Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

The Rambam does not mention the law with regard to the acquisition of a present. The Maggid Mishneh explains that since another person is willfully transferring the property to him, a minor may acquire a present that he is given. He cites Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:7 and Hilchot Lulav 8:10 in support of this thesis.

See also Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 18:2, which states that these types of individuals cannot acquire ownerless property. The rationale for these rulings is that these individuals are not considered to be in control of their conduct.

We have used this translation because this is the intent whenever the term lll”ln is linked with a mentally incompetent individual and a minor (Chaggigah 4b). From the following halachah, it might appear that any person who is deaf is also placed in this category, but this is not necessarily so. The following halachah speaks about how a transaction with a deaf person is conducted. The guidelines mentioned apply whether we are speaking about someone who is both deaf and dumb (in which case the transaction is binding only according to Rabbinic law), or a person who is only deaf (in which case the transaction is binding according to Scriptural Law).
To cite a parallel, Halachah 12 mentions restrictions against a young person’s sale of landed property. According to Scriptural Law, the transaction would be binding. Nevertheless, our Sages placed a restriction on the matter. (See the commentaries of the Maggid Mishneh and Netivot HaMishpat 235:20.)

A person who is hard of hearing, but can hear when spoken to in a loud voice, is not included in this category, but is instead considered to be an ordinary individual [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:19)].

I.e., hand gestures. The movement of his mouth is not considered an adequate indicator of his intent (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:47).

Since the sale of landed property is a more serious matter, our Sages restricted the freedom of these individuals to engage in such a transaction, because of their mental shortcomings. For even a person who can speak but cannot hear does not have full awareness of what is happening around him. For that reason, we check his thinking even with regard to the sale of movable property.

He is tested like a person who cannot speak, as explained in the following halachah. With regard to a person who cannot speak, however, three correct answers are sufficient. With regard to a person who cannot hear, by contrast, it appears that more questions are necessary to establish that he is intellectually sound (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:48).
Kin’at Eliyahu explains that the questioning process must be different from that described in the following halachah, because this person cannot hear the questions he is being asked.

For because of his limited awareness, his thoughts may not be clear.

A person who was born with this disorder.

See Hilchot Gerushin 2:16, which explains that the mute is asked a set of three questions requiring two positive answers and one negative answer (or two negative and one positive). If he answers correctly, we assume that he understands the implications of the answers he gives.

The fact that he can write out instructions indicates that he is consciously aware of what he is doing. It is not necessary that he be tested.

Our translation of the term tu10., reflects the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Edut 9:9-10.

Such a person is considered to be incapable of appreciating the implications of his deeds. Hence, their consequences are not binding upon him.

I.e., a trustworthy person is given the responsibility of caring for the person’s property and providing him - and his family - with their needs.
See Hilchot Nachalot 10:8, which states that similar provisions are made for a deaf mute.

See Hilchot Edut 9:9, where the Rambam writes that even when an epileptic is not in the midst of a seizure, his understanding may be clouded to the extent that he is incapable of fully comprehending the details of a situation.

He may, however, acquire property for himself.

We take it for granted that he is not able to make responsible decisions.

The commentaries interpret this as referring to a child who has lived at least six complete years.

I.e., twelve for a girl, thirteen for a boy. See Halachah 12.

To see whether or not he is responsible. See Halachah 8.

See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, Chapters 8-12, which describe this convention, a matnat sh’chiv me’ra, in detail.

Halachah 1.

As stated in Halachah 1, the minor was granted the potential to buy and sell so that he could provide for his livelihood. Giving presents is also necessary for that purpose, because at times it is necessary to give a person a present to cultivate his good will.

In contrast to these restrictions, as stated in Halachah 11, a minor may purchase landed property.

For there is no one to provide for his livelihood.

Who was appointed to provide for the child.

For our Sages placed limitations on their enactment, empowering a minor only when there was no alternative.

See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:3, which states that the Rambam’s wording implies that even when a child comes of age, he must manifest signs of physical maturity for his transactions to be accepted without his business sagacity being evaluated.
See also the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 235:1), who states that once a child reaches the age of ten, he or she is assumed to have an understanding of financial matters unless he or she has shown signs of being mentally incapable or emotionally unstable.

The Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that a minor does not have the legal right to waive his ownership over property. The Maggid Mishneh explains the Rambam’s decision, stating that when our Sages granted minors the right to engage in business transactions, they also granted them the right to waive their ownership, so that all the laws applying to an adult would apply to them. This is necessary, for unless such an equation were made, no one would be willing to engage in a transaction with a minor. The Rambam’s ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:3) without objections by the major commentaries.

Chapter 12, Halachot 2-4.

This preface indicates that the law that follows is a product of the Rambam’s deductive reasoning without a specific Rabbinic source. The Rambam’s logic appears to be based on the laws stated in Chapter 9, Halachot 4-6.

With regard to this point as well, the Ra’avad differs and maintains that a transaction with a minor may be finalized through the payment of money. Here also, the Rambam’s ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:4) without objections by the major commentaries.

See Chapter 7.

Chapter 5.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 96:15 states that a kinyan in which a minor engages is not binding, because the verse on which the tradition of a kinyan sudar is based (Ruth 4:7): “A man removed his shoe and gave it to his colleague,” speaks of “a man,” thereby excluding a minor.

In this way, the purchaser would acquire the movable property by virtue of its presence in his domain.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that a kinyan sudar that was made with a minor is effective. The Rambam’s opinion is, however, cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:5) without objections by any of the major commentaries.

A minor cannot be sued in court, because a suit must be conducted in the presence of the defendant. In this instance, since the defendant is under age, it is considered as if he were not present.
When meshichah is performed on the movable property, it is physically taken into the possession of the purchaser. Thus, the minor has no way of maintaining possession. In the instances mentioned in this halachah, the movable property is in the physical possession of the minor, and the purchaser must resort to legal process to expropriate it. Hence, the minor is allowed to maintain possession.
The Ra’avad gives another reason why the transaction is not effective when the minor rents the place where the movable property is stored. Just as a minor may not sell landed property, he may not rent it. And since the landed property was never transferred to the purchaser, the movable property was also not transferred to him.

I.e., even if the movable property is not in the physical possession of the minor (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:25),

This is the version found in most texts of the Mishneh Torah. Some manuscripts, however, read “A kinyan is like a legal document.” This version is cited by the Shulchan Aruch.

I.e., the legal value of a kinyan is that the witnesses can draw up a legal document that is recognized by the court.

Note the statements of the Ra’avad cited in the commentary on the following halachah.

See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:9; see also Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 17:8-9.

Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:9; see also Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 17:10. Since a minor cannot appoint an agent, his property cannot acquire the article for him.
Kiddushin 41a derives the principle that a minor cannot appoint an agent from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 24:1, the verse that teaches us that an agent may act on a person’s behalf. For that verse speaks about a person past the age of majority. (See also Hilchot Sh’luchim VeShutafim 2:2.)

Numbers 21:26 uses the word miyado, literally “from his hand,” as meaning “from his possession.” A similar usage is frequent within the Torah and within Talmudic sources. On this basis, the Rambam (Hilchot Gerushin 5:1, based on Gittin 76b) explains:
The Torah’s expression [Deuteronomy, 24:1], “He shall... place it in her hand,” need not be interpreted only [according to its strict literal meaning] that the bill of divorce must be placed in her hand. Regardless of whether the bill of divorce is placed in her hand, her bosom or her courtyard, or given to her agent whom she charged that his hand would be as her hand, the same law applies.
On that basis, Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah 17:10 states:
We derive [the concept that] a female minor [may acquire property by virtue of its presence in her] courtyard from [the fact that] she is able to acquire an article that is placed in her hand....
Just as her courtyard is effective with regard to [the acquisition of a] bill of divorce, so too, it is effective with regard to [the acquisition of] a lost object. [From this we also conclude that she may acquire an article by virtue of its presence in the area within a radius of] four cubits of her, for this area is considered her courtyard with regard to [the acquisition of] a lost article.

I.e., we assume that since our Sages saw that the Torah granted her certain privileges with regard to the acquisition of property, they extended them further and granted her the privilege of these halachic mechanisms to acquire property (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:28). The Siftei Cohen 235:3 takes issue with this logic and questions why a female minor should be granted these privileges.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:29 emphasizes that even if the minor manifests ownership, he does not acquire the property until he pays for it. The rationale is that a minor feels attached to money and does not part with it easily. Until he pays, we fear that he may retract.

In support of the Rambam’s statements, the Maggid Mishneh cites Kiddushin 42a, which brings proof that one may acquire land on behalf of a minor, from the distribution of the land of Israel described in Numbers, Chapter 23. In that instance, the Nasi of each tribe took possession of the land on behalf of every one of the members of his tribe, including several minors.

On the basis of the Rambam’s ruling in this halachah, the Ra’avad questions the Rambam’s ruling in the previous halachah with regard to the rental of land in order to acquire movable property stored on it. Seemingly, since another person is renting him the land, he should be able to acquire both the land and the property. On this basis, the Ra’avad advances the thesis that our Sages’ statement that a male minor cannot acquire an object by virtue of its presence in his courtyard applies only with regard to the acquisition of ownerless property.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s rationale was not that the rental was not effective in acquiring the land for the minor, but that our Sages did not allow the minor to acquire the movable property in this manner. He does not, however, discount entirely the thesis advanced by the Ra’avad.

As stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 4:2, this is an accepted principle in Jewish business law. It is as if the person acquiring the property were acting as the agent of the person for whom he is acquiring the property. Although he has not been formally appointed in that capacity, since the proposition involved is to his benefit, we assume that he would agree.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that the minor’s acquisition of the property is effective because another person is transferring it to him (;,~, o n, n11 nv,). As the Ketzot HaChoshen 235:4 points out, a minor cannot acquire ownerless property, nor can he acquire landed property if he manifests his ownership upon it. Why then can he acquire the property in this instance? Because it is as if the person selling the property were acting on the minor’s behalf and acquired the property for him.

For we cannot engage in a practice that is to a person’s detriment unless he explicitly authorizes it.

This applies according to both Scriptural and Rabbinic Law.

From the Rambam’s statements, it appears that the license for a youth to sell movable property even if he does not understand business matters applies also to movable property that a youth inherits. This ruling is borne out by the Vilna Gaon [in his gloss on the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:9)].

This is a Rabbinic decree, enacted to protect young adults as they enter the financial world.

I.e., when can a youth sell landed property directly after attaining majority?

I.e., landed property that he purchased with his own money, or that was given to him as a present. If, however. property was given to him in someone’s will, it is considered to be an inheritance [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:9)].

Gittin 65a mentions this concept with regard to property inherited from one’s parents, but not with regard to property inherited from others. The Rambam maintains that the same logic applies and, therefore, the restriction also pertains. The Rashba differs and maintains that since it is uncommon to inherit property from anyone other than one’s parents, our Sages did not include such instances in their decree. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) quotes the Rambam’s view.

With regard to land that he bought, the fact that he spent money to purchase the land indicates that he is not overly attracted by money and is willing to invest it. Even when land is given to him as a present, we follow the principle that a present will not be given away unless the recipient expended effort for it. Hence, the youth will value the property that he worked for.

But past the age of majority, as obvious from Halachah 6.

In contrast to a sale, which is not binding.

Nevertheless, when making a sale, the youth also receives significant benefit. Why then is a present considered any different? Because, as the Rambam continues to explain, giving a present of landed property is an abnormal occurrence.

And our Sages did not pass enactments with regard to rare circumstances.

I.e., if his present is upheld, he will be given a certain degree of respect. If the present is rescinded, his honor will suffer and his words will not be taken seriously. Thus, it is to his benefit that his present be upheld.

I.e., it is as if he were below the age of thirteen. See Hilchot Ishut 2:11-13, which explains these concepts in greater detail. As explained in Hilchot Ishut, these concepts apply to both males and females.

The literal translation of the Rambam’s words is “until he attains the majority of his lifetime.”

Their claim is that the youth did not manifest signs of physical maturity (or sterility).

And thus, the sale is invalid and the property belongs to them, for they are the youth’s rightful heirs.

This law is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch, not only in Choshen Mishpat 235:13, but also in Yoreh De’ali 363:7. From the latter source, it would appear that it is considered to be “debasing a corpse” only if the corpse must be disinterred for the examination to be made. If an external examination is carried out before burial, this would not be considered to be “debasing.” The rationales that the Rambam states in the later clauses of the halachah, however, appear to apply whether or not the corpse was buried.

As reflected by Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 24:5, this is a principle applied in many contexts of Jewish business law.

Since the sale is not viable, it can be nullified at any time.

Since the purchase of the property is nullified, retroactively, it is as if the purchaser bad no right to benefit from the property.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:41 questions whether he is considered to be a person who worked land belonging to a colleague with permission, or whether he is considered to be one who worked the land without permission. See Hilchot Gezelah Va’Avedah, Chapter 10, for the laws governing these situations.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam compares this situation to one involving a female minor whose marriage was arranged by her brother. She has the right to nullify her marriage without a formal bill of divorce if she does so before she attains the age of majority. If, however she passes that age without protesting her marriage, she no longer has the right to annul her marriage (Hilchot Gerushin 11:6).
Another example is that of a minor who was converted to Judaism by the court. Until he attains majority, he has the right to nullify his conversion. Once he attains majority, he is irrevocably identified as a Jew (Hilchot Melachim 10:3).
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 235:14) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Tur, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 235:42 and Rabbi Akiva Eiger mention authorities who rule according to the perspective of the Rambam’s teachers.

Who had relations with his daughters without realizing it. See Genesis 19:33.