Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 378:1 interprets the statement of this law by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 378:1) as indicating that not only is a person liable for the damage he causes, but that it is forbidden to cause damage.

See Halachah 4, and Chapter 1, Halachah 12, which indicate that a person is not liable for damages that are caused by his body, over which he has totally no control.

As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 11, “A man is considered to be mu’ad (forewarned) at all times” and must bear full responsibility for his actions.

In contrast to Chapter 1, Halachah 12, the Rambam does not distinguish between an ordinary and abnormal wind in this halachah. This leads to the conclusion that there is no difference, and he is liable in both instances. This understanding is reflected in the statement of this law in the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 13:5.

As stated in the following halachah, there is no difference between an animal and any other possession belonging to a colleague.

For an intruder must assume that the owner of a domain keeps his possessions in various places and the intruder must take the necessary precautions not to break them.

He is liable, however, if he intentionally caused the damage. The owner of a domain has the right to remove an intruder and his possessions from his domain. He does not have the right to damage those possessions (Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 7:7).

For a person need not assume that a person entering his domain is bringing possessions. If, however, the owner of a domain gives a person permission to enter his domain or knows of his entry, he is liable if he damages his person or possessions accidentally. See Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 378:6).

Alternatively, if this took place in the public domain.

If, however, only the person whose possessions were damaged was given permission to be in the domain belonging to the third party, it is as if the damage were caused in the domain of the person whose possessions were damaged. Conversely, if only the person who caused the damage was given permission to be in the domain belonging to the third party, it is as if the damage were caused in the domain of the person who caused the damage.

For he does not necessarily know about the possessions the other person is carrying, and is therefore not required to take care that they remain intact. If, however, one person knows about the other’s presence, he is liable if he causes damages to his person or property, even if he does so unintentionally (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 378:7).
The Ra’avad differs and states that if one of the people intentionally committed an act that damaged the property of the other, he is liable, even if he does not know about the other person’s presence in the domain.

The Ra’avad questions why this is considered as an act of God, and yet a person’s being blown off a roof by an abnormal wind (Chapter 2, Ha1achah 12) is not considered an act of God.

See parallel laws in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 3:13 and 13:6.

I.e., he is not obligated to take extra care to ensure that the jugs are not broken. Bava Kama 28a states: “He may break them as he leaves and break them as he enters.”

The Ra’avad and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 379) differ with the Rambam regarding this point and maintain that if the owner of the courtyard gave the owner of the jugs permission to bring them in, the owner of the courtyard is liable for breaking them. The Rambam’s perspective is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 379:4). The Ramah makes no comment.

For, as mentioned above, he has the right to remove them from his property; he does not have the right to break them.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 383:3 infers that if such a scenario took place in a domain belonging to the owner of the attacking ox, the owner of the ox that was attacked would be liable. The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 383), however, rules differently and does not require the attack to take place in the domain of the owner of the ox that was attacked, in order for its owner not to be held liable.

For he did not intentionally harm the attacking ox.

An ox that is mu’ad is known to be prone to goring other oxen, while an ox that is tam is not. The owner of an ox that is mu’ad is liable to pay full damages for death caused by goring, while the owner of an ox that is tam is liable only for half the damages.
The Rambam’s point is that the owner of the lower ox may pull his animal out even though it involves a risk to the attacking ox - not only when the attacking ox is tam, in which instance the owner of the lower ox would lose half the value of his ox - but also when the attacking ox is mu’ad, and the owner of the lower ox would recover the full value of his ox. For although he could ultimately recover the full value, doing so would require him to engage in a legal suit, and that is undesirable.

The Meiri interprets this as meaning that he could have pulled away the lower ox, and the upper ox might have fallen without being critically injured. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 383:6 interprets it as meaning that he could have pulled away the attacking ox.

Since he had an opportunity to remove the danger to his ox without fatally injuring the attacking ox, and instead, pushed it violently, he is liable.

For he had no other alternative to save his ox.

I.e., they came from two opposite directions. The fact that they are both carrying loads is also significant, for this causes them to walk with their heads down and not to take full notice of the movement of other people.

As stated in Halachah 3, if two people both have the right to be in the same domain, and one damages the other’s possessions unintentionally, the person who caused the damage is not liable.
Note the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 379), who rules that if the owner of the jug is standing still and the owner of the beam runs into him and breaks his jug, the owner of the beam is liable.
To draw a comparison to contemporary experience: Two cars are progressing in opposite directions on a one-lane country road. If they both continue to proceed and they collide, neither is responsible for the damage to the other.

I.e., the two were walking in the same direction, one behind the other.

I.e., the owner of the jug was walking faster than the owner of the beam, and hit the beam with his jug as he advanced.

Even if the owner of the beam was walking very slowly, he is not responsible. For the owner of the jug should have looked in front of himself and taken the necessary precautions so that his jug would not be broken.

The owner of the beam is liable, because the owner of the jug had no reason to suspect that the owner of the beam would stop suddenly. Therefore, the collision is considered the fault of the owner of the beam.
In this instance, the comparison to contemporary experience presents somewhat of a contradiction. If two cars are proceeding in the same lane, one suddenly stops short and the other collides with it, the second car is usually held liable for the collision (in contrast to the Rambam’s ruling, which holds the owner of the beam liable). There is, however, reason to hold the first car liable when it suddenly stops short for no valid reason.

After hearing the warning, the owner of the jug should have stopped and not collided with the beam.

I.e., the owner of the beam proceeded too fast and collided with the jug.

For his was an act of obvious negligence, for which he must bear responsibility.

Because he had no reason to expect that the owner of a jug would come to a sudden stop.

For he was given a warning and should have stopped.

For, as stated above, a person who stops to adjust his load is considered as if he were walking. Therefore, the owner of the beam is liable.
Note the Yam Shel Shlomo, who rules that the owner of the beam is not liable. Theoretically, the owner of the jug may be considered as though he were walking, but in actuality he has stopped, and there is no way that the owner of the jug would know to stop on time.

If the lamp sets fire to the flax, the same principles are applied to determine whether or not the owner of the lamp is liable.

The halachah is speaking about an instance where the two are walking toward each other from opposite directions.

And it is this departure from the norm that caused the accident to take place.

But before the appearance of three stars - i.e., the time of the inception of the Sabbath.
Significantly, in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Bava Kama 3:6), the Rambam does not mention bein hash’mashot, the period between sunset and the appearance of three stars. Indeed, other commentaries explain that the intent is toward nightfall, from the time the need for Sabbath preparations became pressing. In his Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam also mentions that the same laws apply on the days before festivals.

For they are both departing from the norm.

Our Sages refer to all of these as the person’s “arrows.”

In his Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 384), Rav Yosef Karo questions the purpose of the inclusion of this phrase, wondering what law it teaches us. He does, however, include it in his statement of the law in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 384:1).

It must be emphasized that if the person causes the damage unintentionally, he is not liable for the embarrassment assessment, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 17.

And when utensils are damaged because one falls into a cistern, the owner of the cistern is not liable (Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 13:1).

Ibid.:2.

For the spark is a direct result of his activity. And it is not abnormal or even infrequent for beating metal to cause a spark to fly in this manner.

I.e., he was contracted to tear down the wall, but to preserve the stones, so that they could be used again.

I.e., not as a result of his blows, but because they were supported by the other wall, and now that it has been tom down, there is nothing to support them.

For a person is liable for any damage that comes as a direct result of his force.

Although it was the water or the sun that actually killed the animal, the perpetrator of these acts is not considered to be merely an indirect cause of the animal’s death. Instead, it is considered as if he killed the animal with his hands. Note the parallel in Hilchot Rotzeach 3:9.
The Ramah and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 383:5) cite opinions that maintain that if the person does not actually hold the animal in the sun, but merely closes all exits, he is not considered to have killed the animal himself, nor is he held liable by a mortal court.

Sefer Me’irat Einayim 383:9 states that this law applies even when each of the people performs an activity that could by itself have caused the animal’s death or the destruction of the utensil.

This reflects the Rambam’s interpretation of Bava Kama 10a. Rashi interprets the passage differently. As the Maggid Mishneh mentions, the Rambam’s version of that Talmudic passage is slightly different from the version in the standard printed texts of the Talmud.

The fact that the animal was able to walk indicates that it was able to bear the weight of the previous burdens. Thus, it is the sixth person who overburdened it and caused it to die. Therefore, he is held liable for its death.

For it is not clear that his actions were of any consequence. On the contrary, it appears likely that the animal would have died even if he had not placed his burden upon it. From the following clause, the Vilna Gaon draws the conclusion that in this instance, the five people who had placed their burden on the animal previously are liable.

Because of the doubt involved, all six are required to pay for the damages.

Rashi (Bava Kama 10b) interprets this as referring to an instance where the sixth person leaned on the previous five and prevented them from standing up. It is his interpretation that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 381:1). The Shulchan Aruch also interprets the law as referring to a “bench” and not to a “chair.”

Our translation follows the standard text of the Mishneh Torah and is supported by Sefer Me’irat Einayim 381:2. Many authoritative manuscripts and early printings have a different version, which would be translated as “and joined us.”

The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 381:1) comment that we assume that benches are intended to be sat upon, and unless people depart from the norm in the manner in which they sit, they are not liable.

According to all other authorities, the animal must also have been redeemed by its owners and permitted to be used for mundane purposes. Although the Rambam’s wording in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:1 might be interpreted as having other implications, the later authorities agree to this ruling.

The three are considered equally liable, for each had a part in the damages that ensued. The man who pushed and the owner of the ox share in the liability, for the man and the ox pushed the person, animal or object into the cistern. And the owner of the cistern shares in the liability, for had the cistern not been open, this damage would not have occurred.
If a person or an animal fell into the cistern and was injured, and the ox was mu’ad (known to gore), the damages are equally divided. If the ox was tam, its owner is required to pay only half of his share of the damages. Thus, the owner of the ox pays one sixth, and the person and the owner of the cistern each pay five twelfths.
With regard to the other payments mentioned in the halachah, there are differences, because one or more of the three persons involved are not held liable for such assessments. Those who are liable are liable for the full amount of the assessments. There is no reduction, because the others contributed to the death, damages or injury. The rationale is that the deed of each person is - in and of itself - sufficient to cause liability for the entire amount. Therefore, if there is another person to share in the liability, it is shared. If not, it is assumed totally by the one who is liable.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as explaining that the law stated by the Rambam applies only when the man pushed the other person or the animal into the cistern unintentionally. If he pushed the other person or the animal intentionally, the owner of the cistern is not liable. For in the ordinary course of events, his cistern would not have caused damage. To what could this situation be likened? To someone taking an article belonging to a colleague and tossing it on a fire started by a third person. No one would hold the person who started the fire liable in such a situation. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 410:34) accepts the Rashba’s insight.

For these assessments are made only when an injury is caused by a human being, but not when it is caused by an animal or a cistern. See Chapter 1, Halachah 1; Chapter 4, Halachah 1; Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 7:3, 11:3.

For these payments are required only of the owner of a goring [mu’ad] ox. See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 10:2, 11:1.

With regard to utensils, the owner of the cistern is not liable, as stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 13:1. And similarly, he is not held liable with regard to an animal disqualified as a sacrifice, as stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 12:17.