Rambam - 3 Chapters a Day

The term literally means “a promiscuous woman.” Halachically, however, it has a specific meaning as the Rambam continues to explain. This concept is relevant because a priest is forbidden to marry a zonah as mentioned at the beginning of the previous chapter.

Even if she is a virgin, and even if she converts (Halachah 3).

Even against her will. It is the fact of the relations, not her intent, that causes her to be placed in this category. See Halachot 5-6.

This applies even with regard to a prohibition that stems from a positive commandment, as mentioned in Halachah 3.

A child born from a relationship forbidden to a priest, as mentioned in Chapter 19, Halachot 5-6.

There is no prohibition against a challal marrying any Jewish woman, even the daughter of a priest (see Chapter 19, Halachah 11).

She may even marry a High Priest (if she engaged in anal intercourse with an animal), as stated in Chapter 17, Halachah 14.

As stated in Hilchot Ishut 1 :4.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, offering a more lenient view, explaining that although a woman who enters into relations with any of the above individuals is forbidden to marry into the priesthood, these relations do not cause her to be considered as a zonah and she and a priest are not punished by lashes if they engage in relations. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 6:8) quotes the Rambam’s view.

At that age, even if she had engaged in relations, her hymen would regenerate and she would be considered as a virgin (Ketubot 11 b ). Nevertheless, she is not considered as a native-born Jewess. The Ra’avad rules that such a woman is not considered as a zonah. Nevertheless, she is forbidden to marry into the priesthood, based on the interpretation of Ezekiel 44:22 advanced by Kiddushin 78a which states that a priest must marry only from “the seed of the House of Israel.” Note the discussion of this difference of opinion by the Maggid Mishneh. See also Chapter 19, Halachah 12, which states that as long as converts marry among each other, their descendants are forbidden to marry into the priesthood.

See Chapter 12, Halachot 22-23, which defines this term and the prohibition against such a man marrying a native-born Jewess.

See Chapter 15 which describes the prohibition of such a man marrying a native-born Jewess.

See Chapter 12, Halachot 18-21, which describes the prohibition of such converts marrying a native-born Jewess.

See Chapter 16 which describes the prohibition of such a man marrying a native-born Jewess.

Leviticus 22: 12 states “When the daughter of a priest is [possessed] by a foreigner, she may not partake of the terumah of holiness.” Yevamot 68a states: “Since she engaged in relations with someone who is forbidden to her, she is disqualified.”

Since she is forbidden to marry anyone other than her yevam relations with any other man cause her to be considered as a zonah.

The term aylonit refers to a woman who does not have female physical characteristics. Her breasts do not protrude, she stiffens during sexual relations, and her lower abdomen does not resemble that of a woman. She is considered incapable of giving birth (Hilchot Ishut 2:4-6).

These refer to distant relatives whom the Rabbis forbade as safeguards to Scriptural prohibitions. See Hilchot Ishut 1:6 for a list of these prohibitions.

See Hilchot Yibbum 1: 12-13 which explains that once a woman is obligated to undergo chalitzah, there is no Scriptural prohibition against engaging in relations with her or her relatives. Nevertheless, our Sages instituted these prohibitions as safeguards.

Chapter 19, Halachah 16.

We are translating the term heara; see Chapter 1, Halachah 10.

For below these ages, any sexual contact in which these individuals engage is not significant, as stated in Chapter 1, Halachot 13-14.

I.e., if the woman’s husband dies after the adulterous relations without divorcing her, she may not marry a priest. Alternatively, as the Rambam continues to explain in the subsequent halachot, if she is the wife of the priest, she may not remain married to him.

As the Rambam implies, the prohibition indicated by this verse is not explicitly referring to a woman married to a priest. Instead, halachically (see Hilchot Gerushin 11:14), it is interpreted as referring to all married women who are defiled by adultery. The wife of an Israelite who was raped is an exception, but not the wife of a priest.
The commentaries question the exactness of the Rambam’s statements here, because in · this instance two separate prohibitions - the prohibition against relations with one’s defiled wife and the prohibition against a priest engaging in relations with a zonah - are involved. See the Maggid Mishneh for a discussion of the issue. See also Chapter 1, Halachah 22.

See Hilchot Ishut 24:19.

I.e., despite the fact that she is not held responsible for the adulterous relations, they create a spiritual blemish that prevents her from marrying a priest.

For the adulterous relations were carried out against her will.

After her husband dies.

Testimony is not considered binding unless it is made by two witnesses. Thus the testimony of one witness is not of consequence. Similarly, a person’s testimony cannot be used against himself. Hence, the woman’s own testimony is not of consequence.
There is one instance where the testimony of one witness is significant. When the husband issued a sotah warning to his wife. See Hilchot Ishut 24: 18).

And seeks to be released from her husband so that she may engage in relations with him.

And thus he believes that his wife committed adultery.

For since he believes either his wife or the witness, he will be consenting to a transgression each time he enters into relations with her. Accordingly, he has a moral and spiritual obligation to divorce her (Maggid Mishneh to Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.)

The Heit Shmuel 6:25 states that the Rambam’s ruling applies only as an initial and preferred option. After the fact, if she marries a priest, they may remain husband and wife unless he believes her statements.

The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam, explaining that since the woman’s statements were rejected, they are considered of no consequence afterwards. The Maggid Mishneh justifies the Rambam’s ruling and it is accepted as law by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 6: 13).
The Ra’avad’s rationale is that if the woman is able to provide an satisfactory explanation why she originally stated that she was forbidden, her word is accepted, as is the case with regard to other similar situations. The Maggid Mishneh does not accept this logic. See Chelkat Mechokek 6:12 and Beit Shmuel 6:26 which discuss this issue.

In contrast to an Israelite, as the Rambam continues to explain.

The husband’s word is accepted as stated in Hilchot Ishut 11 :8-15. The rationale is that we operate on the presumption that a man will not take on the expense and trouble of making a wedding and then forfeit it because of a spurious claim.

Since the doubt involves a Scriptural prohibition, we rule stringently.

For if the relations took place afterwards, even if she was raped, she is forbidden to her husband as a zonah.

And when there are two doubts involved, even when a Scriptural prohibition is concerned, we rule leniently.

See Halachah 7.

Although a minor who willfully commits adultery is not punished, she is forbidden to her husband (Chapter 3, Halachah 2).

Since she was consecrated before the age of three, even if she had engaged in relations beforehand, her hymen would have regenerated. Thus there is only one doubt involved.

A formal warning delivered in the presence of witnesses not to enter into privacy with a specific man (Hilchot Sotah 1: 1 ).

I.e., if her first husband dies without divorcing her.

Drinking the waters would have tested her virtue. Since she did not undergo this test, the matter is unresolved and hence she is forbidden to a priest.

See Hilchot Sotah 2:1, 3:2 which imply that the refusal to drink the waters is tantamount to an admission of guilt.

In such an instance, the woman is forbidden to her original husband, but he must pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Hilchot Sotah 2: 1 ).

Hilchot Sotah 1: 14 states that if even one witness testifies that he saw the woman commit adultery after receiving the sotah warning, she becomes forbidden to her husband.

Hilchot Sotah 1:10 states that, when a husband is unable to supervise his wife’s moral behavior, the court may issue such a warning on his behalf. In such an instance, however, . the woman is not compelled to drink the sotah waters.

Hilchot Sotah 2:2 lists fifteen women who are not given the option of drinking the sotah waters.

I.e., neither a mamzer, nor a gentile, nor another individual who would disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood.

This represents the legal abstract. Our Sages, however, applied stringencies as indicated by the following halachah.

This factor is necessary to allow for us to apply the principle: "Whenever an entity is separated, it is considered as having been separated from the majority." When, as stated in Halachah 15, the relations occur in a place where an entity is kevua, in its fixed place, we do not follow the majority.

Compare to Chapter 15, Halachah 11, which states that when the lineage of the child is involved, the woman’s word is accepted even when the majority of the men are not acceptable. The rationale for the difference is that with regard to the child, there is no alternative. If the child is not deemed acceptable, he or she will not be able to marry within the Jewish people. If, however, the woman’s word is not accepted, she will still be able to marry anyone other than a priest (Maggid Mishneh ).

I.e., instead of requiring a simple majority as is the usual standard.

This ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 6: 17). That source, however, also cites the view of the Tur and other Rishonim which maintains that if she states that the person with whom she engaged in relations are acceptable and the majority of the people are acceptable, she may marry into the priesthood as an initial option. The Beit Shmuel 6:31 also cites a third, more lenient view.

After the fact, we rely on the halachic abstract stated in the previous halachah. This applies even if most of the people are unacceptable (Beit Shmuel 6:32).

I.e., persons who would disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood.

The Kessef Mishneh explains the Rambam’s ruling as follows: When the woman goes to the unacceptable man for relations, he is considered as in his established place and hence, the doubt is considered equally balanced. Even when the unacceptable man comes to the woman for relations - in which instance, he has been separated from his natural place, and hence the principles of probability should apply - we rule stringently. This is a safeguard, lest one rule leniently when the woman goes to the man.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 6) rules more leniently, maintaining that if the man comes to the woman, we follow the principles of probability. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 6:18) mentions both views without stating which one should be followed.

And after the fact, we rely on her word.

In these two instances, we assume that she lacks the intellectual sophistication to know the status of the man with whom she engaged in relations.

In all instances, the initial and preferred option is for her not to marry into the priesthood (Maggid Mishneh). A child born from these relations is considered a mamzer of questionable status, as stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 12.

Since a question of Scriptural Law which cannot be clarified is involved, we rule stringently.

In such an instance, we are not concerned with the doubt because of the high probability that the man was acceptable.

The minimum age from which time onward sexual relations are significant.

As the Rambam proceeds to explain, since the prohibition is of Rabbinic origin, we do not follow the Scriptural requirements applying to witnesses. Therefore although ordinarily the testimony of two acceptable witnesses is required, in this instance, we accept the testimony of only one witness and moreover, accept testimony from witnesses - women, servants, and relatives - who would ordinarily be disqualified.

There is a difference of opinion among the commentaries whether the testimony of a woman’s son or daughter is acceptable. If they mention the matter in the course of conversation, their word is accepted, as evident from the following Halachah. If, however, a son or a daughter deliver testimony on their mother’s behalf, most authorities maintain that the testimony is not accepted (see Chelkat Mechokek 7: I; Beit Shmuel 7:3).

Even though one could argue that each one is lying on the other’s behalf.

Whenever there is a question whether or not a Scriptural prohibition applies, we rule stringently. This principle, however, is a point of Rabbinic Law. According to Scriptural Law, since the prohibition is not definitely established, one need not observe it.

A minor is not acceptable as a witness. Nevertheless, if he makes statements in the course of his conversation which indicate that a woman - his mother or any other woman - was not molested by her captors, those statements can serve as evidence to grant the woman license to marry a priest. The rationale is that these statements are considered to reflect the truth. We suspect that the child is telling us a representative account of what happened. Hence, since the prohibition was instituted only because of doubt, such statements are sufficient to allay our suspicions. With regard to the principle of accepting statements made in the course of conversation, see Hilchot Gerushin, Chapter 13, and commentaries.

Because the implication is that his mother was not molested.

Or if he makes the statements in the course of conversation (Maggid Mishneh; Beit Shmuel 7:4). The Rama (Even HaEzer 7:2), however, mentions opinions that grant leniency when he makes such statements in the course of conversation.

The rationale is based on the principle: “A person may not give testimony on his own behalf’ [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 7:2)].

For we fear that the maid-servant may lie to cover up for her mistress.

For we do not assume that she will know that these statements may be used to advance the cause of her mistress.

We suspect that he desired to marry her and therefore testified that she was not defiled even though he did not have definite information to that effect. Although we enforce this stringency with regard to the priest himself, we accept his testimony with regard to others and allow her to marry another priest (Chelkat Mechokek 7:6, Beit Shmuel 7:7).

For other persons might come and testify that she was defiled in which instance, he would be forced to divorce her. Hence were he not sure that the matter was true, he would not risk forfeiting his money (Ketubot 36b ).

We would forbid her from marrying a priest only because of her own statements and in those very statements, she maintains that she is pure.

For the testimony of one witness is not halachically significant. Based on Rashi (Ketubot 23b), the Beit Shmuel 7:8 states that this applies even if the witness testifies that the woman was defiled.

The Maggid Mishneh states that this applies even if the witness who testified that she was defiled testified first. Although one might think that once the first witness testifies, her status would be established as forbidden, our Sages ruled leniently with regard to a woman taken captive.

Had the witnesses made their statements first, the woman would not have been granted this license. Nevertheless, once she is given permission to marry into the priesthood, that permission is not rescinded unless there are witnesses that she was defiled.

I.e., watchmen who will observe her and prevent her from being raped by her captors. Although she did not enjoy this protection beforehand, we grant it to her at present.

For testimony delivered by two witnesses establishes a halachic reality which must be reckoned with.

The Chelkat Mechokek 7:9 and the Beit Shmuel 7:12 state that even if the witness came after she was given license to marry into the priesthood, but before she actually married, his testimony is of no consequence and the license is not rescinded. This applies even if witnesses had also come and testified that she had been held captive.

The Chelkat Mechokek 7: 11 quotes the Ritbah who maintains that this ruling applies even if the rumor was substantiated in court. As long as there is not actually testimony, her status remains unchanged.

As is his right until she reaches maturity [Hilchot Ishut 3: 11 (see also 9: 10)].

And she is forbidden to marry into the priesthood.

For his word is accepted only as long as the matter is in his hands (see Kiddushin 64a).

Since he has the right to consecrate her and effect her divorce, his word is accepted with regard to her status.

The Beit Shmuel 7:15 explains that we do not accept his word based on the principle of miggo. To explain: one might think that since the father’s word would be accepted were he to claim that he consecrated her and had her divorced, we accept his word if he claims that she was taken captive, for had he desired to lie, he could have claimed that she was divorced. We do not follow that argument, because the statement that she was taken captive involves a more encompassing prohibition, causing her to be forbidden to partake of terumah as well as being forbidden to marry a priest.

I.e., the prohibition was instituted because we suspect that she was defiled. The Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 7) states that, based on the Rambam’s statements, if there are witnesses that the woman was defiled, this leniency is not granted.

And see that the couple do not engage in intimacy.

This ruling (as continued in the following three halachot) reflects the Rambam’s interpretation of Ketubot 27b. There are several other interpretations of that passage. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 7:10) quotes the Rambam’s view, but also that of dissenting authorities. See also Hilchot Ma‘achalot Assurot 12:24 which states a ruling dependent on the same passage.

See Halachah 17.

Even if the woman admits that she did not escape or hide, her word is accepted, based on the principle of miggo. As stated in the following halachah, had she desired to lie, instead of saying merely that she was not molested, she could have claimed to have escaped or have hidden.

See the Chelkat Mechokek 7:15 which states that the Rambam’s words imply that the woman must come to court and make these statements to be granted license to marry into the priesthood. He also mentions Rabbenu Nissim’s view that does not require this measure, but instead permits all women in these situations to marry into the priesthood automatically.

As mentioned above, there are opinions that differ and maintain that even when the battalion is from another country, the women are forbidden.

The Kessef Mishneh maintains that even when the conquering army is from another country, if they remain in the city for a longer period, the women are forbidden to marry into the priesthood. We suspect that since there was no immediate pressure to flee, the soldiers may have raped the local women.

As are any women taken captive by gentiles as stated above.

Since our Sages forbade women taken captive, that prohibition is universally enforced, regardless of the length of time the women were in captivity (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., we do not suspect that she was raped, because the gentiles will fear to rape her lest they be forced to forfeit the money owed them [Ramah (Even HaEzer 7:11)]. These laws apply not only to jails, but instances when women are held captive by men for other reasons.

I.e., we fear that she was raped by her jailers.

If, however, the husband is an Israelite, there is no prohibition. We do not fear that the woman would try to save her life by seducing her jailers or accepting their advances. Were that to be the case, the relations would be considered voluntary and thus she would be prohibited to her husband.
The Rambam’s ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 7:11). The Rama quotes the opinion of Rabbenu Asher and other Ashkenazic authorities who maintain that a woman would be forbidden to even an Israelite husband for the reasons stated above. He does, however, mention more lenient views.

The commentaries question if these laws apply with regard to contemporary prison conditions when it is less likely for the prison staff to ravage women held under their jurisdiction.

Halachah 17.

I.e., the women mentioned in Chapter 17, Halachah 1.

The fact that he engaged in forbidden relations does not detract from the essential holiness endowed to him by his priestly lineage.

For the spiritual blemish brought about by the forbidden relations has an effect regardless of her intent or lack of it.

For only when the male and the female are these respective ages are, their relations considered significant.

Note the contrast to the following halachah. Although a non-virgin is forbidden only on the basis of a positive commandment (Chapter 17, Halachah 13), offspring from such a relationship are challalim.

Needless to say, a divorcee may not marry a priest. The Rambam is emphasizing that if she is divorced, in addition to the prohibition of a divorcee, she is also prohibited as a challalah.

For as Ketubot I la states, a woman who is divorced after marriage is considered as if she has engaged in relations. The Chelkat Mechokek 7:23 and the Beit Shmuel 7:36 discuss this ruling, mentioning views that differ slightly.

For after the fact, he is allowed to remain married to such a woman, as stated in Chapter 1 7, Halachah 15.

For the prohibition forbidding her to him applies only within the context of marriage (Chapter 17, Halachah 2). Although he performs a transgression for entering into intimacy without the intent of marriage (see Hilchot Ishut 1 :4), that prohibition is not restricted to the priesthood and the offspring are deemed challalim only when the prohibition against the relations is exclusive to the priesthood.

Chapter 18, Halachah 1.

Since she became a zonah, the prohibition against relations with her is exclusive to the priesthood.

Chapter 18, Halachah 2. For the relations do involve a transgression.

I.e., relations with a zonah.

For these women are forbidden exclusively to the priesthood, as stated in Chapter 18, Halachah 3.

Even if they are conceived during the first time the couple engage in relations [Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 7: 14)]. The rationale is that even before the priest engages in relations with such women, they are deemed as zonot.

As Kiddushin 77a states, the determination of whether a child is deemed as a challal or not depends on whether it was conceived through a transgression or not. The mother’s status at the time of birth is not significant.

In Chapter 1 7, Halachah 7.

Relatives forbidden by Rabbinic decree as listed in Hilchot Ishut 1:6.

See Chapter 18, Halachah 4.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 7:20) quotes the Rambam’s ruling. The Tur and the Rama state that the same laws apply to a woman who underwent a chalitzah ceremony of questionable validity. Based on the distinction between such a woman and a woman whose status as· a divorcee is questionable which the Rambam makes in Chapter 17, Halachah 7, the Beit Shmuel 7:40 maintains that the Rambam would not accept such an addition.

See Chapter 17, Halachah 12.

Otherwise, there is a possibility that he will be violating prohibitions of Scriptural origin.

Lest he is an Israelite to whom this is forbidden. See Hilchot Terumah 6:7.

Lest he is a priest to whom this is forbidden.

The prohibition against contact with a corpse.

Chapter 18, Halachah 3.

I.e., those forbidden to the priesthood (Maggid Mishneh). See, however, Halachah 21 and notes.

See Chapter 15, Halachah 7.

Kiddushin 78b states that after the destruction of the Temple, the priests accepted this stringency upon themselves.

Note the Beit Yosef (Even HaEzer 7), the Chelkat Mechokek 7:29 and the Beit Shmuel 7:42 who note that the Rambam requires the girl to be both conceived and born within the Jewish people.

Who is forbidden to marry a native-born Jewess (Chapter 12, Halachah 18).

Who is likewise forbidden (ibid.: 19).

Chapter 18, Halachah 3. As Yevamot 36a states, the women themselves may not marry a priest, but their daughters may.

For a female Ammonite is permitted and a third generation Egyptian is permitted.

We have not used the term grandson or great-grandson, because if a female descendant is involved, the next generation are not challalim.

Neither the son, nor the daughter are considered challalim.

E.g., there is no restriction against a priest marrying the daughter of a Levite or an Israelite.

Thus in the instance mentioned in the previous note, the offspring would be considered as priests.

I.e., neither a Levite nor a challal.

Thus the offspring of a Levite are Levites and the offspring of challalim are challalim.

The Rambam is stating that it is not necessary to investigate thoroughly the lineage of a family before marrying into them. If it is a common presumption that a family is of acceptable lineage, one may marry a family member at the outset. When we know nothing of the lineage of the family, there are some authorities [Remo as quoted by the Tur (Even HaEzer 2)] who maintain that we do question his lineage and require proof that he is acceptable. Others (Rabbenu Asher and Rabbenu Nissim) differ and maintain that even if we do not know anything about a family’s lineage, we assume that they are acceptable. See the discussion of the issue by Beit Shmuel 2:3.
The debate concerns the practice in the Talmudic age and in subsequent eras when Jewish observance was strong. At present, particularly in contemporary communities when there are many non-observant Jews and non-halachic divorce and similar problems are rampant, it is customary for Rabbinic courts to be careful and investigate the lineage of people before performing a marriage.

As mentioned in the notes to Chapter 12, Halachah 23, as related in II Samuel, ch. 21, there was a famine for three years in Eretz Yisrael. Through prophetic vision, David learned that the reason for the famine was Saul’s oppression of the Gibeonites (exactly what Saul did to oppress them is a matter of discussion among the Rabbis). David asked the Gibeonites what they desired to be appeased for this oppression. They answered that they wanted to slay seven of his descendants. David handed over seven of Saul’s descendants to them and they hung them and left their corpses on the gallows. For this act of cruelty, David decreed that they should never marry among the Jewish people.

Joshua, Chapter 9, relates that after the Jews’ conquest of Jericho and Ai, the inhabitants of Gibeon:
Acted cunningly ... They took old sacks upon their donkeys, old and rent wine bottles ... old, worn and patched shoes ... and came to Joshua at Gilgal. They told him: ... “We have come from a distant country. Therefore, make a covenant with us.” Joshua made a covenant with them ... and the princes of the congregation swore to them.
After the ruse was discovered, Joshua and the people honored the covenant and allowed the Gibeonites to live. Moreover, they even came to their defense when they were attacked by other Canaanite nations.

The Beit Shmuel 2:6 cites the opinion of Rashi (Kiddushin 76a) which maintains that even if the two people cast aspersions on the family’s lineage without delivering formal testimony, such investigations must be made.

We are not concerned that a servant intermingled among them, for even if a servant did conceive a child with a woman from a priestly family, the child is acceptable. Our suspicion is that one of the priests had relations with a maid-servant and she bore him a son or daughter who was raised as a member of the priest’s family (Chelkat Mechokek 2:2).

See Halachah 21 and notes which discuss whether a woman is required to make such an investigation or not.

I.e., the obligation is to check the lineage of four women: her mother, the mother of her maternal grandfather, her paternal grandmother, and the paternal grandmother of her paternal grandfather. Nevertheless, to verify the acceptability of the lineage of these women, it is necessary to verify that their mothers are also of acceptable lineage, thus reaching a total of eight (Rabbenu Nissim). Diagram

I.e., one must add the mother of her maternal grandmother and the maternal grandmother of her paternal grandmother (Merkevet HaMishneh).

I.e., after the blemish was mentioned in quarrels, it would become a matter of public knowledge and investigated accordingly.

Hence, their blemished lineage would not be public knowledge.

The Rambam’s statements (based on his interpretation of Kiddushin 76b) have attracted the attention of the commentaries who raise a basic question: The prohibition against marrying an unacceptable partner (e.g., a mamzer) applies equally to men and women (see Chapter 1, Halachah 1 ). Why then is a woman not warned with regard to this matter?
The Maggid Mishneh (quoting Rashi’s commentary to Kiddushin 76a) states that here, the Rambam’s intent is that since the Torah did not forbid a woman of the priestly family from marrying a challal, our Sages did not require a woman to make an investigation even when there is a question whether her future husband is entirely unacceptable.
According to Rashi who interprets “disputing a family’s lineage” (Halachah 18) as merely casting aspersions, this interpretation is tenable. After all, we have no hard and fast evidence that the man’s lineage is unacceptable. But according to the Rambam, who defines that term as referring to testimony delivered in court, the original question remains. Since there is a firm possibility that a Scriptural prohibition is involved, why shouldn’t a woman be required to make an investigation?
Among the resolutions offered is that of the Chelkat Mechokek 2:5 is that the Rambam would require an investigation even when a woman desires to marry. Nevertheless, the investigation need not include all of the eight (or ten) women mentioned by the Rambam. Such thoroughness is required only when a man seeks to marry.
See the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh to Halachah 18 and the Chelkat Mechokek 2:3 which cite differing opinions which also require a woman to make a full-fledged investigation of the lineage of a man she desires to marry if there are questions concerning his lineage.

We assume that he would not remain silent when his lineage is slurred unless there were some truth to the assertions.
The Ra’avad states that the Rambam’s statement (taken from Ketubot 14b) held true only in the Talmudic era when a person who insulted a colleague’s lineage was placed under a ban of ostracism. Hence when a person remained silent instead of appealing to the court, we could assume that he was admitting to the accuser’s assertion. In the present era, by contrast, there is no punishment given for making such slurs. Hence, the insulted person would have no benefit in bringing the matter to the court’s attention. Accordingly, it is preferable to remain silent.
The Ramban and the Rashba explain that the Rambam’s words apply with regard to a family concerning which there already exist doubts with regard to their lineage. When, by contrast, their lineage is considered unblemished, it is preferable for them to remain silent. Rabbenu Nissim states that the insulted person’s silence is considered significant only when it is common for him to protest other matters. If, however, he usually remains silent, the fact that he does so in this situation as well is of no consequence. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 2:4) quotes the Rambam’s words and the Rama quotes the latter views.

As explained in Halachot 18-19. The investigation is sufficient to clarify any difficulties, for the suspicion created by his silence is not a more serious factor than the testimony of the witnesses mentioned in Halachah 18 (Maggid Mishneh ).

I.e., there is a report that a man of questionable status married into a family, but the identity of that man and that of his wife are not known.

One might think that because of the multiple doubt involved the woman would be permitted at the outset. Nevertheless, because of the stringency of the laws of proper lineage, this leniency is not taken.

And, as is stated in Chapter 18, Halachah 1, a woman who engaged in relations with a challal is forbidden to the priesthood.

Since there is a multiple doubt (sefek sefeikah ), the woman is permitted.

I.e., both widows and daughters (Kessef Mishneh).

I.e., the first clause applies to one whose status as a mamzer questionable and the second clause to whose unacceptable status is definite (Kessef Mishneh ).
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Caro mentions opinions that rule more stringently and forbid marriage even when there is a report that a person about whom a question was raised whether or not he is a mamzer married into a family. In his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 2:5), however, he quotes the Rambam’s view.

Chapter 18, Halachah 1.

When the priests do not serve in the Temple and there is no Sanhedrin to verify their lineage.

I.e., they are regarded as priests by people at large even though there is no definite proof of their lineage.

I.e., in contrast to sacrificial meat which may be eaten only in the Temple courtyard or within the city of Jerusalem, depending on the type of sacrifice involved.

As explained in Halachah 3, in the present age, the mitzvah of terumah has the status of a Rabbinic commandment. As reflected by the commentaries to Hilchot Terumah 2:1, according to the Rambam, Scriptural Law requires us to separate terumah from all types of produce usually eaten by humans. The mitzvah does not apply only to the grain, grapes, and olives singled out by Deuteronomy 18:4.

Note the Maggid Mishneh who elaborates, explaining that although generally, the testimony of one witness is sufficient with regard to issues involving Scriptural prohibitions, an exception is made with regard to terumah.

See the conclusion of the tractate of Middot and Hilchot Bi’at HaMikdash 6:11, which describes the manner in which the lineage of the priests was checked.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 2: 1.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Bikkurim 5:5,7, in the Biblical era, there was a distinction between the mitzvah of challah as observed in Eretz Yisrael and as observed in the Diaspora. For according to Scriptural Law, the mitzvah applies only in Eretz Yisrael.

The continuation of the verse describes the mitzvah to separate challah.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Terumah 1 :26 and Hilchot Beit HaBechirah 6: 16, after the conquest of Eretz Yisrael by Assyrians and the Babylonians, the sanctity of the land was nullified and there was no obligation to keep the agricultural laws of Eretz Yisrael. When Ezra led the people back to Eretz Yisrael after the 70 years of the Babylonian exile, the majority of the people did not accompany him. (Moreover, he did not conquer the land.) Hence, his sanctification of Eretz Yisrael was not sufficient to meet the requirements of Scriptural Law. Nevertheless, he and his court ruled that those mitzvot should be observed as a Rabbinic ordinance.
This reflects the Rambam’s view. Although other Rishonim (Ra’avad, Rav Moshe HaCohen) differ and maintain that Ezra’s settlement of the land was sufficient to sanctify it according to Scriptural Law, the Rambam’s approach is accepted by most authorities.

The Rambam maintains that the laws regarding terumah and the tithes are derived from those applying to challah (Kessef Mishneh to Hilchat Terumah I :26).

In the Talmudic era - as is still the practice in certain communities - when a person was given an aliyah, he would read the Torah himself, rather than have it read for him by others.

Although all of these practices are signs of the priesthood, we do not consider them as conclusive evidence of a priest’s lineage.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s words could be interpreted to mean that the child is considered a priest with regard to marriage. Nevertheless, he does not possess the advantage of being considered of established lineage unless testimony is given.

The father’s statement is, however, sufficient to have him considered as a priest with regards to matters applicable in the present age, as stated in Halachah 10.

More precisely, that they are the sons borne him by his deceased wife.

And his daughters fit to marry priests.

And did not pay attention to the fact the person was described as a priest.

E.g., the sheep exchanged in place of a donkey, the first shearing of a sheep, and the like.

This refers even to terumah mandated by Scriptural Law. Ketubot 25b explains that this ruling is based on the principle of miggo. If the priest desired to transgress, he could feed his son terumah without having him declared a priest. See also Halachah 3.

To be given an aliyah first and to bless the people.

For the testimony of one witness is effective.

And there is room to suspect that each is lying on the other’s behalf.

If a Levi did not read after him, the fact that he read first is not significant. For perhaps there were no priests present and an Israelite was called instead or he was given the honor because of his stature as a Torah scholar.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the above are forbidden him, because - as stated in Halachah 9 - when an observer sees a person performing such acts, he may consider that person a priest.
Rav Moshe Cohen and the Rama (Even HaEzer 3:1) maintain that, in the present era, it is customary to accept a person’s word if he claims to be a priest. For the only serious problem with regard to observance is partaking of terumah and we do not separate terumah in the present age. Note the Chelkat Mechokek 3:1 who raises questions regarding the license for this person to recite the Priestly Blessing. See also the Maggid Mishneh who mentions that this custom was also practiced in his era. He strongly protests against it, calling it “an erroneous custom.”

Since he considers himself a priest, it is as if he has taken a vow not to perform these activities.

The commentaries have questioned this statement, for it has not been formally established that the person is a priest. Nevertheless, since he considers himself a priest, as far as he is concerned, the warning given him will be have been of substance and the punishment deserved. Hence he is given the lashes. The woman is not given lashes, for as far as she is concerned, the matter is not definitely established (Maggid Mishneh).

Hence if another priest engages in relations with her, he is not given lashes. Her offspring are also challalim of questionable status and her daughter may not marry into the priesthood (Maggid Mishneh; Chelkat Mechokek 3:3).

He is allowed to partake of terumah mandated by Rabbinic decree, for his statements are given the weight of the testimony of one witness.

This is proof that he was not a servant, for servants are not taught the Torah (Tosafot, Ketubot 26a).

Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi.

Generally, for testimony to be valid, the person observing the matter must be acceptable as a witness. In this instance, however, formal testimony is not required. Hence leniency is shown. (See Hilchot Edut 14:3).

This applies even if there are no rumors that the person’s mother is not acceptable (Maggid Mishneh). The Chelkat Mechokek 3:9 quotes other authorities who are more lenient.

We are not speaking about mere hearsay, but a rumor that is substantiated by the court.

For the testimony of one witness is powerful enough to negate the rumor.

Because the testimony of one witness is of no consequence in the face of the testimony of two witnesses.

The fact that the two witnesses do not testify at the same time is not significant (Hilchot Edut 4:4).

I.e., the intent is that once two witnesses give testimony in court, their statement is given the weight of established fact and needs no further corroboration. Since the statements of the two pairs of witnesses contradict each other, they are both nullified. Nevertheless, the statements of the witnesses who testify that he is acceptable also have the power to nullify the rumor.

The Maggid Mishneh mentions that there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis if he is considered acceptable only with regard to terumah mandated by Rabbinic Law or also with regard to terumah mandated by Scriptural Law. The Beit Shmuel 3:14 states that the Rambam is also referring to terumah mandated by Rabbinic Law.

A woman is required to wait for such an interim so that the lineage of her children will be established definitively.

I.e., as infants, the identity of the children became confused and the doubt was never clarified.

They are not given lashes, because it is not certain that they violated a Scriptural commandment. They should, however, be given “stripes for rebellious conduct,” because of their disregard of the restrictions the Rabbis placed upon them [Perisha (Even HaEzer 3)].

This term refers to the state of acute morning that applies immediately after the death of one's close relative. See Hilchot Evel 4:6.

Yevamot 100b notes a difficulty in the use of the plural in both this and the following clause. Since the ordinary way the mother of this priest could have married a second priest is when her first husband died, how is it possible to speak about the son mourning for that first husband or that first husband mourning for him?
The Talmud answers that this is speaking about a situation where the mother thought she was consecrated to the first husband, but in fact was not. This is not considered a licentious relationship warranting the stringencies mentioned in the following halachah. A formal divorce, however, is not required and hence the woman may marry another priest.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that according to the Rambam, one can also interpret the passage as referring to a woman whose father died in her childhood and who was married by Rabbinic decree. Until she attains majority, she may dissolve that marriage through the rite of mi’un. In such an instance, a formal divorce is not required. If she conceives a child, dissolves her marriage, and then marries another priest, the situation mentioned in this halachah may apply.

For perhaps that person is his father. Rashi (Yevamot, loc. cit.) interprets this statement as referring to the restrictions placed upon priests for aninut. Since it is possible that the person who died is his father, he should not risk the violation of a Scriptural commandment. With regard to the customs concerning aninut mentioned in Hilchot Evel (one of them being that one does not perform any of the Torah’s mitzvot), by contrast, Kinat Eliyahu raises a question: Should one refrain from performing a mitzvah because perhaps the person who died was his father?

For perhaps he is their son.

There is a Scriptural prohibition against a priest becoming impure. That prohibition does not apply when one is certain that the person who died is one’s relative. In this instance, however, neither the father nor son is certain.

The priests were divided into 24 watches. Each one would serve in the Temple for a week in a cycle of rotation (Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 4:3). This priest has the right to serve during the week allotted to both of the individuals suspected of being his father.

In this instance, we are speaking of expropriating property (a share in the sacrifices) from the other priests. Hence we follow the principle: When a person seeks to expropriate property, the burden of proof is upon him.

Each priestly watch was divided into seven batei av, family groupings, who would serve in the Temple one day of the seven (Hilchot K’lei HaMikdash 4:11).

For he is certainly entitled to one portion.

Yevamot, loc. cit., explains that this interpretation is not of Scriptural origin. Instead, the law is a Rabbinic decree. Our Sages, however, found a Biblical verse that supported their ruling.

Because all the individuals suspected of being his father were priests.

For he is definitely a priest and must observe the prohibitions applicable to them.