Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Here we are not speaking about the price of the land, but its value per acre. There are times when a very large stretch of land is not very valuable, because the soil is of inferior quality, it is very far from water and the like. On the other hand, there may be a small stretch of land that is extremely valuable.
Our Sages divided land into three categories: inferior, intermediate and superior, and, as the Rambam proceeds to explain, determined which types of creditors are entitled to expropriate which type of land.
This categorization is dependent on the property each person individually possesses and not on universal standards. For example, if a person has several properties that would all be considered to be intermediate or superior when compared to the value of property at large, the least valuable among them is considered to be inferior. Conversely, if all the properties that he owned were of inferior quality, the most valuable among them is considered to be superior [Tur, Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 102:1)].

Since the option is his, he will choose that which is of least value.

Literally, “doors would not be shut in the face of borrowers.” I.e., if a lender knew that he would receive only property of inferior quality, he would hesitate before - and perhaps refrain from - giving a loan.

In this instance, our Sages did not change the Scriptural ruling, because a person does not consider the possibility of the borrower’s dying before he lends him money (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 108:53).

Or his estate.
This principle applies not only to the repayment of loans, but also with regard to payment for damages, as reflected in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:11.

The property that a person sold is considered to be a guarantor for his debts. Payment cannot be demanded from a guarantor before it is demanded from the debtor himself.

We do not say that the property of intermediate quality should be given to the debtor. Although our Sages granted him that advantage, they did not do so when it would come at the expense of anyone else.

Gittin 50b questions if a present is given the same status as a sale, for the recipient of a present did not spend anything for his acquisition, while the creditor did make an outlay of money. Nevertheless, the question is not resolved, and hence, the property is allowed to remain in the possession of the recipient.

And no longer fit to be sown.

For since the property was originally on lien to this debt, the fact that it was sold a second time does not destroy the lien.

The commentaries explain that this is referring to a situation where Levi purchased all the fields of intermediate value from Shimon. Since these are the fields that are designated for the creditor, the creditor has the right to expropriate them from Levi. On the other hand, he may choose to expropriate the fields of superior or inferior value from Shimon. He has that option because Shimon, as the purchaser of Reuven’ s fields, took responsibility for the debt.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that this is speaking about a situation where Shimon purchased all Reuven’s fields at one time. Otherwise, the lien remains on the field that he purchased last. This interpretation is also cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 119:1).

Leaving Shimon with property of intermediate value.

And since Shimon was the one who purchased the property from Levi, the burden of payment rests on him first.

As stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 1:7.

As stated in Halachah 1.

As stated in Hilchot Ishut 16:3.

The lender should not be granted a higher grade of property than is due him according to law. Similarly, in all the cases that follow, unless there is no alternative, each person should be granted the grade of property due him or her according to law.

The woman is granted a higher grade of property because there is no alternative.

Since there is no alternative, the person who suffered damages is given a lesser grade of property.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Hagahot Maimoniot question why the damages can be collected from property that has been sold. Seemingly, as in the case of a loan supported by a verbal commitment alone, the matter is not one of public knowledge and the purchasers are unable to protect their interests. The Maggid Mishneh states that when a person causes damages to a colleague, the matter is spread by word of mouth and becomes public knowledge to a greater extent than a loan. Therefore, a person who has suffered damages has the right to expropriate property that was sold.
The Hagahot Maimoniot offer a different interpretation, explaining that this is speaking about an instance where the claim was brought to court and a decision rendered against the person who caused the damage. Such a matter, like a promissory note, will become public knowledge. Alternatively, they explain, since the obligation is of Scriptural origin, it is considered as if a promissory note was written.

In such an instance, the claimant might protest that he is entitled to a higher grade of property. The purchaser can, however, respond that (as stated in Halachah 2) this principle applies only when the original debtor possesses the higher grade. After the debtor sold the higher grade properties, all of the liens from the other debts - even those that previously were associated with other properties - fall on the property that remains in his possession, even if it is of inferior quality. When that last property is sold, it remains encumbered by all of these liens.

I.e., each type of creditor is allowed to expropriate property according to the principles stated above.

For then, it will be to the purchaser's advantage to follow this pattern of expropriation.
There are, however, other opinions that as long as the debtor is alive, in all instances, the creditors must expropriate the property of inferior value, for the purchaser had the right to return that property (or give any other present) to the seller/debtor and tell the creditors: “Now the debtor has property. You do not have the right to expropriate property from me until everything he possesses is taken” [Rabbenu Chanan’el as quoted by the Maggid Mishneh, Tur and Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 119:5)]. According to that view, the law stated by the Rambam applies only when the debtor died.

If, however, that property is not sufficient to pay all the debts, the remainder should be collected from the property that was sold second to last, even if it is of superior value (Rabbi Akiva Eiger).

For when the property was in the purchaser’s possession, all of the debts should have been expropriated from this property. Hence, when this property was sold, the liens for all of the debts remain attached to it.

To say: “I left you a place from where you can expropriate your due.”

Since the ordinance was instituted for the purchaser’s benefit, he has this privilege (Bava Kama 8b).

Since this was the last property he purchased, at the time he purchased it all of the liens for the other debts were attached to it. If, however, the creditors desire to collect their due from the property that was sold to the second purchaser, they have that option (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 119:30).

As explained in Halachah 3, in such a situation the creditor has the option of collecting his due from either the first purchaser or the second purchaser, because this lien was originally associated with the property of superior quality. We assume that the creditor will desire to expropriate the property of superior value.

For these were the properties to which their liens were originally attached. Since he purchased the property of superior value last, the purchaser takes over the debtor’s position, as stated in Halachah 6. Hence, these creditors should expropriate their due from him.

The kinyan is necessary to make the note a binding legal document.

As stated above, as long as the debtor possessed property that was not sold, the creditor does not have the right to collect the debt from property that was sold. Hence, the primary lien for the debt is on the property that was sold last.

Since the loss was caused by the creditor himself, this situation does not resemble the circumstance described in Halachah 2, where a field was flooded. Although in both cases the creditor is unable to collect his debt from the property sold last, in the instance described by our halachah he himself caused himself this loss (Maggid Mishneh).

On the contrary, the property sold to the second purchaser was always on lien to the debt.

The only property he possesses.

For the creditor has a lien on the property and did not waive his privileges to expropriate the property from this purchaser.

I.e., the second purchaser can sue the first purchaser to return the money he paid for the field. When the first purchaser pays him, he can sue the original debtor, for he is responsible. He, however, will not have the resources to pay the debt, and that purchaser will look for another medium to recoup his loss and will tum to the creditor.

The creditor did not expropriate the property from the first purchaser directly. Nevertheless, since he did expropriate the property and the first creditor suffered the loss, the first creditor has the right to claim the property from him.

I.e., the second purchaser has the right to claim the property from the first purchaser, because he paid for the land. Hence, once the land is in the possession of the first purchaser, the second purchaser can demand that it be returned to him, and then he will pay the first purchaser the price of the field.

For as above, he has not agreed to exonerate him from having the property expropriated from him.

Where each party will forgo something so that a final settlement can be reached.
The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling on several counts:
a) There are only two parties who are required to sacrifice to engage in the compromise, the creditor and one of the purchasers, because one of the purchasers received his money.
b) When the first purchaser expropriates the property from creditor, the creditor suffered the loss and he has no one to whom he can appeal to for redress. Why should the cycle continue any further?
c) The second purchaser does not have to surrender the property to the creditor, because he can declare, “Desist; otherwise, I will return the field to the first purchaser and nullify his sale of the property to me.”
The Maggid Mishneh sustains the Ra’avad’s objections. He maintains, however, that the text possessed by the Ra’avad was incorrect. The version of this halachah that he suggests [and which is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 118:2)] states:
The borrower sold a field to a purchaser and then sold another field to another purchaser. The creditor writes to the second purchaser, pledging that he would not expropriate the property.... The creditor may expropriate the first field from the first purchaser. The first purchaser may then expropriate the second field from the second purchaser.... The second purchaser may expropriate the first field from the creditor.... And the cycle continues....