as a deed (see Hilchot Sechirot 13:2) and there are Sages (Rabbi Yochanan, Bava Metzia 90b, Temurah 3b) who maintain that it should be considered as a deed. Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion (Temurah 3a; Makkot 16a) is that in this context, it is not considered as a deed.
In his Guide to the Perplexed, Vol. 3, Chapter 41, the Rambam explains that these three prohibitions are singled out for the following reasons: When a person takes an oath, others are obligated to accept his statements. Transferring the holiness of consecrated animals is degrading for them. And cursing a colleague is viewed by people at large as more seriously than injuring a person physically.
I.e., aside from the issue of not involving deed, there is another reason why, seemingly, this prohibition should not be punishable by lashes as the Rambam proceeds to explain.
In which instance, the general rule is that if one fills the positive commandment, he does not receive lashes for the violation of the negative commandment (Makkot 15a; Hilchot Sanhedrin, loc. cit.).
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 87) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 352) consider the charge to regard both animals as holy as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
The prooftext cited above contains two prohibitions: “Do not exchange it and do not transfer its holiness.”
I.e., the scope of the negative commandment is more encompassing.
And thus the positive commandment does not apply in that instance. See Halachah 12 for the derivation of the exclusion of communal sacrifices and sacrificial animals brought by partners.
And the negative commandment does apply as the Rambam proceeds to illustrate.
As stated in Hilchot Shabbat 23:14, one should not consecrate an animal on the Sabbath. Even so, if one transgresses and transfers the holiness of a sacrificial animal to another animal, the transfer is effective and he is liable for lashes.
I.e., a full set of lashes. As stated in Hilchot Sanhedrin 17:1, in practice, a person is never given more than 39 lashes for one violation of a prohibition and that number could be reduced dependent on his strength.
The intent is not that one partner, or one member of the Jewish people, seeks to transfer the holiness of the animal, for it is obvious that such a transfer would not be effective. Since that person does not have ownership over the entire animal, there is no way that he can transfer its holiness. Instead, the intent is that even though both partners or the representatives of the entire people seek to transfer a sacrificial animal’s holiness, it may not be transferred.
I.e., since every Jew has a share in the communal sacrifices (see Hilchot Shekalim 4:1), they are considered comparable to sacrifices owned by partners.
Temurah 17b derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 17:10. Although generally, lashes are only given for the conscious violation of a prohibition, our Sages understood the verse as implying that this case is an exception to the rule.
I.e., how can one be liable for an inadvertent transgression?
For he is transgressing the prohibition consciously. He is merely erring in regard to the identity of the sacrificial animal whose holiness he wishes to transfer. The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, because he follows a different understanding of the Talmudic passage cited. Rav Yosef Corcus and the Kessel Mishneh provide support for the Rambam’s view, explaining that it is also followed by Rashi.
Because he transgressed unknowingly.
This is a general principle, applicable in many contexts with regard to sacrifices. See Hilchot Arachin 6:21, 24, Hilchot Temurah 1:3, Hilchot Nizirut 9:9.
A male lamb for a burnt offering, a ewe as a sin offering, and a ram as a peace offering, as stated in Hilchot Nizirut 8:1.
Since the sacrifice is set aside for his atonement, it is considered his (see Temurah 2b).
This refers to a burnt-offering or a peace-offering. A sin-offering or a guilt-offering is not offered for the sake of a deceased person, as stated in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:1, 14.
In Halachah 1.
As stated in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 3:2, a gentile may consecrate burnt-offerings to be offered in the Temple.
Temurah 2b states that since the punishment for transferring the holiness of an animal will not be meted out to a gentile, the gentile’s transfer of holiness is not effective. Moreover, the passage discussing this prohibition (Leviticus, ch. 27) begins: “Speak to the children of Israel” (Temurah 3a). See also Halachah 12.
I.e., this question is discussed in Temurah 2b-3a and left unresolved. The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, stating that a gentile cannot transfer the holiness of an animal at all, regardless of whether the animal belongs to him or a Jew. He interprets the unresolved question in the Talmud as applying to a situation where a Jew wants to transfer the holiness of an animal which a gentile consecrated for the Jew’s atonement. Rav Yosef Corcus agrees that the Rambam’s interpretation is problematic, for seemingly, since a Jew cannot consecrate an animal that he consecrated on behalf of another person (Halachah 4), why should a gentile have that prerogative?
Temurah 2b derives the obligation of a woman from the exegesis of Leviticus 27:10. In that Talmudic passage, the question is raised: Why is there a need for a special verse to teach us that women are also liable? There is a general rule that women have the same liability as men with regard to all of the punishments of the Torah. In resolution, the Talmud explains that since this prohibition is unique in that there are instances where a person violates the prohibition and yet is not liable for punishment (e.g., partners as stated in Halachah I), it is necessary for there to be a source teaching that women are held liable.
For lashes are never given to a person below the age of majority. Until that age, he or she is not held responsible for their conduct.
As stated in Hilchot Nedarim 11:1-4, when a female reaches the age of eleven and a male, the age of twelve, and they are of sufficient intellectual prowess to understand to Whom vows are being made, their vows are binding according to Scriptural Law.
The Talmud’s question is whether we compare the transfer of holiness to the consecration of an animal, in which instance, one would say that just as such a minor could consecrate an animal, he could transfer its holiness. Or we say that since the punishment for this transgression is not given to a minor, the transfer of holiness is also not effective.
As stated in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 7:1, 9:1, 10:3, the meat of these animals must be eaten by the priests alone.
Thus until the animal is offered, it does not belong to them, as evident from ibid. 11:4 which states that a person who partakes of sacrificial meat before the blood is cast on the altar is liable for lashes. And as stated in Halachah 3, a person cannot transfer the holiness of an animal that does not belong to him.
As stated in Hilchot Bechorot 1:14, a person should keep his firstborn animal home until it grows some before giving it to the priest. When the priest receives it, he receives it, not as his private property, but with the intent of bringing it as a sacrifice.
And the animal to which the holiness was transferred must also be given to a priest, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 2.
As stated in ibid.:7, although a priest is entitled to the firstborn born in his herds, he must offer it as a sacrifice.
Which is offered together with the bull brought as a sin-offering on Yom Kippur (Leviticus 16:3; Hilchot Avodat Yom HaKippurim 1:1).
Because this is his personal offering.
See Hilchot Avodat Yom HaKippurim 5:13.
And the holiness of an animal belonging to partners cannot be transferred, as stated in Halachah 1.
Consecrated for sin-offerings and for burnt-offerings.
Leviticus 27:9-10.
The Rambam (quoting Temurah 13a) uses the term “sacrifices,” because Numbers 31:50 uses the term “sacrifice,” for offerings made to improve the Sanctuary.
Animals consecrated with the intent that they be sold and the proceeds used for the improvement of the Temple.
It was already stated that the holiness of sacrificial animals must not be transferred. Thus the fact that this concept was restated with regard to the tithe offering is obviously intended to teach certain points.
This is one of the Thirteen Principles of Biblical Exegesis listed by Rabbi Yishmael at the beginning of the Sifra and recited every day in our prayers.
Rav Yosef Corcus notes that in Hilchot Bechorot 6:10, the Rambam rules that in certain circumstances, partners may be liable to bring tithe-offerings from their combined holdings. He mentions that the Rambam addressed this issue in a revision of his Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 1:6). Originally (and this version is preserved in the standard published text), he wrote “We already explained at the conclusion of Bechorot that partners are not obligated in the tithe offering.” Afterwards (and this version is found in Rav Kapach’s edition of the Commentary of the Mishnah), he amended the text to read: “[The tithe offering] is not brought as a pledge or a vow by two people, as they would bring an animal as a burnt-offering or a peace-offering.”
I.e., none of the Torah’s agricultural obligations apply to land owned by Gentiles, even in Eretz Yisrael, as stated in Hilchot Terumot 4:15.
In Halachah 6.
And is thus unfit for sacrifice; see a description of these blemishes in Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach, ch. 2.
An animal that has a permanent blemish is not fit to be sacrificed. Instead, it should be redeemed and a sacrifice brought with the proceeds of its sale (ibid. 1:10). Hence, it resembles an animal consecrated for the improvement of the Temple and like it (Halachah 12), its holiness cannot be transferred.
See Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 1:11 which lists several differences between the laws applying to sacrificial animals with temporary blemishes and those with permanent blemishes. The difference between the two situations is that when a blemish is only temporary, the animal is considered as a sacrificial animal and its consecration involves not only its worth, but its actual physical person.
Since it was unblemished at the time it was consecrated, the consecration affected its physical person, not only its worth. Although it became blemished afterwards, that fact does not detract from the original consecration.
See Chapter 2, Halachot I, 3, which explain that a blemished animal can be redeemed by exchanging it with an unblemished one in a way that does not violate this prohibition.
I.e., one that contracted the blemish after being consecrated, as explained in the previous halachah.
Even though one cannot consecrate a blemished animal in a a way that its body becomes consecrated, if one is transferring the holiness of a consecrated animal, its body becomes consecrated. Temurah 9a derives this concept from Leviticus 27:10 which speaks about transferring the holiness of a “good” animal to a “bad” one. “Bad” is interpreted as being blemished and thus unfit for sacrifice [see the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 1:2), see also Chapter 3, Halachah 5].
More precisely, the term tzon is a collective term meaning sheep or goats.
Or more.
Thus if he transferred the holiness of one consecrated animal to 100 ordinary animals, he is liable for 100 sets of lashes and if he transfers the holiness of 100 animals to one ordinary animal, he is liable for one set of lashes (Rav Yosef Corcus).
The offspring of a consecrated animal is itself consecrated. Nevertheless, its holiness cannot be transferred to another animal. Based on a comparison to the following halachah, we must conclude that here, the Rambam is speaking about an instance in which an animal became pregnant after it was consecrated and then gave birth.
In the previous halachah.
Rav Yosef Corcus notes that the Rambam speaks of limbs that are not vital to the animal’s survival. If, however, one says: “The heart of this animal...” or “The head of this animal...”, the transfer of holiness would be effective. See also Halachah 19.
This is speaking about a situation where the person consecrated the animal while it was pregnant. Thus the holiness of it and its fetus are of the same nature (see Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 4:6). In this way, it is distinguished from the offspring of a consecrated animal mentioned in the previous halachah (Lechem Mishneh).
The Kiryat Sefer suggests that this is derived from the fact that the prooftext mentions transferring the holiness from “one animal to another animal.” Since these are not animals, holiness cannot be transferred to and from them.
Which is not fit to be offered on the altar.
An animal which will not live for more than 12 months (see Hilchot Shechitah 5:2 for a list of the different conditions which will cause an animal to be deemed tereifah).
An animal whose gender is masked by a wall of flesh.
An animal who has both male and female reproductive organs. All of these types of animals are not acceptable as offerings (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:1-3).
Which also cannot be consecrated for a sacrifice and yet, the holiness of an animal can be transferred to it, as stated in Halachah 14.
I.e., all of the types of animals mentioned above are considered as departures from the norm, so great that they are considered another type of animal. A blemished animal, by contrast, is considered as part of the same general category as an unblemished one, because it is very common for blemishes to occur (Rav Yosef Corcus).
Which is also unfit for sacrifice.
For that type of animal is offered as a sacrifice and they are permitted to be eaten (Rav Yosef Corcus).
This includes animals set aside, but not used as sacrifices to false deities, animals that were themselves worshipped as false deities, an animal given to a prostitute as her fee, an animal received in exchange for a dog, and an animal that was not of the age fit for sacrifice (see Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 3:7-8, 10).
I.e., it was owned by two partners, one consecrated his portion and the other did not.
The Kiryat Sefer explains that this is derived from Leviticus 27:10 which speaks of exchanging the holiness of “an animal to an animal.” Implied is that the transfer must be from a complete animal to a complete animal. Just as the limbs of an animal cannot be involved in a transfer of holiness (Halachah 15), so too, half an animal cannot be involved in a transfer.
As stated in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:1, this includes: a) the offspring of an animal designated as a sin-offering, b) an animal exchanged for an animal designated as a sin-offering, c) an animal designated as a sin-offering whose owner dies, and d) such animal that was lost and then found only after the owner secured atonement.
For example, an animal designated as a communal sin-offering, by contrast, which was lost and then discovered after atonement was secured, and others placed in the same category, as stated in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim, ch. 4.
These types of sacrifices may only be brought from males (Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 1:8, 10; Hilchot Korban Pesach 1:1).
In contrast to a blemished animal, which is mentioned in Halachah 13.
For the proceeds of its sale will be used to purchase a sacrificial animal that will be offered on the altar, as stated in Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:16-17; Hilchot Korban Pesach 4:4.
All the sin-offerings brought by an ordinary person are female (Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 1:15).
This is the interpretation of the term nasi used by the Rambam (see Hilchot Shegagot 15:6).
Instead of a he-goat as required of a king when he transgresses inadvertently (ibid.:1).
Instead of a bull as required of a High Priest when he transgresses inadvertently (ibid.).
I.e., in contrast to the situations mentioned above, there is no obligation to sell the animal that was designated and use the proceeds of the sale to purchase a sacrifice.
Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:18. The Rambam’s ruling appears to be based on the rationale that when an error was made in consecrating an animal as a sin-offering, it is not consecrated at all. In his gloss to those halachot, the Ra’avad objects to this ruling based on Temurah 19b-20a, but states that there is a way to resolve the Rambam’s perspective. In his gloss there, the Kessef Mishneh recognizes the difficulty in the Rambam’s ruling and also offers a possible resolution.
The ordinary animal.
The sacrificial animal. Rabbi Akiva Eiger clarifies that both animals must be alive at the time the statement is made.
Without specifying which animal consecrated as a burnt-offering he meant.
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 5:6), the Rambam explains that the prooftext for this mitzvah (Leviticus 27:10) states: “Do not exchange it and do not transfer its holiness,” implying that there is a specific animal involved.
Mechullelet, the term the Rambam uses, refers to a convention that is effective when transferring the holiness of a blemished sacrificial animal to a non-blemished one. This convention is not, however, effective in bringing about a forbidden transfer.
The proper course of action for such an animal is to use the convention called chillul in which the holiness of the animal is transferred to money or another animal and then the blemished animal can be sold as an ordinary animal. Nevertheless, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 13, one can also transfer the holiness in a forbidden manner, using the convention referred to as temurah. In that instance, even though the holiness is transferred, the original animal still remains holy.
Placing his hand on the forbidden animal indicates that his fundamental intent was to cause the ordinary animal to be consecrated which involves the convention of temurah (Rav Yosef Corcus).
Placing his hand on the consecrated animal indicates that his fundamental intent was to redeem the consecrated animal which involves the convention of chillul (ibid.).
Which is a desirable and required act.
I.e., for the altar and not for the improvement of the Temple. In such an instance, their bodies, not only their worth becomes consecrated.
Without placing his hands on any of the animals and indicating his intent in that manner (Rashi, Temurah 27a).
We follow this assumption even when as, in this instance, the person has shown that he is willing to violate the prohibition involved.
I.e., the repetition of an action three times establishes a chazzakah, a halachic presumption, on which basis a person's conduct is judged. Since the person transgressed more than three times, one might conclude that he is not concerned with the violation of this commandment at all. Hence, he should be liable for a tenth set of lashes as well, for there is no basis for the assumption that he transferred the holiness of the tenth animal through the convention of chillul.
This conclusion is not accepted. Instead, even in such a situation, we rely on the presumption that a person will not abandon a permitted course of action and follow a forbidden one.
I.e., through chillul.
And perform temurah.
Although the person is violating a prohibition by making one transfer through the convention of temurah, we assume that he will not desire to commit a second transgression and transfer the holiness of both animals through this same convention. Instead, even though he will transfer the holiness of the unblemished animal through temurah, he will transfer the holiness of the blemished animal through the convention of chillul. It is necessary to state this situation, because generally, chillul is used to transfer the holiness of a blemished animal to an unblemished one and not to another blemished one (Rav Yosef Corcus).
When the holiness of the blemished animal is transferred to another blemished animal, we assume that this is being done through the convention of chillul, because when mentioning the prohibition against temurah, Leviticus 27:10 speaks about substituting “good for bad or bad for good.” “Good” refers to an unblemished animal, “bad,” a blemished one. Implied is that there is no concept of substituting bad for bad, i.e., one blemished animal for another, through the convention of temurah (Rashi, Temurah 27a).
This is speaking about a situation where the person had both an animal designated as a burnt-offering and one designated as a peace-offering before him or in his home.
I.e., it should be allowed to pasture until it contracts a disqualifying blemish and then sold (see Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 15:3).
Since he is speaking of one transfer of holiness - even though it involves two animals - it is as if he consecrated an animal, half as a burnt-offering and half as a peace-offering, as described in ibid.; see also Chapter 3, Halachah 3.
I.e., if his intent was to have half of it consecrated as a burnt-offering and half, as a sin-offering, as in the previous instance.
After contracting a disqualifying blemish, the animal should be sold and half of the proceeds used to bring a burnt-offering and half used to bring a peace-offering.
The phrase translated as "immediately thereafter," toch kedei dibbur, has a very specific halachic meaning: "Within the time it takes to say Shalom Elecha, Rebbi" ("Greetings, my master"; Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17).
In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 5:3; see also Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 15:1), the Rambam explains that generally if one seeks to retract his statements immediately, the retraction is effective. There are, however, several instances, for example, marriage, the acceptance of a false divinity, blasphemy, the consecration of sacrifices, and the transfer of holiness from one animal to another where retraction is not possible. Hence, his original statement is binding and the holiness of a burnt-offering alone is transferred to the animal.
In which instance it is not fit to be offered as a burnt-offering, for the animals offered for such sacrifices must be unblemished and male.
A blemished animal may be sold immediately.
As is the law if a person would consecrate a female animal or a blemished animal as a burnt-offering.
Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:1.
Whether male or female.
Temurah 17b notes that Leviticus 5:19 states: “It is a guilt-offering” and comments: “‘It’ is sacrificed; an animal to which its holiness was transferred is not sacrificed.” See Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:14.
Burnt-offerings sacrificed as an embellishment to the altar at a time when the altar is free [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Shekalim 4:4)].
The laying of the hands on the animal by the owner, as explained in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 3:6-15.
Meal, oil, and wine offered to accompany a sacrifice, as explained in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot, ch. 2.
As explained in ibid. 9:6-7, these portions of the animal offered as a peace-offering are placed in the owner’s hand. A priest places his hand below the owner’s hand and the portions are brought to each of the four directions and then upward and downward.
The forty loaves offered with the thanksgiving-offering. See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKarbanat 9:17-19. Temurah 18b derives this from the phrase (Leviticus 7:12): “He shall offer on the slaughtering of the thanksgiving-offering, loaves....” From the fact that the verse speaks of “the thanksgiving-offering,” our Sages conclude: ‘“A thanksgiving-offering’ [itself] requires loaves; an animal to which its holiness was transferred does not requires loaves.”
Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 12:8.
At which time, the obligation to offer the Paschal sacrifice takes effect.
The Kessef Mishneh and Rav Yosef Corcus note that this ruling is the subject of a difference of opinion in Pesachim 96b. There the Talmud notes that Exodus 12:27 states: ‘‘It is Paschal sacrifice” and comments: ‘“It’ is sacrificed, an animal to which its holiness is transferred is not sacrificed.” The Sages then explain that the restriction applies to a situation where a Paschal sacrifice was lost, another was set aside instead, the first was found, and the holiness of the second was transferred. (See Hilchot Karban Pesach 4:6.) If, however, one transferred the holiness of a Paschal sacrifice itself, the animal to which the transfer was made should be sacrificed. Thus the Rambam’s ruling appears questionable.
Rav Yosef Corcus explains that there is a passage in Zevachim 37b which implies that an animal to which the holiness of the Paschal sacrifice was transferred should not be sacrificed. Nevertheless, he quotes Tasafat in Pesachim 97b who explain that the passage in Pesachim should be favored over the passage in Zevachim and therefore questions the Rambam’s ruling. He then offers an interpretation of the passage in Pesachim that fits the Rambam’s decision, but states that difficulties still remain.
For an animal unfit to be offered as a Paschal sacrifice that was consecrated as a Paschal sacrifice should be brought as a peace-offering, as stated in Hilchot Karban Pesach 4:4.
Temurah 5b, et al.
Because of its holiness.
See the Rambam’s explanations when listing the mitzvot at the beginning of Hilchot Becharat.
Without being redeemed, as stated in the following halachah.
After it contracts a blemish. Since the firstborn animal belongs essentially to the priests (the owner has merely the right to decide to which priest to give it), an animal to which its holiness is transferred also belongs to the priests.
Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 1:12. See also Hilchot Bechorot 1:2, 17; 6:5-6.
The law concerning such an animal is that it is considered as consecrated. It should be left to pasture until it contracts a disqualifying blemish. It should then be sold and half the proceeds used for a burnt-offering and half, for a peace-offering (Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 6:3, see Chapter 2, Halachah 4, above).
This appears to refer to the animals mentioned in Chapter 1, Halachot 13, 18, and 21. Their status is that they are not offered as sacrifices, but instead, left to pasture until they contract a disqualifying blemish. They are then sold and the proceeds used for sacrifices.
The Ra’avad notes that the Rambam’s ruling does not match the standard texts of Temurah 26b. Nevertheless, he supposes that the Rambam had a different version of that passage, which said: “Everyone agrees that when one says: ‘Half the animal is a burnt-offering and to half is transferred the holiness of a consecrated animal,’ that it should be offered as a burnt-offering.” The Ra’avad explains that the rationale motivating the ruling would seem to be that since it is forbidden to transfer the holiness of an animal, we assume that this was not the person’s intent. Instead, he first intended to consecrate it as a burnt-offering. Only afterwards did he change his mind and seek to transfer holiness to it.
Rav Yosef Corcus explains that this cannot be used as the rationale for the Rambam’s ruling, because the Rambam states: “The holiness of a sacrificial animal should be transferred to half this animal and the other half should be consecrated as a burnt-offering,” mentioning the transfer of holiness first. Therefore, Rav Yosef Corcus explains that the explanation offered by the Ra’avad cannot be used to explain the Rambam’s ruling. Rav Yosef Corcus cites Rashi’s explanation: that the transfer of holiness does not take effect, because there is no specific animal to which the holiness is being transferred. Rav Yosef Corcus does not accept that interpretation, however, because there is no reason to speak of the transfer of holiness to only half an animal. The same concept could have been stated with regard to an entire animal. Instead, he explains the intent is that holiness cannot be transferred to half an animal. Hence, the transfer of holiness is not effective. By contrast, the consecration of half the animal as a burnt-offering takes effect. And since half an animal contains organs on which the animal’s life is dependent, the consecration spreads throughout the entire animal, as stated in Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 15:2. As a result, the entire animal becomes consecrated as a burnt-offering.
Rav Yosef Corcus quotes Tosafot, Temurah, loc. cit., as explaining that this refers to a situation where a person is tithing his herds, for otherwise, there is no concept of consecrating a tithe offering. Nevertheless, before it emerges, he states that half the tenth animal will be consecrated as a burnt-offering. That statement supersedes the holiness that is endowed through the process of tithing.
Here also, there is no concept of consecrating half a tithe offering (Kiddushin Sia). Hence the person’s statement concerning the tithe offering is of no consequence. Nevertheless, his statement concerning the burnt-offering does take effect. And, as mentioned in note 24, since half the animal comprises organs on which the animal’s life depends, the consecration spreads through the entire animal.
In this instance, neither of the statements are effective. Hence, the animal’s status is in doubt. Kin’at Eliyahu asks why its status is in doubt. Since neither of these statements are effective, its status should be unchanged and it should remain an ordinary animal.
In which instance, the physical person of the animal is considered as consecrated and we wait until either the blemish is healed (in which instance, the animal is sacrificed) or it contracts a permanent blemish (in which instance, it is redeemed and the proceeds used to purchase a sacrificial animal).
I.e., either the animal with the temporary blemish or the unblemished animal.
Even after a consecrated animal is redeemed, its holiness does not depart from it entirely and its status is not that of an ordinary animal, as evident from the fact that it is forbidden to shear or perform work with such animals (Hilchot Me’ilah 1:9; see also the following halachah). Hence, that holiness can be transferred to another animal. Nevertheless, since a large measure of the holiness has departed, the animal to which the holiness is transferred can neither be sacrificed nor redeemed.
I.e., the consecrated animal had already been redeemed.
I.e., before holiness was transferred to them. Needless to say, the laws that follow apply when the animals were unblemished before holiness was transferred to them and became blemished afterwards.
And the proceeds of their sale used to purchase sacrificial animals.
I.e., their status is the same as blemished sacrificial animals that were redeemed, see Hilchot Me’ilah, loc. cit.
This is speaking about a situation in which the person did not know whether the animal whose holiness he transferred had been consecrated as a burnt-offering or as a peace-offering. In such an instance, the animal may not be sacrificed, because it is not known which type of sacrifice it is. Instead, ideally, the animal should be left to pasture until it contracts a disqualifying blemish. Afterwards, it should be sold and the proceeds of the sale used to purchase one of the types of sacrifice. The other type of sacrifice should be brought from the person’s own resources. The Rabbis, however, feared that over time the person would forget that the animal pasturing came from an intermingling of sacrificial animals and might offer only one animal after it became blemished and was redeemed. Therefore, they suggested the course of action mentioned by the Rambam (see Ra’avad, Rav Yosef Corcus, and Lechem Mishneh, based on the Tosefta, Temurah 3:6).
The one to which the holiness was transferred.
The other animal that was brought.
In which instance, the law is that the animals should be allowed to pasture until they contract a disqualifying blemish. Then they should be sold and the proceeds of the more valuable one used to purchase a burnt-offering and a similar sum, used to purchase a peace-offering. The person bringing the sacrifices must make up the difference in the value between the more valuable animal and the less valuable one from his own resources (Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 6:5-6).
These additions are made on the basis of the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh who explains that he brings an ordinary animal, not a sacrificial animal.
As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 15, the holiness of an animal to which holiness was transferred cannot be transferred to another animal. Hence, in this instance, since the two animals one to which the holiness of one of the animals from the first mixture was transferred and one which was consecrated conditionally, as either a burnt-offering or a peace-offering—became intermingled, the result is the same as in the previous clause. Again, ideally, the animal should be left to pasture until it contracts a disqualifying blemish. Afterwards, it should be sold and the proceeds of the sale used to purchase one of the types of sacrifice. The other type of sacrifice should be brought from the person’s own resources. In this instance as well, the Rabbis, however, feared that over time the person would forget the original problematic situation and therefore, suggested the course of action mentioned by the Rambam.
The animal to which the holiness was transferred.
I.e., to it was transferred the holiness of the animal that was brought in the situation described in the first clause. Thus there is a lack of clarity regarding its status: Was the holiness of a burnt-offering or the holiness of a peace-offering transferred to it?
As in the above situation, the animals should be left to pasture. Then they should be sold and two animals each equal in value to the more valuable one should be purchased. The person bringing the sacrifices should suffer the loss from his own resources.
Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim, ch. 6.
Without knowing its identity.
Since the identity of the animal whose holiness was transferred was not known, there is no way that it can be sacrificed.
Because it is possible that the holiness of a peace-offering was transferred to it. The proceeds of the sale should be used to purchase a peace-offering. Although a firstborn offering and a tithe offering need not be redeemed, redemption is necessary because of the peace-offering.
See Halachah 2; see also Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 6:14.
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