Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Hilchot Na’arah Betulah 1:13 derives this concept as follows:
[Exodus 21:22] states: “If there will not be a [fatal] accident, he shall be punished.” Implied is that if there is a [fatal) accident, no punishment shall be levied.... [Leviticus 24:21] says: “A person who [fatally] strikes an animal shall reimburse [its owner] for it, and one who [fatally] strikes a man must die.” Just as Scripture did not distinguish between intentional and unintentional action for killing an animal to make him liable for payment, so too, it did not distinguish between intentional and unintentional action for killing a person to free him from financial obligation.

I.e., that involves capital punishment, even though the person will not actually receive this penalty.

And therefore will not receive capital punishment.

Ketubot 32b derives this concept from the exegesis of Deuteronomy 25:2-3. The interpretation of that passage emphasizes that the transgressor is liable for only one type of punishment, and that lashing takes precedence over the financial penalty.

In both these instances, he is not punished by lashing even though his deed warrants it.

The Rambam mentions the loss of the wallet because if it were not lost or destroyed, the thief would be required to return it (Sanhedrin 72a). When it is destroyed, however, the thief is not required to make restitution, even of the principal.
From the Rambam’s wording, the Maggid Mishneh concludes that even if the article was not lost at the time of the theft, but afterwards, the thief is not liable. The Ramban and Rav Meir HaLevi differ and maintain that if it is lost afterwards, the thief is liable. Note Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 351:1). (See also Chapter 9, Halachah 13 and notes.)

Propelling the arrow beyond four cubits and taking out the wallet violate the prohibition against transferring articles from one domain to another. Setting fire to the grain heap violates the prohibition against kindling a fire.

By lifting up the wallet, he performs a kinyan and is liable for stealing the article.

At this time, he violates the prohibition against transferring an article on the Sabbath.

All of these are prohibitions punishable by lashing.

For then he is not lashed.

If, however, he stole it during the week (and slaughtered it on the Sabbath) or stole it on the Sabbath in a manner in which a violation of the Sabbath laws is not involved at the time of the theft, he is liable for the double payment.

See Chapter 4, Halachah 10.

The Maggid Mishneh notes that the Talmud makes this statement within the context of the discussion of a minority opinion. He questions why the Rambam, who follows the majority opinion, quotes this phrase. Nevertheless, he offers a resolution.

The sale of an animal on the Sabbath or to a false deity is forbidden by Rabbinic decree, but not by Scriptural law.

For the death penalty that he incurs for the violation of the Sabbath takes precedence over the financial penalty.

Bava Kama 70b states that this refers to an instance where the thief threw the stolen animal from the domain of the original owner into the domain of the purchaser. Thus, he becomes liable for the violation of the Sabbath laws at the time when the animal comes to rest on the ground of the courtyard of the purchaser, the very same time when the sale takes effect.

Although the thief is responsible for the agent’s actions, that applies only with regard to the responsibility for the additional payment, and not for the liability for slaughtering on the Sabbath. In that context, we follow the general rule that a person is not liable for a transgression performed by his agent.

Chapter 2, Halachah 10.

Since the testimony of the one witness does not create a financial obligation, it is insignificant in this context. He is not even obligated to take an oath (Maggid Mishneh).

See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 2:8, which states this principle and defines a fine as any financial obligation that is less or more than the principal. The laws that follow are general principles that apply not only to the payment of four or fives times an animal’s worth, but to all cases involving fines.

I.e., three judges.

E. g., he made his admission to three judges when he met them in the marketplace.

Even if they are in the midst of the arbitration of a dispute.

One might think that since he admitted that he sold or slaughtered the animal before witnesses came, he would not be required to make the additional payment. The Rambam, however, does not accept this rationale. When the thief admits his guilt before witnesses come, we can assume that he is repenting, and therefore he is not required to pay any additional penalty. When, however, he admits his guilt after witnesses have testified that he stole, it is to his advantage. For he is not obligating himself further. Therefore, he is not absolved of a penalty.
This is the opinion of Rav, Bava Kama 75a. Shmuel differs and maintains that since he admitted liability for the higher penalty before the second pair of witnesses testified, he shall not be held liable. Although generally, when there is a difference of opinion between Rav and Shmuel with regard to matters of business law, the halachah follows Shmuel’s view, in this instance the Talmud records a debate of the later sages regarding Rav’s view, and therefore the halachah is decided accordingly.

The Perishah, Choshen Mishpat 350:2, states that this applies only when the second claim is brought in a different court. If, however, the claim was made in the same court, the admission to the first partner applies with regard to the second as well.

As stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:10, when a person who causes damage to a colleague’s property possesses movable property, it shall be expropriated for payment first, for it is generally easier to sell than landed property.

This statement explains why the Rambam placed the laws governing theft in his “Book of Damages.”

The laws pertaining to the sale and treatment of a Hebrew servant are discussed in Hilchot Avadim, Chapters 1-3.

Sotah 23b cites an allusion for this in Scripture, for when Exodus 22:2 speaks of a thief’s being sold, it mentions his theft. The Rambam, however, considers this merely to be an asmachta and maintains that the law was transmitted via the Oral Tradition.

As soon as he acquires these resources, he is required to pay.
See the Or Sameach, who states that the money that the servant owes is not collected from the ha’anakah, the bonus he receives after he completes his servitude.

The court sells a Hebrew servant for a six-year period. Therefore, it is possible that his value will be less than the amount of the theft. He is not sold by the court for a longer period. A Hebrew servant who sells himself may sell himself for a longer period (Hilchot Avadim 2:3).

I.e., the seventh year after he was sold. A Hebrew servant must work in the Sabbatical year. He is, however, freed by the advent of the Jubilee year (ibid.:2).

Since the court sells a Hebrew servant for only a six-year period, it is possible that his value will exceed the amount of the theft. He is not sold for a shorter period.

I.e., after having been sold for the first theft.

Before being sold for the first theft.

I.e., even if one thief possesses enough resources of his own to pay for the entire amount of the theft, he is required to pay only his share. If the second thief cannot pay his share, he is sold into servitude.

This may work to the thief’s advantage, because it is likely that he will be worth more than half the amount of theft.