Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

For a person’s body is not considered to be his own possession, but God’s. And one may not damage God’s property.

I.e., delivers a blow that does not draw blood or cause any internal injury.

Some commentaries have explained that this modifier was added to differentiate between an instance when Torah law requires that lashes be administered to a person. Even if a person does not abide by Torah law, we are forbidden to strike him, except when instructed to do so by a court.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 300) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 595) consider this to be one of the Torah’s 613 commandments. In the Mishneh Torah, the Rambam lists this prohibition in Hilchot Sanhedrin.
See the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 420:1), who writes that a person who strikes a colleague is subject to a ban of ostracism. While he is under this ban, he should not be counted as part of a minyan.

The Sifre comments on this verse: If a negative commandment applies when a blow is added after it was a mitzvah to give blows, surely it applies when there is no such mitzvah. This concept is quoted by the Rambam (Hilchot Sanhedrin 16:12).

This concept is derived from Moses’ statement (Exodus 2:13): “He said to the wicked man: “Why do you strike your colleague?” Our Rabbis explain that although the man had not struck his colleague yet, the Torah still calls him wicked.

As mentioned above (Chapter 4, Halachah 9), a person should receive lashes whenever he strikes a colleague. Nevertheless, because of the general principle that a person never receives both financial and corporal punishment, he is obligated to make financial restitution rather than be lashed. In this instance, however, since there is no financial penalty, he should be lashed.

The Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 420) questions why the Rambam mentions a servant belonging to a colleague. Seemingly, the same law would apply to a servant belonging to a person himself. Kin’at Eliyahu explains that a person may strike a servant he owns as a reprimand. Therefore, it is preferable to illustrate the concept by mentioning a servant belonging to another person.

Halachah 1 spoke of the prohibition as involving striking a Jew. This halachah mentions that, in this context, a servant is included in that category. It is also forbidden to strike a gentile unnecessarily, but punishment is not administered for such an act.

Moses smote the Egyptian because he had been beating a Jewish laborer without a valid reason.

Although this oath is required by the Rabbis, it is administered while the person is holding a Torah scroll (or in certain cases, tefillin).

As the Rambam continues to explain, the intent is not that the witnesses observed the injury being inflicted. If that were the case, there would be no need for an oath.

According to Scriptural Law, since there are no witnesses to the actual injury, the defendant would not be held liable if he denied the claim. Nevertheless, our Sages gave the injured person the above privilege in the hope of discouraging violence.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s choice of wording, for he does not consider this a “penalty,” but rather a proper judgment, for it is unlikely that a person would injure himself. The Maggid Mishneh explains the Rambam’s position: Since Scriptural Law would not require such a payment, the privilege awarded the injured is a “penalty” for the accused.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 90:16) state that if a third party is present, but it is clear to the witnesses that the third party did not inflict the injury, no oath is necessary.

If there was a contusion in such a place, an oath is required. For it is possible that the injured person knocked his back against a protruding object to cause the contusion.

In this instance, the circumstantial evidence is significant enough to incriminate the accused.

I.e., his admission is not considered significant, because even if he had not made the admission, he would have been obligated to pay on the basis of the testimony of the witnesses and the plaintiff’s oath.
Generally, when a person admits his culpability for a k’nas and then witnesses testify, he is not liable. Hence, since it is the defendant’s admission and not the testimony of the witnesses that requires the defendant to pay, one might think that he also is not liable. A distinction can, be made, however, because in this instance the plaintiff lodged the claim on the basis of the testimony of the witnesses. See Prishah (the conclusion of Choshen Mishpat 90).

The Rambam’s rationale is that a person will never voluntarily accept damages or pain, even if he is given fair recompense for them. Therefore, he always receives less than their value. Moreover, pain does not represent any financial loss to the injured. As such, these two assessments are considered to be k’nasot (“fines” or “penalties”) (Or Sameach). As stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8, when a person’s culpability for a k’nas is dependent on his own admission, he is not liable.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling and maintains that since fair assessments are made with regard to these damages, they are considered to be mammon, a financial obligation, and not k’nasot. The Maggid Mishneh supports the Ra’avad’s objections in this instance.

This is the law applicable to anyone who denies a claim issued by a plaintiff.

Any lasting marks that cause embarrassment are considered part of the nezek, the payment for damages. Here we are speaking of embarrassment that comes as a result of the act of causing the injury. For together with the physical pain of the injury, there come feelings of shame that others become conscious that such an injury was inflicted by a given individual.
Nevertheless, when comparing the Rambam’s words here with his statements in Chapter 2, Halachah 2, there is a slight difficulty. For in that halachah, there is some indication that the person should be recompensed for the shame of the wound itself.

I.e., when the defendant admits in court that he injured the plaintiff, the plaintiff will suffer embarrassment from having the judges hear of the injury.

Although the Rambam rules in Chapter 3, Halachah 5 that a person is not liable for damaging a person with words, a distinction can be made between the two instances. In the previous instance, all that is involved is verbal statements, and there is therefore no liability. Here, although it is the verbal statement that causes the deed to become public knowledge, the defendant is being held liable for a deed that he committed.

For personal suffering can never be atoned for by mere financial payment.
See Rashi (Bava Kama 92a) and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 422), who single out the pain and the embarrassment as the elements that cannot be atoned for by financial payment, and require a request for forgiveness. There is a certain logic to that conception, for the damages, medical expenses and unemployment compensations are basically financial matters, not very different from damage to property. It is the pain and the embarrassment that affect the person’s feelings.

A region in Eretz Yisrael, renowned for its choice rams. See Isaiah 60:7.

Atonement for sins between man and his fellow man involve not only offering financial payment, but appeasing the person who was wronged. See Hilchot Teshuvah 2:9.

Bava Kama, loc. cit., derives this concept from the narrative (Genesis, Chapter 20) in which God tells Avimelech to placate Abraham and ask Abraham to pray on Avimelech’s behalf. God was emphasizing that Avimelech’s atonement could not be achieved until Abraham was willing to forgive him.

For Jews are by nature merciful, humble and doers of kindness (Yevamot 79a).

From the Rambam’s words, one may infer that if one feels that the person’s first request is not genuine, one may withhold forgiveness until a second request is made. See also Hilchot Teshuvah 2:9, which implies that a person’s teacher has the right to withhold forgiveness from him until he asks for forgiveness repeatedly, to teach him the importance of such conduct.

See Hilchot Teshuvah 2:10, which elaborates on the importance of granting forgiveness, and on how the failure to do so is a sign that one does not share in the heritage of the Jewish people.

We assume that he made his statement facetiously, without really expecting his colleague to injure him.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 421:12) quote the opinion of Rabbenu Asher, that if the injured person explicitly tells the person causing the injury that he will not hold him liable, he is not liable. According to this perspective, when is the person who causes the injury liable? When he asked the injured person, “Will you hold me liable if I injure you?”, and the injured person said: “No.” In such a situation, we can assume that the remark was made facetiously, and he did not imagine that his colleague would actually injure him. When, however, he explicitly gave his colleague permission to injure him, the colleague is not liable.

In this instance as well, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 380:1) share a more lenient perspective and maintain that even if the owner of the property does not explicitly tell him to damage it, as long as he indicates he is willing to free the person who causes the damage of liability, that person is not liable.

We assume that his intent was “You may cause the damage, but must pay me its worth” (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 380:3).

In such an instance, he already accepted the responsibility for returning the article to its owner intact, and he is liable if the article is destroyed through his negligence.

Only such an explicit stipulation can free a watchman from the responsibility he accepted.

Even though the owner did not explicitly stipulate that he would not be held liable. The rationale is that the person who caused the damages never accepted any responsibility with regard to the article, and he did no more than follow its owner’s instructions.

For rather than listening to the instructions of the instigator, he should have followed the rules of the Torah, which prohibit causing wanton destruction. See Kiddushin 42b.

The Rambam is referring to the prohibition (Leviticus 19:14): “Do not put a stumbling block in front of the blind,” which our Sages interpret as a warning against giving people improper advice.