Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

I.e., it is not necessary to wait until they become blemished and then have them redeemed. Instead, they themselves should be offered as peace-offerings, according to all the relevant laws.

The forty loaves that are brought together with a thanksgiving-offering (see Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 9:17-19).

Chapter 3, Halachah 1; Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 12:8.

The fact that the consecrated animals were left unsacrificed for enough time for them to produce offspring and for their offspring to produce offspring. Why would he desire to do this? So that the sacrificial animal would produce other sacrificial animals for him to offer. In the interim, however, he would be transgressing the commandment (see Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 14:13) against delaying the offering of sacrifices [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 3:1)].
In the original text of the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 3:1, preserved in the standard version of that text), he ruled that even the offspring of the offspring of a peace-offering should be brought as a sacrifice. In his revision of his text (as presented by Rav Kapach in his translation), the Rambam changed his mind and ruled as above.

As evident from Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashim 4:6, this refers to the offspring of an animal consecrated as a sin-offering that became pregnant after the mother was consecrated for that purpose. If the mother was consecrated while pregnant, the animal is not consigned to death.

For even an animal to which the holiness of a sin-offering is transferred is consigned to death.

As explained in ibid. 4:1, the intent is not that “one should kill them with a utensil or by hand. Instead, they should be brought into a room, locked inside, [and left] until they die.”

We are speaking about a sheep or a goat whose ordinary period of gestation is five months. Since the fetus has not completed a full term pregnancy, it is still considered as a limb of the mother and permitted to be eaten because of its mother’s slaughter. Implied, however, is that if the animal had been carried for a full term pregnancy, this leniency would not be granted.

Even ritual slaughter is not necessary, as stated in Hilchot Shechitah 5:14.

I.e., it must be eaten in the Temple Courtyard, by males of the priestly family, on the day the mother was offered and on the following night.

See Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 1:19.

I.e., the money is used to buy animals that are offered as burnt-offerings at a time when the altar is not being used. See the following halachah.

I.e., there is no need to wait until it is blemished and have it redeemed and then purchase another animal. The only reason that it is required to pasture until it becomes blemished is because we are afraid that if it were to be offered it would be offered as a guilt-offering instead of the animal originally selected. Once that offering has been brought, there is no reason why it should not be offered itself (Temurah 20b).
The Ra’avad objects to this ruling, noting that the offspring of an animal consecrated as a burnt-offering is not offered as a burnt-offering and asks why this instance should be any different. The Kessef Mishneh and Rav Yosef Corcus distinguish between the two explaining that when one consecrates a female as a burnt offering, the animal that was consecrated is not fit to be offered (for burnt-offerings are brought only from males). Hence, its offspring should also not be offered. This same logic applies with regard to the offspring of a female set aside as a guilt-offering (as stated in the following clause). In this instance, by contrast, the animal consecrated as a guilt-offering could have been offered. The offspring came from the animal to which its holiness was transferred. Since the animal originally set aside could have been offered, the offspring in question can also be offered.

Guilt-offerings may be brought only from males.

A ram is more valuable than a ewe and it is likely that both animals would have to be sold to purchase it.

For, as stated above, an animal (as opposed to a fowl) may be offered as a burnt-offering only if it is male.

Temurah 17b derives this concept from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 12:26-27. As stated above, this does not represent a contradiction to rulings regarding similar animals, because in this instance, the animal that was originally consecrated could be offered as a sacrifice.
In Halachah 1, it was stated that the offspring of the offspring of an animal to which the holiness of a peace-offering was transferred should not be offered as a sacrifice as a safeguard, lest the person raise herds of sacrificial animals and benefit from their meat when offering them. The Sages did not institute such a safeguard in this instance, because here we are speaking of animals consecrated as burnt-offerings. They are consumed entirely by the altar’s pyre and the person does not derive any material benefit from bringing them (Lechem Mishneh).

The offspring itself should not be offered as a sacrifice, because in this instance, the animal that was originally consecrated could not be offered as a sacrifice.

Hilchot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 3:7; see also Hilchot Shekalim 2:3; 3:14.

Ibid. 2:2.

The wine, oil, and meal brought to accompany a burnt-offering, as described in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot, ch. 2.

Laying one’s hands on the sacrificial animal, as described in ibid. 9:6-7.
Once the person places the money in the chest for the freewill offering, it is no longer considered as his personal property, but as the property of the community. Hence, he is not the owner of the sacrifices and may not perform semichah on them. For that same reason, the community brings the accompanying offerings.

Because it is considered as his personal sacrifice.

For even an animal to which the holiness of a tithe offering itself was transferred is not offered, as stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 1.

See Hilchot Becharot 1:3; 6:4.

The Rambam does not mention the offspring of the firstborn, because only males are consecrated as firstborn offerings. That factor also explains why the offspring of an animal to which the holiness of a firstborn is transferred is not offered. Since there is no precedent for the offspring of such an animal being offered, we do not offer the offspring of the animal to which its holiness was transferred.

For the firstborn animal is the property of a priest, not of the owner of its mother. See Chapter 3, Halachah 2, and notes.

Which could be a female.

See Chapter 3, Halachah 1; see also Hilchot Karban Pesach 4:4,6.

Because the transfer of holiness was performed after noon.

Because the transfer of holiness was performed before noon.

An error, for the Paschal sacrifice may only be a male.

One might think that the mother and the offspring themselves should be brought as peace-offerings, for an animal consecrated as a Paschal sacrifice at any other time of year should be brought as a peace-offering. Nevertheless, since at the time this animal was consecrated, it was inherently unfit to be sacrificed, it is never sacrificed itself (Kiryat Sefer). See also the commentary to Hilchot Karban Pesach 4:4.

An animal whose gender is masked by a wall of flesh.

An animal with both male and female genital organs.

An animal that will die within a twelve month period. Although a sacrificial animal that is tereifah should not be redeemed (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 2:10), it is possible to differentiate between an animal that was deemed a tereifah after it was consecrated and one that was born as a tereifah (Or Sameiach).

They can be redeemed immediately; there is no need to wait until they contract a disqualifying blemish, for they are unfit for sacrifice in their present state. Although these offspring are unfit for sacrifice, since they are born from consecrated animals, the value of the offspring is consecrated and should be used to purchase offerings.

This is speaking about an animal that was unblemished (or possessing only a temporary blemish) when it was consecrated. Hence, its actual physical person was consecrated and a fetus which it conceives becomes consecrated. If, however, it was blemished at the time it was originally consecrated, only its worth is consecrated and a fetus that it conceives is not (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 1:11).

Even though its mother is not fit to be sacrificed, the offspring may be sacrificed.

Even though the fetus is not seen, we follow the principle: “There will not be a placenta if there is no fetus” (Rashi, Temurah 33a) and we assume that there was a fetus and some of its substance was absorbed by the placenta.

Because the offspring is considered as a consecrated animal in its own right.

The first clause speaks about attempting to change the designation of an animal for sacrifice, e.g., he says concerning a burnt-offering, “This is a peace-offering.” The second clause involves changes the designation of other consecrated articles.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 107) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 356) consider this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

If a person endeavors to transfer the holiness of an animal in this manner, his actions are not effective and it remains consecrated for the original purpose (Sefer HaMitzvot, op. cit.).

The Sifri notes that the words before the portion of the verse cited as the prooftext are “to God in the animal.” This could be interpreted as implying that the prohibition applies to any animal consecrated unto God.

The Ra’avad differs on this point and maintains that the prohibition applies only to animals consecrated as sacrifices. In that instance, there is a difference whether the animal was consecrated for one sacrifice or another, because each of the sacrifices is bound by distinct rules. With regard to articles consecrated for different purposes in the Temple, by contrast, their fundamental status and the laws applying to them are the same. Therefore, there is no reason why one cannot change them from one purpose to another.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that perhaps the Rambam’s words could be interpreted as meaning that one cannot change an article consecrated for a purpose of a higher level of holiness to one involving a lower level. One may, he maintains, change from a lower purpose to a higher one. Rav Yosef Corcus does not, however, accept this interpretation of the Rambam’s words.

The Kessef Mishneh (and the Sefer HaChinuch, loc. cit.) states that one is not liable for lashes because a deed is not involved, (for speech is not considered as a deed). Rashi (Temurah 32a) explains that he is not liable, because his attempt at changing the purpose for which the article was originally consecrated was not effective and its original purpose remained.

In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Temurah 5:1), the Rambam emphasizes that it is permitted to employ such a technique. Doing so is not considered as deceiving God.

A firstborn animal is inherently holy and must be offered as a sacrifice. However, it may not be offered immediately and is eaten by the priests. Hence, a person may desire to save himself the difficulty of caring for the animal.

I.e., it acquires the holiness of a firstborn animal only when it is born (see the following halachah). Hence, before then, one may consecrate it for another purpose.

A burnt-offering is offered on the altar entirely. Major portions of a peace-offering, by contrast, are given to the owner of the sacrifice to eat together with the members of his household.

Before the animal gave birth with the intent that his words take effect when the animal gives birth.

Once the majority of its head emerges, it is considered to have been born. See Hilchot Bikkurim 11:15 where this concept is applied in another context. The question is thus: At the time it emerges from the womb, it can be consecrated for either of two purposes: as a burnt-offering, as desired by the owner or as a firstborn, as it would be had no statement been made. There is room to say that since a burnt-offering has a higher level of holiness - as evidenced by the fact that it is consumed entirely on the altar - the consecration for that purpose should prevail.

Temurah 25a explains the rationale: “When the words of the student (the person desiring to consecrate the animal) are weighed against the words of the Master (God Who ordained that the firstborn should be consecrated as a firstborn offering), Whose words should be heeded?”

Halachah 3 above.

As stated in Halachah 12 and in Hilchot Bechorot 2:14.

Berachot 33b records a difference of opinion which revolves around the issue of whether the mitzvot of the Torah are decrees to be followed without concern for their rationales or whether they are motivated by reasons that can be understood intellectually. In his Guide to the Perplexed, Vol. III, chs. 46-48, the Rambam explains that he follows the approach which maintains that there are motivating rationales for all of the Torah’s decrees.
The commentaries have noted that in Hilchot Tefilah 9:7 and in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Berachot 5:3) the Rambam follows the other approach. From the statements here, it can be explained that the Rambam does not see the two approaches as mutually exclusive. God’s statutes are expressions of His will and must be observed regardless of whether or not we understand them. Nevertheless, as His will is filtered through the medium of intellect, we can appreciate motivating rationales. These we should seek to understand and use as tools to enhance our characters.

Eruvin 21b; Bamidbar Rabbah, the beginning of Parshat Chukat.

This expression indicates a concept which the Rambam derived through a process of deduction without relying on an explicit statement in a prior Rabbinic source.

Because an animal consecrated as a sacrifice that it not blemished may not be redeemed (Hilchot Issurei Mizbeiach 2:6; 3:10).

Rav Yosef Corcus and others object to the wording “nothing other.” They agree that all of the Torah’s laws and ordinance will lead to the refinement of a person’s character and guide him in a path of ethical perfection. Nevertheless, they explain, this is not the ultimate purpose of the Torah and its mitzvot. We fulfill the Torah out of obedience to God’s will for reasons that only He knows. Nonetheless, as a by-product of our observance, our personalities are enhanced and shaped by God’s will.

Cf. Isaiah 25:1.

Cf. Jeremiah 32:19.

The bracketed additions and the interpretation of the verse are based on the glosses, Metzudot David and Metzudot Tzion.