Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Note the parallel to a woman’s bill of divorce, as stated in Hilchot Gerushin 1:1.

I.e., it makes no difference whether the object the owner retains is landed property or movable property [Kessef Mishneh; Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Pe’ah 3:9)].

For the bill of release mentions an article over which the master still possesses authority. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 267:57) quotes the Rambam’s decision. Tosafot, Gittin 9a and the Tur offer a different interpretation of the Talmudic passage on which this ruling is based. Therefore they rule slightly differently and do not accept the decision of the Rambam.

Even though the owner intended to free the slave, since the wording of the bill of release is not proper, the bill is not effective.

For as stated in Chapter 6, Halachah 7, if a slave brings his bill of release and says: “It was written and signed in my presence,” his word is accepted.

I.e., if the owner (or his heirs, in the event of his death) protest, the property is considered his until the servant has the authenticity of the legal document verified.
The laws governing the verification of the legal documents are explained in Hilchot Eidut, ch. 6.

This also includes the slave himself, for he is part of his master’s property.

Although the master did not make a distinction between the slave and the property as in the first clause, we nevertheless make that distinction. This is an extension of the Talmudic principle palginin diburo.

Rashi (Gittin 42a) derives this concept as follows: With regard to a woman’s bill of divorce, Deuteronomy 24:1 states: “And he shall write a bill of divorce for her.” As the Rambam states (Hilchot Gerushin 4:19), this is interpreted to mean that a bill of divorce must be written for each woman individually. This is considered part of the requirement to write a bill of divorce lishmah, “for the sake of the woman being divorced.” And since the requirement to write a bill of release for a slave lishmah is equated with the requirement that applies to a woman’s bill of divorce (Chapter 6, Halachah 6), this principle also applies with regard to a slave (Radbaz).
Others (see Turei Zahav 267:25; Siftei Cohen 267:69) derive this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus 19:20: “And freedom was not given to her” – i.e., freedom must be given to her individually.

I.e., they are not freed, because the two servants were mentioned in the same legal document. And since they are not freed, they do not acquire the other property, because a slave cannot acquire property until he is free.

They must free each other, because each is considered to have acquired half of his own person and half of the other slave.

The Tur and the Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 267:59) state that for the law stated by the Rambam to apply, the owner must give both documents to a third party to acquire on behalf of the two slaves. In that way, they acquire the property at the same time. If, however, one of the legal documents is given to one of the slaves or to another person on his behalf before the second document is given, the first slave acquires all of his master’s possessions, including the second slave.

More precisely, half was not released in the same document. For the master did not retain ownership of the slave at all. Nevertheless, since the slave was not released as a whole in a single document, he is not granted his freedom (Rabbenu Nissim, as quoted by the Kessef Mishneh).

As stated in Halachah 1.

Gittin 41b states that just as a woman cannot be half divorced with a bill of divorce, so too, a slave cannot be half released.

The Turei Zahav 267:28 explains that the equation with a woman applies only with regard to release through the medium of a legal document, because that is the subject of the verse upon which the equation is based. There is, by contrast, no such equation with regard to freeing a slave with money.

That the release of half of the slave through a bill of release is not effective.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Nissim, who maintains that for the transaction to be effective, the purchase or the present must be made before the bill of release is given. Otherwise, the slave will not have left the master’s domain entirely with the bill of release.

While the other half is owned by the person to whom it was sold or given.

In this instance, the deed of release is effective, because the owner released his entire portion of the slave (Rashi, Gittin 42a).

For although the child-to-be can be considered to be part of the mother, as in the second clause, the mother can certainly be considered an independent entity whose fate is not dependent on that of the child (Siftei Cohen 267:75). This distinction refutes the question raised by the Ra’avad in his gloss on this halachah.

Which is not effective, as stated in the previous halachah.

This term (taken from Leviticus 19:20) refers to a woman who is half Canaanite maid-servant and half free, who is consecrated by a Hebrew servant.

Before she was freed, the consecration involved only the half of her that was freed. For a Canaanite maid-servant cannot be consecrated (Hilchot Ishut 4:15). After she is released, however, the consecration automatically spreads to her other half (Ibid.:16). See also Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 3:13.

Because the part of him that is free is forbidden to have relations with such a woman.

For a free woman is not allowed to have relations with a slave.

We have used indefinite wording, because the commentaries differ whether the obligation to compose the promissory note is incumbent on the freed slave or the master. It must, however, be noted that the Rambam’s wording leads to the conclusion that the master composes the document.

As stated in Hilchot Ishut 15:2, this is a mitzvah incumbent on a man and not on a woman. Gittin 41b states as the rationale for this ruling: “The world was created solely for the sake of procreation.” In order to allow this person to fulfill this mitzvah, the master is compelled to free him. It must, however, be emphasized that this compulsion is a Rabbinic law without a source in our Scriptural obligations.

And engage in lewd behavior with her.

So that she will marry and her husband will prevent her from engaging in wanton behavior.

According to Scriptural Law, a minor may acquire property, but he may not transfer ownership of it to others. Even according to Rabbinic Law, he certainly cannot be forced to transfer ownership to another person.

Generally, a guardian is not allowed to free slaves (see Hilchot Nachalot 11:8). Nevertheless, since the father attempted to circumvent the law, we empower – and indeed require – the guardian to release the slave.

I.e., we give the child a small amount of money to play with, so that he will be willing to part with the slave (Rashi, Gittin 40b).

But not part, as in Halachah 1.

As explained in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, Chapter 8, when a dying man apportions his property, his gifts are provisional, and if he recovers, he regains possession of them.

As explained in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, the gift of a dying man does not take effect until after his death, and ordinarily, the slave’s bill of release would not be effective after his master’s death, for the slave would already have become the property of his heirs. Nevertheless, our Sages ordained that an exception be made in this instance.
The Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:22, where this halachah is stated, quotes the Rashba as explaining the rationale for this law as follows: Once a slave is freed, he can never be enslaved again. This is a point of common knowledge; certainly the master is aware of it. Therefore, we assume that the master’s intent was to free him when making this statement.
The Maggid Mishneh thus explains that the slave is actually freed. Rashi (Gittin 9a) offers a different interpretation, stating that the master is not allowed to use him as a slave, because people at large will be operating under the impression that he has already been freed.
It appears that the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 250:15) shares this conception for it changes the Rambam’s wording, stating kol shehu ben chorin, a rumor that he is free, rather than shem ben chorin, “the reputation of being free.” The Sefer Meirat Einayim 250:48, however, interprets the Shulchan Aruch according to the Maggid Mishneh’s explanation.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 250:15) states that if the master gives the slave the property “from today, if I die,” the slave is not granted his freedom if the master recovers. The rationale is that the present was obviously conditional in nature.